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Abstract 
Roger Garaudy occupied a position at the centre of the debate with Louis Althusser, Lucien Sève and 
others over Marxist humanism within the French Communist Party. That, and his active participation 
in the Marxist–Christian dialogue, ensured that what he said, wrote and did was widely reported at 
the time. Even those who have continued to analyse the complex relationship between Marxism and 
Christianity rarely ignore his role.  
All this changed completely when he was expelled from the Party in 1970. His subsequent adoption 
of a project which was both Marxist and Christian lasted just a decade, compared to an intellectual 
and political life that stretched from before World War II until well into the 21st Century. This period 
of his intellectual life and the project that he undertook has attracted no specific study. There are 
several reasons for this neglect. Firstly, Marxist commentators were either still Communist Party 
members and sought only to make political capital out of his expulsion, or they were sympathetic to 
Garaudy, eager to demonstrate continuity in his work, and therefore not seeking to emphasise his 
work after he left the Party. Secondly, Christians were suspicious of a former Party member, especially 
given that his Christianity did not seem to fit conventional understanding. Thirdly, Garaudy’s populist 
style and ability to reach a mass audience distanced him from the academic world. Many of the central 
ideas of the project are scattered across different publications, and nowhere written up for academic 
publication. Then, after his conversion to Islam in 1982, his work was almost completely 
overshadowed by perceptions of his association with the Islamic world, especially after his conviction 
for Holocaust denial in 1998. The result is that Garaudy’s project has been largely lost to history, 
rejected by Marxists and Christians alike.  
This thesis by contrast focuses directly on the project itself, broadly covering his independent years 
between expulsion from the Party and his conversion. The result of this focus has been to uncover a 
very different and much more radical relationship between Marxism and Christianity within the 
project than Garaudy had ever evinced during his previous period as a Marxist humanist. Some 
elements of Garaudy’s previous Marxist humanism are retained, just as some are carried forward, if 
erratically, into his subsequent adherence to Islam. More importantly, however, for the Garaudy of 
the project, not only does Marxism need to be revised in political terms, but it also s tands in need of 
two key concepts directly derived from Christianity: subjectivity and transcendence. There is therefore 
a need for detailed examination of the meaning, significance and plausibility of both concepts within 
Garaudy’s project.  
What emerges from Garaudy’s project is a Marxism that appears very contemporary in its emphasis 
on the individual, its ecological politics, and in its insistence on the essential role of religion in human 
emancipation. The world has however moved on significantly since then. The next stage in the analysis 
of the project is therefore whether it still has relevance in the 21st Century, and to what extent. Others 
have developed a very different relationship between Marxism and Christianity, notably and in very 
different ways, Slavoj Žižek and Terry Eagleton. Their work is placed in the context of whether they 
have something to offer to improve Garaudy’s project. The assessment, however, is that neither of 
them has produced a better blueprint for the relationship between Marxism and Christianity than 
Garaudy had already offered. This is not to suggest that Garaudy’s project represents the last word. 
Other areas of thought and action that Garaudy left unexplored within the project, ethics in particular, 
are also considered as candidates for inclusion in a revised project.  
There is no doubt that Garaudy’s project was fragile — his subsequent trajectory proved it. Overall, 
however, the conclusion is very positive. In abandoning it, Garaudy threw away the key to how 
Christianity can provide a plausible basis on which to revise Marxism. Whilst recognising the import of 
his conversion, and condemning what followed, there is therefore good reason to take Garaudy’s 
project seriously in the contemporary world, and to revise it, as the basis on which an enduring and 
potentially successful relationship between Marxists and Christians can yet be built.  
Lay Summary 
 
Born in 1913, Roger Garaudy had a long and remarkable career as a public intellectual in France. First 
at the centre of Communist Party politics in France, where he was responsible for developing a 
significant amount of the Party’s policy towards culture and religion, only eventually to be expelled in 
1970 after conflicts with the Party hierarchy over such issues as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
He then spent a decade as an independent intellectual espousing both Marxism and Christianity. In 
1982 he converted to Islam, and remained a Muslim thereafter, his anti-Zionist stance leading him to 
prosecution for denying the Holocaust. At the time of his death in 2012 his former friends and 
colleagues on the Left in France had rejected him completely, whereas he enjoyed a high reputation 
as an Islamic thinker in countries such as Iran and Libya. 
Until he converted to Islam, Marxism and Christianity were Garaudy’s two principal interests, and as 
he himself said, his principal aim in life was to bring the two ends of the chain together. During his 
time within the French Communist Party, he led its contribution to the dialogue in the 1960s between 
the European Communist Parties and the Church, writing extensively on the common ground of faith 
in humanity and work for the future that he believed Marxism and Christianity shared. After he 
converted, however, his focus switched completely, and he became a dedicated and enthusiastic 
advocate of Islam. 
In between was the period after his expulsion from the French Communist Party, but before his 
conversion to Islam. In this time of independence he sought to develop what he called his ‘project’ to 
bring Marxism and Christianity together under one roof, to include not just the West but all humanity 
in the joint endeavour to create a new and better world that would be free of capitalism and set all 
people free. It is that period, which falls almost completely within the decade of the 1970s, that I focus 
on in this thesis. It is a period of his life that has been largely lost to history, ignored by Marxists and 
Muslims alike. 
Yet studying his work in that period uncovers a very different and much more radical relationship 
between Marxism and Christianity within the project than Garaudy had ever advocated during his 
previous period as a Marxist humanist. In particular, Garaudy seeks to take what he argues are 
essential ideas of Christianity, the importance of the individual — which he calls subjectivity — and 
the power to transform the world — which he calls transcendence — and use these twin ideas to 
breathe new life into Marxism.  
What emerges from Garaudy’s project is a very modern Marxism, with its emphasis on the individual, 
its ecological politics, and in its insistence on religion as central to human emancipation. Although 
other Marxist philosophers such as Slavoj Žižek and Terry Eagleton have also engaged with religion, it 
is certainly possible that Garaudy’s project represents a good, perhaps even the best, starting point 
for Marxism in today’s world. That is not to say that just as Garaudy sought to update Marxism, his 
project itself should not be itself updated: he missed out some important parts of any strategy to 
change the world, most notably ethics, and I have made some suggestions as to how his project can 
be improved.  
Garaudy himself found his project wanting. Belonging to a community like Islam in the end became 
more important to him than the lonely task of sketching out a way forward for Marxists and Christians. 
Yet in converting to Islam, not only did he put himself on an unfortunate personal trajectory, but he 
threw away what is at the very least an important contribution to the future of both Marxism and 
Christianity, and at the most, the key to their future successful relationship.   
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Chapter One: Why Roger Garaudy still matters 
 
 
Introduction — Marxism and Christianity 
 
This thesis sets out to analyse the project to establish the mutual dependence of Marxism and 
Christianity espoused, for a time, by a leading French intellectual of the 20th Century, Roger Garaudy: 
to take Garaudy’s project seriously as the basis of a future relationship between Marxism and 
Christianity. I believe that this investigation is of deep and persistent importance, for three reasons.  
First, I agree with one leading scholar of Marxism that religion is a deep and enduring part of 
humanity which is highly likely to continue at least into the near future (McLellan, 1987:5). This is 
despite the fact that pinning down a precise definition of religion has proved enduringly elusive. 
Religion is perhaps not unique in being gifted with almost as many definitions as there are people who 
have tried to define it (Smith, 1998: 281). Scholars have variously sort to define religion functionally, 
in terms of its capacity to meet fundamental social and individual human needs (Arnal, 2000:24–25), 
ostensively, by practices and demonstrations (Spiro, 1966:87), or by a set of beliefs, however different 
between religions (Spiro, 1966:91), e.g. in a particular supernatural ontology or in a code of ethics, a 
view which in particular I suggest could be better described as a faith. Perhaps, as has even been 
argued for many decades, the whole attempt to define religion should be given up not just an 
intractable problem, but as one without any kind of solution at all (Ferré, 1970:4; Braun, 2000).  I am 
not willing to go down this defeatist path, but the alternative does appear to me  to avoid insisting on 
one definition, but rather to recognise an ‘anti-essentialist, anti-hegemonic and multi-dimensional 
approach’ (Platvoet & Molendijk, 1999:ix) recognising the immense variety and complexity of religious 
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phenomena, and the need for an intersection of analysis from different perspectives and academic 
disciplines.  It may not therefore be necessary to reach a particular definition of religion.  
Difficulties of definition notwithstanding, there can be fewer issues of importance for the 
future of civilisation as a whole than the choice of religious faith and political ideology. Whether the 
claim that ‘At the core of every culture and every civilisation lies its religion’ (Swidler & Mojzes, 2000:1) 
is fair, it is certainly plausible to suggest that ‘if we wish to understand human life in general and our 
specific culture and history, it is vital to gain an understanding of religion and its role’ (Swidler & 
Mojzes, 2000:1). It does also seem right to observe that, at least in Western countries, ‘at times of 
political and economic turmoil, the Bible and theology become favoured zones for debate’ (Boer, 
2014:28). Moreover, Boer’s further point, that the rationalist anti-religious position of dogmatic 
atheists is indissolubly linked with a Western economic and political dominance that he alleges is being 
eclipsed (Boer, 2014:38), does at the very least place faith at centre stage in a combat between 
economic systems. At most it may eventually involve the identification of particular faiths with 
economic systems themselves, as Max Weber (1906 [2001]) argued. So, it is short-sighted for the Left 
to ignore, or worse, reject, religions, as this will result in the political Right exercising political 
domination within them. And indeed, arguably this has been exactly the trajectory of the Left in recent 
times, to a lesser or greater extent, as writers have tried to show for Australia (Maddox, 2005) and 
perhaps above all, the United States (George, 2008).  
Second, Christianity and Marxism were the two leading doctrines of the 20th Century West 
that promised a better life, whether in a spiritual or a temporal hereafter. So what shall I take for the 
meaning of ‘Christianity’? A religion: but without unanimity of belief, doctrine or practice: an almost 
Wittgensteinian-like ‘game’ with a multitude of different institutional settings over history. Certainly, 
‘a religion such as Christianity is not merely a collection of ideas and beliefs; it also includes social, 
institutional and economic elements, often difficult to separate clearly from one another’ (Boer, 
2014:168). To focus exclusively on the Bible as the exclusive revelation of God in the world, or on the 
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preoccupations of individual theologians, is a very different task than to study Christianity as a faith 
through history. Consequently, although it has often been theologians who have spoken for 
Christianity in the Marxist–Christian dialogue, or who have sought to adopt elements of Marxism, 
theology is only one part of Christianity. There is wider ground to be covered and I wish to include all 
those who identify as Christians: not only Catholics and Protestants of the main churches as part of 
Christianity, but those outside the main churches as well.  
Likewise, Marxism cannot — or at least I believe ought not — be reduced to Marx’s own 
thought as evidenced by the original Marxist texts and their interpretation. This is a contention for 
which there is support from at least one leading theological analysis of Marxism (Lash, 1981) as well 
as from many other scholars, both within and outside the Marxist tradition (e.g. Labedz, 1962; Girardi, 
1966; Kolakowski, 1981; Molyneux, 1983; Carver, 2011; Boer, 2019). Indeed, the words of Marx have 
even been described as ‘unimportant’ for Marxism (Turner, 1983:3), which may be regarded as 
understandable, given the diversity of Marxist thought and practice (Gouldner, 1980; Kolakowski, 
1981). It was Pope Paul VI who noted that whereas, for many, Marxism was class struggle, one-party 
rule and atheism, ‘At other times, finally, it presents itself in a more attenuated form, one also more 
attractive to the modern mind: as a scientific activity, as a rigorous method of examining social and 
political reality, and as the rational link, tested by history, between theoretical knowledge and the 
practice of revolutionary transformation’ (Pope Paul VI, 1971:33). At its core, however, what is 
generally understood is the capacity to understand history generally, the primacy of work, and 
perhaps above all, ‘the essentially transitory nature of capitalism1’ (Sève, 2004:8). 
In the 21st Century Christianity still retains its followers in the billions, whilst Marxism has 
largely retreated to the academy. Yet both doctrines remain of contemporary significance, although 
in the short term at least, it has been claimed, albeit perhaps contentiously, that ‘few would dispute 
that there is a better future for religion than for Marxism’  (McLellan, 1987:172). Whilst by the late 20th 
 
1 L’essence transitaire du capitalisme 
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Century it was already being argued that Marxism had become ‘as bewilderingly pluralistic as has 
Christianity’ (Lash, 1981:26), perhaps in the 21st Century it really is sufficient for a person to be ‘deeply 
inspired by Marx’ (Ojoy, 2001:343) or ‘to think with Marx’ (Sève, 2008:1) to be labelled a Marxist. At 
least in this sense, Marxism has proved more enduring than the regimes that professed to adhere to 
its tenets, albeit only in the academy, and even there, it is not widespread. But as one scholar who 
sought to be both a Christian and a Marxist was well qualified to remark, ‘fashion is no guide to truth’ 
(Collier, 2001:1). 
And what of the relationship between them, whIch has been described as ‘the tradition of 
engagement between Marxism and theology’ (Boer, 2014:28)?  Neither mutual amity nor enmity 
should be presumed. To start with two analogies. Roland Boer says that: 
‘I have come to see the relation between Marxism and theology as a difficult and tempestuous 
love affair, with a good mix of lust, affection, argument and profound differences of opinion.  
Even though they may go their own way for years at a time, they always return to renew their 
engagement’ (Boer, 2014: xi). 
I see their historical relationship somewhat more conventionally as two wary boxers in the 
ring: familiar opponents, each seeking to land a knock-out blow, but never succeeding, at the most 
hoping for the end of the match when they might put aside their enmity, but with a fickle audience 
that leans first this way, then that (significantly, there are only two parties  in Boer's metaphor), 
occasionally applauding both sides as blows rain in, yet increasingly otherwise preoccupied during the 
match.  
Such a view is not uncommon: from the Philippines comes the ‘recognition of a perception of 
mutual antagonism’ (Ojoy, 2001:1), echoing the view that for the most part it has been a relationship 
between ‘two mutually hostile social forces’ (Hornosty, 1976:1),  as  
‘since its inception Marxism has appeared to be the very antithesis of Christianity. It seemed 
clear that its atheism scorned God and religion. Its materialism denied the soul and after-life. 
Its determinism negated free will. Its revolutionary strategy promoted class antagonisms and 
violent overthrow of the state. Its socialism would take away the right to private property, 
and with it, all incentive to work’ (McGovern, 1980:1).  
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So, it was ‘this mutual regard for one another as a deadly virus that enabled the Christian–Marxist 
dialogue to have its own history of being repudiated in both camps’ (Ojoy, 2001:4). There even seemed 
to be an unbridgeable gulf between a critical theology and what has been characterised as ‘the critique 
of heaven and earth as projected by Karl Marx’ (Van Leeuwen, 1974:262). Whilst one author could 
suggest that the dialogue ‘remains a permanent fixture on the horizon of mankind’s hopes’ (Vree, 
1974:50), another observed more soberly that ‘there must be a reconciliation, or both will perish’ 
(Lauer, 1968:48). To put it more mildly, ‘The mutual suspicion of an irreducible atheism on one side 
and complicity with the rulers of the world on the other have not helped matters’ (Boer, 2007:4). 
Cholvy & Hilaire (1988) went further, and blamed ‘the love affair of many radical Catholics with 
Marxism’ (McLeod, 2007:11), amongst other factors, for the decline of the Catholic church, not just in 
France but globally. ‘The results included bitter internal divisions, a weakening of the rhythms and 
disciplines of Catholic life, and disillusion when the unrealistic hopes of those years inevitably came to 
nothing’ (McLeod, 2007:11; Cholvy & Hilaire, 1988: 287–330). The persistence of the Catholic faith 
and the eclipse of liberation theology in Latin American countries might suggest that it may be unwise 
to base any policy on this argument, but it is evidently both sincerely held and worth consideration.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that if adherents of these two very significant sets of 
ideas could never work together on anything other than the most temporary basis  of dialogue or an 
uneasy, temporary alliance possible, and that any closer relationship could only be harmful to either 
or both, then the prospect of any further alternative society would then have to rest on one or the 
other, or as seems currently likely, neither, but definitely not on any close relationship between them. 
Their mutual downfall could even perhaps be inevitable. 
Others have investigated the relationship between Christianity and Marxism with a more 
synthetic inclination — most notably Andrew Collier (2001), Alastair MacIntyre (1953 [1968], 1995 
[2008]), John Macmurray (1933, 1935, 1938), David McLellan (1987), and Denys Turner (1983). It has 
even been pointed out that that between Marxism and Christianity ‘there are certain similarities in 
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their respective patterns of unity and diversity’ (Lash, 1981:35) — cults and schisms, loyalty to certain 
texts, and internationalism, to name only a few. If Christianity is without doubt a significant continuing 
part of the history of the world, and if Marxism represents at least one serious attempt to understand 
how the world works, then solutions to this impasse are surely still worth serious study. But there is 
very little work in the Anglosphere on whether Continental thought, Garaudy in particular, was a 
different or in any way more satisfactory attempt to solve the same potential impasse. 
 
Who was Roger Garaudy? 
 
André Dupleix pointed out that one does not dialogue with ideas, not with Marxism, 
capitalism or Christianity, but with people with beliefs, who must therefore listen and make 
themselves heard (Dupleix, 1971:11). I therefore argue that, thirdly, this subject is worth studying 
because of Garaudy himself. Roger Garaudy was a principal exponent of both Marxism and 
Christianity, yet his project to bring the two into a closer relationship has received scant attention. 
There are several probable reasons. One may be because Garaudy’s project emerged in the shadow 
of an immediately prior, very public, involvement in Marxist–Christian dialogue; and it ended when it 
eventually failed to satisfy its author. The reasons for Garaudy’s conversion to Islam and its dramatic 
eventual consequences for his reputation have been discussed elsewhere (Fleury, 2004; Minard & 
Prazan, 2006; Prazan & Minard, 2007; Minard, 2019). I will myself address his conversion in Chapter 
Six, although from the standpoint of why the project ended, as this thesis is not primarily to tell the 
story again in more detail or from a different perspective. No doubt, however, biographical 
information and background is especially important in the context of an individual who was frequently 
portrayed by his numerous critics as changing his views with such alarming frequency that his 
commitment to any of them could reasonably be brought into doubt simply on the grounds of their 
lack of durability. Garaudy’s trajectory was certainly one of significant change in views over time. Yet 
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he also had the experience of living through what were undoubtedly tumultuous times: in his own 
view, more change had been produced by the 20th Century than the previous five thousand years of 
written history (Garaudy, 1989:9).  
In a long life, the periods when he considered himself as both a Christian and a Marxist were 
quite brief. Roger Garaudy was born in Marseille on 17 July 1913. From his childhood, he says in his 
autobiography, he derived inspiration from the love of his mother and grandmother (Garaudy, 
1989:13). He further says that his identification as a Christian at the age of sixteen (Garaudy, 
1973a:398) — to Protestantism, in particular — was a reaction, or perhaps a compromise, with the 
Catholicism of his mother’s side of the family and the atheism of his father, whose faith was shattered 
by the First World War. After finishing several terms in a local lycée, Garaudy transferred to the 
prestigious Lycée Henri IV in Paris (McClain, 1972:162). The young Garaudy held a strong Christian 
faith: he led a young Christian organisation in Marseille as a student. This did not prevent him, 
however, from joining the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) in 1933. On the contrary, ‘In such a 
context, he could not conceive of limiting the love he felt to his own immediate circle. Rather, he 
sought to transpose this feeling into a great project in which all humanity could share’ 2 (Fleury, 
2004:94). 
He was not alone: it has been contended that the historically most outstanding thinkers of 
French Marxism in the 20th Century, Roger Garaudy and Louis Althusser — and Henri Lefebvre also — 
came to Marx from a religious background (Sève, 2008:402). At university in Aix-en-Provence Garaudy 
attended the last lectures of Maurice Blondel and also mingled with evangelical theologians 
enamoured of Karl Barth and Søren Kierkegaard, going on to receive his agrégation in philosophy at 
Strasbourg in 1936. He then became a philosophy teacher at a lycée in the Tarn region. His rapid rise 
in the equally rising PCF then saw him become an aide to the party’s Secretary-General, Maurice 
 
2 Dans un tel contexte, il ne conçoit pas de limiter l'amour dont il se sent porteur, à son entourage immédiat. 




Thorez, the originator of the policy of the ‘outstretched hand’ towards French working -class Christians 
(Mauriac, 1936:1; Bustros, 1976:xiii). At this time Garaudy considered himself both a Communist and 
a militant Christian, so his writing from these early years may be of more than tangential interest for 
this thesis. 
Three years later came World War II, and Garaudy was conscripted. He distinguished himself 
by his bravery, earning the Croix de Guerre with two citations during the fall of France in 1940. In 
September of that year, after trying to re-establish the PCF clandestinely in the Tarn, he was arrested 
and deported to Djelfa camp in Algeria. Released in 1943, he worked briefly for Radio France in Algiers, 
and then for the communist journal Liberté. It was in 1945 that he wrote his autobiographical novel 
Antée (Garaudy, 1945), which was followed by another the following year (Garaudy, 1946). Once back 
in France, his political career took off: in 1945 he was elected as a provisional member of the PCF 
Central Committee, and as a full member in 1947, already occupying ‘the first rank (or almost) 
amongst the theoreticians of the Party’3 (BEIPI, 1952:2). He became a provisional member of the 
Politburo of the PCF in 1956 and finally, a full member in 1961 (Robrieux, 1984:253). Electorally, he 
served as PCF deputy for Tarn (1945–1951) in the provisional National Assembly and then the first 
Assembly of the Fourth Republic, actively participating in the mineworkers’ strikes of 1947–48, then 
as PCF deputy for the Seine (1956–1958) (Assemblée Nationale, 2020), eventually becoming Vice-
President of the National Assembly, and then briefly, PCF senator for Paris (1959–1962). With the 
expulsion of the PCF from the National Assembly, Garaudy quit professional politics to lecture in the 
Faculty of Arts of the University of Clermont-Ferrand from 1962, allegedly ‘over the protests of the 
faculty’ (Hughes, 1970:26) but left after disagreements with Michel Foucault, who detested him, 
‘partly because of his Stalinist past, partly because of his “soft” humanism’ (Macey, 2019:110). He 
transferred to Poitiers, where he stayed until 1973 (Prazan & Minard, 2007:92).  
 
3 le premier rang (ou presque) parmi les théoriciens du Parti 
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Garaudy’s political practice was intertwined with political theory. His rise to political 
prominence within the PCF was accompanied by an increasing intellectual dominance within the Party. 
At some point — it is not clear exactly when, he himself says only ‘some years’ after joining the Party 
(Garaudy, 1975:96) — Garaudy seems to have started to identify as an atheist and provider of 
intellectual support for Stalin against critics such as Arthur Koestler, André Marty and Henri Lefebvre 
(Garaudy, 1953, 1955a). In 1948 he published a study on Vatican policy towards communism 
(Garaudy, 1948) and in the following year, he began a long association with Latin America with a tour 
and subsequent report to the PCF on prospects for revolution there (Bustros, 1976:xiv). Having 
obtained his doctorat ès lettres in philosophy with a thesis on the materialist theory of knowledge 
from the Sorbonne in 1953, examined by a jury chaired by Gaston Bachelard, he spent a year in the 
Soviet Union, at the end of which he defended another thesis, this time on ‘Liberty’ before the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Garaudy, 1955).  
Then, at the beginning of 1956, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) occurred. It was little wonder that Nikita Khrushchev’s Secret Speech denouncing Stalin’s 
crimes shook Garaudy to his core; he recounted weeping uncontrollably at his desk as the revelations 
tumbled out and the images of Stalin were torn down (Garaudy, 1989:161). Garaudy himself then paid 
tribute to Khrushchev for having ‘fundamentally challenged, in the eyes of the whole world, an image 
and method that have led a socialist regime to commit crimes against socialism’ (Garaudy, 1966 
[1970:19]) and for pointing out how dogmatic dialectical and historical materialism had been used 
ideologically to justify these crimes (Garaudy, 1966: [1970:17]). As he admitted, the events of 1956 
were psychologically catastrophic. A decade later he confessed that:  
‘For a soul, the fear of death is the fear of losing its motives for living and acting: and there is 
no reason why one should not admit that for a moment, on the morrow of the Twentieth 
Congress, one understood just what this utter vital bewilderment could be’ (Garaudy 1966 
[1970: 18]). 
His sternest critic agreed: 
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‘The effect on Roger Garaudy was devastating: was it then for these horrors that he had  
believed it necessary to repress the religious aspiration in himself? In what he himself called 
the vacillation of his communist faith, the road to Christian faith was re-opened’ (Sève, 
2008:402).  
And, Sève intimates, so too was Garaudy’s road away from Marxism. Certainly, the events of 1956 
were of huge significance for Garaudy, as they were for every intellectual within the PCF and the wider 
Communist movement. But unlike others (e.g. MacIntyre, 1953 [1968]), Garaudy did not leave the PCF 
over the Hungarian invasion of the same year. For the time being at least, if the choice were between 
Soviet rule and the restoration of capitalism, Garaudy would support the former. It was perhaps little 
wonder, after more than two decades as a PCF loyalist, that ‘his break with the Stalinist heritage, like 
his party's, was a slow and cautious process’ (McClain, 1972:226).  
From the collapse of Stalinism, however, Garaudy steadily emerged as ‘one of the French 
Communist Party's leading theoreticians, a respected philosopher and authority on Hegel, and an 
author of dozens of scholarly works’ (O’Keefe, 1999:31). Although he wrote few academic articles, 
Garaudy excelled in the book form. They included La Liberté (Garaudy, 1955), his doctoral thesis from 
the Soviet Union, and also probably his most significant philosophical work during this period, 
Perspectives de l'homme (Garaudy, 1959 [1969]). In that work, the evolution of his thought in the 
direction of openness towards Christianity was already evident (Robrieu, 1984:253). He also published 
Dieu est mort (Garaudy, 1962 [1970]), a study on Hegel. As if this were not sufficient, he also published 
critical aesthetics: Du surréalisme au monde réel. L’itinéraire d’Aragon (1961), D’un Réalisme sans 
rivages. Picasso, St.John Perse, Kafka (1963), and Pour un réalisme due XXo siècle. Dialogue posthume 
avec Fernard Léger (1968).  
Scholars variously suggested that Garaudy’s aim after 1956 was to demonstrate ‘how Marxism 
is not only a humanism but a theory of human liberation compatible with Judeo-Christian notions of 
emancipation’ (Lewis, 2005:162); noting ‘his will to syncretism ’4 (Prazan & Minard, 2007:99), and that 
the ‘union of Marxism and Christianity [would] remain the great objective of Garaudy’s life and work’ 
 
4 sa volonté de syncrétisme 
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(Bustros, 1976:xiii). How differently these last words read in the light of Garaudy’s eventual conversion 
to Islam. 
One key point often lost in subsequent criticism of Garaudy was his ‘broad reputation beyond 
the confines of the PCF as a party spokesman on ideological and cultural matters’ (McClain, 1972: 
174), that ‘his views carried weight well beyond party circles’ (O’Keefe,  1999:31). He was in held in 
high repute as a philosopher during his period in the PCF — not just by Communists, but by significant 
Western philosophers outside, or almost outside, the movement. Notably for example by Jean-Paul 
Sartre, who in an exchange regarding existentialism and Marxism paid Garaudy the compliment of 
engaging with him as the intellectual voice of Marxism in France (Sartre, 1960). Certainly ‘It is really 
difficult today to convey the authority exercised by Roger Garaudy over the post-war years’5 (Prazan 
& Minard, 2007:53), but by way of further illustration, he was mentioned alongside such Marxist 
greats as György Lukács and Ernst Fischer as a ‘critical luminary’ (Versluys, 1978:608), whilst one 
Catholic theologian writer even referred to ‘Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to Mounier in the past, to 
Garaudy himself’6 [my emphasis] (Sommet, 1973:543). Garaudy’s own photographic album, from 
which he extracted priceless examples of his own fame (Garaudy, 1985), is testimony to the extent of 
his travels, the breadth of his contacts (Sartre, Castro, Picasso, Ben Bella, Nasser and Khrushchev, 
amongst many others) and the extent of his influence: ‘his impact was massive and his contribution 
substantive’ (Swidler, 1990: 35). No doubt his skill at languages in a pre-Internet age was part of his 
success.  
But under the surface, all was not well within the PCF almost from the beginning. It was 
evident as the years passed that Garaudy was experiencing progressively more difficulties with the 
Party line. Intellectual debate had broken out throughout the PCF along with destalinisation, and 
Garaudy, and his principal ally, the poet Louis Aragon, soon found themselves confronted with 
 
5 Il est bien difficile aujourd’hui de se représenter l’empire exercé par Roger Garaudy sur les années d’après 
guerre. 
6 De Sartre et Merleau–Ponty à Mounier hier, à Garaudy lui–même 
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ideological enemies not only outside the Party, but within it. These included notably the anti-
humanists Louis Althusser and his younger adherents such as Pierre Macherey and Étienne Balibar, 
but also those opposed to Marxist humanism and anti-humanism alike, such as Lucien Sève, Michel 
Verret, and Michel Simon (Pudal, 2006:55). Garaudy’s critics rejected principally his adoption and 
development of ‘Marxist humanism’.  
The sequence of Garaudy’s works during this subsequent period is an indication of his 
increasingly defensive intellectual focus: a biography of Karl Marx (1964), Marxisme du XXe siècle 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970]), Le problème chinois (Garaudy, 1967), Lénine (Garaudy, 1968a), Peut-on être 
communiste aujourd’hui? (Garaudy, 1968b), reformulated as Pour un modèle francais de socialisme 
(Garaudy, 1968c) and Le grand tournant du socialisme (Garaudy, 1970). He also came in for internal 
criticism within the PCF for his enthusiastic support of Marxist–Christian dialogue, of which Garaudy 
was one of the leading Marxist participants during the 1950s and 1960s (Garaudy, 1965 [1967]), in a 
party that has been described as riven with vanity and rivalry (Verdès-Leroux, 1981:54). After the 
death of his mentor Thorez, Garaudy found himself increasingly isolated politically from his comrades 
in the PCF. Disagreements were not only theoretical, about humanism and religion, but also practical, 
concerning attitudes towards the Soviet Union and the correct political path for the PCF (Garaudy, 
1968b). There was an increasing disparity of views between Garaudy and most PCF Central Committee 
members, not only in respect of relations between Christians and Marxists, and the status of faith 
itself within Marxism, but also his reluctance to continue to place the traditional proletariat at the 
centre of political action for Marxism in France (Garaudy, 1970:25–41). This became a gulf that was 
too wide to be bridged as Garaudy struggled, and eventually failed, to keep ideological control of the 
Party. Finally, following his outspoken criticism of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, about 
which comrades in the Party such as Sève and even the de facto leader Georges Marchais had 
remained tellingly silent, Garaudy was dramatically expelled from the PCF at a Party Congress at the 
13 
 
Palais des Sports in Nanterre, in February 1970. He described the shock of the event: ‘for the first time 
in my life, I was tempted to suicide’7 (Garaudy, 1975:22).  
His actual reaction was the opposite: to capitalise on his reputation as a public intellectual by 
explaining the events that had led to his expulsion (Garaudy, 1970a, 1970b), and to call for more 
radical politics based on ‘self-management’8 (Bustros, 1976: xvii; Garaudy, 1972, 1975) outside and 
beyond conventional political parties. Amongst his intellectual allies was the Abbé Pierre, who 
supported Garaudy much later when he became famous for Holocaust denial. The 1970s were 
undoubtedly a very difficult period for a man who had spent almost four decades inside an institution 
— the PCF — which although it had now rejected him, seemed to Garaudy now in apparently terminal 
decline. Confronted by the evident failure of Marxist practice, he invoked now a strong 
environmentalism, supported liberation theology and began to embrace a much wider religious 
perspective than hitherto. He eventually announced that he was a Christian9. His publications from 
the 1970s chart the continued progress of his intellectual odyssey and the increasing importance of 
religion within his worldview: from his espousal of faith in humanity, and what has been described 
(Norris, 1974:11) as the integration of love, sin and even grace into the Marxist perspective: 
Reconquête de l’espoir (Garaudy, 1971), his enthusiastic adoption of revolutionary youth, L’Alternative 
(Garaudy, 1972 [1976]) and aesthetics, Danser sa vie (Garaudy, 1973) through the personal expression 
of faith and policy which he concluded by announcing his Christianity, Parole d’homme (Garaudy, 
1975). Onward again to overtly religious political manifestos for the coming century, Le projet 
espérance (Garaudy, 1976), a tour of worldwide human and religious development, Comment 
l’homme devint humain (Garaudy, 1978) and finally the best-selling Appel aux vivants (Garaudy, 1979).  
However much sympathy for Islam and other religions is evident from these books, as late as 
1980 Garaudy is reported as having answered a question as to whether he was already Muslim 
 
7 Pour la première fois de ma vie, j’ai la tentation du suicide 
8 l’autogestion 
9 His conversion specifically to Catholicism, claimed by Collès (2014), was denied by his daughter in a post on the 
same blog.  
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‘scathingly’10 and that Marxism remained his creed11, adding that nothing that had happened 
intellectual or politically had shaken his view of the dangers of religion (Mekki, 2012). Nor apparently 
of the merits and importance of feminism (Garaudy, 1975:29, 1981). For this thesis, the importance 
of his biography must be that which he left behind at this point in his writing and actions, not what lay 
ahead. 
Yet it is impossible to ignore his subsequent trajectory. For in fact, the position of a powerless 
Western Marxist left-wing intellectual outside the Communist Party, which for example eventually 
became that of his younger PCF colleague Lucien Sève — in fact, outside any Party, as not for a 
moment did either of them consider joining the Socialists — was not one with which Garaudy himself 
could ever feel especially satisfied. Neither did standing for the Presidency of the Republic in 1981 
bring any solace (Garaudy, 1981a). Instead, for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter Six, Garaudy 
dramatically converted to Islam in 1982. From then on, everything changed. For his critics, his 
conversion to Islam was just one in a series of reversals and betrayals that eventually culminated in 
antisemitism and Holocaust denial. His change of beliefs was indicative of ‘a certain breed of Western 
intellectuals who play with ideas and concepts just as they play golf or poker on a weekend . . . [and] 
shows how irrelevant political religious and moral issues have become to a certain intelligentsia that 
treats politics, religion and ethics as consumer goods’ (Taheri, 2007, n.p.). Garaudy himself strenuously 
denied the charge, as he had equally done almost three decades earlier when he proclaimed Marxist 
humanist credentials, and for much the same reason. Conversion to Islam, he maintained, was a 
change of community, not of faith, just as he had maintained earlier that Marxist humanism was a 







As a Muslim he adopted the name ‘Ragaa’ and once again emerged, this time as a prominent 
Muslim intellectual, continuing to support the Palestinian cause. Most notably he became embroiled 
in Holocaust denial after publishing a strongly anti-Zionist book, Les mythes fondateurs de la politique 
israélienne (Garaudy, 1995). For this he was in 1998 prosecuted by the French State, sentenced on 27 
February 1998 for challenging crimes against humanity and racial defamation, and given a suspended 
jail sentence. In its Judgement, the tribunal emphasised that ‘far from being limited to a cr iticism of 
Zionism . . . Roger Garaudy has engaged in a virulent and systematic challenge to the crimes against 
humanity committed against the Jewish community’ (European Court of Human Rights, 2003). Despite 
numerous appeals on his part, including to the European Court of Human Rights, his conviction was 
upheld. His reputation lay in tatters in France, and it has never recovered.  
It would however certainly be a mistake to judge Garaudy’s long period as a Muslim solely on 
the basis of Holocaust Denial. He continued to make intellectual contributions — some of them quite 
radical, and consistent with his own previous contentions, on occasion startlingly so (Garaudy, 1992), 
others much more conventionally Islamic, especially during the early years after his conversion 
(Garaudy, 1981b, 1981c, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 1987). As a result of these endeavours, he was widely 
appreciated, as well as applauded, in the Islamic world. The stark disparity of his reputation is 
illustrated by the comparison of a retold anecdote to the effect that French intellectuals would not 
even sit next to him in a café (Taheri, 2007, n.p.), whilst during the same period Garaudy was invited 
to Tehran as a guest of the President, receiving honours reserved for visiting heads of state. In June 
1999, Jordanian intellectuals named Garaudy ‘the most important international cultural personality 
of the 20th Century’, whilst former Syrian Vice-President Abdul-Halim Khaddam called Garaudy ‘the 
greatest contemporary Western philosopher’, and Libyan leader Muammar Gaddhafi even called him 
‘Europe's greater philosopher since Plato and Aristotle’ (Homa, 2018:42fn). He eventually settled in 
Cordoba in Spain, living relatively quietly, and establishing a Foundation dedicated to research into 
Islamic influence in Spain. 
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Garaudy’s death aged ninety-eight at Chennevières-sur-Marne, east of Paris, on 13 June 2012, 
during a period which can undoubtedly be characterised as one of deteriorating international relations 
between OECD countries and much of Islam, therefore predictably occasioned very different reactions 
in Paris and in the Islamic world. His story continues to generate strong, mainly adverse responses, 
amongst those few Western intellectuals who engage with him; in France, ‘the figure of Roger Garaudy 
has sunk into oblivion very rapidly’12 (Michaël Prazan, personal communication, 28 March 2018). But 
on the contrary, his death occasioned respect in Islam (MEMRI, 2012), his role in Holocaust denial 
especially noted. What few denied was either his ability to reach a wide audience through his writing, 
which enjoyed far more sales than his philosophical contemporaries, even Althusser or Foucault, let 
alone his capacity for controversy.  
Very recently the faintest traces of revisionist appreciation of Garaudy may be discerned in 
France and even more widely. Adrien Minard delivered a paper on his conversion to Islam as part of a 
conference on the subject (Minard, 2019), Roland Boer has reached back to his contribution to the 
Marxist–Christian dialogue of the 1960s (Boer, 2019:123), Gerard Ronge has presented Garaudy’s 
theory of aesthetics from a Polish perspective (Garaudy, 1963; Ronge, 2019) whilst Didier Gauvin 
(2018) has written a thesis on Garaudy as a ‘disruptive’ French intellectual, presenting the case that 
even before his conversion to Islam, his refusal to adhere to ‘conventional’ Marxism and his support 
for religious ideals marked him out as ideologically unacceptable to the majority of the strongly anti-
clerical French intellectual Left (Gauvin, 2018).  
 
Organisation of the thesis 
 
 
12 la figure de Roger Garaudy ayant sombré dans l’oubli très rapidement en France  
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I have chosen to write this thesis in eight chapters, including the Conclusion. This first chapter 
has set the scene, explained the issues involved, provided a biographical sketch of the author of this 
project concerning Christianity and Marxism, and explains how I shall go about the task.  
Chapter Two is a literature review, examining the existing literature on Garaudy, but focusing 
on what has been written about his Marxism, his Christianity and especially on that little  written 
surrounding his concurrent espousal of both, seeking thereby to place both him and his work in 
historical and theological context. 
The core of the thesis lies in the three succeeding Chapters. Chapter Three presents what 
Garaudy concluded of his work after leaving the PCF in one key text, that it was ‘a project. That is to 
say the start of an action’13 (Garaudy, 1976:217), as evidenced in the evolution of his views through 
published books and articles, correspondence, and the media. It is this project, its components and 
construction, how it compares and contrasts with other work in the same tradition of engagement 
between Marxism and Christianity, perspectives on other religions, and its significance — past, 
present and perhaps future — which is the core set of views that is the subject of the thesis. Some of 
the project I will argue was long established by the time he announced his renewed Christianity 
(Garaudy, 1975). Other parts — not only in respect of his reasons for converting to Islam, common 
themes throughout his work, or observations about the past — can usefully be derived from his work 
even after he converted to Islam (e.g. Garaudy, 1992).  
Having established what the project is in general terms, the following two Chapters focus in 
turn on the two key areas that Garaudy believed Christianity had most to offer Marxism: subjectivity 
and transcendence. A contemporary commentator recognised the importance that Garaudy attached 
to both in the Marxist–Christian dialogue: ‘Garaudy specifies two themes in regard to which 
Christianity can amplify Marxism: transcendence and subjectivity. Man can contemplate his own 
destiny and project imaginatively future possibilities that qualitatively surpass his present 
 
13 un projet. C’est-à-dire, le commencement d’une action 
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constrictions’ (Moellering, 1971:40). Throughout his work, Garaudy insisted on the importance of the 
role that both must play in the construction of socialist society (Bustros, 1976:xv). The succeeding two 
chapters therefore address each of these in turn.  
Chapter Four analyses Garaudy’s  concepts of subjectivity and the individual, their connection 
with relativity and openness in his thought in the context of Marxist humanism and Christianity, and 
their importance for the consistency of Marxism with Christianity in Garaudy’s thought. It a lso 
attempts to place Garaudy’s approach to the individual and subjectivity in relation to both Marxism 
and Christianity in the context of the views of a range of other authors on the same subjects.  
Chapter Five likewise focuses on definitions of transcendence, Garaudy’s own concept of the 
term, the role he believed it played in the consistency of Marxism with Christianity, and the 
relationship between Garaudy’s own views and those of others, notably leading theologians who have 
grappled with this subject. Chapter Five also therefore analyses the broader eschatological 
relationship between Christianity and Marxism that Garaudy espoused, and again how it compares to 
other writers on the same subject.  
If Garaudy’s intellectual odyssey had abruptly ended before his conversion to Islam, there 
would not be a need for the following chapters. But it dramatically did not, and so we have the 
advantage of a kind of having all of its author’s subsequent views on which to draw as part of a critique, 
or even a contribution, to his project. The subsequent Chapter Six therefore reviews Garaudy’s project 
in relation to his evident eventual dissatisfaction with it himself, the political issues that caused him 
to focus increasingly on Islam, his eventual conversion itself, and its consequences.  
Garaudy left the task of his project in pieces on the floor. And yet, the possibility and even the 
need for consistency between Marxism and Christian faith, the task of building a faith-based 
alternative to capitalist hegemony, which Garaudy asserts is perhaps one of the major conditions of 
the transformation of the world and its survival (Garaudy, 1975) remains as important as ever to the 
Left of politics and many of Christian faith. Few have taken up the task. In Chapter Seven I therefore 
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go further, to present the questions, and cover the subject areas, both those that I contend Garaudy 
missed, and those that have come to light as a result of developments, both theological and political, 
since he converted to Islam. I seek too to elucidate the extent to which anyone seeking to establish 
the mutual dependence of contemporary Marxism and Christianity might provide different answers 
to those Garaudy himself gave. From this exchange I have boldly attempted to move Garaudy’s project 
on from where he left it, to a position that may be more appropriate for a fresh audience and changed 
economic and political conditions. I will also make an attempt to identify and reflect upon the kind of 
intellectual coherence and strength for such a new mutual dependence that might reasonably be 
required to claim plausibility.  
I then conclude the thesis. Did the failure of the project to establish the wide acceptance of 
mutual dependence between Christianity and Marxism have any practical significance? What is  of 
contemporary relevance from the story of Garaudy’s short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful project? 
Was there something of genuine and lasting worth — a combination of ideas, politics and personality 
— that we can glean from taking Garaudy’s project seriously? Did Garaudy in fact throw away an 
achievement of great merit: a work in progress, for sure, but his own, and reach out, however 
understandably, to a ready-made alternative. Or did he simply stop attempting the impossible? 
 
 
Reading Garaudy  
 
This is not a straightforward task, for many reasons. In common with all historical writing, 
events at the time must be recalled. The comment that ‘The popular misconception of communism 
which has formed a basis for much anti-communist propaganda — that human value must be 
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sacrificed on the altar of the state — is the misconception Garaudy fights’ (Ratliff, 1975:21) serves as 
a reminder to the political reality under which Garaudy wrote much of his work.  
Secondly, Garaudy was not — and never claimed to be — an ‘original’ thinker, in the way that 
for example Ernest Bloch or György Lukács might reasonably have be claimed to be. Whatever value 
lies in his work must be sought elsewhere than in originality: in its ability to synthesise the work of 
others, to persuade, or both. This results in a further problem with reading Garaudy, it must be 
admitted. On the one hand Garaudy read the work of others prolifically. His project, I will argue, 
created an original mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity. He never hesitated not 
only to refer to and promote the work of others, but to weave them into a view of the world that he, 
at least, regarded as consistent. He was in that sense a compulsive system-builder. Those on whom 
he drew ranged from Rabindranath Tagore, whose commitment to love and beauty as proof of the 
divine future of humanity Garaudy celebrated (Garaudy, 1935) to Karl Barth, Maurice Blondel, Ernest 
Bloch, Karl Rahner, Josef Hromádka, Jan Lochman, Gabriel Marcel, Jean Lacroix, Emmanuel Mounier, 
and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, amongst others. Jürgen Moltmann wrote to him that Garaudy’s project 
between socialism and Christianity ‘is also my own ‘Project’14 (Moltmann, 1977: n.p.). On the other 
hand, especially during his ‘prophetic period’ (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:451) during which he developed 
his project, he was writing polemically, and certainly not academically. He did not — in his defence, 
perhaps wisely, given his audience — provide overmuch in the way of academic references to others’ 
work, or even indexes. But whilst even some academic texts from the 1970s often do not quite match 
up to contemporary standards for referencing or even plagiarism, Garaudy scarcely excelled in that 
department even amongst his contemporaries. One reviewer lamented that ‘a work of this magnitude 
[Garaudy, 1979] deserved a rich bibliography, but it is missing’15 (Thomas, 1980:200), whilst a less 
tolerant more recent reviewer commented acidly that the bibliography of one of his books [Garaudy, 
1990] was confined to his own work (Poulat, 1991). Assembling intellectual contributions to his project 
 
14 ist auch mein “Projekt” 
15 Un ouvrage une telle ampleur méritait en outre une riche bibliographie or celle-ci est absente 
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of establishing mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity is therefore of necessity 
something of an exercise in detection, comparison and analysis, both from the Marxist and the 




Conviction for Holocaust denial may, and arguably should, prevent any wholescale 
posthumous rehabilitation of Roger Garaudy in the West. It must also be recognised that Garaudy’s 
later conversion to Islam and involvement in Holocaust denial has overshadowed his earlier reputation 
in the West as a radical of immense note. It also no doubt goes some way to explaining why his earlier 
work is now largely ignored.  
My central argument will therefore be this: if Garaudy’s earlier views were plausible as a 
position that others could adopt, then they should be examined on their own merits, despite the fact 
that their author subsequently changed his mind. Many individuals do change their minds (Pettinger, 
2013). And as human lives lengthen, spanning longer periods of socio-economic change as well as 
more events of personal biography, we should perhaps expect more evidence of individuals doing so, 
even on fundamental issues. But equally, no one is obliged to agree with them when they do. So, was 
the collapse of his project inevitable, and if so, was it so for Garaudy alone? Does his experience 
provide some form of guidance, or even proof, of the inevitable failure of such attempts? Or 
alternatively, was there any direction in which he could have turned that might have placed in 
question his own perceived necessity to convert? Was there merit in his project for the relationship 
between Marxism and Christianity, even under the very different circumstances of the 21st Century?  
If my argument that there is such merit were accepted, there may be some hope that the very 
length of his intellectual career and the different positions he adopted may give rise to separate 
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evaluations of his contribution to an important debate at different times. Therefore, our view of the 
Muslim Ragaa Garaudy, convicted of Holocaust Denial, should only be allowed to inform, not 
completely eclipse, that of the influential Marxist and Christian intellectual Roger Garaudy. Finally, 
then, let there be no doubt: this thesis is an attempt at a revival, and tentative development, of Roger 







Chapter Two: Did others take Garaudy seriously? 
 
 
Introduction — different perspectives 
 
Dividing up Garaudy’s life and work into different periods has become something of a leitmotif 
in ‘Garaudy studies’ from Bustros (1976) to Gauvin (2018). Hence, for example, the Melkite Greek 
Catholic Christian Selim Bustros, who wrote his PhD thesis on Garaudy’s thought, separated an initial 
Stalinist phase before 1956 from a subsequent Marxist humanist phase, compatible with Christianity, 
which continued indefinitely thereafter. Bustros did not, of course, have the advantage of writing after 
Garaudy’s conversion to Islam, nor even his later work before he did, in order to question this 
supposed post-Stalinist homogeneity. Almost a decade later, the Catholic Julian Rodriguez identified 
‘the Stalinist or acritical period of his intellectual formation where loyalty to official Marxism and to 
the Party was the ideal life’16 (Rodriguez, 1984:11), a prolonged period of ‘a critical, engaged, humanist 
Marxism’17 again starting from 1956 (Rodriguez, 1984:11), and then ‘Finally, the period of openness 
to the dialogue of civilisations, of transcendence’18 starting with Garaudy’s expulsion from the PCF and 
ending in conversion to Islam (Rodriguez, 1984:12). With more hindsight, Garaudy’s friend Father José 
Rui Da Costa Pinto divided Garaudy’s work into five phases: the Stalinist phase (1949–1959), the phase 
of dialogue and reconsideration (1959–1969), the phase of rupture (1969–1972), the ‘prophetic’ 
phase (1972–1981) and finally, ‘Garaudy, or brother Rajaa’ (1981–2012)19 (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:452). 
Finally, in a recent authoritative doctoral treatment of Garaudy as an ‘rogue  communist intellectual’20, 
 
16 El período staliniano o a crítico de su formacíon intellectual y su fidelidad al marxismo official y al partido como 
ideal de su vida 
17 El período de un marxismo crítico humanista y dialogal 
18 Finalmente, el período de aperture al diálogo de civilizaciones, de transcendencia 
19 Fase estalinista (1949 – 1959), Fase do diálogo e do repensamento (1959–1969), Fase da rutura (1969–1972), 
Fase do “profetismo” (1972–1981), and Garaudy, o “irmão Rajaa” (1981–2012) 
20 intellectuel communiste illégitime 
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and despite seeking to demonstrate an overarching continuity in Garaudy’s thought, Didier Gauvin 
(2018) identified four phases: 1. The liberation phase; 2. The Stalinist phase proper, in the heart of the 
Cold War; 3. The ‘détente’ phase linked to the ‘aggiornamento’ of the PCF; 4. The final phase, dispute 
and exclusion’21, with a prophetic character throughout, although especially noticeable after his 
expulsion from the PCF. Perhaps most remarkable of all is the simple division between a Marxist phase 
and a post-Marxist one implicit in Mattei (2012).  
I largely follow Rodriguez (1984). However I am not as persuaded as are he and Da Costa Pinto 
(2017), as well as critics such as Lucien Sève (1969 [1978], 2008) that Garaudy’s thought, as opposed 
to his practice, was ever especially ‘Stalinist’, especially given his Christian faith at the time he joined 
the PCF. I am therefore reluctant to concede that his entire intellectual output prior to 1956 should 
be disregarded in the context of his Marxist humanism. My focus though is on the subsequent project, 
so I will not adopt a chronological approach, as does one of the principal analysts of the relationship 
between Marxism and Christianity (McLellan, 1987), however ‘insightful’ (Boer, 2019:123) Garaudy’s 
contributions to it may have been. Still less will I attempt a biographical approach to Garaudy himself 
(e.g. Prazan & Minard, 2007). 
My own division of Garaudy’s thought and practice is  into three. The first is that of Garaudy 
as PCF loyalist, politician, and eventually as theoretician of Marxist humanism. This may be said to 
have begun with his adherence to the PCF in 1933. I do not therefore agree that:  
‘With Garaudy, the complete militant commitment of the 1940s and the assumption of party 
responsibilities had, as a corollary in the philosophical domain, a complete alignment with 
Soviet orthodoxy as defined by Stalin’s famous text Dialectical and Historical Materialism 
(Stalin, 1938), in which the humanism of the young Marx finds no place. Christian faith no 
longer found any expression in his writings of the time except for the forced lyricism with 
which the theorems of Marxism–Leninism are presented’ (Sève, 2008:402).  
Rather, consistent with my contention that his Marxist humanism was not a mere intellectual rupture 
which concealed a cynical political response to destalinisation, I argue that there are contributions to 
 
21 1. La phase de la libération ; 2. La phase stalinienne proprement dite au coeur de la guerre froide ; 3. La phase 
de « détente » liée à « l’aggiornamento » du PCF ; 4. La phase finale, de contestation et d’exclusion 
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Garaudy’s project whose origin and even development lie throughout his earlier work. Not only do his 
writings whilst a senior member of the PCF provide a strong indication of his future project, even 
though his official public position to say the very least severely cramped his style, so do those even 
from his youth (e.g. Garaudy, 1935).  
The second is the short phase where Garaudy developed his ‘project’ (Garaudy, 1976:217), on 
which I focus exclusively in Chapters Three, Four and Five. I locate its inception in 1970, when Garaudy 
was expelled from the PCF; its apogee, his declaration of Christian faith in 1975 and his public 
promulgation of the project; and its downfall, his conversion to Islam. The project is therefore the 
result of Garaudy unchained — the only period in his long adult life where he was not an active 
member of a particular political party or adherent of a religion. As an end date I therefore suggest 
1981 if a year must be given, with his actual conversion following within a year. Just over ten years in 
all at most, conveniently falling almost exclusively into the decade of the 1970s, in only the latter part 
of which he held Christianity as a public position, although I argue that his writing between 1970–1975 
may definitely be included within his project, albeit that he did not officially declare himself a Christian.  
Finally, the third is the period after the end of the project, which forms the content of Chapter 
Six. Even some of these subsequent texts may be interrogated, if cautiously, for the light they may 
shine on the project. However, I seek firmly to distinguish selective inclusion of pre- and post-project 
material from any contention of complete consistency. Through this approach I hope to avoid creating 
a ‘best of Garaudy’ theoretical album, concentrating on a very small body of texts and ignoring the 
process of change and development underlying them.  
This literature review therefore focuses primarily on what Da Costa Pinto calls the ‘prophetic’ 
period and Rodriguez the period of ‘openness’. It also includes prior and subsequent work that I will 
argue in Chapter Three should be considered as relevant to Garaudy’s project to establish the mutual 
dependence of Marxism and Christianity during this period: his contribution to Marxist–Christian 
dialogue, his Marxist humanism, and his outburst of syncretic writing after his conversion to Islam 
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(Garaudy, 1992). I have however largely omitted contemporary political criticism of Garaudy, which 
can perhaps most usefully be viewed with the benefit of the hindsight I myself use in Chapter Seven.  
Where to find this commentary? Garaudy’s written output was mostly in the form of books, 
rather than academic articles — a practice admittedly generally more common last century than this, 
but partly motivated by his increasingly polemical motivation in writing for the wider audience that 
he undoubtedly did eventually reach (Bourdieu, 1984). Some commentary on his work can therefore 
be found in books and articles where Garaudy and his opponents talked past each other, for example 
in the prolonged debate with Althusser over Marxist humanism (e.g. Althusser, 1965 [2005], 1966 
[2007]). Other more sympathetic, or at least tolerant, commentary emerged in the form of brief 
citations, and reviews of his work, in newspapers and political and academic journals, often identifying 
Garaudy with a particular viewpoint, notably in favour of Marxist humanism (e.g. Cottier, 1967), or 
even expressing agreement with him from a Christian standpoint that ‘the meaning of history is to 
free man’ (Daniélou, 1951:506). 
In much of this commentary, Garaudy was often mentioned as a leading light of the Marxist–
Christian dialogue. Sometimes, this was along with other intellectuals: ‘Among the philosophers we 
shall mention the French Garaudy, Mury, Goldman, the Polish Schaff and Kolakowski, the Germans 
Bloch, Havemann; the Hungarians Lukács and Márkus; the Italians Gramsci, Lombardo-Radice, 
Luporini… . . .’22 (Girardi, 1966:281). And sometimes, it was alone — one Jesuit scholar, for example, 
cited no other representative of Marxist–Christian dialogue, referencing Garaudy’s reminder that 
Marx had always recognised that under certain circumstances at least, religion could play a positive 
role (Decloux, 1966:480), another in discussing a conference in Vienna on dialogue hailed Garaudy as 
‘the leading French Communist participant’ (McLellan, 1968:463), whilst a review of the dialogue from 
a Chilean perspective commences with Garaudy’s question as to why Christians should engage in 
 
22 Parmi les philosophes nous citerons les français Garaudy, Mury, Goldmann, les polonais Schaff et Kolakowski, 
les allemands Bloch, Havemann ; les hongrois Lukács et Márkus ; les italiens Gramsci, Lombardo-Radice, Luporini 
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dialogue with their persecutors (Bartolomé, 1970:241). Two years later one writer suggested that the 
future of Russia ‘will create a community which is both socialist and personal — that is to say — I 
apologise to M. Roger Garaudy — Christian’ (Matzneff, 1968:863). Similarly, Garaudy was often cited 
as the representative of the humanist tendency in Marxist thinking across a wide range of topics, for 
example, his view of the individual as the sole source of the liberation of Man (Sommet, 1973:543), or 
a sympathetic sociology of religion (e.g. Heeger, 1971:230; Eyt, 1973:533). Across all this commentary, 
it is noticeable that frequently one of Garaudy’s observations would be cited out of context, if 
sympathetically, for example: ‘That’s what R. Garaudy remarkably observed by saying that Judeo-
Christianity had “defatalised” history. Faith is here a discourse on the impossible made possible’ 
(Gesché, 1975:810). This kind of isolated quotation was certainly much more frequent than any 
detailed analysis of Garaudy’s position, whether on Marxism, Christianity or anything else. 
Finally, it is noticeable how once Garaudy ceased to hold particular views himself, reference 
to his previous views largely disappeared from the relevant literature. His intellectual reputation 
survived the publication of relatively short works, such as Marx (Garaudy, 1964) and Lénine (Garaudy, 
1968a), the latter of which was described as readable, but nonetheless not without technical merit, 
presumably on the assumption that the two were almost incompatible (Drooghenbroeck, 1973:609). 
But it did not survive his attempt after he was expelled from the PCF to establish mutual dependence 
between Marxism and Christianity and to reach a wider audience in so doing. Rapidly, both Marxist 
and Christian critics stopped taking Garaudy seriously: despite his  initial celebrity status, commentary 
soon became either distinctly adverse, dismissive, or vanished altogether. For example, there was no 
further commentary from theologian Johann Metz, who had previously engaged in debate with 
Garaudy as part of the Marxist–Christian dialogue (Garaudy, 1966c:409). Perhaps this was because 
Garaudy’s usefulness to either side had diminished, perhaps because his announced Christianity 
provided some satisfaction to the establishment of the PCF that they had been right all along about 
the fundamental deviance of his philosophy from at least their kind of Marxism (Gauvin, 2018:17), but 
perhaps not least of the criticism levelled at Garaudy was his alleged use of language more appropriate 
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to literature than to philosophy, where conceptions may be irreconcilable and where the adversary 
must be defeated. The relationship between Garaudy and language became itself a symbol of 
revisionism for his more orthodox Marxist critics (Sève, 1969; Martelli, 2017).  
 
Garaudy as Marxist philosopher 
 
His earlier work was reviewed by academics as serious philosophy. Garaudy was therefore a 
target of anti-Marxist criticism: his relational definition of human individuality — from which he never 
swerved — the target of particular criticism (Massenet, 1952:89). On the other hand, his La Liberté 
(Garaudy, 1955) earned one reviewer’s tribute as: ‘the most systematic and detailed analysis of the 
concept of freedom and its related problems which has yet been produced [within Marxism–
Leninism]’ (Somerville, 1956:272). Somerville was in evident sympathy with Garaudy’s view of 
freedom: embracing materialist causality, and recognising the operational, ideological meaning of 
freedom in history, yet holding out hope that fear, hatred, prejudice, bigotry, ignorance, and 
selfishness can eventually be driven out of the list of causes that determine human action. Others 
were prepared to praise ‘a work that is overall, instructive, and written with evident sincerity’23 
(Lhomme, 1959:804.).  
An equal sympathy was evidenced for Garaudy’s subsequent study of French philosophy 
(Garaudy, 1959 [1969]), which pointed to two competing directions, existential and Marxist, arguing 
that Man becomes something, somebody, in his collective context, and that only the unity of theory 
and practice can lead to a meaningful future for Man (Riepe, 1961:127). It was evident to at least one 
reviewer that in envisaging the future of Marxism, Garaudy did indeed take very seriously the 
analytical transition from society to the individual, and the existentialist standpoint on both (Ehrard, 
 
23 Ouvrage au total instructif une évidente sincérité 
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1961:821). Garaudy subsequently turned his attention to Hegel, keen to demonstrate not only that 
Marxism owed much to the Hegelian dialectic, but that Hegel himself could be explained from a study 
of his life and times, conclusions which, it was asserted, ‘are sufficiently convincing to warrant belief 
that Hegel's intellectual career, like that of Wordsworth and Coleridge, was at least a faithful 
barometer of the time’ (Hodges, 1963:623), although a later critic remained unconvinced of Garaudy’s 
purely Marxist explanation of the Hegelian dialectic (Barthélemy-Madaule, 1972:365).  
Destalinisation also provided a cover for several position changes, such as Garaudy’s public 
divergence from the position of the Soviet leadership in the I lichev affair of 1962, where he refuted 
the argument that it was not possible to combine religious faith with adherence to the Party (Gauvin, 
2018:22), in line with the conviction of their compatibility that Garaudy had held all his life. That 
Garaudy was an unconventional Marxist had therefore been recognised at the time he wrote, e.g. in 
relation to Marxisme du XX siècle (Garaudy, 1966), ‘What Garaudy sets out to do is to provide a 
restatement of Marxism [my italics] which is at the same time faithful to Marx's own intentions and in 
keeping with the progress in knowledge that has taken place since Marx's time’ (Cranston, 1970:12). 
This new methodology, which one author explicitly connects with the work of Roger Garaudy, 
‘presupposes that the major problems of contemporary philosophy are similar both for Marxist and 
non-Marxist philosophy, only their solutions differ’ (Kovaly, 1971:289). 
Not all Marxists were delighted with this unconventionality, however. Garaudy’s Marxist 
critics came in waves. First, there were those from the extreme Left in France, ‘students or former 
students of Louis Althusser’24 (Gauvin, 2018:33fn), such as Etienne Balibar, Guy Dhoquois — who 
pointed to ‘The eclecticism of Roger Garaudy who juxtaposes contradictory ideas, without realising 
that they are, and who cannot solve anything because he does not pose any real question’ 25 
(Dhoquois, 1969:164) and Jacques Rancière (1974 [2011:36–7]), who already regarded him as a 
 
24 élèves ou ex élèves d’Althusser  
25 L'éclectisme de Roger Garaudy qui juxtapose des idées contradictoires sans s'apercevoir qu'elles le sont, qui 
ne peut rien résoudre, car il ne pose vraiment aucune question 
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revisionist. These critics followed Althusser, at least at that time,  in his insistence on the crucial 
political need to demarcate between proper Marx and ‘humanist interpretations’ which included 
‘objective idealistic’ readings of Marx (Lefebvre, Cornu, Garaudy) which ‘hold that history is the 
journey of the human spirit to end its alienation; and also ‘subjective idealisms’ like Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty which hold that the dialectic describes the individual’s attempt to end his alienation 
by realising freedom in the human community’ (Lewis, 2005:165). Althusser and the structural 
Marxists held the opposite: that the alienation of individuals and its opposite, freedom, was a function 
of primarily — but by no means exclusively — economic activity giving rise to social relations. 
Humanist language concealed revisionist, ultimately reactionary intent: ‘ ’Man’ is a notion employed 
in order to mask the class struggle’ (Althusser, 1966 [2007:165]). The ultimate conclusion of their view 
was expressed by Althusser: the concept of the individual as advanced by their opponents was 
unnecessary for Marxism (Althusser & Sève, 2018) — they had equally little time for Garaudy’s  
subsequent opponents within the mainstream of the PCF, it should be noted, even if both groups 
agreed on attacking Marxist humanism (Matonti, 2005).  
These more mainstream PCF critics however became in turn the second wave, which started 
as internal criticism within the PCF led by Lucien Sève and Guy Besse. Sève’s criticism is worth especial 
attention, as he first became a leading critic of Garaudy at the famous Argenteuil Conference of 1966,  
where the PCF sought to determine its line on philosophy, in particular on Marxist humanism vs 
structuralist Marxism (see inter alia, McLaughlin, 1966; Geerlandt, 1978; Sève, 2000; Lewis, 2005), and 
always remained so, such was the ferocity of the contest. Certainly, this was initially politically brave 
(Lévy, 2017), for at the time of its writing, Sève was far junior in the Party hierarchy to Garaudy. Sève 
knew Garaudy well and his sustained attack on Garaudy is worth careful examination, especially given 
that Garaudy’s achievement at Argenteuil (Courtine, 1981:75; Martelli, 2017) was only ‘a superficial 
victory’26 (Gauvin, 2018:23), which was quickly followed by retreat, e.g. criticism from leading PCF 
 
26 victoire de façade 
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member Antoine Casanova that forced Garaudy into specific criticism of the Catholic Church’s failure 
to engage more positively with efforts to combat poverty (McLaughlin, 1966: n.p.).  
Sève first noted that in the ten years after 1945, Garaudy published a number of works in 
which the humanism of the young Marx held no place. Sève however observed that in painting a quick 
picture of the birth of Marxism, Garaudy did not even mention The Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts (Marx, 1844 [1975]) among the works of the young Marx until much later, when he 
stressed the connection with Hegel (Garaudy, 1963a), following instead the well-known Marxist–
Leninist position that ‘Marxism attains maturity’ in 1847–48 with The Poverty of Philosophy (Marx, 
1847 [1976]) and The Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels, 1848 [1972]) (Garaudy 1955: 165 et seq.). 
For those such as Sève who were eventually to try to hold the line between Garaudy and Althusser 
within the PCF, this was not to be commended. Sève complained even decades later that Garaudy had 
long adhered to Stalinism: 
‘Yet in Humanisme marxiste [Marxist Humanism] in 1957, Perspectives de l’homme [Prospects 
of Man] in 1959 and all the publications that follow, Garaudy poses all of a sudden as a 
champion of humanist Marxism and, according to him, the analysis of alienation in the 
Manuscripts of 1844 having prefigured the major theses of Capital’27 (Sève, 2008:522).  
Two objections may be raised here. The obvious one is why it is not permitted to Garaudy to change 
his mind, as Sève himself eventually did politically, if not philosophically, especially given ‘The 
accidents in the history of communism, which pressed with all their weight on Garaudy's trajectory’ 28 
(Goulon, 1983:10). The second is whether Garaudy really ever did adhere to an uncritical philosophy 
of dialectical materialism: repeated attention to liberty (Garaudy, 1950, 1955) is surely a striking 
choice of subject if so, but unlike Somerville (1956) neither Sève (1969 [1978], 2008) nor any other of 
Garaudy’s critics seemed to be interested in examining what he actually had to say in any of his earlier 
work.  
 
27 Mais dans Humanisme marxiste [Marxist Humanism] en 1957, Perspectives de l’homme [Prospects of Man] en 
1959, et toutes les publications qui suivent, Garaudy se pose tout d’un coup en champion d’un marxisme 
humaniste, et les Manuscrits de 1844 passeront même selon lui pour avoir préfiguré dans leur analyse de 
l’aliénation des thèses majeures du Capital 
28 Les accidents de I'histoire du communisme, qui pesaient de tout leur poids sur l'itinéraire de Garaudy 
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Rather, the question of what constitutes the Marxist conception of man, and whether 
Marxism is a humanism, has underlined and continued to underline29 the acerbic polemics of the 
international communist movement (Geerlandt, 1978:7–8). As Geerlandt pointed out, successive 
leaders of the French Communist Party had associated Marxism with humanism (Thorez, 1937 
[1954:168]; Rochet, 1966; Marchais, 1973:209–210). This ideological dominance was not assured, 
however. One critic of Althusser proposed to drive a theoretical wedge into the variant of Marxist 
humanism promoted by those dismissed as repentant former Stalinists such as Garaudy and Adam 
Schaff, interested only in dialogue with all those of good will (Löwy: 1970:124) through the 
revolutionary humanism of Mao and Guevara, which, it was claimed, can accommodate the kind of 
flexibility in economic laws advocated by Ernest Mandel and denied to the anti-humanists (Löwy: 
1970:125).   
Sève, too, argued that Garaudy and other Marxist humanists, such as Schaff (1965 [1970]), to 
which one could add Norman Geras (1983) tried to twist readings and interpretations of Marx to justify 
an unchanging ‘human nature’, which he argued was not only erroneous, but also an essential, flawed 
ingredient of Marxist humanism. The problem, as Sève saw it, was that Garaudy fixated on the 1844 
Manuscripts and refused to accept that in the later Marx there was much more than ‘an adaption of 
speculative concepts’ (Garaudy, 1968b:73), cited in Sève (1969 [1978:158]) but rather: 
‘a real reversal of perspectives, a theoretical revolution . . . To emphasise this untenable aspect 
(among others) in the interpretation of Marxism which Roger Garaudy has developed since 
1959, is not to degenerate into a minor matter of Marxological erudition: it is the very meaning 
of mature Marxism which is involved here’ (Sève, 1969 [1978:158fn]).   
For Sève, the early Marx saw the human essence as ‘species man’, i.e. inherent in a still abstract 
individual, and therefore in pre-scientific form. For Sève, and indeed for Althusser also, Marx needed 
to upend this concept, which he did initially in the VI Thesis on Feuerbach and then in the German 
Ideology before the fully developed version of humanity is seen in Das Kapital. This is that the human 





therefore no longer possible to engage in the kind of philosophy with ‘Man’ as a subject, in which 
Garaudy delighted, as the concept has been superseded. Indeed, Sève claimed that misrepresenting 
the crucial importance of the distinction between human essence and individuality, Garaudy 
continually revived the philosophico-humanist myth of ‘Man’ in general as the subject of history (Sève, 
1969 [1978:158]).  
And this mattered: ‘All this, ‘cast like a single block of steel’, in Lenin’s words, gradually breaks 
up in Roger Garaudy’s works’ (Sève, 1969 [1978:159]). So Sève says that whilst Garaudy is right to 
criticise theoretical anti-humanism’ as non-Marxist, he says his argument is no better because it is 
developed from an even less acceptable view of Marxist humanism which is reduced to certain of its 
pre-scientific aspects of 1844 and which is, moreover, for him at least distorted in a spiritual direction 
(Sève, 1969 [1978:159]). Hence, Garaudy’s simplification of the VI Thesis 
‘. . . which replaces the materialist definition of the individual with a mere relational 
conception of the individual, brings us back from the science of history to a philosophy of 
‘inter-subjectivity’ which, after all, is banal and which, detached from a materialist basis, is 
perfectly acceptable to a spiritualist and in fact is inevitably led into spiritualism’ (Sève, 1969 
[1978:160]).  
The route back is, perhaps, not quite so straightforward as Sève believed, but it is noteworthy that 
one of the characteristics of the majority of attacks on Garaudy is the accusation that in some way he 
fails to appreciate the great depth and sophistication of whatever opposing position is advanced.  
Sève suggested that Schaff had made the same error of interpretation of the VI Thesis, 
although Schaff rejected the association, agreeing that Garaudy’s interpretation was ‘mistaken’ 
(Schaff, 1965 [1970:265]), as ‘several works of Roger Garaudy and all of his interpretation of Marxism 
in recent years are based on an obvious distortion not only of the spirit but the letter itself of the VI th 
Thesis on Feuerbach’30 (Sève, 1971:264). These famous words are usually translated as ‘the human 
essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social 
 
30 plusieurs ouvrages de Roger Garaudy et toute son interprétation du marxisme dans ces dernières années sont 




relations’ (Marx, 1844 [1975:423]). Garaudy’s error, Sève felt it worthwhile to explain again almost 
four decades later, was to site the ‘real’ Marx not in Das Kapital but in the 1844 Manuscripts, which 
was to misinterpret the VIth Thesis on Feuerbach: 
‘as if it placed an equals sign between the individual and social relations, to pass in silence 
over the radical historical materialist critique of “man” in favour of an intersubjective 
hominism that that critique discredits, to see nothing of the central anthropological 
innovations presented here while extolling the individual as “creator of himself,” communism 
as “realization of man,” and Marx as champion of a “modern humanism” — these ways of 
viewing the matter are more or less common to all of those cited above — are, in relation to 
the actual Marxian anthropology, a miscomprehension in the guise of recognition’ (Sève, 
2008:103–4).  
Sève encapsulated what he continues to regard as Garaudy’s theoretical errors in his principal text, 
Marxism and the Theory of Human Personality. It is worth citing from a later edition of this book at 
length, as a summary of his criticism of Garaudy: 
‘He again assigns to Man essential human properties from now on inevitably conceived 
abstractly (“the creative project”, ”dialectical surpassing”, etc.) and above, all, once again 
turning the relations between men and social relations on their head, again setting up typical 
idealist views against historical materialism … It is he who ‘produces’ the social relations 
(Garaudy, 1968b:105) and through him that “the meaning of history originates” (Garaudy, 
1968b:298). In a word, “specifically human activity [is] the act of creating values” (Garaudy, 
1968b:232). “‘Man’ is ‘a creator in the image of God’” (Garaudy, 1968b:378]). At the extreme, 
every difference between Marxism and spiritualism is obliterated. At the same time, it is the 
class basis of communist politics which is directly at stake in this reconversion of scientific 
socialism into philosophical humanism. 
In the autobiography with which his book (Garaudy, 1968b) begins, Roger Garaudy reveals 
certain personal motivations for this spiritualistic attraction to which he never stops 
subjecting Marxism. What he now feverishly strives for from book to book is  the point where 
what he calls “’the subjective moment” of the communists’ historical initiative and fight might 
link up with the Christian faith” (Garaudy, 1968b:388]) and the message of Jesus (Garaudy, 
1968b:379). But one cannot help but see that it leads him constantly to slide from dialogue 
between men and from a confrontation of ‘values’ to the search for an impossible 
convergence of doctrines. Are there really ‘irreducible philosophical differences’ between 
Marxists and Christians? he asks (Garaudy, 1968b:386) which in actual fact, from the 
theoretical and practical point of view, beyond liberties with texts, inexorably mean a 
fundamental deformation of Marxism. For while it is a correct expression of Marxism to 
pursue a policy of making friendly overtures, Marxism is nonetheless unwilling to accept this 
spiritualistic ‘addition of soul’ with which one claims to enrich it. Anyone wishing to ‘save’ the 
soul of Marxism destroys it’ (Sève, 1969, [1978:160–161]).    
At the risk of re-igniting the debate (Held, 2009), I argue that the problem with Sève’s criticism is that 
it uses the distinction between the particular and the general, an important point closely identified 
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with Sève’s own work, to do too much theoretical work. Garaudy does talk about ‘Man’ in general, for 
sure, but he need not have done. If one were to replace ‘Man’, with ‘Real, historical men (and 
women)’, Garaudy’s message would surely be no less clear. Surely all Sève has achieved is to eliminate 
a form of shorthand, not won a theoretical victory? Still less has he proved that there is any necessary 
connection between the use of the singular instead of the plural and the distinction between 
spiritualism and Marxism, between idealism and materialism.  
Sève’s attack could also be wrong more fundamentally, because perhaps Marxism could live 
with a conception of ‘Man’ after all (Geras, 1983), which would at least include the benefit of 
dispensing with the Marxist anti-humanism and structuralism associated with Althusser and his 
supporters. Or it could be that Garaudy never intended to commit the crime of which he stands 
accused. Unfortunately, Garaudy’s response to Sève was studiously to ignore him, which is unhelpful 
to rooting out what he actually thought about the criticism. 
There is something worth pursuing here though, which Carl Shames put well by observing that 
for Sève, we are the commodity form (Carl Shames, personal communication, 23 September 2017). 
The real criticism of Garaudy implicit in Sève, which discussion of the correct meaning of the VI Thesis 
rather occludes, is that he does not explore the extent to which human beings are influenced by socio-
economic conditions, the truth of the argument that human beings are essentially social, and the 
compatibility of socio-economic determinism at the individual level with individual self-determination, 
creativity and existence in the image of God. But these potential criticisms and their specific, detailed 
implications for such concepts as free will, sin or individual responsibility are as noticeably absent in 
actual criticism of Garaudy — and Marxist humanism in general — as in the work of the critics 
themselves, almost as if a tacit agreement existed not to trespass on detail, but rather, to pursue the 
debate only at a high level of philosophical generality, emphasise radical ideological differences (e.g. 
Pieper, 1977 [2001:39–40]) and debate over the meaning of texts.  
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Nevertheless, it is a comprehensive and powerful attack eventually sustained over many 
decades: Sève never accepts Garaudy’s claim to be a Marxist. However, one is entitled to ask: is this 
criticism entirely fair? Especially given the fact that if Garaudy was no Marxist, nor forty years later 
was Sève himself: we are exhorted only to think with Marx, no longer to be Marxists, and certainly not 
even to belong to the Communist Party (Sève, 2004, 2008). It is hard not to see Sève as having moved 
at least part of the way towards Garaudy’s own previous position, much as he strove to deny it in his 
later work. In Chapter Seven I aim to show in relation to the ‘turn to religion’ by Marxists that Sève 
has been far from alone in this trajectory.  
 
The Marxist–Christian dialogue 
 
For those others who engaged with Garaudy in the decades before his conversion without 
descending into abuse, he was first identified as amongst the ‘few volunteers’ for Marxist–Christian 
dialogue in the sense of Dean (1976), that is to say, of those who were prepared to countenance 
change in opinion on both sides of the divide, including those Christians such as Girardi who engaged 
with atheism in general (Girardi, 1967) and Garaudy and other Marxists in particular (Girardi, 1968). 
The question of the relationship between Marxists and Christians, a recent commentary observed, 
‘joined that of “realism” for which [the French poet] Aragon, solidly supported by Garaudy, had been 
fighting for some years’ (Martelli, 2017:4).  
Christian reviewers were largely sympathetic in the period when Garaudy confined himself to 
working for, and writing about, dialogue, which he began soon after the PCF embraced destalinisation 
(Garaudy, 1957a, 1957b, 1958). Hence one reviewer singled out Garaudy’s contribution to a seminar 
as a valuable contribution to the dialogue (Isambert, 1965). Commentary in Le Monde at the time of 
the publication of De L'anathème au dialogue (Garaudy, 1965) called it ‘one hundred and twenty-eight 
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clear, well-documented, ardent pages’31 (Le Monde, 10 December 1965), whilst another reviewer 
declared that ‘Garaudy's book [Garaudy, 1965] is a significant contribution to a better understanding 
between Marxism and Christianity’ (Doherty, 1967:386). As one later reviewer observed, ‘the various 
aspects of the creative act of Man which Garaudy sought to emphasize are accepted by Girardi as the 
premises from which to begin’ (Banks, 1974:139). ‘His [Girardi] acknowledgement of Garaudy’s plea 
that Marxism’s emphasis upon personal initiative and praxis be taken seriously, and his suggestion 
that the concepts of freedom and alienation most clearly illumine the degree of convergence and 
divergence it possesses with Christianity, are distinct advances over the attitude to Marxism expressed 
in the pre-dialogue encounter’ (Banks, 1974:141). 
Still more specific support for Garaudy’s version of the dialogue came from those who 
believed in the social mission of the church and were prepared to stand up for the kind of theology 
represented by Moltmann (1965 [2002]), Balthasar (1968) and others (Hitz, 1972:683). Not only is 
consistency between Marxism and Christianity evident, but the origin of the later mutual dependence 
of the two within the project is clearly identified. Garaudy presents us, one Scottish reviewer 
suggested,  
‘with much that essential Christianity and Marxism can share: both face the infinite, open 
completely to endless possibility for the humanisation of creation, both question death and 
meaning in life, both are rejuvenated by a recent return to sources, both are in true form not 
rigid and both wish to transform. And each deeply questions the other: Marxism, a Christianity 
favouring only the establishment that offers itself security and privileges; Christian faith, 
Marxist illusions about religion or methods of transforming creation’ (Williams, 1968:113–
114).  
This goes some way to explaining why ‘Some consider Christianity to be both a humanism and an anti-
humanism, because of its establishment leanings. Yet, Christianity first presented the idea of a 
universal human essence’ (Geerlandt, 1978:14). So ‘According to Garaudy, Christ is the founder not of 
the church, but rather of the party’32 (Der Spiegel, 1970:147), which was paralleled by the comment 
that ’There is a Marxism open to dialogue, that of men; and a Marxism that is closed to it, that of 
 
31 cent vingt-huit pages claires, bien documentées, chaleureuses 
32 Nach Garaudy ist Christus der Gründer nicht der Kirche, sondern der Partei 
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institutions’33 (Girardi, 1966:307; Torrealdai, 1975:120). Hence one analysis of Garaudy’s views 
concluded that Garaudy had merely decided to choose one type of Marx over several kinds in 
existence (Shinn, 1967). A similar but more critical view was that of Vree (1976), which was that 
Garaudy, with his stress on the young Marx, on historical initiative, and his call for a re-evaluation of 
the Marxist critique of religion, could never be representative of ‘normative’ Marxism. Vree was not 
alone: five years earlier, Garaudy had been accused of a definition of Marxism so broad that it  
‘seems to share some common ideas with positions which are by no means derived from Marx 
or other Marxist thinkers — including, for instance, certain non-dogmatic religious 
conceptions. Garaudy is fully aware of this fact, which does not embarrass him in the least, as 
we can see — among others — from his positive view of Teilhard de Chardin’ (Koecher, 
1971:391; Garaudy, 1965c, 1967e, 1975a).  
This was mirrored by the pessimistic conclusion that ‘A dialogue with such a limited number of men 
representing such a small number of Christians, is certain to meet with limited success’ (Hughes, 
1970:59). The dialogue may have been between like-minded individuals, but the tribes from which 
they had sprung remained obstinately apart, at least for the then foreseeable future. This view became 
easier to criticise as time went on, rendering it clearer that many Marxists viewed Marx’s  method and 
commitment as the real essentials of Marxism, whilst many Christians also challenged traditional 












Marxism and Christianity — philosophy and religion 
 
More detailed commentary from Christians on Garaudy’s  own views did emerge. At the 
Salzburg Dialogue in 1965, Metz asked, even when the Marxist total Man is achieved, will he have 
answers to all human questions? If he does, will he not be less human, for he will have lost his capacity 
for an ever-expanding future? It was to be a persistent objection: a subsequent reviewer asked 
rhetorically: ‘Can the Marxist Man who has become a god deny his work? Will this new god not be the 
victim of a new alienation, chained to his own creation? ’34 (Reix, 1975:368). Garaudy replied to Metz 
that the fully developed, Marxist Man will still be a questioner, for that communist future, marking 
the end of class war, will be filled with questions which transcend anything we can now ask about the 
future.  
Metz then claimed that Marxism harboured a desire for ‘more-being’ which surpassed the 
possibilities and empirical reality of any given project. In his view this could only be God. In an answer 
that became famous, Garaudy first declared, ‘My thirst is no proof of the existence of a spring’ 
(Garaudy, 1966c:411). Metz went on to define the negative capability of Marxism as absence and 
exigency rather than the Christian ideas of presence and promise. He finally claimed that the Marxist 
hope of emancipation is necessarily a project of alienated men and not a future with its own 
redemptive power (in Christian language, God) surging toward man.  
Christians and Communists may come to greater understanding about that future, but, as a 
Marxist, Garaudy cannot name its power (Lischer, 1968:37–38). Metz then added: ‘I would like to 
criticise the idea of the ‘total man’, by which M.  Garaudy characterizes the Marxist concept of the 
future, as a problematic abstraction and at the same time an exorbitant demand on the quest 
concerning the future’ (Metz, 1967:230). This was despite the fact that Metz recognised that ‘the 
 
34 L'homme marxiste devenu dieu pourra-t-il renier son œuvre ? Ce nouveau dieu ne sera-t-il pas alors victime 
d'une nouvelle aliénation, enchaîné qu'il sera à sa propre création 
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demythologisation’ of Christian apocalyptic–eschatological symbols had ‘drawn their sting’, had 
dissolved their power to elicit and sustain a hope for a better world in the future (Ashley, 1998:107).  
Finally, Metz insisted that ‘the alternatives developed by M. Garaudy between promise and demand, 
between expectation and struggle, so to speak between Christian eschatology and revolutionary 
world-planning, do not or must not exist for the Christian’ (Metz, 1967:227). Notably, Metz was 
prepared to continue his debate with Garaudy only so long as Garaudy remained at least superficially 
only Marxist, and not Christian as well.  
Archibald Cox asked wider questions relating to the Christian–Marxist dialogue, pointing at 
Garaudy in the first instance. He suggested that Garaudy’s conscious effort to shift the dialogue onto 
the territory of Chapters Four and Five — transcendence and subjectivity — obscured the real 
differences between Marxism and Christianity, enabling him to ‘win theological friends too easily’ 
(Cox, 1968:25). Noteworthy was that ‘In particular, there has been a tendency to evade discussion of 
the biblical emphasis upon the “fallenness” of Man and the cosmic dimensions of evil, an omission 
which leaves the dialogue with a certain degree of imbalance’ (Banks, 1974:147). For Cox, this silence 
on important points of potential disagreement obscured the benefit of an historical materialist 
approach for Christians. But he sounded a note of caution: in Gaullist France, no less than for liberation 
theologians and the Left in a Brazil then governed by a military dictatorship, cooperation between 
Communists and Christians had weighty political significance. Garaudy was ‘certainly not unaware of 
the larger connotations of this dialogue, but I wonder how carefully Christians have thought about the 
political overtones and implications of the same matter’ (Cox, 1968:25).   
Dissenting voices opined sternly, if somewhat precipitately, that: ‘Cooperation will not be 
effected by a synthesis of Christianity and Marxism’ (Lischer, 1968:2). So too the suggestion was made 
that the theses of Togliatti (1966) on Marxist–Christian dialogue were the core, or even the jewel in 
the crown, of Garaudy’s own work, although the dialogue itself ran the risk, the author noted, of 
merely repeating the unfruitful dialogue between ‘isolated scouts’ of Marxism and Christianity, mostly 
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mistrusted within their own communities (Desroche, 1966:182). Hence the observation that a review 
of Garaudy’s own work in the dialogue (Cottier, 1967) focused too greatly on the ‘horizontal’ 
perspective of institutional dialogue, thereby failing to appreciate the significance of Garaudy’s 
aesthetic perspective, let alone the ‘vertical’ dimension which ‘Being Christian without Christianity’35 
(Cottier, 1967:95), involved, which could be counterposed to the ‘Christianity, without Christians’ 36 of 
Saint-Simon (Desroche, 1968:183). Late in the day came Russell Norris, whose book, God, Marx and 
the Future (Norris, 1974) was an extended dialogue with, and commentary on, Garaudy’s Marxism 
from a Christian perspective. Unfortunately, Norris’ work supposes that Garaudy was still a Marxist 
and an unbeliever, albeit that ‘he personifies a special kind of Marxism’ (Norris, 1974:9). At no point 
does he seem to recognise that Garaudy had already moved beyond dialogue, as he would have had 
to do had he had written even just one year later, by which time Garaudy had declared himself a 
Christian (Garaudy, 1975), even if, as one critical reviewer of the book asked: ‘But has Norris, like 
Garaudy, moved beyond the relative safety of critical polemic and engaged in . . . dialogue . . . I think 
he has not’ (Dean, 1976:186). 
Perhaps the last word on a constructive dialogue should be left to those who rejected it. Many 
of these critics wrote in the Marxist journal La Nouvelle Critique. Their interest in the purity of Marxist 
thought led them to scepticism of any dialogue with Christianity, especially given Garaudy’s insistence 
that a real dialogue involved change, or at least the potential for change, on both sides. Contemporary 
observers recognised this, suggesting that Garaudy — and later Machoveč (1965, 1972 [1976]) ‘are 
not interested simply in recruiting Christians for Communist causes. They are concerned to facilitate 
a dialogue which could alter the content of both of the traditions in question’ (Cox, 1968:21). This was 
a point picked up for especial criticism by inter alia, Sève (1969), and in an exchange of views between 
Garaudy and other senior PCF figures — Guy Besse, Garaudy’s successor as chief PCF ideologue, and 
 
35 un christianisme sans chrétienté 
36 sans chrétienté sans christianisme 
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Antoine Casanova, both of whom complained about Garaudy’s apparently equal ideological treatment 
of the church community and the Party (Brunet, 1966:464–465; Casanova, 1966:6–7).  
 
A Marxist no longer?  
 
Most welcome however in terms of this thesis are critiques of Garaudy during what Gauvin 
(2018) called his the ‘prophetic’ phase, during which he developed and promulgated what he himself 
describes as his project, albeit that it is in the hands of his readers (Garaudy, 1976:217–218). He was 
finally free from the constraints of PCF politics and doctrine, as commentators noted (Merad, 1981).   
Both his Christianity and his Marxism were of at least initial interest to some commentators, albeit 
that they swiftly lost interest as the failure of the project in practical terms became painfully apparent 
as the decade wore on and critics were to wonder that: ‘The French Marxist, Roger Garaudy, though 
his expulsion from the Party diminished his role as a spokesperson for Marxism, has gone so far as to 
call for a rejection of atheism and to speak of “Christian Marxism” as a needed alternative vision’ 
(McGovern, 1980:82). Undoubtedly part of the problem was that as Garaudy moved away from 
convincing comrades to persuading the wider public, his style of writing changed, as he was aiming, 
very successfully, at a mass audience and exhibiting less concern with philosophical niceties. One 
student admitted in his PhD thesis on Garaudy to being ‘always seduced by the music of his prose’37 
(Goulon, 1983: 10). 
So too the fact that Garaudy claimed to remain a Marxist (Goulon, 1983:11) throughout — at 
least until his conversion to Islam — led to the suggestion that ‘Much more interesting than his  
recovery of Christianity is Garaudy's discussion on the contemporary conditions and future 
possibilities of the Communist and Capitalist worlds’ (Mayrl, 1978:86). Three factors had led Marxists 
 
37 toujours séduit par la musique de sa prose 
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such as Garaudy to examine the very foundation of their movement: the amazingly rapid development 
of science and technology, the superficiality of apparent socialism in one-third of the globe, and the 
growth of national liberation movements in developing countries (Hughes, 1970). Garaudy’s resultant 
emphatic rejection of the Soviet and Eastern Bloc was after all noteworthy for someone who had, 
after all, once been a firm adherent of the PCF. Until the Ilichev affair in 1962, when he had publicly 
opposed the idea that it was only possible to build communism after the suppression of religion 
(Ilichev, 1964), and then the Prague Spring of 1968, he had more or less followed the PCF line on the 
Soviet Bloc. He nevertheless eventually departed from that line, arguably very sensibly at a time when 
the PCF has been described as ‘a party which had very few clues as to what was going on’ (Ross, 
1992:48). Interest too surrounded his evaluation of capitalism, where Garaudy’s view on the 
increasing pace of the scientific and technical revolution and its consequences for humanity sat easily 
within a review of the potential emergence of a new, more broadly defined working class (Adam, 
1972:527) and the post-industrial society (Coste, 1976:388), albeit that this ‘soft Marxism’ certainly 
did not find favour with every Marxist. Marxist criticism of Garaudy was directed at the apparent 
priority of any alliance between the working class and students or intellectuals, together with denial 
of any reduced role for the proletariat (Mandel, 1970; Bensaïd & Artous, 1977) and scepticism over 
the likely differentiation of interests between different components of the proposed alliance 
(Poulantzas, 1972:42–43). This was especially so given that Garaudy’s Marxism began to diverge from 
the PCF line to include more speculation about the role of youth, the importance of co-operatives, or 
the creation of a new ‘historic bloc’ for change; even contemporary commentators were not 
necessarily in complete agreement (e.g. Jakubec, 1972:302; Kovaly, 1973:125), or came to his latest 
work at the end of their analysis of Marxism and Christianity, rather than at the beginning (Coste, 
1973:38). From the extreme Left came the predictable accusation that he had confirmed himself as ‘a 
good-natured reformist’38 (Bensaïd, 1970:2).  
 
38 un réformiste bon teint 
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There was more criticism, including accusations of self-plagiarism: one commentator in a 
piece on theology of hope observed that:  
‘In his work “The Hope Project39” as in all his previous work, R. Garaudy calls for the 
achievement of a society freed from savage economic growth and social injustice’ 40 (Masset, 
1977:323).  
Or failing that, unoriginality:  
‘Readers who are familiar with the extensive studies  of technological culture carried out by 
Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno and with the detailed analyses of the revolutionary 
potential of intellectuals and technicians done by Serge Mallet and Andre Gorz, among others, 
will find little that is new in Garaudy's book (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]). Indeed, by comparison its 
analyses are superficial’. (Mayrl, 1978:87).  
Garaudy’s view that ‘self-management is ‘more than ever the future of true democratic socialism’ 41 
(Goulon, 1983:281) is criticised as an impossible third way between the market and centralised 
planning (Mandel, 1975:5), granted that it ‘was developed and discussed long before Garaudy stopped 
fighting for the dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Mayrl, 1978:87). Another reviewer, late in the project, 
even lamented the absence of understanding of international relations (Jacob, 1981). For one 
reviewer, the project was political narcissism: ‘this moment certainly is legitimate, we must believe 
what we do, and what we say. What seems dangerous to us is to make narcissism into a political 
theory’42 (Brunelle, 1973:72). 
Another critic, in a history of debates within the PCF, noted in a footnote informed that: 
‘Garaudy’s first intellectual mentors were the German theologian Karl Barth and the Danish pastor 
Søren Kierkegaard. A Christian, he joined the PCF aged 20, and then adopted the materialist and 
atheistic politics of Marxism’43 (Geerlandt, 1978:30fn; Goulon, 1983:19). The none-too-subtle implicit 
criticism is of course that by borrowing from these sources, and by failing to perceive assumed 
 
39 le projet espérance 
40 Dans son ouvrage le projet espérance comme dans toute son oeuvre antérieure, R. Garaudy prône l'avènement 
d'une société libérée de la croissance économique sauvage et des injustices sociales 
41 L'autogestion est, plus que jamais, I'avenir d'une véritable démocratie socialiste 
42 Ce moment certes est légitime, il faut bien croire à ce qu'on fait, à ce qu'on dit. Ce qui nous semble dangereux, 
c'est de faire du narcissisme une théorie politique 
43 Les premiers maîtres à penser de R.Garaudy ont été le théologien allemande Karl Barth et le pasteur danois 
Kierkegaard. Chrétien, il adhère, au PCF à 20 ans, puis fait sienne la politique matérialiste et athée du marxisme 
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contradictions between them and Marx, Garaudy did not achieve, or perhaps even did not seek, any 
kind of Marxism that could conceivably be dependent on Christianity, or indeed, anything original at 
all. One intense critic of his later anti-Zionism dismissed the entire project as ‘a meandering journey’ 
(Le Monde, 31 January 1996), another as ‘a decade of wandering’44 (Godin, 2011:215). Others with 
little sympathy for the Left were even more critical. One Christian critic noted ‘the way in which 
Garaudy has sought to measure up to his own standards for human initiative and freedom, and the 
distance he has travelled from normative Marxism in so doing’ (Vree, 1976:152). This in turn led to an 
alleged contradiction in his thought between man’s ontological freedom, that Man alone is the creator 
of his history and destiny, and that Man is not the alienated servant of either God, history, or Party 
and Marxist language of lawful historical necessity. ’Garaudy is dimly aware of his dilemma and has 
great difficulty in fighting his way free of it’ (Vree, 1976:153). Nor was his Marxist–Leninist past always 
forgiven. As a result of his isolation from his captive audience, one critic noted smugly that ‘Now he 
will be read only by people who are already free’ (Cranston, 1970:18).  
After his expulsion from the PCF, Garaudy also came in for a third wave of attack from the 
Soviet philosophical establishment, which generally agreed with the sentiments of these Western 
critics. Less than a decade separated Velikovich (1965), who had mentioned with approval Garaudy's 
participation in the dialogue, from Mitrokhin (1972), who criticised what he described as the mistaken 
position of Roger Garaudy in taking the dialogue into theological areas of transcendence, subjectivity 
and love, rather than leaving it in the sociological and political fields of class struggle and revolution 
(Read, 1973:12). It is certainly possible to conclude that the CPSU, and with it the Marxist–Leninist 
Parties of Eastern Europe, intended only joint activity, not parallel, or convergent, beliefs, and certainly 
not a belief in God. It was therefore to lead to significant criticism from Soviet writers (e.g. 
Trapeznikov, 1972:88–89). The title of a book published in Moscow by the official Soviet publishing 
house, Progress Publishers, and devoted entirely to criticising Garaudy, encapsulates this critical 
 
44 une décennie d’errance 
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viewpoint: Marxism and the Renegade Garaudy (Momjan, 1974). Its author, Hachik Nishanovich 
Momjan, held no less a position than head of the department of Marxist–Leninist philosophy at the 
Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, a position of great importance in Soviet philosophy.  
For Momjan, Garaudy was a revisionist, in the same category as Ernst Fischer and Franz Marek, 
guilty of ‘overestimation of the strength of capitalism and underestimation of the limitless possibilities 
of socialism’ (Momjan, 1974:10). Guilty, too, of much more: of altering his negative view of 
existentialist philosophy, of wrongly portraying Marxist philosophy as sclerotic and dogmatic, of 
trying, and failing, to prove the idealist origins of Marxism in the work of Kant and Fichte, an emphasis 
noted even amongst contemporary Marxist scholars in the West (Rockmore, 1980:84), of 
misunderstanding the importance of extracting the dialectic from Hegel, and of introducing the 
erroneous and unnecessary ‘old idea of the pluralism, multiplicity of truth’ (Momjan, 1974:35) 
together with the equally erroneous idea that all scientific propositions are mere hypotheses 
(Momjan, 1974:4). Garaudy’s ‘revisionist programme’ came under attack for its eschatological concept 
of consciousness, emphasis on subjectivity at the expense of objective laws of development, allegedly 
incorrect and idealist formulation of the nature of man, and perhaps above all, its alleged rejection of 
the leading role of the Party and even of revolution. For Momjan, Garaudy, along with Marcuse and 
many others, had abandoned Marxism altogether, not revised it, further evidence of which was 
provided by Garaudy’s defence of the Czech rebellion against a Soviet–style regime in the Prague 
Spring of 1968 (Momjan, 1974:113, 141). When Garaudy was eventually expelled from the PCF, 
Christians remembered that defence, and held it against those who had expelled him (Lauer, 1971:18). 
It is entirely consistent with this third wave of criticism to attack Garaudy for misrepresenting 
the Marxist–Leninist position on religion, for confusing political collaboration and joint action with the 
ideological drawing together of communism and Christianity (Momjan, 1974:168). For this official 
philosophical voice of Soviet Marxism–Leninism, ‘communism and Christianity advocate mutually 
exclusive philosophical principles and here no dialogue can remove their irreconcilable contradictions’ 
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(Momjan, 1974:180). No escape for Christianity from its historical fetters can be permitted, even after 
Vatican II, nor any definition of God that allows for the identification of transcendence with secularity, 
nor the superficial appeal of the death of God in the hands of Rudolf Bultmann or John Robinson 
(Momjan, 1974:199), nor even the supportive position taken towards Marxism of Girardi (Momjan, 
1974:202). All must be rejected in exactly the same terms as Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism, [Lenin, 1909 [1947]) or else risk ‘the complete ideological disarmament of the Party’ 
(Momjan, 1974:191). And there must be no compromise with the ‘pitiful and degrading love for 
everyone’ (Momjan, 1974:219) advocated by Christianity, and supported by Garaudy. People, Momjan 
says in one admittedly powerful observation, ‘cannot be forced to love’ (Momjan, 1974:219). As for 
Garaudy himself, ‘Having crossed the Rubicon, the “Marxist” Garaudy has appeared before us in a  
cassock holding a New Testament’ (Momjan, 1974:224) — an echo of the name by which Garaudy was 
often known in the PCF: the Cardinal. 
Reading this impassioned and forceful text, with its ad hominem attacks on Garaudy, it is 
impossible to avoid the feeling that, for Momjan even at the time, Garaudy’s ideas are a dangerous 
virus that must be combatted. He had taken his direction from CPSU General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev himself, who singled the renegade Garaudy out by name at the XXIV CPSU Congress as a 
leading anti-Soviet, and thereby a servant of bourgeois ideology and propaganda (Brezhnev, 1971:10). 
The possibility that Garaudy’s approach might represent the only way forward cannot ever even be 
contemplated. As one senior Kremlin adviser readily conceded in his diary ‘nobody dared to put 
questions the way Garaudy puts them (or even in a different form), though perhaps it is impossible to 
put this question in any other way’ (Chernyaev, 1973: n.p.). The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the Warsaw Pact governments proved Soviet suspicions of danger correct; yet it also renders 
Soviet criticism of Garaudy poignant. There is scarcely any practical observation of Garaudy’s that is 
presented critically that has not come to pass. He correctly foresaw the centrality of energy to politics 
(Garaudy, 1976:10), the increasing importance of safety considerations in transport policy (Garaudy, 
1976:28), and the central importance of computing throughout society (Garaudy, 1971a:171). If 
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philosophical and religious convictions had to pass a test of accurate political forecasting, then 
Garaudy emerges the winner in this contest with Marxism–Leninism. With one exception, however, 
changing and frequently more positive attitudes towards capitalism of the Church, both Roman 
Catholic and Protestant (Poole, 2010:32). Momjan was accurate in that, at least: ‘for Christians, the 
dialogue [with Marxists] is not an occasion for ideological disarmament’ (Momjan, 1974:202).  
It was little wonder, though, that Garaudy ended up being a political target as much as a 
philosophical one in the West as much as in the East, as:  
‘Roger Garaudy articulates a position now increasingly accepted, in its general form, by neo-
Marxists. The contradictions of capitalism are such that they cannot be resolved without 
socialism. Therefore one can think of an “external necessity” or inevitability about the effects 
of capitalism. But if we are not “conscious” of the necessity for socialism (an “internal 
necessity”), the contradictions, crises and wars generated by capitalism could continue 
unresolved’ (McGovern, 1980:33).   
Such beliefs ensured that there was equally never any shortage of Western Marxist critics for whom 
his defection from the Communist Party was proof of what they had believed all along. David McLellan, 
for instance, talked of: 
 ‘so much muddying of the waters by such as Roger Garaudy when it was difficult to spot the 
difference between progressive Communists and left-wing Catholics’ (McLellan, 1987:5).  
Hence the sarcastic comment that:  
‘after having professed himself an atheist for many years, he had the "overwhelming 
experience" of discovering that "there has always been a Christian inside him". Who, after all, 
would be in a better position than Garaudy to take as a labour of love the bringing together 
of these two great humanistic systems?’ (Mayrl, 1978:86).  
For his Marxist critics, Garaudy was not, and perhaps never had been, a ‘real’ Marxist. 
Not a Christian either? 
 
On the other hand, and perhaps naturally enough, Christians were encouraged by any interest 
in Christianity, especially when they perceived a chance to be in the ascendant and organise 
themselves in relation to Marxists: ‘It is, in particular, highly important to note at this point that the 
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figure of Jesus has fascinated — and still fascinates — such Marxist thinkers as Bloch [1959], Garaudy 
[1975], Lombardo-Radice [1968], and Machoveč [1976], etc.’45 (Coste, 1979:167). Notwithstanding 
Garaudy’s insistence on the reality of Jesus’ example for the human future (Garaudy, 1969a; Belloso, 
1975:10), ‘perhaps in respect of his concern for the figure of Jesus, the truth is that we find in his 
writings less evidence than that which might have been expected in a man of such openness and 
trajectory’46 (García, 1988:143), and, García argues, what we do find appears to conform to the view 
of Bloch. Christian critics suggested that Garaudy was proposing the absorption of Christianity into 
Marxism, or at least of those parts that he deems worthwhile, love in particular. In one sense they 
were right that: 
‘Roger Garaudy does not consider détente the proper heir of the Christian–Marxist dialogue. 
Indeed, he is even willing to announce himself a Christian in order to get on with the serious 
business of developing a revolutionary coalition. The history of Garaudy's own development, 
in this regard, is interesting because it shows that even if a Marxist capitulates on issues of 
belief, he still poses a dilemma to the Christian. In fact, in many ways the dilemma becomes 
more complex’ (Mayrl, 1978:85).  
So too another Christian critic cautioned against Garaudy’s  promotion of Marxism as the terrestrial 
conscience of Christianity, as ‘a significant number of Christians did not need to wait for Marxism to 
strive to make the world a more just and fraternal place’47 (Coste, 1979:176) and even suggested that 
‘neo-Marxists’ such as Garaudy and Kolakowski saw Christ ‘only as the initiator of a revolutionary 
movement in favour of the poor and disinherited, to which Marxism can have an interest in rendering 
more dynamic‘48 (Coste, 1979:182). Rather, ‘Christians would do well to apply to their attitude towards 
Marxist analysis the famous Pauline directive, although it was given in a completely different context: 
 
45 Il est, en particulier, hautement significatif de constater à quel point la figure de Jésus a fasciné — et fascine 
encore — certains penseurs marxistes tels que E. Bloch, R. Garaudy, L. Lombardo-Radice, M. Machoveč, etc. 
46 En cuanto a su preocupación por la figura de Jesús, la verdad es que encontramos en sus escritos menos 
expresiones de las que hubiera cabido esperar en un hombre de semejante aperture y trayectoria 
47 un nombre non négligeable de chrétiens n'ont pas attendu le marxisme pour s'efforcer de rendre la terre plus 
juste et plus fraternelle 
48 seulement l'initiateur d'un mouvement révolutionnaire en faveur des pauvres et des déshér ités, dont le 
marxisme peut avoir intérêt à recueillir le dynamisme 
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check everything: what is good, remember; beware of every kind of evil (First Epistle to the 
Thessalonians., 5, 21–22)’ (Coste, 1973: 38)49.  
An almost symmetrical line of attack to that of Garaudy’s former comrades in the PCF and the 
Soviet Marxist–Leninists was that, according to another of his persistent Christian critics , he had 
equally misinterpreted Marx’s view of religion, as purely a damaging ideological illusion: ‘Garaudy’s 
personal position is fortunately different and welcoming. But, unfortunately, this was not that of 
Marx’50 (Coste, 1974:920). He is duly criticised for failing to explain exactly what he means by ‘God’ 
(Da Costa Pinto, 1976:277). Nor can he appeal to some impersonal Nature or Matter, as Masset (1977) 
suggests Bloch and Engels can do. Garaudy is left only with a reflexive turn to Man himself. Masset’s 
criticism, as that of Sève, is that it is precisely Garaudy’s anthropology that constitutes the weak point 
of Garaudy's conception of the world, and in particular of his conception of hope. According to this 
critical analysis Garaudy’s belief in Man, in his creativity, and in the future, is built on sand. He can 
neither turn to the experience of the past, either for Man or history generally, nor to divine power, 
‘which cannot find a place in the Garaudyen universe’ (Masset, 1977:323) as it does in, for example, 
that of Nikolai Berdyaev’s criticism of Marxism (Andelson, 1962:279).  
The Christian attack on Garaudy did not rest at that. For one traditional Christian, Garaudy 
had hijacked words such as faith and resurrection, stripped them of their supernatural meaning, and 
applied them to purely natural phenomena. Without a personal God, the immortality of the individual 
soul — not any collective soul — and an individual resurrection — it is suggested the most important 
points of all, there is no Christianity (Desnoues, 1979). As another critic complained, ‘The symmetry 
Garaudy institutes [between Marxism and Christianity] is false, because what is essential dogma for 
 
49 Les chrétiens,croyons-nous, feraient bien d'appliquer à leur attitude par rapport à l'analyse marxiste la célèbre 
directive paulinienne, bien qu'elle ait été donnée dans un tout autre contexte : vérifiez tout : ce qui est bon, 
retenez-le; gardez-vous de toute espèce de mal (Thessalonians., 5, 21–22) 
50 La position personnelle de Garaudy est heureusement autrement accueillante. Nous nous en réjouissons. Mais 
ce n'était malheureusement pas celle de Marx 
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Christianity is a misguided and wrong for Marxism’51 (Caveing, 1973:6). Fernández agreed, arguing 
that Garaudy’s intention is ‘to reinterpret Christianity in the Marxist terminology of earth-bound 
immanentism’52, and that for Garaudy any personal commitment to Christ and the acceptance of the 
Christian message completely overshadows the role of faith in the world. A very similar criticism 
emerges from the Francosphere: notwithstanding his Christian faith, Xavier Dijon was evidently an 
admirer of Garaudy’s courageous stand against numerous ills of society, whether the school system, 
scientific positivism, or capitalism itself (Dijon, 1975:970). None of this, however, prevents him from 
questioning whether Garaudy has reduced Christianity to just another theory, a way of looking at the 
world that may have appeal for many, and asserting that for Garaudy to call himself a Christian was, 
in fact, an abuse of language (Dijon, 1975:970). This criticism also comes from the Hispanic world:  
‘It is clear that for G. there is something in Man that goes beyond Man himself; and it is the 
others who help us to perceive it. But our unease persists when we ask ourselves if G. really 
believes in a "totally Other" of numinous and divine character — as Rudolf Otto defined it 
after studying about thousands of religions of the world [so that] By emptying God of his real 
transcendence and emptying Christ of his divine essence, phrases of Garaudy's last essay 
sound hollow, and romantic Christian “horizontalism”’53 (Fernández, 1975: n.p.).  
Not therefore, contra Garaudy, amamus, but amamur, should be prior (Fernández, 1975, n.p.). 
Garaudy was also quickly accused of viewing all alternatives to European cultural hegemony through 
rose-tinted spectacles, for example idealising ‘the land of Africa’54 (Luneau, 1976:39). The resultant 
level playing field between religions, eventually, would not have seemed so eclectic or unusual, 
perhaps, if reviewers had read others on the same subject, such as René Guénon (1931), Ananda 
Coomaraswarmy (1947) or perhaps especially Frithjof Schuon (1948), but Garaudy was never placed 
by his critics in the same category, perhaps because of his Marxism. 
 
51 La symétrie qu'institue Garaudy est fausse, parce que ce qui est essentiel dans le christianisme, le dogme 
comme tel, est avatar et malformation dans le marxisme 
52 de reinterpretar el cristianismo en términos marxistas de Inmanentismo terreno 
53 Es claro que para G. hay en el hombre algo que desborda al mismo hombre; y son los demás quienes nos lo 
ayudan a percibir. Pero nuestro malestar persiste cuando nos preguntamos si G. realmente cree en un 
"totalmente Otro" de carácter numinoso y divino –como lo definió Rudolf Otto tras estudio sobre miles de 
religiones del mundo. ¿… Al vaciar a Dios de su real trascendencia y al vaciar a Cristo de su esencia divina, frases 
del último ensayo de Garaudy suenan hueco y a romántico horizontalismo 'cristiano' 
54 la terre africaine 
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But what therefore should Garaudy be allowed to call himself? Despite Garaudy’s sensational 
proclamation of Christianity, should Christians believe him? At root the criticism was the same, that 
Garaudy was really neither Marxist, nor Christian, but something quite different:  ‘in fact, for Garaudy, 
there is no personal God but the great whole of the Universe which will be lost and confused after 
death, whether all living beings realize it or not. This ideology is as old as the world: it is called 
pantheism.’55 (Desnoues, 1979, n.p.). This was a view shared by a later critic who suggested that as a 
Christian, Garaudy had espoused a ‘Hegelian pantheism of love’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.), although it 
would be unusual to point to love as a central concept for any depiction of Hegelian pantheism. The 
criticism is anyway surely off the mark: Garaudy certainly could have described himself as a pantheist, 
had he so wished, but he did not, and for good reason — as a humanist he spent much of his time 
trying to emphasise the distinctive importance of every human being, not their identity with inanimate 
objects or the universe in general. Both as a Christian — and later sometimes even as a Muslim 
(Garaudy, 1992) — he sought to emphasise Jesus’ Gospel of love. More broadly, Desnoues does not 
explain what he means by a ‘personal’ God, nor from where he concludes that Garaudy’s God is any 
different from his own. This style of criticism has changed little over the years, however, and Garaudy 
has been far from the only target of attack by conservative Calvinists, for example, who have had 
‘Pelagians’ of every stripe in their sights in the new millennium as much as in the old (Sproul, 2001). 
Garaudy’s main distinction was to be attacked on both sides, as much as for his Marxism as much as 





55 En fait, pour R. Garaudy, il n’y a pas de Dieu personnel mais le Grand Tout de l’Univers où viendront se perdre 
et se confondre après leur mort tous les êtres vivants conscients ou non. Cette idéologie est vieille comme le 




Sympathy for the project 
 
There were some commentators on Garaudy who recognised that neo-Marxists were capable 
of much deeper analysis than simply wordplay on who was entitled to call themselves a Christian, or 
a Marxist. One notes the prophetic tradition within Christianity: ‘Throughout the his tory of 
Christianity, a tension has always existed between the prophet and the priest’ (Hornosty, 1976:7), with 
Garaudy placed firmly in the former category, pointing to his stress in L’Alternative on the 
revolutionary potential of the ‘prophetic spirit’ in contrast with ‘positivism’ (Garaudy, 1972, 
[1976:122]). Academic criticism which came close to suggesting that Garaudy was making himself the 
project (Bourdieu, 1984) ought therefore to be tempered, as some was, with comments such as  
‘there is something about this book which makes it worthwhile reading. The fact that it offers 
a familiar analysis and a borrowed vision is compensated by its highly personal and passionate 
mode of presentation. The Alternative Future should be read as an episode in the biography 
of a remarkably durable and surprisingly flexible revolutionary thinker’ (Mayrl, 1978:87). 
Much later in the itinerary of the project, a reviewer of Pour un dialogue des civilisations (Garaudy, 
1977) feels able to conclude that ‘the study of the attempts at synthesis already suggested by non-
Westerners must bring additional light to the elaboration of a plan of life and a project of hope on a 
global scale’56 (Henvaux, 1978:209), whilst another concluded merely that it was ‘a book well worth 
consideration’57 (Keller, 1981:176). 
One of the most sympathetic commentaries was that of Perottino (1969, 1974), which 
combined analysis with a selection of Garaudy’s own works, though largely ignoring the philosophical 
 
56 l'étude des tentatives de synthèse déjà suggérées par des non–Occidentaux doit apporter un surcroît de 
lumière dans l'élaboration d'un « plan de vie et un projet espérance à l'échelle planéte  
57 Livre considérable . . .  
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and political changes wrought by the project, as does a reviewer (Baufay, 1977). For Perottino, 
Garaudy is right on every count, the exceptions being singled out by Baufay (1977) that sometimes his 
thought perhaps goes beyond the acceptable, at least for orthodox Marxists, in relation to 
‘conscience–reflection’, where Garaudy argues that work is an act of transformation of nature and of 
oneself, but preceded by the consciousness of its ends (Perottino, 1974:152); and that the 
consciousness of purpose precedes the work done (Perottino, 1974:94). So too Garaudy’s reflections 
on love, death, and religion were sympathetically drawn, even noting that he was ‘striving to respect 
the spirit and the letter of Marx’58 (Baufay, 1977:715) at a time when others in recognising Garaudy’s 
call for revolution noted that ‘violence and the sacred have been drawn closer together’ 59 (Ries, 
1974:515). For García, however, Garaudy goes a little further, using the historical figure of Jesus to 
underpin an anthropology of revolutionary action, in which faith in the resurrection takes on an 
individual, human dimension rather than expressing an epistemological relation. Not what happened, 
says García, but its effects on human life, is what matters for Garaudy (García, 1988:145). What was 
radically new in Christianity was the opposite of renouncing the world — ‘it was its transition, through 
the central experience of the Incarnation, of the God-man and the man-God, from the love of love to 
the love of the other’ (Garaudy, 1967b:216). 
Even more positively, in one review the argument is made that it is ‘ likely that many of the 
doctrines which separated the two camps would be exposed as myths which grew up in response to 
unique historical circumstances’ (Mayrl, 1978:86). Commentators from outside the Anglosphere have 
also occasionally lent support, even after Garaudy’s conversion to Islam and in apparent isolation from 
it. Hence: 
‘Roger Garaudy holds a ·special place among French Marxists for his interest in religion. He 
went through various phases of spiritual transformation from dogmatic Marxism to 
Christianity and finally Islam. In his Marxist phase when he had already surpassed his dogmatic 
position, he was driven to better understanding of the humanistic essence of Marxism, 
surpassing naive and realistic comprehension by noticing some positive characteristics of 
 
58 en tâchant de respecter l'esprit et la lettre de Marx 
59 on a rapproché la violence et le sacré 
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Christianity. Garaudy claimed that Christian humanism first of all is a positive characteristic of 
Christianity, manifested in Christian treatment of subjectivity and radical affirmation of 
Christian love as a general human possibility. He points out that in real human life subjectivity 
is expressed in latent and subtle forms of consciousness and spiritual states, such as care, love, 
and the experience of transcendence. (Skledar, 1989:18). 
Garaudy did find other isolated sympathetic commentators. In Portugal, Da Costa Pinto contributed 
articles sympathetic to Garaudy to the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. His review of Garaudy’s work 
to date quoted Garaudy’s assertion of the role of Christianity in social transformation: that the 
resurrection of Christ inaugurates a new existence, a rupture with and surpassing of individualism, and 
the conviction of the good news that ‘everything is possible’ (Da Costa Pinto,  1982:738). 
Unfortunately, the delays involved in academic publication meant that Garaudy converted to Islam in 
the same year.  
There were very few book-length treatments of Garaudy’s project, or even articles. This was 
surely not because of a failure to recognise that Garaudy ‘proved himself more eager to exchange 
ideas than to impose his views on others; he was willing to learn, and he spoke of the conversations 
as a dialectical exercise which would result in an enrichment of Marxism itself’ (Cranston, 1970:12). 
As early as De L’anathème au dialogue, (Garaudy, 1965) ‘Garaudy in his book says that Marxism itself 
must now learn something from Christianity, especially concerning the problems of what he calls 
‘subjectivity and transcendence’ (Cox, 1968:21) — the subjects as noted above of Chapters Four and 
Five. There were however three contemporary doctorates written about Garaudy’s Marxist–Christian 
thought, either wholly or in part: Charles McClain’s From Ideology to Utopia: the Marxist Careers of 
Ernst Fischer and Roger Garaudy (1972), Salim Bustros’ Socialism, Christianity and Human Liberation 
in the Thought of Roger Garaudy60 (1976) and Robert Goulon’s The Spiritual Itinerary of Roger Garaudy 
in his Written Work61 (1983). The three wrote from widely different perspectives: whereas McClain 
wrote in the History Faculty of Stanford University, Bustros was in the Theology Faculty at Louvain and 
 
60 Socialisme, christianisme et libération de L’homme dans la Pensée de Roger Garaudy 
61 L'itinéraire spirituel de Roger Garaudy dans son oeuvre écrite 
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Goulon was in the Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences at Lorraine. Both their academic heritage and 
their time of writing can be seen to influence the narrative of each thesis.  
McClain’s thesis is entirely concerned with Garaudy (and Ernst Fischer, also singled out by 
Brezhnev as a renegade) as Marxists. He begins with the PCF and why ‘The Christian vision gave a deep 
significance to the sufferings of the poor and helped him for a time to bridge the gap between the two 
worlds. Yet this proved to be only a temporary solution to his dilemma’ (McClain, 1972:163). He 
continues with a description of Garaudy’s career, in particular his sympathy with ‘all that was valuable 
in the French past’ (McClain, 1972:179), from medieval Catholic thought to eighteenth century 
rationalism, notwithstanding what is described as Garaudy’s ‘sovereign disdain’ (McClain, 1972: 185) 
for the aesthetic decadence he saw pervading post-war French culture (Garaudy, 1947). Yet in 
describing Garaudy’s role in the criticism levelled by the PCF against André Marty and then Henri 
Lefebvre, we learn that ‘His Marxism burned with the fire of religious faith’ (McC lain, 1972:217).  
The biographical approach then leads to Garaudy’s Marxist humanism, the emergence of 
which is characterised by comparison with Perottino (1969) as ‘very gradual’ (McClain, 1972:226fn). 
This leads McClain to examine the course of Garaudy’s  exchange of views with Sartre (Garaudy, 1960; 
Remley, 2012:19), his emphasis on the Hegelian dialectic within Leninism, engagement with 
Christianity, positive evaluation of the work of Louis Aragon and prominent artists, reform of the PCF 
in the context of a pluralistic evolution of the French Left (McClain, 1972:295) and the creation of a 
new ‘historic bloc’. But the conclusion is that however heterodox their opinions, ‘Both men [Fischer 
and Garaudy] have remained convinced Communists through every phase of their careers’ (McClain, 
1972:333). The parting of ways between Garaudy and the PCF is the conclusion of McClain’s thesis; it 
is the start of this one. 
Bustros’ project derived from a very different starting point: a practical wish to investigate the 
compatibility of socialism and Christian belief, for an answer to which he turned to Garaudy, for whom 
he evidently had a high regard as a messenger of hope amidst all that he had seen of the chaos of war 
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and its consequences (Bustros, 1976:ix). Bustros intends to present Garaudy’s theoretical work as a 
contiguous, homogenous, if not entirely immobile, body of thought. Hence the starting point of the 
self-identification of the working class as collectively capable of transformation (Garaudy, 1975:95) 
and the need of the PCF to incorporate the best in Christian morality (Garaudy, 1975:96). Hence the 
argument that ‘The Christian cannot but question the dependability and stability of a morality which 
is vague and subject to various interpretations according to how the particular leader believes 
humanity can be made more fully human’ (Hughes, 1970:59) can be set alongside quotes from 
Garaudy’s dialogue with Quentin Lauer and biographical information from his youth. Bustros’ quotes 
from Garaudy are arranged functionally for his case, not biographically. From then on, he argued, his 
philosophical quest tended towards emphasising within Marx what, in his opinion, led to a 
convergence between Marxism and religion, and in particular an affirmation that Christian faith could 
form the basis of revolutionary action — although clearly there could be others. 
Bustros found that Garaudy sought consistency between Marxism and Christianity in a re-
evaluation of Marx’s atheism on the one hand, and analysis of the development of Christianity on the 
other. (Bustors, 1976:225). For Bustros, Garaudy’s project will succeed if he can satisfy himself that 
Marxism should not be understood as atheist, either theoretically or practically. If Marxism is a 
humanism, as Garaudy contends, then the question of atheism need not arise. Bustros identifies 
Garaudy’s distinction between a metaphysical atheisim in Marx and a methodological one, only the 
latter really being the case. He cited Garaudy’s distance of Marx from dialectical materialism, from 
any purely materialist ontology. For Garaudy, like Marx, God cannot intervene in nature, hence a 
rejection of the God of the gaps. This ‘methodological atheism’, Bustros avers, Marxism brings to 
Christianity. Marxism is a middle way between idealism and mechanism. Religion is protest, from the 
Levellers in England through to Hobbes the materialist autocrat. Garaudy is also critical of the 
repression of Christians in Soviet Bloc countries, which he said had no theoretical basis in Marxism, 
but rather, could be explained by the Church’s identification with reactionary politics. Not belief but 
organised religion disappears under Communism. Nevertheless, for Bustros, Garaudy still represents 
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a minority, revisionist tendency inside Marxism; he doubted whether these views of Garaudy’s were 
shared by the majority of communists (Bustros, 1976:238). This was a reasonable supposition even as 
late as when Bustros wrote, even if as we shall see it no longer is. 
On the other hand, Bustros picked up from L’Alternative (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]) three social 
trends that were, Garaudy claimed, bringing Christianity into line with Marxism. First, he noted the 
end of empire as indicating the existence of alternatives to the Western model of growth — 
highlighting a distinction between religion, in the sense of established churches, and individual faith. 
Marxist criticism of Christianity aims at the religion, not the faith. Bustros noted that Garaudy picked 
up on Bultmann’s essence of the kerygma, an intimate dialogue with God, not a Christian ideology, 
and on Teilhard de Chardin’s elimination of the concept of original sin as a legacy of a pre-evolutionary, 
primitive world. The end result: no more God of the gaps, a view to which Bustros was evidently 
sympathetic. Others were not, expressing scepticism about Garaudy’s Marxist credentials once he had 
published L’Alternative (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]) and suggesting that ‘It will then be important to define 
them carefully and diagnose if they are still in the line of Marx and Engels or if they already express a 
contradiction with some of their essential positions. The question may arise, for example, for some 
points of the doctrine of Roger Garaudy at its current stage62 (Coste, 1973:38).  No conclusive answer 
to this question, however, is provided anywhere, most obviously because there is no one who could 
provide one authoritatively, any more than for Christianity.  
Goulon (1983), by contrast, presents an almost exclusively historical conception of Garaudy’s 
thought, recounting it bereft of any critical analysis of any potential contradictions. For Goulon,  
historical developments alone appear to suffice as both an explanation for Garaudy’s change of views, 
whether from Stalinism to Marxist humanism, in favour of dialogue, or his decision to leave the PCF, 
and a justification for them. ‘Men of faith are interested in Garaudy’63 (Goulon, 1983:202) he says, 
 
62 Il importera alors de les définir avec soin et de diagnostiquer si elles se situent encore dans la ligne de Marx 
et d'Engels ou si elles expriment déjà une contradiction avec certaines de leurs positions essentielles. La question 
peut se poser, par exemple, pour quelques points de la doctrine d'un Roger Garaudy à son stade actuel  
63 Les hommes qui intéressent Garaudy sont des hommes de foi 
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without indicating exactly why they ought to be, or indeed who exactly ‘men of faith’ may be. Goulon 
too notes the influence of Bultmann, Cox, Hromádka, Robinson and Teilhard de Chardin, all 
contributing to a ‘new theological conception’64 of God in the world, not outside it, but which can 
safely remain unexplained, or contrasted with others (Goulon, 1983:228). He also includes Garaudy’s 
aesthetics and the role of love without comment. Perhaps his most telling remark is in relation to 
Garaudy’s expulsion from the PCF: he was crucified65 (Goulon, 1983:279).  
 
Commentary after the conversion 
 
Fast forward to more than a after Garaudy had declared his adherence to the Muslim faith, 
and Garaudy’s work is again the subject of sympathetic commentary (Da Costa Pinto, 1994). We are 
again led to believe that there is consistency across the years: an attack on purely quantitative 
measures of human existence, a rejection of Cartesian philosophical assumptions, a denunciation of 
economic growth, and an insistence on transcendence. What Garaudy assimilates from Islam is his 
introduction of the term ‘prophetic philosophy’ counterposed to ‘Western philosophy’ (Garaudy, 
1985c:169), and differences in the direct perception of God, the only reality, the pathway to God, and 
the realisation of that pathway through human action. Islamic commentators were unimpressed with 
his failure to adhere to conventional Islam, Les Fossoyeurs (Garaudy, 1992) in particular coming in for 
criticism: ‘In a most un-Islamic fashion, he stresses the importance of Jesus' crucifixion for our 
understanding of God’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.).  
Christian sympathisers, on the contrary, are more inclined to argue that Garaudy speaks with 
one voice throughout his work. The question of any inconsistency between on the one hand his 
suggestion that multiple religious sources of ‘wisdoms’ could lead to ‘unprecedented encounter 
 
64 Cette nouvelle conception théologique 
65 Il est “crucifié” 
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between faith and politics that allow Man to rediscover his lost dimensions’ (Da Costa Pinto, 1994:313) 
and on the other the derivation of the inspiration of prophetic philosophy from Islam never arises. 
Others may need to concern themselves with requirements to accept the full consequences of a 
particular set of ideas, but Garaudy, at least for Da Costa Pinto, always appears to rise above such 
awkward choices, so that even his Islamic faith flows naturally from his spirituality. His Marxism, and 
his Christianity, let alone his pariah status, are all allowed to fade away without comment as t he 
decades pass (Da Costa Pinto, 2017).  
 
Ad hominem, no ad rem 
 
It is worth observing that throughout his career, Garaudy attracted criticism from many 
quarters. Not just criticism of his ideas: is very noticeable that one of the main methods of engagement 
with Garaudy’s thought has been ad hominem arguments, frequently descending into abuse. 
Examples are very easy to find: 
‘Garaudy exaggerates and sentimentalizes the fashionable humanism of Marx. The result 
reads more like a personal testament than a judicious assessment and presentation of 
Marxism’ (R.J.B., 1967:158). 
Or this: 
‘Garaudy always wrote tactfully, even perhaps with a certain sly cunning’ (Cranston, 1970:13).  
Or this: 
‘One finds attempts to explain Garaudy’s behaviour by his personal traits: his inability to hold 
firm, consistent views, his frequent departures from strictly scientific thinking, his tendency 
to be governed by emotion rather than logic, and his passion for new ideas, regardless of 
whether they are correct (Momjan, 1974:8).  
Or this:  
‘there are Marxists — the Frenchman, Roger Garaudy, for example — whose engagement in 
dialogue has been a prelude to a surrender of their belief system’ (Vree, 1976:4), although 
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this does not prevent him from “setting up straw men”, and has either deluded himself or 
attempted to delude his audience with empty rhetoric’ (Vree, 1976:155). 
Or this:  
‘Unfortunately, the reader who takes the subtitle seriously and expects to find a sequel to 
From Anathema to Dialogue will be disappointed. The present work fails to achieve, much less 
to go beyond, the level of sophistication found in the earlier book which, by the author's own 
admission, had been intended only to establish a framework for discussions between Marxists 
and Christians’ (Mayrl, 1978:86).  
Garaudy’s subsequent career, especially his prosecution for Holocaust denial, did nothing to enhance 
his evidently precarious pre-conversion reputation. Hence the observation that ‘although Garaudy 
was among the best-remembered of advocates of Marxist–Christian dialogue, he was far from being 
the most sophisticated’ (McBride, 2016:7) a view that was based on Sartre’s alleged view of Garaudy 
as not a brilliant intellect, the fact that Garaudy’s dissertation centered on the discredited reflection 
theory of consciousness, and a negative evaluation of From Anathema to Dialogue. ‘I just don’t see 
Garaudy’s work as offering a lot of new insights, although… it constituted an important contribution 
at the time, and perhaps had more influence than most (or perhaps any) of the others’ (William 
McBride, personal communication, 1 December 2017).  
As to his conversion, there were critics of his Islamic writing even beforehand — some were 
evidently bemused, others perhaps felt contemptuous of his ‘passing from a shabby Marxist–
Christianity to a no less problematic adherence to Islam’66 (Paquette, 1992:100), whilst one of those 
who had many years previously staked his reputation, almost, as an esoteric Christian theorist, on 
Garaudy’s thought throughout the decades seized enthusiastically on Garaudy’s temporary re-
engagement with esotericism (Garaudy, 1992) as proof that after his conversion he had abandoned a 
dogmatic Islam (Da Costa Pinto, 1994).   
But especial vitriol was reserved for Garaudy after his identification with Holocaust denial, not 
least, but by no means exclusively only, from those deeply concerned with his anti-Semitism — 
‘Despite his obvious turn to the French extreme Right, the favourable reaction to Garaudy in Arabic 
 
66 en passant d'un scabreux christiano–marxisme à une non moins problématique adhésion à l'islam 
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newspapers and magazines was overwhelming’ (Nordbruch, 2001:4). At his trial in 1996, the 
prosecutor opening the case began by arguing: ‘Roger Garaudy is the man of perpetual denial. He has 
approved all of the great impostures of the century, the two totalitarianisms, passing from the red 
plague to the black’ (Lorach, 1996, n.p.), a view repeated in the powerful words of one of his most 
prominent liberal critics many years later, that he wished to put his philosophy in the service of 
successive totalitarian systems of thought, first ‘communism’, then Islam (Taguieff, 2012). As a result 
of this, together with more general socio-economic factors that have shifted collective attention away 
from Marxism, little of his pre-Islamic work has been discussed since his conversion, even in a country 
like Cuba where Marxism has at least until very recently enjoyed state support (Cortés Sánchez, 
2007:133). A sympathetic review of his argument that Islam and the West should make common cause 
against capitalism, for example, even called him ‘a former Communist, who became active in Marxist–
Christian dialogue and embraced Islam after being expelled from the party in 1970’ (Nottingham, 
1996:560), as if the Garaudy of the project in between did not exist. Likewise, critics and supporters 
alike have also chosen to ignore it, suggesting that he ‘disappeared from public view’ between his 
expulsion from the PCF and conversion to Islam (Yakira, 2009:47) or fostering the illusion that Garaudy 
converted directly from secular Marxism to Islam (e.g. Chelain, 1996:5). 
The absence of recent commentary is even more striking in relation to Garaudy’s publications 
immediately before and after he was expelled from the PCF. In recent years some critics have also 
been able to take advantage of Garaudy’s total fall from grace in France as a justification for avoiding 
active engagement with his thought and to deliver even more aggressively critical commentaries. 
Hence this, in relation to Garaudy’s desperate attempt to wean the PCF off its dogmatic dependence 
on a tightly defined and fast disappearing French industrial proletariat: ‘it appeared that the best 
Garaudy and his fellow Communist Party thinkers could offer in terms of a challenge to Marxist–
Leninist orthodoxy was an anaemic approximation of Lefebvre’s theory of alienation coupled with a 
willingness to admit anyone, including all Catholics and middle managers, into the workers’ struggle’ 
(Lewis, 2005:156). Or that he used: 
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‘questionable sources (for example propaganda documents from Moscow to support one of 
his two doctoral dissertations, the seriousness of which is undermined), a counterfeit use of 
quotations, plagiarism, recourse to a thunderous but hollow phraseology, and frequently 
changed his opinions like a weather-vane’ (Prazan & Minard, 2007:174).  
Or this:  
‘As philosopher, politician, and agitator, Garaudy's utter mediocrity is instantly apparent to 
anyone who reads a few pages of his œuvres’ (Taheri, 2007: n.p.).  
Even the very volume of his output was criticised (Sève, 2000), and even his earlier Marxist humanist 
work (Garaudy, 1959 [1969]) was dismissed as ‘crypto-religious neo-rhetoric67’ (Sève, 2004:134). For 
his critics, he could do, or think, no right.  
Some commentators have equally been prepared to write as if his conversion to Islam and 
everything that followed did not exist, either uninformed about how his thought had itself evolved, 
deliberately disinterested, or re-writing history. For example, a history of religion and the Cold War, 
where Garaudy features only as ‘the PCF religious specialist and philosopher’ (Hainsworth, 2003:147), 
or a retrospective evaluation of his philosophical contribution to Marxist–Christian dialogue that 
concluded: ‘All this is rather stunning stuff, coming as it did from a Marxist philosopher and French 
Politburo member of such prominence and profundity’ (Swider & Mojzes, 2000:40), his views on 
transcendence by comparison to that of Marx (Paulose, 2000), an evaluation of his Marxist humanism 
which was the subject of sometimes favourable comparison to Althusser or Sartre, but quite 
independently of any of his subsequent published work (Boey, 1980; Gil Claros, 2008), a penetrating 
analysis of his philosophical contribution to the Marxist–Christian dialogue (Boer, 2019:123), the way 
his Christian views were extensively drawn upon decades later by one Colombian writer on Teilhard 
de Chardin (Fernández, 2013), or the dismissal in one phrase of the entire project as ‘a heterogenous 
Christianity’68 (Gugelot, 2009:291), a mere postscript to the Marxist–Christian dialogue. By way of 
complete contrast, however, from an Islamic perspective his thought is seen as a continuous evolution 
towards Islam, with his prophetic phase subject to especial criticism. One Islamic writer, Neal Robinson 
 
67 la néo-rhétorique crypto-religieuse 
68 un christianisme hétérodoxe 
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(2004: n.p.) went so far as to argue that ‘he was never particularly at ease in that capacity [i.e. as a 
Christian]’, an argument to which the subsequent Chapter is intended as a response.  
Only very recently has a glimmer of ‘revisionist’ literature on Garaudy begun to emerge, of 
which the most significant individually is probably Didier Gauvin’s doctorate, Un intellectuel 
communiste illégitime : Roger Garaudy (2018). Gauvin, who like Goulon and Da Costa Pinto knew 
Garaudy personally, is a magnificent source of sympathetic political biography, but for this very reason 
his concern with the underlying philosophy of Garaudy’s project is understandably tangential. His own 
view closely parallels that of Goulon (1983) in promoting an essential continuity in Garaudy’s thought. 
Quite different in structure, though again similar in conception, is the French website, Roger Garaudy 
à contre-nuit, a title derived from one of Garaudy’s poems (Garaudy, 1987a), which is meticulously 
maintained by Alain Reynaud, and which contains an invaluable, almost comprehensive, collection of 
articles by and about Garaudy’s work, including the period of the project. Reynaud explained: ‘Without 
subscribing to every idea, I want to contribute to rediscovering a work which is today boycotted, 
truncated, deformed, and to enable it to contribute to resistance [to the current world order] and the 
construction of alternatives to the tendencies of today’69 (Reynaud, 2018). Similarly, there is a German 
text (Polat, 2018) and website (Polat, 2018a) although in this case, diametrically opposite to my own, 







69 Sans en partager toutes les thèses, je veux contribuer à faire redécouvrir une oeuvre aujourd'hui boycottée, 





Garaudy made intellectuals jealous, and they barely took care to conceal their contempt for 
his mass appeal (e.g. Bourdieu, 1984). This was not surprising, surely, given the publishing success of 
his books and his ease of access to the media (e.g. Le Monde, 7 November 1980). Equally, for senior 
members of the Centre catholique des intellectuels français who worried that people would follow his 
ideas and they lacked anyone of sufficient calibre to oppose him, ‘there was an especial fear of 
Garaudy . . . they were scared to death of him’70 (Tavares, 1981:56).  
One reason was that he straddled politics, philosophy — and culture — readily and with 
apparent ease. Another was that in a pre-internet age, his global influence was enormous: in 
terminology familiar today, we might say that he was a master of marketing, and created his own 
brand. Attitudes to his work depended significantly not only on the subjective standpoint of the 
reviewer or commentator, but also on changes in the wider socio-economic environment. The 
evolution of commentary on Garaudy’s work is therefore quite striking: so long as he swam with the 
intellectual tide — not necessarily with wider social trends — he was applauded by reputed 
intellectuals. His work on Marxist–Christian dialogue, on Marxist humanism, his Hegel scholarship, and 
even in the West his criticism of the Soviet Union and the PCF establishment were all favoured by 
sympathetic reviews or intelligent criticism. As he veered away, however, and the decade of the 1970s 
proceeded, he lost support, and when he entered the mass market, academics paid less and less 
attention. Of those who did, the Marxists looked at his Marxism and found it derivative and wanting, 
whilst the Christians did exactly the same for his faith.  
There was an underlying logic to later criticism of Garaudy’s Marxism, his Christianity, and 
then his eventual project of mutual dependence, a theme that tied them together. They mostly 
 
70 Il y avait une espèce de peur panique de Garaudy . . . ils avaient une peur bleue de Garaudy  
66 
 
emerged from the liberal West, where with the alleged end of history (Fukuyama, 1989), academic 
and popular opinion alike felt increasingly less need to engage with Marxism, and in many cases, with 
Christianity either. Those who remained on the Left, especially in France, owed their allegiance more 
to structural rather than humanist Marxism, whilst Christians felt progressively less need to engage 
with Marxism. Either way, there was therefore certainly not much perceived need to take seriously 
any attempt to span the two poles of Marxism and Christianity, especially from someone who 
subsequently abandoned both and, after his conversion to Islam, associated with anti-Semitic 




Chapter Three: Garaudy’s project  
 
 
Introduction — recapitulation and purpose  
 
There have been three central objectives in the preceding two chapters. First, to introduce 
Roger Garaudy, to examine his long and varied life, his intellectual and political journey from Marxism 
and Christianity to Islam, and to argue for the continued significance of his thought in the 21st Century. 
Secondly, to identify and define a specific period within that journey, the 1970s, when Garaudy sought 
to develop a particularly close relationship between Marxism and Christianity. I have followed his own 
nomenclature (Garaudy, 1976:217) in describing this attempt as Garaudy’s project. Third, to identify 
and review what others thought and commented about Garaudy, especially during the period of his 
project.  
This chapter now seeks to build on those thoughts and commentaries to explain the 
theoretical basis of the project, its content, and its trajectory. For the most part, I have not sought to 
exercise critical judgement over Garaudy’s project at this point. Although I believe this  task to be 
essential, I am delaying it until Chapter Seven, for three reasons. First, because Chapters Four and Five 
focus on two particular components of the project, subjectivity and transcendence, a focus I believe 
necessary before engaging in critical analysis. Second, because of the need to incorporate Garaudy’s 
conversion to Islam, which I examine in Chapter Six. And finally, because in the decades since Garaudy 
ended his project, the relationship between Marxism and Christianity has been treated by other 
authors (e.g. Eagleton, 2011, 2018; Žižek, 2000, 2003), contributions which I have included in my own 
critical judgement of Garaudy’s project in Chapter Seven. This Chapter, then, presents a largely 




From consistency to mutual dependence 
 
As others have noted, conceptual taxonomy is important in considering the relationship 
between two sets of ideas, especially in respect of intellectual traditions or ‘belief systems’ such as 
Marxism and Christianity . No doubt the definition of either an intellectual tradition or a belief system 
is not easy: both terms are much more frequently employed than explained. One definition to which 
I am sympathetic envisaged an intellectual tradition as a set of families of previously produced which 
serve as models or points of departure. Specifically, ‘An intellectual tradition is a set or pattern of 
beliefs, conceptions of form, sets of verbal (and other symbolic) usages, rules of procedure, 
recurrently and unilaterally linked with each other through time’  (Shils, 1972:23).  Further, a Western 
intellectual tradition — such as Marxism or Christianity - has at its centre ‘the need to define, confine 
and manipulate ideas’ (Stringer, 2008:1). Such a definition certainly fits well with the descriptions of 
both Marxism and Christianity employed in the literature surrounding their encounter (Vree, 1976, 
1978:395; Turner, 1975:244, 1977:192–193; Rourke, 1991:27).   
 My argument for the distinctiveness of Garaudy’s project rests on a difference between 
consistency and mutual dependence. I therefore set out working definitions of both, which I believe 
are relatively straightforward, and I hope are uncontroversial.  
Two or more sets of intellectual traditions as defined above may be said to be consistent when 
it is possible to claim without logical contradiction to hold the contentions, methodology and practice 
of both or all of them concurrently. Where traditions do not themselves contain contradictory 
ontological, epistemological, ethical, teleological or any other kinds of beliefs, it is possible to establish 
complete mutual consistency. Only partial consistency is possible where either this is not the case, or 
where consistency is possible only between some of the contentions, beliefs or practice of the two 
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intellectual traditions. Provided he is not simply judging one on the basis of the other, MacIntyre put 
his own partial consistency between Marxism and Christianity well in writing the revealing 
autobiographical words that form the frontispiece to this thesis (MacIntyre, 1953 [1968:vii]). How 
individuals act with regard to their belief of consistency can in practice range from an entirely 
introspective silence to an attempt, such as that of Garaudy during his Marxist humanist phase, to 
persuade others of the truth, and usually of the importance, of the belief in consistency. 
For two or more intellectual traditions to be either wholly or partially mutually dependent, on 
the other hand, it is necessary to hold some or all of the contentions, methodology and practice of 
both or all of them concurrently. Mutual dependence is furthermore a causative relationship, closer 
even than that described elsewhere as ‘strong compatibility’, for example the claim that ‘Christians 
are compelled to accept the basic claim of the Marxist critique of religion’ (Turner, 1977:193). Mutual 
dependence likewise may range from introspective to communicative.  
What then distinguishes Garaudy’s project from his Marxist humanism period? In both, it may 
be said that Marxism and Christianity share common ground. Hence in referring to Garaudy's analysis 
of Marxism, (Garaudy, 1966 [1970]) it has been observed that during the Marxist–Christian dialogue, 
'Again and again, one encounters efforts to identify the core of both Marxism and Chris tianity' (Boer, 
2019:119). I argue however that there is a crucial difference. In the former, Marxism and Christianity 
were partially consistent: Garaudy argued it was possible to believe in certain aspects of Marxism and 
remain a Christian, and vice versa. In the latter, they become mutually dependent: in order to be a 
Marxist, it is necessary to hold some beliefs derived from Christianity, and vice versa. Garaudy’s 






Finally, where mutual dependence becomes complete, all beliefs of each tradition must be 
held by both, and there may be said to be a synthesis between the two traditions. Either mutual 
dependence or synthesis are candidates for the ‘convergence’ that Sève derides in Garaudy’s Marxism 
(Sève, 1969 [1978:158–160]) and to which the language used by liberation theologians occasionally 
gives rise. As, for example, Dom Helder Camara writes to Garaudy, ‘the revolution is not bound with 
an essential but purely historical tie to philosophical materialism and with atheism, but that, on the 
contrary, it is consubstantial with Christianity’71 (Garaudy, 1977b:11). This is a step well beyond the 
argument that for synthesis it is sufficient to take ‘positions and approaches which, on the basis of 
either assumption or argument, interweave or combine Christian and Marxist concepts or arguments 
in one analysis . . . using the concepts and methods of both systems of thought without compromising 
the integrity of [the other]’ (Rourke, 1991:23).  
In response, Garaudy could point to decades of argument against dogmatism — ‘which 
separates out one aspect of the whole experience and seeks to explain all by reference to one element 
of it’72 (Garaudy, 1938:15). Both as a Marxist humanist, and in the project, this  argument was aimed 
at what he named ‘intégrisme’ (Garaudy, 1971:32, 1990). By intégrisme, Garaudy meant more than 
dogmatism — it incorporated much of what has been defined as fundamentalism, by which the word 
is usually translated, for ‘it is a conception of the organicity of values, by virtue of which one cannot 
accept certain values without accepting all, or at least at the most fundamental level’ 73 (Girardi, 
1966:282). In practice intégrisme was frequently identified by an attempt to demand that a group of 
ideas or practices should be manipulated to bring them into complete compatibility with another 
group of ideas or practices, a charge laid at various time against both Marxism and Christianity (Girardi, 
1966).  
 
71 la revolución no está atada con un lazo esencial sino solamente histórico, con el materialismo filosófico y con 
el ateísmo, y que ella por el contrario es consustancial al cristianismo 
72 qui détache un aspect de l’expérience totale et veut expliquer le tout en fonction de l’une des parties  
73 c'est une conception de l'organicité des valeurs, en vertu de laquelle on ne peut se rencontrer sur certaines 
valeurs sans se rencontrer sur toutes, ou du moins sur les plus fondamentales 
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Garaudy himself argued as a Marxist humanist that any attempt to enforce one single system 
on human thought and endeavour was doomed to failure. This was a view subscribed to by others: 
‘One of the more unfortunate legacies of Bolshevism is what Berdyaev (1937) called ‘integral’ Marxism 
— the idea that Marxism is a total world view which must be accepted all or none (Collier, 2001:125). 
Even as a Marxist humanist, Garaudy not only denied that truth was the prerogative of Marxism, but 
also argued as a Marxist that truth was both absolute and relative: absolute in the sense of all our 
current knowledge, but relative in the knowledge we have that in the future, that truth will be 
superseded by a greater, more comprehensive truth (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:43]). Marxists should not, 
therefore, ‘regard ourselves as possessing a truth given once and for all, definitive and ready-made’ 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:155]), for ‘once we claim to be the interpreter, the spokesman and even the 
agent of the absolute, we are on the direct road to the Inquisition or to Stalinism’ (Garaudy, 1973b: 
65). Garaudy’s criticism of intégrisme may therefore be juxtaposed with a contemporary, and surely 
intégriste, viewpoint from his premier critic inside the PCF: ‘Marxism is not a voice, not even the bass, 
in the speculative polyphony of an ecumenical humanism’ (Sève, 1969 [1978: 126]).  
Total mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity was not ever, therefore, 
Garaudy’s aim, even before the project. The distinction is a sharp one and one firmly maintained in 
Garaudy’s project, both politically and in relation to Christianity and other religions.  
There is a further important analytical consequence of the rejection of intégrisme. Throughout 
his development of the project, Garaudy adheres to the principle of levels, what Collier (2001) calls 
‘regions’: in particular, psychological, social and political, as well as within economic analysis 
(Bartolomé, 1970:243; Garaudy, 1975:216–217), but in particular the distinction between the natural 
and the supernatural (Cuschieri, 1977:289). Hence for Garaudy, as for a later proponent of the same 
theory, historical materialism should be considered as ‘a local theory, not a total theory’ (Collier,  




Trajectory of the project 
 
The project begins with Garaudy’s reaffirmation to himself, immediately after his final fateful 
speech to the PCF Conference in February 1970, of ‘the obscure but invincible certitude that to be true 
to itself socialism needs this divine dimension of Man’74 (Garaudy, 1989:233). Garaudy is far from 
alone in the broader aspects of this mutual dependence, sharing it not only with Marxists such as 
Bloch (1959), but also a range of authors who were loosely grouped as ‘political theologians’ on the 
Left, (e.g. Gutiérrez, 1973; Miranda, 1972, 1978 [1980]; Moltmann, 1965 [2002]; Metz, 1968 [1969]) 
who were convinced that ‘politics that does not also meet man’s deeper aspirations must fail. 
Conversely, a theology which does not have tangible political effects is likewise sterile’ (Schall, 
1975:28).  
Amongst this distinguished company, the distinctiveness of the project is that amongst 
Marxists, Garaudy eventually declares himself a Christian — in both French and Spanish (Garaudy, 
1975:265, 1975b), and develops a project principally surrounding the relationship between 
Christianity and religion. ‘The other prominent Marxist thinkers of the dialogue [Kolokowski, 
Machoveč and even Bloch] ‘remained faithful to Marxism and atheism’75 (Winling, 1981:269). Yet we 
should also remember than when he joined the PCF in Marseille in 1933, Garaudy unequivocally 
indicated that he was Christian and intended to remain so (Sève, 2008:398; Garaudy, 1989: 34–35). 
As he himself said when looking back as a Muslim, ‘Between faith which gave sense to life, and a 
method which rendered my actions effective, I saw no antagonism but, on the contrary, saw them as 
complementary’76 (Garaudy, 1983:57). He added shortly afterwards that he had been: ‘Christian, in an 
 
74 la certitude obscure mais invincible que le socialisme avait besoin, pour être lui-même, de cette dimension 
divine de l’homme 
75 les autres penseurs entendent rester fidèles au marxisme et à l'athéisme 
76 Entre la foi qui donnait un sens à la vie, et une méthode qui donnait une efficacité à l'action, je ne voyais pas 
d'antagonisme, mais, au contraire, une complémentarité 
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absurd world, to give sense to my life. Marxist, in a world of violence, to render my actions effective’ 77 
(Garaudy, 1985:250).  
The spiritual dimension of the project leads Garaudy to a broadened perspective, which was 
prefigured in his Marxist humanist period: ‘Garaudy's book [Garaudy, 1963], with its advocacy of an 
“open realism”, [is] capable of incorporating both classic realism and the avantgarde’ (Bates, 1997:60).  
Now, within the project, Garaudy asks himself why he had for so long ignored non-Western thought 
(Garaudy, 1989:264), a question to which the answer is eventually to prove destructive to the project 
that gave rise to it. His neglect also suggests to him the importance of aethestics, as expressed through 
dance and art, which is now no longer just a question of tolerance or positive appreciation within 
Marxism, but much more: ‘There [Garaudy, 1974] he shows that the great works of art of each epoch 
demonstrate the relationship that Man establishes with his environment, with his fellow human 
beings and with God’78 (Collès, 2013:123). The emphasis Garaudy places on art within the project 
enables him to recapture the mystic view of his youth, that when reviewing Rabindranath Tagore had 
led him to conclude that:  
‘Beauty, which symbolises the fraternity between our soul and the whole world, calls us to 
the ideal and liberating union of Universal Man, and, by the intensity of its Apollonian joy,  in 
no small degree marks the fulfillment of our spiritual destiny’79 (Garaudy, 1935:76).  
What then does the project entail in practical terms? Plunged into the void of a daily routine that had 
involved not only writing and lecture tours but also Politburo and other PCF meetings, Garaudy adopts 
a self-imposed routine of writing in the mornings, and meetings with political and spiritual leaders in 
the afternoon (Didier Gauvin, personal communication, 6 June 2019). The project looks outwards, to 
an unspecified humanity at large, but at its centre — Garaudy himself.  
 
77 Chrétien, dans un monde de l'absurde, pour donner un sens à ma vie. Marxiste, dans un monde livré à la 
violence, pour donner une efficacité à mon action 
78 Il y montre que les grandes œuvres d'art, à chaque époque, manifestent les rapports que l'homme établit avec 
son environnement, avec ses semblables et avec Dieu 
79 La beauté, qui symbolise la fraternité de notre âme et de toute chose, nous appelle à l'union idéale et 




The output of books continues, as listed in Chapter One, but now directed at a general rather 
than academic audience. Work advances in different directions at once. For example, in 1973, Garaudy 
launches a journal, ‘Alternatives Socialistes’, which he plans to publish quarterly (Le Monde, 27 
December 1973). The project also involves Garaudy in extensive travel — to Japan, to China, and to 
Africa. He directs a film, ‘Dionysos Noir’, which aims at demonstrating the contribution of African 
culture to universal civilisation, as well as the ‘lost dimensions’ of white Europe (Perottino, 1974:197). 
The year after his African visit, in 1974, Garaudy creates an international institute for the dialogue of 
cultures, insisting that the West should open up to other great traditions: Islam certainly, but also 
Hinduism and others, with the objective of the spiritual unity of the world, yet opposing 
fundamentalism, as in the past (Garaudy, 1996:7). How it is to achieve its objectives he does not 
explain.   
In 1978, Garaudy launches an ‘Appel aux vivants’, which is shortly accompanied by the best-
selling book of the same title. He tells us that within a year, over a million French people had read it 
(Garaudy, 1989:287). The book becomes part of the project itself, rather than the loose separation of 
political and theoretical work that characterised Garaudy’s Marxist humanism. The royalties of 12m 
francs (approximately £1.2m, perhaps five times that in 2020 terms) he uses to create an international 
Association, again of the same name. He intends it to be a ‘new ‘resistance’, non-violent, to struggle 
against the overwhelming ‘occupation’ of institutions and spirits by the ideology of ‘growth’ and the 
anaesthesia of souls’80 (Garaudy, 1989:288). This in turn leads him back inexorably into the electoral 
politics that he had abandoned two decades earlier. Politically, it may be said that the project both 
culminates and is extinguished by Garaudy’s bid for the Presidency of the Republic in the 1981 
election, in which he fails to make it into the top ten (France-Politique, 2019), but where the first 
victory of the Left in the Fifth Republic sees the socialist François Mitterrand elected, after a collapse 
in the Communist vote (Goldey & Knapp, 1982:3). After the defeat, no more is heard of the 
 
80 Une nouvelle « résistance », non violente, pour lutter contre l’écrasante « occupation » des institutions et des 
esprits par l’idéologie de la « croissance » et l’anesthésie des âmes 
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Association, or the museums established around the world at the same time. Within a year, the project 





The legacy of Marxist humanism in the project 
 
So much, then, for the structure of the project to which Garaudy gives a decade of his adult 
life. What more can be said about it in terms of its theoretical content?  Garaudy believes he can retain 
Important aspects humanist Marxism virtually without change in the project. First, the defence of 
Marxism in general that he had advanced during the period of the Marxist–Christian dialogue. He 
noted then the strength of objections to the possibility of Marxism ‘integrating in its concept of the 
world and of man, the essential element in Christianity’s contribution to the figure of man’ (Garaudy, 
1966 [1970:144]), but asked: is the Marxist conception of praxis and revolution as absolute value 
reconcilable with the principle of the absolute value of the person? (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:145]). Yes, 
he answered, Marx’s conception of the human species should not be confused with Hegel’s absolute 
spirit, first because Marxist praxis is a collective, historical, and above all human history, and secondly 
because for a Marxist, revolution is a necessary means, not an end. None of this argument alters in 
the project: Garaudy continues to promote Marx as a humanist and stress the importance of his early 
writing, notably in his review of Marxism (Garaudy, 1977a). That he should still be publishing such 
analysis relatively late in the project indicates the continued centrality of Marxism to the project. The 
world changes, Garaudy can say to his readers, and I am only adapting to it, not jettisoning any 
fundamental tenets of my beliefs. 
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Second, the argument against existentialism that individuals reach self-consciousness only 
through engagement with others, primarily through work, the prime epistemological and indeed 
moral category (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:97]) is maintained. The transformation of the engines of social 
and economic change, together with explanations of historical development, is not meant to be in the 
direction of existentialist reliance on a personal relationship with God. Similarly, both Garaudy’s 
compromise position with regard to free will between Marxist–Leninist determinism and existentialist 
indeterminism, as if either extreme were ever really held by anyone, and his rejection of a positivist  
science that ignores values (Cranston, 1970:14–16) are carried forward to the project. 
Third, Marxist epistemology had already also been transformed, and was virtually project -
ready. Garaudy had declared that ‘the major portion of the theoretical misunderstandings between 
Christians and Marxists result from the great confusion about the word ‘materialism’ (Garaudy, 
1965:61), which probably goes some way to explaining Garaudy’s persistent desire to temporise over 
materialism. This had not been a necessarily straightforward journey. Whilst Garaudy had entered the 
PCF as a committed Christian, his subsequent adoption of metaphysical materialism entailed a 
commitment not only a reflective understanding of knowledge, but also to Engels’ materialist view of 
religion. Such overt materialism remained his standpoint until the commencement of the project. As 
a Marxist–Leninist, he had asserted that ‘Matter is not in need of any spirit in order to exist’ (Garaudy, 
1953a:1), and concluded that ‘Within this immense and eternal reality the human species is only a link 
in the chain of infinite development of matter. Humanity only slowly begins to realise what may be 
the fullness of its historical consciousness’ (Garaudy, 1953a:298). Whilst Garaudy’s Stalinism may have 
been exaggerated by his political opponents, there is certainly a real difference between this 
materialism and his subsequent Marxist humanist view that Marx had discovered ‘a materialist 
conception of human work as a creative act’ (Garaudy, 1965:63) which allowed Garaudy to depict 
Marxism as ‘essentially a methodology of historical initiative’ (Garaudy, 1965:64). Whilst a vital step 
away from any identification with determinism, and neither unconducive to dialogue nor even partial 
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consistency, such a position in itself it entailed no rejection of materialism, and certainly provided no 
grounds for mutual dependence.  
Fourth, even before the project began, it was evident to one observer, and I agree, that  in 
Garaudy’s conception of Marxism, the moral categories of socialism were more conspicuous than the 
economic ones (Cranston, 1970:17). ‘The final objective is socialism, alone capable of making every 
human being a person, that is to say, a creator, a centre of initiative and responsibility at all levels’81 
(Garaudy, 1971:81). Denying that Marxism could be reduced simply to an economic system equally 
was a key step in the project (García, 1988:128). This  denial Garaudy shared with others who had 
participated in the Marxist–Christian dialogue such as Hromádka (1965) and Machoveč (1976) as well 
as with liberation theologians such as Gutiérrez (1973), Miranda (1972, 1978 [1980]), and Boff (1978 
[1988]), and fed into the debate over the extent to which the economic enjoys primacy over social, 
cultural and ultimately ideological causes for social behaviour. This may seem a quite commonplace 
step in the 21st Century, but not then. This much had already become evident by the time of his 
expulsion from the PCF in 1970, placing Garaudy in the chronological forefront of the change. 
But finally, the reconfiguration away from materialism in turn led Garaudy to a re-evaluation 
of religion within Marxism. He had already started as a Marxist humanist, certainly, by observing that 
atheism had been a positive force in the destruction of feudal relationships and absolute monarchy 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:106]). Religion is only an expression of alienation; Man takes refuge in the 
fantasy world of the beyond because he is profoundly frustrated in his earthly existence (Dupré, 1968) 
and ultimately because of his alienated labour (Marx, 1867 [1976:990]; Fromm, 1961). There was even 
value in the ‘scientist’ atheism of the 19th Century in rejecting the superstitions that nourish the 
appetite for mystery, the readiness to accept man’s impotence and accept the miraculous (Garaudy, 
1966 [1970:107]). But the limitation of this traditional Marxist analysis was that ‘it saw in religious 
 
81 L’objectif final est le socialisme, seul capable de faire de chaque homme un homme, c’est-à-dire un créateur, 
un centre d’initiative et de responsabilité à tous les niveaux  
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practice nothing but an arbitrary intervention, without asking either what human needs it met or what 
human values had been created in this arbitrary form’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:107]).  
For Marx and Engels, Garaudy said, religions were both the reflection of real distress and 
protest against it. For Sève, citing the 1844 Manuscripts, the speculative, unscientific nature of 
religious thought is there in the questions themselves, and he has been comfortable to remain in this 
conviction (Sève, 1969 [1978], 2008:377). Garaudy however was far from satisfied. There is in religion 
‘no longer just a way of thinking, but a way of acting: no longer an ideology but a faith, a way of 
confronting the world and behaving in it’ (Garaudy,  1966 [1970:109]). For Engels in particular, Garaudy 
reminded his readers, in primitive Christianity: 
‘Here we have neither the dogma nor the morals of later Christianity but instead a feeling that 
one is struggling against the whole world and that the struggle will be a victorious one; an 
eagerness for the struggle and a certainty of victory which are totally lacking in Christians of 
today and which are to be found in our time only at the other pole of society, among the 
Socialists’ (Engels, 1894 [1957:7–8].  
For primitive Christianity, Garaudy argued, ‘The world is seen no longer as the inevitable unfolding of 
a rational law, but as a gift of love’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:130]).  
‘From this new conception of the world is derived a new conception of man: his goal is no 
longer the grandeur of being equated, by knowledge, with the eternal order of the cosmos 
and the sovereign law of the city. His infinite value is that he in turn is, in the image of God, 
creator with the capacity for gift and love, facing an absolute future which is not a logical 
extension of the past or a phase in a given totality, but the possibility of a new life: to this he 
is called by a God who is no longer totality, nor concept, nor harmonious and completed image 
of the human order, but both a personal God and a hidden God, whom no knowledge can give 
us, and to whom only faith can open the road — always, however, in suffering and uncertainty’ 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:131]).  
Garaudy’s criticism of an all-powerful God, as evidenced within the Old Testament, of which 
Feuerbach has disabused us, leaves no room in the project for the re-introduction of a God of control 
separated from, let alone controlling, the lived experience of humanity, however little this may chime 
with a traditional Christian view either (Dean, 1975:22). Religion is an opium, says Garaudy, when ‘the 
relations that it establishes between Man and God are relations based on the type of relation between 
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master and slave in Hegel’82 (Garaudy, 1973a:383). Yet for Garaudy the Marxist humanist, the end of 
Marxism–Leninism already entailed the need for a replacement, so notwithstanding this risk he came 
close to earmarking religion for the purpose, specifically Christianity. His chapter on ‘Marxism and 
Religion’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:106–163]) echoed Mark Antony, and really quite blatantly. Garaudy 
claimed he comes to bury Christianity, not praise it, but we may expect a very different reaction from 
the reader from a chapter that starts by lauding the benefits of atheism and ends by calling for a 
common conception of what it is to be human between Marxism and Christianity, albeit at the expense 
of a transcendent God entirely distinct from the material world. This crucial step taken, Garaudy the 
Marxist humanist had already satisfied himself of mutual consistency between Marxism and 
Christianity. The view of Man and of God that this entailed is substantially carried over into the project. 
But this is not yet mutual dependence. The politics of the PCF prevented it. 
 
The politics of the project 
 
Garaudy had always been prepared to engage much more closely with contemporary non-
Marxist thought, whether existentialism or Catholicism. than many of his PCF contemporaries. He was: 
‘In fact, open to dialogue, picking up the idea of subjectivity from Sartre’s existentialism and 
from Christian philosophy the idea of transcendence, all whilst continuing his adherence to 
the philosophy of Marx. From these two springs he derives his "humanist" anthropology, free 
from the doctrinaire inhibitions of a dogmatic and denunciatory Marxism and always against 
any devaluation of man, whether through praxis (Stalinism and the totalitarian regimes of 
Eastern countries) or through theoretical discourse (the anti-humanism of Althusser)’83 
(García, 1988:143).   
 
82 elle est un opium lorsque les rapports qu’elle établit entre l’homme et Dieu sont des rapports conçus sur le 
type de rapports du maître à l’esclave chez Hegel 
83 De hecho, abierto al diálogo con el existencialismo de Sartre recogerá la idea de subjetividad, y de la filosofía 
Cristiana la idea de trascendencia, todo ello desde su adhesión nunca desmentida a la filosofía de Marx. Desde 
esos frentes se alza su antropología «humanista», desembarazada de las inhibiciones doctrinarias de un 
marxismo dogmático y denunciadora siempre contra cualquier devaluación del hombre, tanto si acontece por 
la vía de la praxis (stalinismo y regímenes totalitarios de los países del Este) como por la vía del discurso teorético 
(antihumanismo de Althusser) 
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He devoted numerous articles (e.g. Garaudy 1966c, 1967b, 1967c), and an entire book to this 
engagement (Garaudy, 1965) and participated in others (Garaudy, 1965 [1967], 1965a, 1965b, 1965d, 
1965e, 1967d; Garaudy & Lauer, 1968). But it was the experience of the Czech Revolution against 
Soviet authority in the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968 that brought Garaudy to a stark conclusion (Garaudy, 
1968c) He came to acknowledge that only in the context of a socialism that involves liberation from 
below can there be consistency, let alone mutual dependence, between Marxism and Christianity. 
This in turn, once he was free of the constraints imposed by his senior position within the PCF, led to 
a fundamental recognition: it would not be possible to incorporate every twist and turn of Marxism 
into the project — and in particular, not the state socialism of the Communist Bloc.  
The Soviet Union specifically to be excluded: he criticises in particular the refusal to recognise 
‘the legitimacy of the search for new forms of socialism, adapted to national traditions and to the 
degree of development of each country’ (Garaudy, 1971:10). Holding nothing back in his denunciation 
of central planning, he points out brutally that agricultural production at the time of the death of Stalin 
in 1953 had not surpassed its level in 1913 (Garaudy, 1971:18) and that Soviet economic growth is less 
than that of Japan (Garaudy, 1971:21). He also notes the increasing relative failure of the USSR in the 
utilisation of peaceful nuclear power, for example, anticipating the nuclear power plant explosion at 
Chernobyl by a decade and a half (Garaudy, 1971:25). In a far later review of the Soviet experiment, 
his criticism remained trenchant: three fundamental perversions underlay Marxism–Leninism — of 
the laws of growth of capitalism, of confusing socialisation with nationalisation, and of confusing 
planning with total economic control (Garaudy, 1994:123). It is no wonder to hear him insist that as 
‘The socialism we want to establish in our country is not that which is today imposed by military force 
on Czechoslovakia’84 (Garaudy, 1971:10). 
 
84 le socialisme que nous voulons instaurer dans notre pays n'est pas celui qui est aujourd'hui imposé 
militairement à la Tchécoslovaquie 
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But as the project emerges from behind the veil of party discipline, the evolution of Garaudy’s 
political thought, from his sympathetic response to the events of 1968 in France and above all in 
Czechoslovakia (Garaudy, 1968c), his final speech to the PCF in February 1970 (Garaudy, 1970a) and 
his published article on the ‘historical bloc’ (Garaudy, 1971a), criticised by Poulantzas (1972), to that 
advanced in Appel aux vivants (Garaudy, 1979) is certainly both identifiable and striking. In that final 
speech to the Conference of the PCF, he appeals for the Party to shake off its dogmatism and identify 
with the forces that had brought about the protests in France in 1968, and indeed also with the 
attempt by Czechoslovakia to introduce ‘socialism with a human face’. His public front is still that of a 
revolutionary, and the working class as originally defined by Marx is still at the forefront of his 
conception of revolutionary change. But Garaudy now emphasises that the working class should no 
longer be confined either analytically or politically to an industrial proletariat, given the new role of 
science as a productive force (Garaudy, 1970a:157, 1971:57). In its place stands a new ‘historic bloc’, 
in which, he specifically notes, Christians participate in as workers, as engineers, or technicians 
(Garaudy, 1970c:193). It is a radical update of the ‘outstretched hand’85 of the PCF under his mentor 
Thorez in the pre-war years (Murphy, 1974:255), but is nevertheless to be distinguished from it. In the 
past, dialogue and cooperation between Christians and Marxists, however engaged and fruitful, was 
between two separate groups of people. In the project, the distinction breaks down: there is now only 
one unified, inclusive political grouping. He later makes particular reference to Gramsci as a proponent 
of the ‘historic bloc’, pointing to the radically different conception of socialism shared by students and 
other youth by comparison to the utopian yet essentially nationalist dreams of his generation 
(Garaudy, 1971a). The PCF rapidly adjusts its own line towards more inclusivity — but too late, 
Garaudy is gone from its ranks. 
Garaudy follows the same line in L’Alternative, (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]) except that now, two 
years outside the CPF, Marxism–Leninism or even Eurocommunism is no longer even a subject for 
 
85 La Main Tendue 
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discussion. Garaudy decides that party politics in a conventional, Marxist–Leninist sense, already had 
been thrown out of the window, or if not, it should be. This was a perspicacious decision, taken well 
before the reality of electoral decline and oblivion for the PCF was apparent. It was to take Sève until 
2010 to do the same thing when he too left the PCF.  
Look forward to 1979, and the same disregard of party politics remains within the project. 
Now however there is mention of a series of collaborations between different elements of what Ken 
Livingstone in the UK at the time called the ‘Rainbow Coalition’ (Garaudy, 1979:392–3; Cooper, 
1998:485), including students as well as revolutionary movements in developing countries (Garaudy, 
1979:388–397). This perspective is reinforced by the feminism of the project: ‘The most radical change 
must come from women’86 (Garaudy, 1979:393; 1981b), although Garaudy, it should be carefully 
noted, never mentions anything like LGBT issues during the period of the project (Didier Gauvin, 
personal communication, 21 December 2018). In terms of means, therefore, what is most obvious is 
the very idea of revolution has been abandoned at worst, transformed at best. The emphasis has 
moved entirely to non-violence (Morales & Garaudy, 1975:26), with Gandhi cited in support (Garaudy, 
1979:364). Not pacifism, however: asked whether a future socialist state should have an army, 
Garaudy is explicit in equating occupation by the USA and Soviet Union. He turns to the experience of 
the peoples of Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and replies: 
‘It seems to me that the guarantee of an effective defence lies today in the work of a conscious 
people, in which each citizen is responsible for the fate and future of the freedoms of which 
they have been deprived’87 (Morales & Garaudy, 1975:26). 
But even the political objectives of the project are radically different from those of his preceding 
Marxist humanism. There is therefore something almost poignant about the review of Garaudy’s 
project by Da Costa Pinto (1982). By the time it had been published, Garaudy himself had moved on. 
But the article itself is interesting as representing something very akin to the purpose of this chapter, 
 
86 Le changement le plus radical doit venir des femmes 
87 Me parece que la garantía de una defensa eficaz radica hoy en el trabajo de un pueblo consciente, en el que 
cada ciudadano sea responsable de la suerte y el futuro de las libertades conquistadas 
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an attempt to present Garaudy’s project as a coherent body of thought , with a focus on political ends. 
Da Costa Pinto starts by presenting Garaudy’s view of economic growth as a tyrannical master of ‘the 
West’, although in contrast to his Marxist humanism he is now prepared to dismiss socialist countries 
as equally under the entropic spell of the same master. The second consequence of international 
competition and growth, Garaudy says, is institutional violence. Competition has become internalised 
at the individual level, too, effectively dominating both psychology and society with the demand that 
we all become consumers, whilst with Faust as its archetype, science itself has degenerated into 
positivism, which Garaudy had long viewed as ‘the most tyrannical of all dogmatisms’ (Garaudy, 
1956:235). 
The response is not to be confined to any one nation or culture, as this response indicates, 
Garaudy’s prophetic phase necessarily involves ‘a planetary project, fertilised by an authentic 
“Dialogue of Civilisations”’ [Garaudy, 1977 [2012:12]]. This dialogue is intended to forge a new 
relationship between all oppressed people and with the divine, within society and between society 
and nature. The emphasis on rejection of Western values in the project, or at least the incorporation 
of others, is demonstrated by the previous ‘dialogue of civilisations’ that Garaudy had originally 
promulgated when still a PCF Politburo member (Garaudy, 1968e). He now argues, however, for its 
much greater importance, as in the project, relations between civilisations must precede and 
dominate economic and political relations — culture first, because the determination of ends and 
goals necessarily precedes and rules the human organisation. ‘By the absence of a goal for humanity, 
Garaudy wants to make clear that profit alone has become an end in itself in modern society’ 88 
(Jakubec, 1972:302). Only in this way can we recover the lost dimensions of Man and build our future 
according to a goal for humanity’ (Garaudy, 1973c).  
 




It is at least arguably utopian, albeit sharing with Marx a refusal to be drawn on specifics 
(McLeish, 2016:86), a fluid concept with no single delineating category (Adorno, 1964 [1989:8]). But 
in Garaudy’s view, not at all: the success of the project will necessarily involve each national economy 
passing from quantitative measures such as GDP, which will no longer be a measure of progress, 
towards qualitative ones, although Garaudy does not say what they will or even might be. Statistical 
and anonymous democracy will give way to participatory and associative democracy (Da Costa Pinto, 
2017:451). This will be accompanied by the rejection of contemporary forms of economic organisation 
in favour of ‘a new type of modern enterprise which will be neither private nor state’ (Garaudy, 
1979:37). Garaudy argues that this will represent a rejection of Western economic values, despite the 
fact that the co-operative has long and honourable roots in Western society as much as elsewhere, 
for example in England through the work of Robert Owen (Podmore, 1905). But it will rejuvenate 
Marxism, which otherwise runs the risk of becoming a provincial ideology in a globalised world 
(Garaudy, 1973a:394). What he leaves unanswered is the timeframe in which all this is to transpire, a 
weakness which he himself eventually makes the Achilles heel of the entire project.  
He further argues that there is a need to redefine basic principles after the failure of the Soviet 
system (Garaudy, 1977b:16). Garaudy’s three main political objectives were now ‘that of the abolition 
of the nuclear energy monarchy, that of the elimination of institutional waste, and that of the means 
of new and sane growth’89 (Garaudy, 1979:324). For ‘It’s our whole way of life that we have to change, 
not just our political structures’90 (Garaudy, 1980:9). The entire ecological movement and the future 
of the Left is presaged in these objectives. 
In the project, rather than seek to refine the analysis of class, above all based on work, as did 
other writers writing at a similar time (Gorz, 1982), Garaudy progressively devalues the concept of 
class and the ability of any class to effect revolutionary change altogether. Technology is berated 
 
89 celle de l’abolition de la monarchie énergétique du nucléaire, celle d’elimination du gaspillage institutionnel, 
et celle des moyens d’une nouvelle et saine croissance 
90 c'est tout notre mode de vie que nous avons à changer, pas seulement nos structures politiques 
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almost as much as economic growth and progress. Garaudy sees with absolute clarity what is only in 
the 21st Century is becoming practically the case, that the loose talk of cybernetics, computers and 
systems that characterised the early 1970s would eventually require, and be closely connected with, 
human transformation and political action (Garaudy, 1970d), the political implications of which the 
CPSU and the PCF alike appear to him to ignore (Dupleix, 1971:43). In Garaudy’s project, Marx is almost 
relegated to the sidelines, one prophet amongst others: as he says, ‘Prophetism is a fundamental 
aspect of humanity’91 (Garaudy, 1979:201); yet he aims to preserve within the project what Garaudy 
considers 20th Century Marxism to be, the most powerful explanation of social change (Garaudy, 
1977a).  
From the politics of the project, the conclusion must surely be that the emphasis in any mutual 
dependence between Marxism and Christianity is not a question of short-term politics. It is rather the 
fundamentals of Marxist analysis with which Garaudy wants Christians — and the whole world — to 
engage: class, an eventual end to capitalism, and capturing the forces that govern historical change, 
forces which had themselves changed radically during the twentieth century.  
 
Christianity in the project 
 
As a Marxist humanist, Garaudy had been instrumental in the Marxist–Christian dialogue. But 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia satisfied Garaudy that, whatever it had achieved, the Christian–
Marxist dialogue had had no reason to go on. The temporary triumph of ‘order’ was reflected in the 
fact that:  
'Any possibility of cross-fertilisation of Marxist action and Christian faith has, for the moment, 
been rejected, as a result of the Stalinist conditions created by the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. This dialogue is now confined principally to small minorities within 
 
91 Le prophétisme est une dimension fondamentale de l’homme  
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church and state, or, when necessary, outside them. We are at an impasse’ (Garaudy, 
1973c:39).  
From Garaudy’s perspective, there is therefore a political demand to go beyond dialogue towards a 
project that encompasses ‘interpellation’ between Marxism and Christianity, and that will prove more 
efficacious and just than the Marxist–Leninist experiment that Garaudy could see failing. Be it said 
that none of this differs much from neo-Marxists such as Erich Fromm, who also recognises that 
Christians already formed part of a similarly ill-defined movement, which he argued had arisen as a 
reaction to what both he and Garaudy perceive as ever-increasing:  
‘the threat of nuclear extinction and the threat to all that is specifically human: independence, 
aliveness, creativity, and most of all, to man’s being an end in himself and not the means for 
institutions or purposes outside of himself’ (Fromm, 1970: xi–xii). Critical Marxism was just 
one name for ‘the stance of neo-Marxist ‘intellectuals’ rather than any determinate social 
movement. It is represented by dissident individuals within Communist Parties [and] by 
independent Marxist thinkers (e.g. the Frankfurt School, Ernest Bloch, Roger Garaudy) and it 
claims Marxist intellectuals of the past (e.g. Lukács, Gramsci) as forerunners’ (McGovern, 
1980:50).  
Thus far, Garaudy was in good company. 
Garaudy’s solution was distinctive in that its roots lay rooted in religion: take back Christ, fuse 
the church with the world’s problems, and not just question priestly celibacy, but revive the idea of a 
priesthood of all believers (Eastwood, 2009) and overthrow the priestly caste. Nothing in this is new 
in Garaudy’s thinking: whilst still a CPF Politburo member, he had written: ‘Christianity stimulates 
historic creativity by its indication of the merely provisional character of every historic present, and 
participates with all its power in the full realisation of man, because it is through this full realisation 
that Man can encounter God’ (Garaudy et al., 1967:10). And again: ‘what is important is that the 
completely human faith in our task should not rob Man of any of the dimensions historically 
conquered from the starting-point of faith in God, and that faith in a transcendent Deity should never 
limit or put brakes on faith in the human task’ (Garaudy et al., 1967:13).  
But within the project Garaudy goes further. He now implies that Christians can pass beyond 
a theology of resistance inspired by Bonhoeffer’s view of Christ (Marsh, 1994:143; Garaudy, 
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1973a:384), — which although he does not himself suggest it, has been linked to the specific historicity 
of resistance to the Third Reich, described by even Bonhoeffer himself as ‘silent witness’ (Mengus, 
1992:S137) — to a theology of radical change suitable to combat global capitalism. This perception of 
a connection between alleged failures of both the Church and theology to confront fascism has been 
suggested in relation to political theology more widely (Jeanrond, 1992:S201). In contrast to a purely 
economic approach, and certainly not laying the blame with religion, Garaudy now explains that it is 
philosophy to blame for all failures of this kind, and in particular a form of dualism that is at root 
responsible, that between body and soul, which, via the primacy of the ‘spiritual’, leads to ‘a marked 
preference for ‘order’, considered to be on the side of the ‘spirit’, as opposed to rebellion, which 
smacks of chaos and ‘matter’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:27]). Such dualism, Garaudy explains, extends to 
all levels — the division of class society, cultural and social life (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:28]). The whole 
history of the Church is informed by this internal dialectic, by this opposition within it of two traditions, 
a position which Garaudy had long held. First, the Constantinian tradition, in which the accent is on 
the fact of sin, and which serves as a justification for a providential and legitimate state of authority 
leading otherwise incapable men to liberty (Garaudy et al., 1967:9). Hence the long relationship 
between the Church and political power in the West, at least since Constantine. Second, the 
apocalyptic tradition, which re-appears whenever the masses of the populace become aware of their 
strength, which places the accent on the fact that God incarnate as Man has triumphed over sin, and 
which undertakes to inscribe this apocalypse into history (Garaudy et al., 1967:10). Nothing again in 
this is new, in Garaudy’s thinking. Whilst still a CPF Politburo member, he had written: ‘Christianity 
stimulates historic creativity by its indication of the merely provisional character of every historic 
present, and participates with all its power in the full realisation of man, because it is through this full 
realisation that Man can encounter God’ (Garaudy et al., 1967:10). 
In Germany as in France, the report of a widely-read article prefigures his project and provides 
evidence of its gestation: 'An ever-greater role in Garaudy's philosophy is played by the idea that 
socialism is of religious origin. In 'L'Evangile aujourd'hui' Garaudy addressed his words to the clergy 
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and asked them to give Christ to the communists. According to Garaudy, Christ is the founder not of 
the Church, but of the Party. In memorable words, he [Garaudy] called out: 'You, the traducers of 
great hope . . . you people of the Church, give Him back to us’92 (Der Spiegel, 1970:147; Cruse, 
1992:126). Garaudy is not alone in believing that ‘Jesus is the criticism of the Church from inside’ 
(Moltmann, 1974a:422), but his twist on ‘render unto Caesar’ is sharp — Caesar is a God, so the remark 
is even more subversive than it at first appears (Garaudy, 1979:164). Jesus of Nazareth is the first 
witness of a faith that inflexibly refuses any kind of totalitaranism‘93 (Garaudy, 1980:5). Garaudy says 
explicitly that it is only since the rise of Marxist humanism, with the liberation theology of Latin 
America and with Eurocommunism, that this current of thought has recovered actuality and vitality. 
Eurocommunist politicians are in agreement: for example, in 1970 Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General 
of the Spanish Communist Party, says to the French daily Le Monde: ‘Without the unity policy with 
Catholics, the opposition would not have been able to emerge. You know, we have often said that 
Spanish socialism marches forward with a hammer and sickle in one hand and a cross in the other!’94 
(Le Monde, 4 November 1970).  
Garaudy willingly accepts what de Lubac (1978, 1980) derides: the remarkable conception of 
Joachim de Flore, of three moments of time — the Father's, the Mosaic law; that of the Son, that of 
Christ; and that of the Holy Spirit, the moment in which there is a secular Kingdom without a state, 
without classes, without property and even, he says, without a Church, since the Spirit will be present 
in each one of the members of Christianity (Garaudy, 1977b:13, 1980:5). These same ideas, it has been 
argued, politically inspired John Hus, then Thomas Müntzer (Bloch, 1921; Packull, 1977), and then all 
revolutionary thought in Europe (Garrigues, 2013:71). In criticising Zionism, therefore, Garaudy 
 
92 Eine immer grőßere Rolle in der Philosophie Garaudys spielt die Vorstellung, daß der Sozial ismus religiőser 
Herkunft sei. In “L’Evangile aujourd’hui” richtete Garaudy seine Ansprache an der Klerus und forderte ihn auf, 
Christus an die Kommunisten herauszugeben. Nach Garaudy ist Christus der Gründer nicht der Kirche, sondern 
der Partei: “Ihr, die Vehehler der großen Hoffnung….Ihr Menschen der Kirche, gebt ihn uns zurück” 
93 Jesus de Nazareth est le premier témoin d'une foi qui refuse inflexiblement toute espèce de totalitarisme  
94 Sans la politique d'unité avec les catholiques, l'opposition n'aurait pas pu faire surface. Vous savez, nous avons 




advances the familiar argument that Christianity, in proclaiming the ‘New Covenant’ that is, the 
individual's personal relationship with God, goes beyond any ritualism. The apostle Paul, himself born 
a Jew, says clearly:  
‘For he who is in Jesus Christ, neither circumcision nor lack of circumcision is effective, but 
faith acting through love’ (Epistle to the Galatians V, 6). It is not the rite but union with God 
which purifies hearts. St. Paul says again (Galatians III, 8): ‘Scripture, foreseeing that God 
would justify the pagans, announced in advance to Abraham: All nations shall be blessed in 
you’ (Genesis XII, 3). It is in the name of this universalism which excludes all racism that he 
concludes: ‘There no longer exist either Greeks, or Jews, or slaves, or free men’ (Galatians III, 
28). The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (VIII and IX) breaks radically with the pretensions 
to exclusivity of the chosen people; God belongs to all peoples’ (Garaudy, 1977c:43).  
The change in focus from Marxist humanism is very clear. Then, Garaudy made the distinction 
between the Christian promise of a redeemer, who ‘sheds a glow on the first page of human history’, 
and ‘The hope of a universal city [the light on the hill], reconciled in labour and love maintains the 
effort of the proletarians who fight for the happiness of all men’  (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:114]). In the 
project, these two alternative perspectives are reconciled.  
Where the project differs from its preceding Marxist humanism is not, therefore, in any 
characterisation of the capacity of Christianity for revolutionary change, and still less in the division 
within Christianity that Garaudy believes has been directly caused by a philosophical dualism. Rather, 
the role now allocated to religion is much broader, that of a solution for the ills of the world and the 
failure of Marxism–Leninism to avert them. If Man has become ‘one-dimensional’ (Marcuse, 1964), 
then ‘the problem of growth is not only an economic and political problem, but an essentially religious 
problem’95 (Garaudy, 1979:20) and ‘The politics of socialism … cannot exclude a fundamental problem: 
that of the confrontation of its goals with those of philosophies and religions96 (Garaudy, 1971:108). 
In contemporary France, Garaudy says, he will confine his analysis of what he calls an ‘interpellation 
of Marxism’ to ‘the conception of Man and his future that, in our country, is the oldest and the most 
 
95 le problème de la croissance n’est pas seulement un problème économique et un problème politique, mais un 
problème essentiellement religieux 
96 La politique du socialisme…ne peut donc écarter un problème fondamental : celui de la confrontation de ses 
visées avec celles des philosophies et des religions 
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deep-rooted — Christianity’97 (Garaudy, 1971:108–109). According to Garaudy, the contemporary 
reality is that ‘The young reject all that separates the churches from society, that makes them alien 
and superior’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:25]). This is a political disaffection, but it is neither explained nor 
expected to be solved entirely in economic terms. What is different in the project is that change could 
be expected to be a gradual, and essentially religious process. ‘Of course, when I take this [Marxist] 
option I will have to instruct myself in scientific technique, for strategy, tactics, economic organization, 
etc., all at the service of science. But faith is a postulate, and there is an act of faith to be an atheist as 
there is for a Christian’ (Garaudy, 1977b:16). In relation to this assertion, it has been suggested that 
‘Insofar as the future is concerned, both Marxism and Christianity constitute a faith and a hope rather 
than science or knowledge … As proposal, hypothesis and wager, the two are one and the same’ 
(Fierro, 1977:422).  
As the project evolves, Garaudy suggests that both faith and politics have changed since the 
time Marx wrote, and the issue of their relationship needs to be remodelled. Garaudy refers to two 
separate issues, relations between Church and State, on the one hand, and between faith and politics 
as two dimensions of man, on the other (Garaudy, 1979:1). Any attempt to resolve the ‘choc’ between 
Marxism and Christianity must involve an acceptance of the correct ‘sphere of influence’  for both — 
an erroneous conflation of levels happens in respect of both eschatology as well as epistemology when 
a church wants to turn itself into a political party or a party attempts to transform itself into a faith 
and formulate a religion (Garaudy, 1979:12). Garaudy’s positive attitude to original Christianity, 
distrust of the Church, and openness to other traditions is picked up by strands of modern Christianity, 
for example Celtic Christianity (Mitton, 1995), and others who have stressed that ‘Marxism and 
Christianity can each learn something from the other about secularity’ — to reject totalitarianism and 
‘religion’ — we should never identify devotion to God with devotion to the church (Collier, 2001:126). 
And we must unify faith and politics in a new communal life, Garaudy says, because it is not possible 
 




to separate, in a fatal dualism, a faith confined to the interior life, any more than a politics that is 
complete outside the inner individual. The conclusion is inevitable: ‘Religion is not a private affair’’98 
(Garaudy, 1980:12).  
It is a difficult path to tread, for he also insists that, ‘The crucified Christ is the opposite of 
these images of power’99 (Garaudy, 1979:3). It is perhaps not surprising that Garaudy especially 
identified with Jesus’ allocation of duties between God and Caesar. He was always seeking to do the 
same. This he shares with contemporary radical theologians (Moltmann, 1974; Pannenberg, 1973). 
The project may well be profoundly subversive, a living current of faith whose inspiration is both 
Marx’s vision of human emancipation and the life of Jesus, but Garaudy still needs to explain much 
more to us about this faith and hope, and how it will translate into effective action.  
 
Garaudy’s selection of material for the project 
 
Garaudy makes no apology in drawing on what he perceives to be the most useful insights 
from what he has read, which may reasonably be described as cherry-picking for the project. He makes 
immediately explicit that he owes this assertion to Hegel: ‘Hegel, I believe, showed in his Philosophy 
of History a profound grasp of this decisive moment of history when he discerned in Christianity the 
source of every vision of the world which acknowledges in Man his active interiority, and which makes 
Man the mainspring in the evolution of reality’ (Garaudy, 1975:74). He adds to the debt to Hegel by 
citing him further: ‘Christ, he [Hegel] writes, the man who in his human existence showed by his death 
and throughout his life, the eternal history of the Spirit’100 (Garaudy, 1975:243). Yet this is far from the 
full extent of the claims Hegel actually makes for Christ, which he envisaged as at least essential to 
 
98 La religion n'est pas affaire privée 
99 Le Christ crucifié, c’est le contraire de ces images de la puissance 
100 « Christ, écrit–il, l’homme en tant qu’homme dans lequel est apparue l’unité de Dieu et de ‘l’homme, a 
montré par sa mort et son histoire en général, l’histoire éternelle de l’Esprit »  
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demonstrate the unity of divine and human nature, even if the extent of Hegel’s Christian orthodoxy 
and the precise nature of his view of the Incarnation has been much debated (e.g. Küng, 1970:380; 
Altizer, 1991:77; Hodgson, 2005:155–177; Bubbio, 2014, 523–524). For the Garaudy of the project, 
Hegel is evidently there to be plundered, and appropriated only up to the point required, not to be 
debated with, let alone accepted wholescale. This is particularly the case in relation to Hegel’s 
treatment of the universality of the divine Spirit. For whilst Garaudy might agree with at least the 
interpretation of Hegel that ‘Divine essence recovers its universality when the universal presence of 
divine Spirit replaces the individual presence of God in Jesus ’ (Jamros, 1995:286), Hegel goes on to 
argue that the living Christ is to be found in the Church which He founded, and in the doctrines of the 
relation of God and Man of which the Church is the earthly symbol, a view to which Garaudy was 
diametrically opposed.  
From Bloch, Garaudy derives the importance of hope, which has been central to his Marxist 
humanism and is carried across into the project. ‘Hope is the key to Bloch's system of 'meta-religion', 
a vast attempt to inherit from religion — above all the Jewish–Christian religion — a revolutionary 
hope which has the courage to live for the future and a new world’ (Collins, 1968:261). For Bloch the 
contemporary picture of Christianity was bleak, as the rightfully messianic fire of Christianity has been 
extinguished, to be replaced with a torpor congenial to capitalism. Yet theologians, notably Metz and 
Moltmann, still drew on Bloch for inspiration, crossing and re-crossing the supposed divide between 
Marxism and Christianity. Garaudy joins them in enthusing about hope, which he sometimes appears 
to believe is the prerogative of those in support of the project.  
Hence for example he writes that the youth — as one part of the historic bloc — oppose this 
[capitalist torpor] with ‘what theologians call eschatology, Christian hope’ (Garaudy,  1972 [1976:27]). 
In cherry-picking from others, Garaudy says that Bloch rediscovered ‘the essential foundation of all 
living Marxism — what he calls “the principle of hope”’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:95]). It is no doubt 
welcome for Garaudy to have discovered the essential foundation of something as important to him 
93 
 
as Marxism, and Garaudy’s explicit assertion is that the politics of the project will be fuelled by this 
kind of hope — although he might equally well have added, courage, discipline and other virtues 
familiar to the Hellenic world as well. This project of hope will involve new relations with nature, new 
economic relations based on qualitative not quantitative criteria, new relations between the individual 
and society — a participative, not elective, democracy — between East and West, and between Man 
and God (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]). But how is this expected to work in practice? None of this is actually 
explored.  
It is reasonable then to ask, apart from his assertion of Christian faith, does Garaudy say 
anything different to Bloch’s formulation of ‘Religion as protest, the Bible as biased towards the poor, 
the Church as open and free, God as truly human — an impressive doctrinal system that has proved 
to be a positive catalyst in Marxist–Christian dialogue’ (McLelland, 1988:182)? Yes, in my view: and 
especially in retrospect the difference is important. Over three decades later the trajectory of both 
Marxism and Christianity suggests that despite its doctrinal originality Bloch’s thought really was a 
blind alley, for at least two principal reasons.  
First, for Bloch, the absolute rejection of Christianity by vulgar Marxism is not the right critique 
of religion. Rather, it is to subject Christianity to a class, and by extension an ethica l, rebuke. What 
emerges from Bloch’s Marxist criticism is, at least potentially, a Christianity purified of oppression 
generated by class. As noted above, however, Garaudy refuses to allow class to be the only filter for 
his project. In his Pour un dialogue des civilisations (Garaudy, 1977), for example, there is already both 
a political imperative and an implicit recognition of the value to be extracted from every religion, a 
recognition later made explicit and described in detail (Garaudy, 1979).  
Secondly, Bloch’s dance on the edge of faith has been echoed by other more popular 
advocates, notably those in the Protestant tradition, the first at least specifically acknowledged by 
Garaudy (e.g. Robinson, 1963; Hick, 1977; Holloway, 1997; Spong, 1998, 2001; Cupitt, 1997, 2006). 
But Bloch and others who followed in the same Marxist tradition (e.g. Gardavksy, 1967; Machoveč, 
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1972) blazed a trail that few eventually followed. When Garaudy hesitates to answer yes to the 
question of whether he has Christian faith, on the grounds that ‘it would be vain to claim it before 
having verified it in action that matches its power’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:98]), he does both himself 
and the project a millenarian injustice that he would soon, as noted above, both recognise and remedy 
(Garaudy, 1975:265).   
Thirdly, there is a much more fundamental distinction to be made between Bloch and 
Garaudy. In the very next paragraph from his confession that ‘the Christian inside him has always been 
there’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:202]), he says that it is agonising ‘to have to doubt the very conception 
of this Party precisely in order to hold on to the hope that it brought to life’ (Garaudy, 1972 
[1976:202]). As the project develops, Garaudy makes explicit the inescapable connection at a personal 
level between acceptance of Christianity and the rejection of the central role of the Party. At the core 
of the project, therefore, is the transformatory political significance of Christianity.  
Moltmann is next in line for incorporation within the project — not arguing against Bloch, 
Garaudy is careful to say, but responding to his insight (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:95]). From Moltmann’s 
insistence that ‘Hope finds in Christ not only a consolation in suffering, but also the protest of the 
divine promise against suffering’ (Moltmann, 1964 [2002:7]), Garaudy extracts a causal link between 
faith and impatience with the idolatries and alienations of the world (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:96]). From 
Moltmann too he cites a representation of Christ as ‘the fully human man whose every action teaches 
us to look to ultimate objectives’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:96]), even though ‘to be a Christian is not to 
believe that the resurrection is 'real' (in the sense of positivist history and science); it means believing 
it is possible . . . The Resurrection is every day’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:97]). More than that, ‘The 
Resurrection is the challenge to entropy, to the forces of death, to all the powers which destroy human 
beings’ (Garaudy, 1976a [1980:10]). In the name of a false idealism that considers that there is an 
immutable human nature that prevents our salvation, it is no more utopian to believe in a Christian 
renewal than in Marxist one (Garaudy, 1977:17). I suggest that this remark is significant. Even if 
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references to Jesus are less frequent with Garaudy or Kolakowski than for Bloch or Machoveč, and the 
Resurrection figurative, ‘Jesus’ historical existence is not denied’ (Winling, 1981:265).  
Any theorist seeking to demonstrate the mutual dependence of two traditions must surely 
indicate what politely to leave behind and what to include in the relationship. Garaudy acknowledges 
that beyond science there are questions to which it has no answer. For the time being, these are 
delegated to the realm of myth and philosophy (Hughes, 1970:30). This would appear to be a similar 
view to that of Bultmann and of process theology more generally, particularly of myth (Hughes, 
1970:42). But whereas Garaudy the Marxist humanist could argue that Bultmann’s demythologising 
was consistent with Marxism, he tactfully remained silent on those aspects of Bultmann’s work, such 
as his quietist view of hope (Collins, 1968: 260) that met with less approval from more radical 
theologians such as Moltmann. So too Bultmann’s insistence on the primacy and immediacy of 
Revelation, an allegedly existentialist picture of the Gospel as ahistorical, at the expense of 
eschatological interpretation, eventually disavowed even by Karl Rahner. ‘This preoccupation with the 
present has meant that the existentialist theologians have individualized and spiritualized 
eschatology’ (Collins, 1968:263), so Garaudy no more than Bloch, Moltmann or Rahner can accept it.  
 
Three pillars on which the project rests 
 
In successive articles and books, Garaudy claims that the project rests on three premises, 
asking rhetorically whether the premises on which revolutionary action is based are the same as those 
of the Bible (Garaudy, 1973:14). Always three — but they vary somewhat. 
Faith and Revolution (Garaudy, 1973b), although it predates his actual announcement of 
Christian faith, represents a synopsis of Garaudy’s view of the relationship of religion and revolution 
within the project. Here, the first premise of revolutionary action is transcendence. ‘We posit the 
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premise that it is possible for us to liberate ourselves from a given natural order and to shape our own 
future’ (Garaudy, 1973:34). So too in Parole d’Homme (Garaudy, 1975), the first premise is again 
transcendence, that ‘the aims of revolutionary action cannot be derived only from the past or the 
present’101 (Garaudy, 1975:231). As an aspect of faith, transcendence is at the core of all escape from 
determinism in history, the incarnation of God in Man, his revelation and continued creation in and 
through Man (Garaudy, 1975:236). There is little change in this premise throughout the project. 
Chapter Five explores this pillar of the project in detail.  
The second premise is relativity: it ‘asserts the possibility of a radical break with all forms of 
social alienation’ (Garaudy, 1973:68). This ‘prophetic’ premise is designed to show that no 
achievement is permanent, no goal final. As for a paradigm, it is artistic creation, Garaudy says, that 
‘may perhaps provide both revolutionary action and the Christian faith with the example they need’ 
(Garaudy, 1973:68). In Garaudy (1975), the second premise is again relativity, the prophetic premise 
that ‘even people alienated by a society are capable of fighting against that alienation’102 (Garaudy, 
1975:237). So too, little change. It is this premise which places the project firmly in the category of the 
Marxism and Christianity that has been variously described as revisionist and heretical respectively, 
or, in a term to cover both intellectual traditions, closer to each other than to their own doctrinal 
versions, ‘dialogical’ (Vree, 1976:176).  
Garaudy claims that both these premises rest on a third, that of openness, ‘the eschatological 
premise, following on the utopian and the prophetic, or again, if you like, the premise of hope’ 
(Garaudy, 1973:72). This premise, he further argues, ‘may perhaps be identified with the very 
foundation of faith, namely, faith in the Resurrection of Christ’ (Garaudy, 1973:72). But this is the 
English translation. In the original article (Garaudy, 1973c) and in Garaudy (1975), he goes further, 
beginning with identical language: the premise of openness not merely may be, but is ‘identified with 
 
101 Les fins de l’action révolutionnaire ne peuvent être déduites seulement du passé ou du présent 
102 même les hommes aliénés par une societé sont capables de combattre cette aliénation 
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the essence of faith: faith in the Resurrection of Christ’ (Garaudy, 1975:242). Shortly, we learn that 
the basis of the love that is true freedom is ‘hope in the Resurrection.’ 103 This is because ‘The 
Resurrection is par excellence that defiance of entropy, of the forces of death, of all the destructive 
powers of Man’104 (Garaudy, 1976a:12).  
It is a persuasive suggestion, as part of an appeal to Christians, as the faith required here is 
surely not just in the future, it is in the premises themselves, which other than this comparison go 
otherwise without challenge. Garaudy immediately tempers this assertation with the modest denial 
of any attempt at theological pretension, claiming that he is only trying to explain to himself what he 
can understand. But he then goes on to remind his readers of the impact of that faith on the first 
Christians, which he asserts was to change their perception of freedom from that of necessity to 
participation in the act of creation.  
 
The contribution of other religions 
 
By the time of Appel aux vivants (1979) the premises for revolutionary action, at least for the 
politics of the project, have quietly disappeared in the wake of Pour un dialogue des civilisations  
(Garaudy, 1977). Instead, the emphasis is on the role of religions and cultures other than C hristianity 
to the project. The mutual dependence of Christianity with Marxism in the project could only ever be 
partial, particularly because of the openness of the project towards other religions.  
Contributions to the project from other religions are usefully indicated separately in Garaudy 
(1977, 1979).   
 
103 l’espérance de la Résurrection 
104 La Résurrection est, par excellence, ce défi à l’entropie, aux forces de la mort, à toutes les puissances 
destructrices de l’homme 
98 
 
From ‘The Egyptian Book of the Dead’ and contemporary Africa, he takes the wish to abolish 
the limit, the barrier between life and death, between Man and the divine. The divine dimensions of 
human life, he says, entail that Man is not an isolated part of the universe, that he is responsible for 
it, that his life is that of a God (Garaudy, 1979:71). Africa, he tells us, has kept for us the relationship 
born in Egypt between Man and the world, between Man and community, and between the visible 
and invisible worlds (Garaudy, 1979:73). This rejection of ‘the absurd dualism of body and soul’105 
(Garaudy, 1979:74) is the core of what he intends the project to capture from African religion and 
culture whereby nature is considered as a nexus of living forces, with Man at its nucleus (Garaudy, 
1973d:115). So too the ideas that death is the continuation of life in other ways, that to live is to be a 
creator, and that work, initiation and marriage are all sacred acts (Garaudy, 1979:75). None of this 
rhetoric is above critical comment. What does it mean in practice to reject the dualism of body and 
soul? Does it mean more than to reject the dualism of a capitalist society, ultimately that between 
individuals? And, if all is sacred, we might ask, perhaps nothing is. The link between what we should 
learn from African religion and the activist politics of the project certainly seems to be absent. A critic 
might even suggest that the difference between accepting what Garaudy has to say about African 
religion into the project and not doing so amounts to mutual respect between civilisations, which is 
not to decry such an innovation in itself, only to query whether tribal religion is the most useful 
gateway to its achievement. 
Next Garaudy turns to Zarathustra. Setting the historical scene, he contributes the surely 
interesting view that ‘The cultivation of the earth showed for the first time that one could live 
differently’106 (Garaudy, 1979:80). He goes on to suggest that it was Zarathustra who first introduced 
the idea of an ethical god, the human differentiation between Good and Evil (Garaudy, 1979:80). He 
also credits him with introducing monotheism, with the ideas of the world as a battlefield between 
Man and the enemies of his humanity, that Man can encounter God within himself, rather than 
 
105 L’absurde dualisme de l’âme et du corps 
106 La culture de la terre a pour la première fois montré qu’on pourrait vivre autrement 
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through rites and sacrifice, of respect for every life (Garaudy, 1979:81), and harmony with all of nature 
(Garaudy, 1979:83). So too Zarathustra is the first to reject any anthropomorphic conception of God 
in favour of a God both transcendent and immanent, the creator of human freedom, defined as the 
choice faced by every individual between Good and Evil (Garaudy, 1979:81–82). Life is a struggle, 
‘every person is both a warrior and a mystic’107 (Garaudy, 1979:82). The revolutionary prophecy of 
Zarathustra gives to each person the vocation of saviour of the world, through prayer, faith, directed 
intelligence and the complete engagement of life in the combat (Garaudy, 1979:83). If the word 
‘militant’ is missing, then it is surely only because of its previous association with the Communist Party 
that Garaudy has left behind: the principle seems extremely familiar.   
From Zarathustra to Hinduism is for Garaudy but a short migration. The central message of 
India he takes to be the sense of the profound unity of man, nature and the divine, which as expressed 
in the Vedas give rise to joy, liberty, and deliverance from illusions that bind our lives to partial realities 
and wants (Garaudy, 1979:86). It is in the rites of passage from death to life, from birth to eternal life, 
that Hinduism presents mysticism (Garaudy, 1979:87), but it does seem that it is Hindu technique 
which Garaudy seems to want us to admire, along with the other religions of Asian origin he goes on 
to explore (Garaudy, 1979:88), certainly by comparison with a traditional Hindu ontology replete with 
multiple levels of deities: devas and asuras prominent amongst them (Williams, 2008). Turning to the 
Upanishads, Garaudy again appears to find greater interest in methods of esoteric teaching, 
symbolism, meditation, and ‘the achievement of ‘a “Self”, going beyond any individual 
idiosyncrasies’.108 (Garaudy, 1979:93). The existence of the caste system is put down to capitalism, 
although placing real power with people of sacrifice and wisdom rather than those of meets with a 
favourable comparison to the elders of Plato’s Republic. Conquest, possessions and the control of 
wealth are on the lowest rank of the social scale (Garaudy, 1979:95).  
 
107 Chaque homme est à la fois un Guerrier et un mystique 
108 un «Soi », dépassant toute particularité individuelle 
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Buddhism Garaudy characterises as a reform of Hinduism, a rejection of priestly authority and 
ritual in favour of the practical question of human suffering (Garaudy, 1979:118). If it proves possible 
to escape the illusion that apart from each of the elements of being — the body, sense, ideas, feelings, 
conscience — there is ‘an actor behind the act, a thinker behind the thought, a “me” behind my 
conscience’ (Garaudy, 1979:119), the route to escape from suffering lies open. But, for Garaudy the 
defender of the individual against the collective, this is evidently a fine line to tread: his stress must 
lie on the autonomous, permanent, isolated, idealist illusion of individuality that is the subject of 
Buddhist ethical criticism; he cannot and does not accept any complete dissolution of the personality 
and recognises the continuing tension within Buddhism between ‘personal wellbeing and social 
liberation’109 (Garaudy, 1979:122). Thus ‘The central insight of the Tao is to reject all dualism’110 
(Garaudy, 1979:126), but this is only so that the distinction between subject and object can be 
unfavourably compared with the liberation provided by illumination of ‘unknowing’ 111 (Garaudy, 
1979:128), which ‘ends the cycle of violence and changes the concept of power and the purpose of 
action’ (Garaudy, 1979:129). The Tao in turn therefore opens the way to the authority of the sage, 
whose acts are those of being, not the acts of the possessive individual. Love becomes easy when all 
are part of me, and I of them (Garaudy, 1979:131). A mysticism, yes, but Garaudy chooses to derive it 
from the Tao rather than from Christianity to avoid any association with inertia or quietism. Instead, 
he seeks to distinguish it from selfish action derived from an inadequate and false conception of whom 
I really am. Garaudy closes his inclusion of the Eastern religions within the project by placing Zen as 
another renewal: its grand masters attack formality, conventions and religious myths (Garaudy, 
1979:142), in order to break down barriers: between being and non-being, life and death, and 
between the Divine and the human (Garaudy, 1979:147).   
 
109 le salut personnel et la libération sociale 




Then Garaudy turns to Judaism. Garaudy’s equal treatment of Judaism, even its inclusion at 
all, is of especial significance as marking a clear distinction between the project and its Islamic 
successor. The initial distinction he draws is between ‘a movement from Man towards God’112 
(Garaudy, 1979:148) within the Eastern religions on the one hand, and ‘a movement by God to 
interpellate Man’113 (Garaudy, 1979:148–9) within the religions of the book. Garaudy is no doubt not 
oblivious of the structural Marxist use of the term in this latter phrase (Althusser, 1970 [1976:113–4]). 
As a result, East and West cannot be compared. The revolutionary status of the prophet in Judaism 
derives not from any divination or oracle, but from their judgement of each institution, each act, in 
relation to their ends (Garaudy, 1979:154). Judaism’s essential contribution is to introduce a new 
conception of time, that of the promise, of hope — the time of the project (Garaudy, 1979:154). ‘This 
message is indivisibly divine and political’ (Garaudy, 1979:154).  
After the treatment of Christianity examined in more detail above, finally we learn, and in 
view of his subsequent conversion with great interest, the particular lessons that Is lam should impart 
to the project. Garaudy is drawn to what he describes as the ‘new collective life’ 114 to which the soul 
is brought through Islam, on which I will comment further in Chapter Six. But he is also impressed by 
the Sufist conception of union with God and by the essential message of the Quran, to awaken in Man 
a higher consciousness of his relationship with God, with Man, with the universe. ‘Islam gives to each 
action all its meaning in not separating the terrestrial from the spiritual world’115 (Garaudy, 1979:200). 
It is this unifying vision which ‘inspires all the aspects of Islam on earth — art, science, action’116 
(Garaudy, 1979:197) and creates the distinction between sacred acts are tied to and inspired by this 
unity and profane acts that are not.  
 
112 Un mouvement qui part de l’homme pour aller à Dieu  
113 Le mouvement part de Dieu pour interpeller l’homme 
114 nouvelle vie collective 
115 Islam donne à chaque action tout son sens en ne séparant pas un monde terrestre et un monde spirituel 
116 Inspire toutes les dimensions de la vie en terre d’Islam: l’art, la science, l’action  
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Islamic science in particular is praised for its break with the purely deductive reasoning of 
Greek thought, as well as the inseparability of science with wisdom. Yet Garaudy does not spare Islam 
(or Christianity) the accusation of decadence and intégrisme. He cites three particular instances with 
respect to Islam: defence of the established order against the poor, obstructing the progress of science 
with superstition, and prayer for personal needs instead of working to achieve them (Garaudy, 
1979:200). But over the centuries, Garaudy contends, Islam has not been identified with fatalism. 
Rather, it has been a powerful incentive to action, to the change of social structures, to the 
development of science and to the work of builders (Garaudy, 1979:200). This contention too is 
addressed in Chapter Six. 
A hierarchy of religions? 
The cherry-picking of ideas from different religions within the project presented in Appel aux vivants 
(Garaudy, 1979) may yet raise the suspicion that lurking below the surface is at least some element of 
Christian supersessionist thinking. The fact that it is Christianity that is to be the source of two of the 
most important underpins of the project, subjectivity and transcendence, to be discussed in Chapters 
Four and Five, might give rise to additional concern on this score.  
Of the persistence of supersessionist Christian thought there can be no doubt, especially in 
relation to Judaism (Bibliowicz, 2013: 104; Knitter, 2009:558), even if it has not only been theologians 
of religious pluralism who have contested supersessionist arguments (e.g. Hick, 1980) but also 
religious leaders themselves. Pope Francis, for example, has followed the pronouncements of his 
predecessor at the Second Vatican Council (Pope Paul VI, 1965) and gone out of his way to express 
sympathy with Islam (Pope Francis, 2013). Garaudy adopts such an approach within the project, 
wherein the contribution to be made by other religions develops in tandem with the increased 
emphasis he places politically on the dialogue of civilisations and the contribution of developing 
nations. Eventually, however, in combination with the short-term political failure of the project, this 
contribution has a destructive effect that forms the subject matter of Chapter Six.  
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Notably, and in sharp distinction from what both the exclusive focus on Christianity as a 
Marxist humanist before Garaudy began his project, and the Islam that was to follow, Garaudy at no 
point during the project suggests that partial consistency of any of these religions with Marxism is not 
possible. But Garaudy’s cherry-picking, even assuming the cherries are both where he claims they are, 
and ready to be picked, has a bias to the past: ideas should be taken from the earliest religion where 
they appear. Hence in Garaudy (1979) there is a broadly chronological consideration of religions. This 
bias is an important component of the project, occasionally finding explicit voice, as when he says that 
‘Hinduism gave the first model of mysticism’ (Garaudy, 1979:87), evidently intending this to be a 
justification of its inclusion in the project, at least as represented by the work in hand.  It may, 
however, be called out for what it is: a presentational device, with no explicit or implicit hierarchy of 
religions either intended or concluded.  
The different role of religions is an important distinction between the project and its 
predecessor. There might be a strong case for Garaudy as a Marxist humanist elevating Christianity 
beyond other religions: his treatment of religion (Garaudy, 1966 [1970: 106–163]) concerns only 
Christianity, for example. It is a criticism that has been levelled against Marx as well, in particular given 
what he had to say about his own Jewish heritage (Fischman, 1989:757).  By contrast, Garaudy’s 
project sought to engage with all religions whilst yet avoiding a charge of intégrisme, and so Garaudy 
should and indeed does not reproach the philosophers for such consistency. Within the project and 
even after his own conversion, Garaudy explicitly rejects the idea of a hierarchy of religions. ‘It’s about 
helping the Buddhist to be a better Buddhist, the Christian a better Christian, the Muslim a better 
Muslim’117 (Garaudy, 1992:206). Mutual dependence between Christianity with Marxism within the 
project entails openness to consistency with other religions, especially in terms of the source of 
transcendence, if not of subjectivity. The same connection between religion and revolution Garaudy 
for example identified in Islam and Buddhism (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:27]).  And as Garaudy’s conviction 
 
117 Mais aider le bouddhiste à devenir un meilleur bouddhiste, le chrétien un meilleur chrétien, le musulman un 
meilleur musulman  
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that the West is at fault both philosophically and politically deepens, so the tension rises between his 
tentative re-commitment to Christianity and his increasing  tendency to attribute not only significance, 
or benefit, to every religion, but implicitly to assign them equal status, most notably in Appel aux 
vivants (Garaudy, 1979). Equal, but separate: determined to avoid intégrisme, and maintain the 
cultural independence of every religion, he is as a result not quite prepared to admit that he intends 
to adhere to the approach taken by those who argue for the common origin of all religions, nor to 
agree with the existence of subterranean traditions of agreement and concordance (Swidler, 1988; 
Fernando et al., 1991), let alone to support them. This is despite his recognition of ‘the theory by which 
each doctrine progresses and asserts its distinctiveness, not in a state of anxiety and isolation, but 
open to the winds of change, accepting cross-fertilisation from other visions of the world’118 (Garaudy, 
1979:157). Much later he did recognise that his objective had indeed been ‘this ambition to unify the 
world spiritually’119 (Garaudy, 1996:7).  
 Is there therefore anything connecting Christianity with the project that is distinct, however, 
both from its role within the Marxist humanism that preceded the project and from the contributions 
made by other religions? I argue yes: within the project, Christianity does still have privileged status 
— of a kind. Its privileged status within the project does not derive from any comparative advantage 
by comparison to other religions, and certainly not because of its largely European institutional 
adoption. No member of any religion has any more of a covenant with God than any other, nor is 
prevented from entering Garaudy’s Promised Land by virtue of their faith. Rather, it arises by virtue of 
its relationship with Marxism. Garaudy contends that not only is it possible to achieve a partial 
consistency between Marxism and Christianity, but they are mutually dependent. Garaudy’s project 
entails the assertion that only from Christianity can Marxism derive the necessary theoretical concepts 
to save not only itself, but the whole world. Yet almost paradoxically he seems concerned to establish 
 
118 La théorie selon laquelle toute doctrine progresse et affirme sa spécificité non dans un isolement anxieux, 
mais s’ouvrant aux souffles du large, en acceptant la fécondation réciproque des autres visions du monde 
119 cette ambition d'unifier spirituellement le monde 
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a parity in the relationship of mutual dependence, almost as if a barter trade were in progress. In the 
project, Marxism demands that Christianity accepts its own concepts of social class and equality, 
explanations of change within society, the role of economics, and ultimately of justice and freedom, 
the light on the hill that Garaudy hopes Christians will accept in order to regain their lost political and 
social compass. Norris recognises that in exchange Garaudy has ‘come to view two contributions of 
Christianity as basic to any Marxist humanism: subjectivity and transcendence’, which were the two 
ideas that Garaudy stresses in all his work for the construction of socialist society, including the project 
(Bustros, 1976:xv; Norris, 1974:11; Borg, 1976:332; Ratliff (1975).  They are central to the definition of 
God that Garaudy himself provides: 
‘I call God that origin, inaccessible yet near, that personal and living presence, who thinks of 
me when I think, that is, when I conceive of new possibilities, new projects, when I realise 
them through my work, and which is revealed when I have a thought or act in a way that goes 
beyond, that transcends all of that which has made up what I have known, conceived and 
done until now’120 (Garaudy, 1975:55–56) 
If Garaudy is to be exonerated from a charge of Christian supersessionist thinking, therefore, it must 
be with this important proviso, that whatever is to be derived from other faiths, there must not only 
be room for the acceptance of both subjectivity and transcendence from Christianity, but that such 
acceptance does not of itself constitute a new form of supersessionist thinking.  Such exoneration may 
draw not only on the difference between religion and politics, but also from the fact that, by the time 
of the project, the mounting challenges of Marxism are very apparent to Garaudy. So, although the 
project is indeed designed as a way out of the impasse in which Marxism has found itself, to claim that 
components of a religion are essential for Marxism can therefore hardly be regarded as much of a 
basis for supersessionism. 
It must be conceded, however, that if the derivation of critical components of the project from 
Christianity are regarded as drawing an equivalent within the project to traditional claims of Christian 
 
120 J’appelle Dieu cette source inaccessible et proche, cette présence personnelle et aimante, qui pense en moi 
lorsque je pense, c’est-à-dire lorsque je conçois de nouveau possibles, de nouveaux projets, lorsque je les réalise 
par mon travail, et qu’affleure ainsi une pensée ou une œuvre qui dépasse, qui transcende l’ensemble jusque-
là constitué de ce que j’ai connu, conçu et fait jusqu’ici 
106 
 
superiority over other religions, then the conclusion is inescapable: far from placing all religions on an 
equal plane, Garaudy is guilty of the very crime that he is so concerned to avoid.  
 
Conclusion: A flawed project 
 
The project represents the opportunity for Garaudy both to write his revisionist political 
manifesto, separate and quite distinct from that of the PCF, and publicly to confess his Christian faith 
and its mutual dependence with that revisionist Marxism. In the project we can see an unveiling of 
Garaudy’s developing political and religious beliefs, to which he tries to make his actions conform. The 
populist language of the project can therefore be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the project 
is polemical, just as was its Marxist humanist predecessor (Hampsch, 1968:139), perhaps even more 
so. Hence for example even at the end of the project, Garaudy counterposes his view of autonomous 
individuals within both Marxism and Christianity with Althusser’s view of individuals as mere puppets 
within structures (Garaudy, 1980:14). Such populist presentation reflects the political component of 
the project, which was largely a response to what he perceived as the ineffective sclerosis of the PCF. 
It has had the effect of largely shrouding it from detailed examination, in sharp contrast to the Marxist 
humanism that preceded and the conversion that followed it. To sketch is one of Sève’s favourite 
verbs; he says so himself, in developing an outline of a theory of personality consistent with Marxism 
(Sève, 2008:390). Garaudy did no more or less: he also sketched out such mutual dependence 
between Marxism and Christianity: perhaps a sketch was all that could reasonably be expected. This 
is far from saying that his views did not change even during this short period. The challenge that I have 
sought to meet, however, is to determine the real evolution of his views.   
I have sought too not only to place the political evolution of the project in context, but also to 
give it its proper philosophical status. As Garaudy himself said, Lenin favoured opportunities (Garaudy, 
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1979:45fn) — he might have added, Lenin knew political failure as well all too well — and it would be 
completely unfair to force Marxism into a purely Marxist–Leninist political quandary. During the 1970s 
it gradually dawned on Marxists worldwide that a series of earnestly held Leninist political beliefs and 
forecasts were most probably radically wrong. It is therefore arguably to Garaudy’s credit that he 
grapples with political reality and seeks coalitions for change, albeit that his project only comes to light 
after his ejection from the PCF. Whilst we might want to wonder how long he would have remained 
inside the PCF in the absence of the February 1970 dénouement, it is in fact inconceivable to imagine 
that given the divergence of views at the time, and in particular his clash with Marchais, let alone with 
Sève and his other critics, he could have stayed much longer.  
Garaudy’s problem, however, is that in wishing simultaneously to distance the project from a 
Constantinian church, an ossified Communist movement and capitalist institutions, he leaves himself 
with only the ineffective components of a vaguely defined ‘historic bloc’. If this ‘historic bloc’ was 
something of a fantasy (let alone a distortion of Gramsci), if the women’s movement in which he 
seemed to place such hope would lose its way, if humanity as a whole failed to accept the political 
and ultimately religious challenge that he posed throughout the 1970s, then he is neither alone in 
advocating any of these things, nor should his politics disqualify him from the Marxist label, especially 
as he wishes to claim it. What is missing, however, is a theory, let alone a roadmap, of how humanity 
is supposed to carry out the political aspect of the project, especially in the short time that Garaudy 
thought available before some form of catastrophe was likely to ensue. When any cohesion or 
transformatory change fails to materialise from this or any other source, the political aspect of the 
project appears, to Garaudy at least, to have reached a dead end, symbolised by the abject failure of 
his own candidacy for the Presidency of the French Republic in 1981.  
Garaudy had for so long, during his Marxist humanist phase, been forced to defend himself 
against accusations of revisionism, even defending Lenin by comparison to Stalin (Garaudy, 1968a), 
that an assertion of political revisionism was politically impossible, even if he was prepared to offer 
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socialist President Mitterrand the benefit of his advice on cultural matters (Garaudy, 1981d). Politically 
the project presents an at times ultra-leftist position, and at all times overt revisionism would have to 
remain a closed book. Garaudy’s own past blocked the political way forward, and with it, necessitated 
the a priori rejection of any potential opportunity to integrate the project with the revisionist Marxist 
tradition, however potentially consistent with Christianity.  
The challenge of the project is not however confined to extensive, if idiosyncratic, political 
revisions of Marxism, even going beyond the limitations of its ‘positivism’ (Garaudy, 1973e:64). The 
Christian component of the project had largely been hiding in plain sight during Garaudy’s Marxist 
humanist phase, masquerading as mere description not belief (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:131]). 
Consistency between Marxism and Christianity had been part of Garaudy’s praxis throughout his 
Marxist humanist phase and even before. To hold the two ends of the chain together had been his 
life’s aim to date. Garaudy’s project can therefore be envisaged as the consequence of his return to 
the Christian belief of his youth combined with revisionist Marxism, but this time as prophet rather 
than disciple.  
As a Marxist humanist, ‘Garaudy adhered to two distinct communities of thought, within 
which the interpretation of "Reality" varies, but there are also discourses that, although they express 
themselves in different terms, refer to similar ethical considerations. It is in this space of common 
words that Garaudy builds his life project’121 (Fleury, 2004:105), The claim remained, however, that, 
‘in contrast with all earlier forms of atheism, Marxism can integrate all the human aspirations which 
are to be found, in a mystified form, among believers’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:115]).   
In the project, by distinction, the two communities merge, and the interpretation of ‘reality’ 
therefore also becomes one. Marxism no more subsumes Christianity than vice versa. Free from all 
 
121 Garaudy adhère ainsi à deux communautés de pensée distinctes, à l’intérieur desquelles l’interprétation de 
la « réalité » varie, mais où l’on retrouve aussi des discours qui, bien qu’ils s’expriment en des termes différents, 
font référence à des considérations éthiques similaires. C’est dans cet espace de propos communs que Garaudy 
construit son projet de vie 
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the restrictions imposed by his former role in the PCF, Garaudy immediately muses that when true 
history begins, for Christians: ‘That will be perhaps their real triumph: the moment when faith will be 
forever integrated into a complete conception of Man. In that sense, there will no longer be any 
Marxism either’122 (Garaudy, 1970c:174). But the problem is that the project then takes on a dream-
like quality. Neither Biblical nor scientific, the criticism is easy to make that it runs a significant risk, 
that of blocking the participation of Christians of traditional beliefs and rejecting the ‘grass roots’ of 
Christianity as much as it excluded the admittedly already diminishing number of Marxist–Leninists. 
Ever alert to the problem of engagement, especially in the developing world, Garaudy takes care, 
within the project, to try for example to moderate the insistence on the purely mythological character 
of Christianity, but only by ignoring this amongst other issues of Christianity in practice altogether. By 
the time Garaudy critically evaluated evangelical Christianity from a political perspective, for example, 
it was as an outsider (Garaudy, 2000).   
Even though Marxism and Christianity have joined forces within the project, success is not 
certain: Garaudy is under no illusion that ‘The problem that arises today is whether Christianity and 
Marxism can be living components in the construction of a future with a human face’123 (Garaudy, 
1977b:11). This is in part a recognition that ‘religions no longer live in splendid isolation from each 
other’ (Fredericks, 1998: 171), which results in Garaudy finding himself eventually compelled to assign 
Christianity the role of one religion amongst others. This result had been anticipated. In what reads 
almost like a very prescient debate with Garaudy himself, the young Marx asked rhetorically: ‘If you 
presume yourself raised so high above religion that you are entitled to separate its general spirit from 
its positive provisions, how can you reproach the philosophers if they carry out this separation 
completely and not halfway, if they call the general spirit of religion the human spirit, and not the 
Christian spirit?’ (Marx, 1842 [1975:184]).  
 
122 Ce sera peut-être leur vrai triomphe: le moment de la foi sera intègré pour toujours à une conception plénière 
de l’homme. En ce sens, il n’y aura plus de marxisme non plus 
123 El problema que hoy se plantea es saber si el cristianismo y el marxismo pueden ser componentes vivas en la 
construcción de un futuro con rostro humano 
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In that sense, Garaudy’s project indeed calls the general gift of religion the human spirit. Though 
Christianity is being asked to donate two of its most important principles to Marxism, it is yet being 
asked to yield any position of pre-eminence amongst religions, a position that not only Christians may 
find difficult to accept, but also adherents of other faiths may find difficult to believe. Equally, 
however, Garaudy urges Marxists to accept what he argues Christianity offers, and which Marxism 
must accept to survive: the way to Heaven on Earth through subjectivity and the concomitant 




Chapter Four: The role of subjectivity in the project 
 
 
Marxism in need of rescue 
 
Whether in a doctoral thesis (Garaudy, 1955), analysing competing trends within French 
philosophy (Garaudy, 1959 [1969]), defending the influence of Hegel within Marxism (Garaudy, 1962), 
presenting a short history of Marxism (Garaudy, 1966 [1970]), in respect of the calculation of surplus 
value, in political tactics, or in philosophy, where he was noted as emphasising ‘our freedom to take 
our cultural tradition into our hands’ (Will, 1974:329), Garaudy as a Marxist humanist always stressed 
Marx’s anti-dogmatic thought. Garaudy’s reading of Marx, especially the early Marx, led him to the 
conclusion that Marxism was a philosophy of liberty and freedom, and therefore embraced ‘the 
contingency of historical hegemony’ (Garaudy, 1973:40). We therefore read him insisting, as much 
perhaps to his former comrades in the PCF as to a wider readership, that ‘a plurality of possible ways 
is conceivable and realisable, that the future is not a scenario already written without us, that we are 
not puppets, but fully responsible for our own history and for our own future’ (Garaudy, 1973:40–41).  
No doubt intending to implicate Marxism–Leninism, Stalinism in particular, as well as 
structuralist Marxism, Garaudy argued that in any other determinist form, ‘there  is a perversion of 
Marxism, a dogmatism unable to integrate the prophetic dimension of Man, that of artistic creation, 
that of love, that of faith’124 (Garaudy, 1971:126). For Garaudy, the origins of this perversion of 
Marxism lay well before its inception, in a dichotomous and false view of Man, which, although 
prevalent since the Renaissance, can trace its origins back to Ancient Greece, through Galileo and 
Copernicus onto positivism and then to ‘From Auguste Comte to Durkheim, from Pavlov to Jacques 
 
124 Il y a là un indice irrécusable que l’on a affaire à une perversion du marxisme, à un dogmatisme? incapable 
d’intégrer la dimension prophètique de l’homme, celle de la création artistique, celle de l’amour, celle de la foi 
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Monod, from Hegel to Stalin: none ever concealed that they were systematically applying to Man the 
methods and laws that had been proven in the natural sciences’ 125 (Garaudy, 1979:46; Robinson, 
2004). Such positivism, ‘the view that science consists simply in the observation of facts and the  
induction of laws from the regularities discovered in nature’ (Cranston, 1970:14), had unfortunately 
dominated the Marxist–Leninist conception of science, which had as a result become a caricature of 
the dialectical materialism for which Garaudy no longer saw a place in Marxism. It was a diagnosis 
with which others of a different philosophical persuasion concurred: Sartre has been characterised as 
arguing that Marxism ‘will degenerate into an inhuman anthropology if it insists on founding its 
teaching upon a dialectic of Nature instead of a dialectic of the individual’ (Carpenter, 1982:245), in 
particular if it failed to reintegrate Man into itself as its foundation (Sartre, 1960:250).   
Despite continued vigour as a political force, Marxism therefore stood in dire need of both a 
remedy for its positivism, and a new mechanism to explain and then to direct history. Only a Marxism 
that recaptured Marx’s original project, but reinfused it with a strong subjective element, could 
achieve both tasks. In the most well-known formulation, existentialism was advanced as the solution, 
as it 
‘intends, without being unfaithful to Marxist principles, to find mediations which allow the 
concrete individual — the particular life, the real and actual conflict, the person — to emerge 
from the background of the general contradiction of productive forces and relations of 
production’ (Sartre, 1957 [1963:57]). 
This Chapter aims to show that Garaudy the Marxist humanist also set himself the task of identifying 
and selecting a similar, but different solution, which he claimed derived from Christianity, and how it 




125 D’Auguste Comte en Durkheim, de Pavlov en Jacques Monod, de Hegel en Staline, on n’a jamais dissimulé 
que l’on appliquait consciemment à l’homme les méthodes et les lois qui avaient fait leurs preuves dans les 
sciences de la nature 
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Freedom: more advocated than analysed 
 
For Garaudy, subjectivity, practice and freedom were a lways ‘the three great philosophical 
themes that concern Marxists’ (Garaudy, 1964 [1967:36]), even if historically Marxists had not focused 
on them. He early on addressed the question of human freedom (Garaudy, 1955). Here he argued that 
the recognition of causality, of necessity at the society level, was an essential first step to genuine 
liberty, a Hegelian view also taken by Marxists from Engels (1877 [1947]) on, as well as by the Frankfurt 
School (Hearfield, 2017) and by radical theologians, arguing for instance that the world is a realm 
where ‘necessity meets the possible’ (Moltmann, 1965 [2002:10]). Garaudy went on to try to 
demonstrate what the concepts of freedom meant in practical terms, not only in the actual patterns 
of practice observed in laws and customs, but as ideological tools and weapons playing roles in the 
struggles of contending groups (Somerville, 1956:273). He concluded that ‘Freedom road goes through 
the dictatorship of the proletariat’126 (Garaudy, 1957:13). Then, in his lengthy treatise on Hegel 
(Garaudy, 1962), he placed Hegel in historical context, arguing that he can be seen as complementing 
Garaudy’s Marxist conception of freedom. Garaudy’s focus was on the evolution of Hegel’s thought in 
terms of the influence [upon it] of Rousseau, then Smith, and finally, ‘the theological transposition of 
his interests, following a loss of confidence in revolutionary ideals ’ (Hodges, 1963:623), a process of 
change that uncannily, but perhaps not entirely accidentally, presaged the transformation of 
Garaudy’s own views in the project.   
Garaudy’s philosophical writings may have provided a satisfactory etymological analysis of 
‘freedom’, and it certainly has force, but neither his analysis of freedom itself nor his attempt to 
rehabilitate Hegel went to the heart of the debate between Christians and Marxists over individual 
self-determination, let alone moral responsibility. Both might even be taken as supporting the 
contention that ‘freedom and individuality are social products’ (Sayers, 1998:7), which can find no 
 
126 Le chemin de la liberté passait par la dictature du prolétariat 
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place in either the epistemology or the politics of the project. All Marxist analysis does here is point 
to freedom and its limits, and no one suggested that Garaudy had provided an entirely satisfactory 
explanation of the dichotomy between Marxist explanations of social change and individual agency.  
Ambivalence towards freedom, and criticism, persisted into the project itself. Hence for 
example in relation to the question of individual freedom versus historical necessity, ‘Garaudy prefers 
to delight in this mystery rather than give it a rational explanation’ (Vree, 1976:155), e.g. in his remark 
that ‘So, for Marx, Man and his history begin with the conscious purpose, the design, that has 
determined the chain of causality thereafter, without violating it ’127 (Garaudy, 1978a:138). Human 
freedom is therefore a crucial element of the project, yet Garaudy is content to be accused of an 
alleged looseness of thought with which neither Bloch (1959) nor Cranston (1970), no more than Sève 
(1978) or Momjan (1974), can have any sympathy. One can only wish that he had turned at least part 
of his attention more closely to the theoretical compatibility of individual freedom and self-
determination on the one hand, and Marxist socio-economic analysis on the other, either as a Marxist 
humanist before launching the project, or at least as a parallel philosophical effort to the more 
polemical and popular work of his ‘prophetic’ period. As it was, he wrote separately on Marxism 
(Garaudy, 1977a, 1978a) to which some of the work of the project (e.g. Garaudy, 1977, 1979) did not 
refer. The role of levels of analysis was perhaps being asked to do too much work, a problem Coste 
suggests arises also with much of liberation theology and even the work of Christians such as Girardi 





127 So fängt für Marx der Mensch und seine Geschichte mit dem bewußten Zweck an, mit der Entwurf, der seither 
die Kette von Kausalitäten bestimmt, ohne sie zu verbrechen 
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Subjectivity and Marxist humanism 
 
Quite early on, in Perspectives de l’homme (Garaudy, 1959 [1969]), he set out the objectives 
of his approach. Presenting Marx as a humanist, he aimed to free Marxism from a rigid determinism 
based on technical progress and the class struggle, thereby asserting subjectivity and human liberty. 
He was not alone in this: Marxist humanism was a global collection of theories (Fromm, 1967).  
Mere human freedom to act, however much proven and well-integrated into a Marxist 
humanist framework for the understanding of social change, would not have sufficed for the project 
to achieve any political goals. So, from his Marxist humanist phase onwards, ‘the problem of 
subjectivity, that is to say of human creative initiative continuing through history, takes centre 
stage’128 (Perottino, 1969:6). Garaudy defined it thus: 
‘Subjectivity is in the first place the affirmation of the impossibility for the consciousness of 
being equated with itself. Even if consciousness can at times be equated with being, can make 
it transparent to itself, it cannot be equated with its own act by which it necessarily transcends 
and creates itself. Subjectivity, therefore, is of the order not of being but of act’ (Garaudy, 
1966 [1970:85])129. 
By way of explanation, Garaudy volunteered later that: ‘the subjective element of revolutionary action 
is not only the ‘science’ possessed by the theoreticians and the leaders, but also the ‘historic initiative 
of the masses’, not to be despised as ‘spontaneity’’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:89]). Although Garaudy did 
not explicitly draw the parallel, ‘Kierkegaard’s insistence upon action and his denigration of abstract 
thought’ (Garelick, 1965:1) is a distinction drawn along similar lines. Kierkegaard, Marx, Sartre — all 
would line up to agree with the importance of subjectivity in at least some form (Miller, 1982:174).  
But there are differences, at least whilst Garaudy’s Marxist humanism presented a concept of 
 
128 Le problème de la subjectivité, c’est á dire de l’initiative de l’homme dans la création continue de son histoire, 
passe ainsi au premier plan 
129 l'impossibilité pour la conscience, de s'égaler à soi. Si la conscience peut parfois s'égaler à l'être, se le rendre 
transparent, elle ne peut s'égaler à son acte par lequel nécessairement elle se transcende et se créé. La 
subjectivité n'est donc pas de l'ordre de l'être mais de l'ordre de l'acte (translation is by René Hague) 
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subjectivity as an explanation of liberty and an essential component of revolutionary change. As he 
set out to compare, in one of the last occasions that he would identify as an atheist: 
‘If I try to find what for an atheist can be the equivalent of prayer for a believer, it seems to 
me that this is the moment when I realise that I am not, cannot be, only the culmination, the 
result, of my past, or of my instincts, of my habits, of my conformity, of my society, but where 
I realise that I can at each moment start again my life and my history, in conditions obviously 
determined in the past, but where I can take the initiative of a new departure’130 (Garaudy, 
1973a:396)  
This is what he promoted as the ‘subjective’ element in Marxism. There is in Garaudy’s argument thus 
far a strong parallel between different subjectivities. On the one hand, there is that of the Marxist, 
one of self-awareness, a certain — no doubt limited, but identifiable — independence of action and 
thought based on class identity and political participation. On the other hand, there is that of a 
Christian, equally convinced that the future is not wholly determined, but lying in some way at the 
disposal of God, albeit that in some incomprehensible way human beings have also the capacity for 
self-determination. Marxist humanists were content to let the difference stand.  
In the work of Marx, especially the early Marx, and even more especially now that early works 
were available — the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1844 [1975]), but also The 
Poverty of Philosophy (Marx, 1847 [1976]) and The German Ideology (Marx & Engels, 1846 [1975]), 
even in Marx’s work on suicide (Plaut et al., 1999), Garaudy believed he had found ample proof of the 
accuracy of his characterisation of the importance of subjectivity to Marxism (Garaudy, 1963a). From 
this body of work, Garaudy the Marxist humanist drew conclusions on two fronts. First, that ‘Marx’s 
underlying thesis persists — from his first works to his last struggles’ (Garaudy, 1964 [1967:203]), a 
view that more recently has found support in the contention that ‘Marx’s later insights and proposals 
were arrived at, and in part explicated by or grasped through, his earlier ideas’ (Horowitz, 2014:455). 
 
130 Si j'essaie de chercher ce que peut être pour un athée l'équivalent de ce qu'est la prière pour un croyant, il 
me semble que c'est le moment où je prends conscience que je ne suis pas, ne peux pas être seulement 
l'aboutissement, la résultante de mon passé, ou de mes instincts, de mes habitudes, de mes conformismes, de 
ma société, mais où je prends conscience que je peux à chaque instant recommencer ma vie et mon histoire, 
dans des conditions évidemment déterminées par le passé, mais où je peux prendre l'initiative d'un nouveau 
départ   
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This view was in polemically sharp distinction to Althusser and those structuralist Marxists who 
supported him in advocating the ‘epistemological break’ in Marx’s thought (Althusser, 1965 
[2005:221–247]), as well as contemporary ‘orthodox’ Marxist–Leninists (Vree, 1976:175; Miller, 
1982:2), who still supported the vanguard role of the Communist Party (Vree, 1976:122). Second, that 
Engels was right to insist that ‘Marx's theory of history never pretended to determine — economically 
or otherwise — what individuals would do. The greatest latitude was allowed for the variety of 
personal motivation’ (Engels, 1886 [1996:49]; Sowell, 1963:121),  
For Garaudy the Marxist humanist, there was therefore ample proof of this subjectivity in 
Marxism within the work of the early Marx itself — only published, it must be recalled, just over two 
decades before Garaudy began to write on the subject. It just needed to be demonstrated and 
accepted by Marxists themselves so that it could be co-opted as the philosophical underpinning of 
politics for a socialist society suitable for the economic and political conditions of 20th Century Europe.  
There were two problems with this reliance on Marx for Garaudy and other Marxist humanists 
that followed chronologically. First, everyone on the Left did not agree, as the well-documented 
theoretical rebellion of the structuralist Marxists started and led by Althusser against Marxist 
humanist ideas demonstrated (Althusser, 1965 [2005]). This was especially evident within the PCF in 
the contest between Garaudy and his opponents discussed above in Chapter Three. But second, at 
least for Garaudy after his expulsion from the PCF, the perception that Marxism had despite his efforts 
still not moved sufficiently in the direction of appreciating the practical importance of subjectivity, 
and indeed that the PCF appeared to fail to understand it altogether. Philosophically, therefore he 
now sought a broader base for subjectivity than the contested narrative over Marx’s own views of 
subjectivity. His response, as analysed below, was to seek a theory of agency that spanned Marxism 
and Christianity. Politically, he now sought a wider base of support, which include Christians as before, 
but this time bereft of Party leadership. Here already is the core of the first important role Garaudy 
envisaged for Christianity in enriching Marxism, of providing the missing element that had prevented 
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the success of revolutions in the past and lay at the missing heart of the failure of the Soviet state 
socialist experiment.  
 
‘L’homme’ in Garaudy 
 
Subjectivity needs a subject, just as agency needs an agent. Garaudy needed that subject, but 
there appeared to him nowhere within Marxism to turn. At ease with social and economic categories, 
especially class, Marxism undoubtedly struggled with the alleged absence of a theory of individuality 
from the outset — and arguably still does (De Paiva & Oliveira, 2018:1795). Questions of personality, 
let alone of character, were to be evaded, and psychology was treated with suspicion (Sève, 1969 
[1978:11]). Even sympathetic criticism of Marxism frequently focused on its alleged incomprehension 
of personality and tried helpfully to develop for it a philosophy of Man, suggesting for example that 
Marxism is in some ways quite gender inclusive (Plamenatz, 1975) or reaching out to psychoanalysis 
to develop a theory of character (Fromm, 1949:54–55). There were notable exceptions: Lev Vygotsky 
(1927) was the inspiration for the cultural-historical school, whilst Marxists such as Georges Politzer 
(1928 [1994]), Henri Wallon (1951 [1972]), Jean Desanti (1947), Henri Lefebvre (Kipfer et al., 2015) 
and Lucien Sève (1969, [1978], 2008) all refused in varying ways and across different disciplines to 
concede that Marx could play no role in psychology, as have critical psychologists (e.g. Parker, 2009).  
In the absence of clarity, arguments ensued between Marxists, including within the PCF. They 
may today seem tendentious, and even ethically inappropriate given the state of the world and the 
need for action. But they were very much alive at the time that Garaudy attempted to align Marxism 
and Christianity, and immediately beforehand, and they were perceived as having a direct bearing on 
the question of the status of the Soviet Union and the future of Marxism. Garaudy was a key player 
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within them. This was no more so than in respect of the relationship between Marxism and 
psychology, and the philosophy of Man within Marxism (Geerlandt, 1978:14). 
Whatever the precise relationship between capitalist forms of economic relations, private 
property, and alienation, the socialist humanists, for example Schaff, held that ‘the central problem 
of socialism — of any socialism — and Marx’s socialism in particular — is the problem of Man’. (Schaff, 
1967:129). In his most well-known work on the subject (Schaff, 1965 [1970]), which emerged while 
Garaudy was attempting to hold the line within the PCF, Schaff claimed that after the publication of 
Marx’s early works, there was ‘a deliberate desire to replace the scientific motivation of Marxism with 
an ethical, humanist one’ (Schaff, 1965 [1970:15]). A limited autonomy, however, based on social 
relations to be specifically contrasted in turn with the solitude of existential freedom, as for example 
presented by Sartre (1943), whose existential cure for the ails of Marxism (Sartre, 1960; Birchall, 
2005), the Marxist humanist Garaudy consistently thought as bad as the disease (Garaudy, 1947:79, 
1966a). It was indeed criticised elsewhere as attempting not to fall into the errors of vulgar Marxism, 
which also loses sight of the individual (Schaff, 1967:131), and succeeds only in replacing Marxism 
with individual freedom (Aron, 1969:48), the end result being described as ‘an odd amalgam of 
existentialism and Leninism that raised more questions than it answered. ’ (Miller, 1982: 172). 
The debate was central to the question of ideology within the PCF. For both sides of the 
debate, individual human beings become something, somebody, in their collective context, itself 
explained best by Marx. In its turn, in standing for the unity of theory and practice, psychology can 
present a meaningful future for Man (Riepe, 1961:127). But psychology as a science, even if there 
were Marxists in the fold, was insufficient to resolve the debate. So, whilst socialist humanists agreed 
that personality was ‘the defining factor of a real individual, peculiar to the individual’ (Schaff, 1965 
[1970:94]), their doctrinal Marxist critics tried to develop a philosophy of personality based on social 
labour (Sève, 1969 [1978]). For Sève, at least in his earlier writing, personality was a function of 
fundamentally economic relations between people (Sève, 1969 [1978:347]), in particular labour, as 
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for Marxists, ‘work is a basic human need’ (Sayers, 1998:5). The distinction had political as well as 
philosophical significance: even Garaudy’s critics remembered that Lenin believed the Communist 
Party should be open to all workers, irrespective of their individual religious beliefs (Casanova, 
1966:7). 
For Garaudy, the question of individuality within Marxism therefore became not only 
philosophically central, but also politically urgent, given debates within the PCF and the rise of the 
Althusserian anti-humanist current. His response was to develop nothing less bold than a Marxist 
conception of Man. Garaudy argued that ‘I am conscious of this I only through the presence of others 
in me’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:97]). This was not to deny individuality: ‘once it has emerged, Garaudy 
insists that the “I” is just as real as the “We”. Man is therefore both a social and an individual animal’ 
(Cranston, 1970:16). But it was to defend against existentialist negativity: Garaudy would surely have 
agreed that ‘Sartre (1954) got it wrong: Other people are not our hell; they are our hope’ (Sampson, 
2000:1431).  
So far, and in such abstract, general terms, Garaudy and the socialist humanists travelled 
together. They believed, at least after he and so many others recognised the dead–end of Marxism–
Leninism, that Marxism had lost its way. The gap at the centre of Marxism that Sartre had so pointedly 
identified looked all too real to Garaudy and to all of those who sided with him in the long debate 
against structural Marxism and even the remnants of dogmatism within the PCF. Garaudy’s insistence 
on the importance of subjectivity, and the importance of the individual that underlay it, may have 
been polemical, but it was not unique, nor did he engage in war on all fronts. Subjectivity in economics, 
history or psychology remained untouched. For example, he never engaged with Sève over the 
development of the personality in adult life, except insofar as he is in agreement with him and Soviet 
activity theorists such as Leontiev (1979) that the personality is not present at the beginning of a 
human life, but rather, emerges through actions as a biography, for proof of which he does not 
hesitate to offer himself at length and repeatedly as an example (Garaudy, 1975). He certainly never 
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lost sight of his own individuality, regarding the disparity between the different worlds of his 
upbringing and education that he concurrently inhabited in his youth as ‘a binding necessity, taken up 
as the responsibility of a free and lonely choice’131 (Garaudy, 1957:9). Garaudy identified the 
importance of individual decision-making in his own early life — that he was brought up in an atheist 
family, yet chose to become a Christian, and that his family was politically conservative, yet he joined 
the PCF. As he himself wrote much later to emphasise the subjective element of political participation, 
not for the first time and not even the last: 
‘Thrown into this convulsive universe and my heart full of thunderstorms, I made two 
decisions to which I was not bound by any tradition: my parents were religious atheists, yet I 
chose to become a Christian. My parents on the political front were traditionalist, yet I 
adhered, in 1933, to the French Communist Party’132 (Garaudy, 1985:250). 
In successive books he did not therefore let others forget his far from ordinary biography, although 
the autobiographical component of his work was much to the chagrin of his critics, who implicitly 
charged him with self-absorption as well as explicitly of inconsistency. All this Garaudy provided as 
evidence that there is no such thing as a self-sufficient individual personality. Autobiography may be 
interesting, but it is far from demonstrating that a theory of subjectivity can succeed in banishing 
individualism in the existentialist sense, whilst at the same preserving the concept of the individual 
from the attack of Marxist structuralists. Even his most supportive recent intellectual biographer 
concurs: ‘The repetition of these self-justifying autobiographical fragments in many of his works 
attests to the need to respond to the equally consistent accusations of fickleness or inconsistency’133 
(Gauvin, 2018:44) and to ‘that eclecticism, for which he was so often reproached, an eclecticism that 
 
131 nécessité contraignante et assumé dans la responsabilité d’un choix libre et solitaire  
132 Jeté dans cet univers convulsif et le cœur plein d’orages, je pris deux décisions auxquelles je n’étais porté par 
aucune tradition : mes parents étaient sur le plan religieux athées, et je choisis de devenir chrétien. Mes parents 
sur le plan politique étaient traditionalistes, et j’adhérais, en 1933, au Parti Communiste Français  
133 La répétition de ces fragments autobiographiques auto–justificateurs dans nombre de ses ouvrages atteste 
de ce besoin de répondre aux accusations non moins récurrentes de versatilité ou d’inconsistance  
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led him to take an interest in subjects as diverse as painting,  theatre, the novel or dance’134 (Gauvin, 
2018:69).  
Garaudy also relied on what has been described as ‘a schema of apprehension of the ‘reality’ 
which stems mainly from the thought of Blondel, Marx and Kierkegaard’ (Fleury, 2004:103). From 
Blondel, Garaudy derived the key idea that ‘Humans are not beings who only act, but are the sources 
of creative, original action as well’ (Grumett, 2010:508). Garaudy may have suppressed this view 
during his years of supposed Stalinist orthodoxy (Garaudy, 1955) but Blondel’s theory of action later 
became one of the constituent elements of the project. ‘Blondel seemed in his eyes to resolve the 
contradiction between the requirement of rationality carried by philosophy, in particular Marxism, 
which he had begun to read at that time, and a faith intended to escape the concept’135 (Gauvin, 2018: 
122).  
Garaudy’s project surely runs the risk here of losing its Marxism: Sève denounced Garaudy for 
replacing ‘the materialist definition of the human essence by a mere relational conception of the 
individual’ (Sève, 1969 [1978:160fn). This criticism had force, notwithstanding that Sève himself 
moved on from it in his own later work to something closer to just that (Sève, 2008).  Theologians 
(Shults, 2003; Shults & Sandage, 2006; Kelsey, 2009) have drawn similarly on what Moltmann (1981) 
recognised as a relational understanding of individuality. But there is equally nothing to isolate either 
Garaudy’s argument or theirs as uniquely Christian. In particular, relational theorists from Macmurray 
(1961) to more recent contributions sited in the legal concept of autonomy (Oshana, 1988; Nedelsky 
2011) see no reason to accept a specifically Marxist concept of personality, let alone one so directly 
and precisely tied to the division of labour as sketched out by Sève (1978:347).  
 
 
134 cet éclectisme qui lui a été si souvent reproché, éclectisme qui l’a conduit à s’intéresser à des sujets aussi 
divers que la peinture, le théâtre, le roman ou la danse 
135 Blondel semble à ses yeux résoudre la contradiction entre l’exigence de rationalité portée par la philosophie 
et singulièrement le marxisme dont il aborde la lecture à cette époque et une foi sensée échapper au concept 
123 
 
The alienated personality 
 
For Garaudy the Marxist humanist, anything other than a Marxist analysis fails to grasp what 
is an essential point: Man is not alienated from an abstract supernatural God or from an equally 
abstract reflection of himself; he is alienated from other men through capitalism. Both socialist 
humanists such as Fromm and Marcuse, notwithstanding disagreements between them, agreed upon 
‘This conception of man [which] aims to make multi-dimensional man triumph over one-dimensional 
man, shaped by the division and endless subdivision of labour, and reduced to nothing more than the 
homo economicus, simply a producer and a consumer’136 (Garaudy, 1976:180). Neither the Marxist 
humanist nor the prophetic Garaudy would disagree that:  
‘Man has become alienated from his work, from his fellow man, and from himself; he 
transforms himself into a thing, occupied with production and consumption. Unconsciously 
he feels anxious, lonely, and confused, because he has lost the sense of the meaning of life 
and the conviction of who he is and what he lives for’ (Fromm, 1970:x).  
For the early Marx at least (Wendling, 2009:13), and arguably as a central theme throughout his work 
(Held, 2009:137), as for Garaudy, alienation is not a moral but an historical category, a drama played 
out in the social, principally economic, relations of real individuals, in the relationship between each 
man and other men (Marx, 1844 [1975:281–3]). Hence for example the claim that the contemporary 
French education system ‘destroys personality rather than creating it’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1974:17]). By 
this Garaudy meant the socialisation of the child in relation to their future role in the production 
system or the State. It is equally not surprising to find that Garaudy the Marxist humanist presented 
this definition:  
‘Alienation is the opposite of creation. That is why the alienation of labour, if it is not the sole 
alienation, is root of all others. It is this that corrupts, at its very source, work, that is, the 
essence of all creative man’. (Garaudy, 1964 [1970:61]). 
 
136 Cette conception de l’homme vise à faire triompher l’homme multidimensionnel contre l’homme 
unidimensionnel, modelé par la division et la subdivision sans fin du travail, et réduit à n’être plus que « l’homo 
economicus », simplement producteur et consommateur 
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He does not find it necessary, though, as did Fromm, to locate the source of the idea of 
alienation in the Old Testament concept of idolatry (Fromm, 1961:39), although he does reflect that 
Marxism can provide historical, social and militant context to the ‘desalienation’  that the refusal of 
idolatry at its commencement represents (Garaudy, 1972a:13). There is little to distinguish Garaudy’s 
position here, especially on the direction of causality between private property and alienation 
(Garaudy 1964 [1967:62]) from that of the socialist humanists, who followed Marx and before him 
Babeuf and others in arguing that private property denies individual development and prevents the 
flowering of ideal individuals, ‘all-round accomplishments whose full development is not hampered 
by the prevailing social relations with their various forms of alienation’ (Schaff, 1965 [1970:91]). This 
even though Marx himself was more of the view that ‘though private property appears to be the 
reason, the cause of alienated labour, it is rather its consequence’ (Marx, 1844 [1975:282]).  
At root here is both an economism and an optimism that lie at the root of Marxism, including 
any psychology that takes Marxism as a whole seriously. The Marxist concept of alienation has 
therefore not gone without criticism. On the one hand it is held to account for allegedly ignoring the 
many relations between people that are not economic, such as family and gender (Leonard, 
1984:100). On the other, it is castigated for ‘systematically ignoring the possibility of an unfetishized 
subjectivity’ (Hannay, 1995:164); Marx might simply have been wrong to locate alienation entirely, or 
even mainly, in the issue of labour, or even that he did not make this clear (Churchich, 1990:16). Whilst 
his opponents within the PCF may have been susceptible to this criticism, Garaudy himself was very 
much alive even as a Marxist humanist to the limitations of doctrinal Marxism in analysing and 
overcoming alienation, recognising early on that ‘As long as the communist society has not been built 
up, roots of various forms of alienation continue to exist in socialism’ (Novack, 1970:12). This escape 
from economism was later to lead to the inclusion of aesthetics (Garaudy, 1974) race, religion and 
culture (Garaudy, 1973e, 1978), and feminism (Garaudy, 1981) in the broad sweep of his project. Far 
from maintaining that only the proletariat held true knowledge about the world, ‘Garaudy argued that 
all classes and all peoples potentially possess knowledge that may be useful to humanity in its struggle 
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to overcome alienation. In addition, he specified that the way to access this knowledge and to make 
use of it practically was through dialogue and collective action’ (Lewis, 2007:144). 
Historical Initiative 
 
Garaudy’s principal motivation in his identification of subjectivity as the key to Marxism was 
his belief that, to be true to the vision of Marx himself, and certainly to succeed politically, Marxism 
needed to transcend both dialectical materialism and determinist historical materialism, both 
provided by Marxism–Leninism through a distortion of its Hegelian ancestry. ‘The ultimate end of all 
our actions and all our battles as militant communists is to make every man a [true] man, that is to 
say a creator, a centre of historical initiative and of creation on the economic and political plane, on 
the plane too, of culture and love, on the spiritual plane — to use an idiom that is not ours’ (Garaudy, 
1966 [1970:146]).  
As one of Garaudy’s apologists put it in advocating consistency for subjectivity within the 
entire corpus of Garaudy’s work, ‘At every step it is necessary to take a decision, a historic initiative, 
involving risk and responsibility‘137 (Reynaud, 2015: n.p.). Garaudy therefore — despite his 
sympathetic critique (Garaudy, 1977a:103–114) — replaced historical materialism with historical 
initiative, a method derived, he claimed, from the young Marx (Garaudy, 1965:63). But for historical 
initiative to come alive as a real, historical force for revolutionary change, there was an urgent need 
for Garaudy to identify individuals to populate it, both theoretically and in practice.  
No doubt in the political aspect of the project, Garaudy’s ontology of class and social groups 
deviated very substantially from anything a Marxist–Leninist might recognise. As we have seen in 
Chapter Three, his faith was pinned on international ‘youth’, claiming that they ‘are working out a 
great alternative’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:10]), and on a ‘new historic bloc’, a concept overtly derived 
 
137 A chaque pas il est requis de prendre une décision, une initiative historique, dans le risque et la responsabilité  
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from Gramsci’s adaption of Sorel (Sotiris, 2018:99), the assorted agents of change analysed above in 
Chapter Three. For Garaudy, membership of the new historic bloc is still a collective question of 
occupation, but although its origins, development and membership may be objective, he stressed the 
subjective element in its role, not least in self-management itself (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:160]).   
For Garaudy the Marxist humanist, there was therefore no doubt already that a full 
recognition of not only the existence of the individual, but of individual responsibility and significance 
in history, were necessary requirements for any kind of successful radical politics. In outlining his 
project, he went further to argue that ‘spontaneity is an invaluable aid in banishing the illusion that 
Man can achieve authenticity and happiness from an outside source’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:24]). It is 
not going too far to suggest that for the Garaudy of the ‘prophetic’ period, the individual has actually 
substituted — not for Marxism itself, as in Aron’s charge against Sartre noted above  — but for the 
Party. ‘Everyone can contribute to this process … can suggest how to coordinate all these individual 
efforts … This is how each individual can become a creative source of the future … it is not a matter of 
creating a party, but a spirit’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:204]).  
The distinction is clear between Garaudy’s single-minded emphasis on the individual and the 
dual fidelity of a liberation theologian such as Gutiérrez's — both to Man's responsibility for his own 
destiny which will result in ‘the creation of a new Man and a qualitatively different society’ (Gutiérrez, 
1973:25) and to the Bible, which presents liberation — salvation — in Christ as the total gift. The 
observation that ’Gutiérrez is open to the criticism that the dual fidelity brings an irreconcilable 
situation, a real predicament’ (Rondón, 2002:45) is one of many similar criticisms of the divided loyalty 
of liberation theology. ‘For if radical transformation and real liberation (salvation) represent 
‘something humans must go out and earn for themselves [then] it cannot  be a ‘total gift’, a logical 
contradiction from which he cannot free himself (Vree, 1984:211). For Garaudy, however, it follows 
that ‘Each individual must count himself personally responsible [my emphasis] for this new model of 
democracy’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:167]). This responsibility has no associated judgement: in 
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advocating choice and suggesting freedom of action, Garaudy was aware throughout his ‘prophetic’ 
period — it is fair to say, increasingly aware — of the distinct possibilities that outcomes may not be 
optimal, either from his own point of view or those adversely affected. But with neither a Party nor a 
supernatural God as arbiter, there would seem to be no penalty for failure beyond the individual 
themselves. 
 
A universal human essence  
 
Garaudy was to defend the Marxist humanist concept of the individual, and that of a universal 
human essence, against the Althusserian attack (Althusser, 1965 [2005]) and even that of Sève (1978), 
to the point where it became a leitmotif of the debate between revisionist elements within the PCF 
and their opponents. Both Garaudy and his critics start with a rather general concept of ‘social selves’, 
shared by other Marxists from Vygotsky to Sève (e.g. Burkitt, 1991, 2008). At the time Garaudy wrote, 
however, what became the flashpoint of the debate within the PCF, and more widely, was whether 
he and fellow Marxist humanists, such as Fromm, were relying on an abstract and ideological concept 
of Man, which critics denounced (Márkus, 1978 [2014:8]). In particular, an extended polemic 
developed between Sève, Garaudy and Schaff surrounding the precise meaning of the VI Thesis on 
Feuerbach. When Marx argued that ‘the essence of Man is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations ’ (Marx, 1845 [1975:4]), was he was 
engaging in metaphorical polemic (Schaff, 1971:164) or writing in deadly earnest (Sève, 2008:43–47)? 
All agreed that ‘tying Marx’s conception of history to his philosophical anthropology’ (Jaffe, 2015:39) 
was desirable: but they disagreed on what both were. 
That the Marxist humanists believed in a universal human essence is a matter of record: ‘The 
whole concept of humanity and of humanism is based on the idea of a human nature in which all men 
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share’ (Fromm, 1962:27); ‘The ideal type of man, the image of true man, is at the basis of all aspirations 
in the human world’ (Schaff, 1965 [1970:89]). To the fact that Garaudy too did have a concept of the 
essence of ‘Man’, independent of class or of individuality, numerous of his texts similarly attest: his 
advocacy of Fichte as a major influence on Marx is one example: yet this is couched in terms that any 
materialist might at least recognise as their own, that ‘the primacy of essence was advanced vis-à-vis 
the a priori theological or anthropological “definition’ of Man”’ (Garaudy, 1964 [1967:36]). The 
polemical appeal being made shines clearly through Garaudy’s own writing on the subject: ‘No greater 
mistake, again, than to believe that Man does not exist for Marxism, that what does exist is a sum of 
social relations, that men are not the subject of history but only the effects and the props of a sum of 
social relations’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:148–149]). Hence, ‘although he recognised the legitimacy of 
structuralism as a scientific method for analysing various aspects of human and social reality, he 
rejected the claims of Althusser and Foucault that it was a philosophy which could give an exhaustive 
account of both, without adhering to a poststructuralist view such as Lyotard or Derrida’ (Robinson, 
2004: n.p.). 
Why did this matter? If the socialist humanists were right, then even if an individual were the 
sum of their social relations, then the human essence, whatever it might be, could be preserved from 
any reductionism. Individuals mattered. This might lead to greater political emphasis on the individual, 
as to a significant extent, the philosophical debate over Man was a metaphor for the political direction 
of the PCF and Communist Parties more widely. If the latter, then there was no room for a human 
essence beyond social relations (Turner, 2013:815). This was to be of great importance for the project, 
which relied on subjectivity for its agency. 
It was however for Garaudy, unlike for Fromm or other socialist humanists,  Christianity that 
first presented this idea of a universal human essence (Geerlandt, 1978:14), notwithstanding the fact 
that as Michel Simon pointed out at Argenteuil, this idea did not drop out of the sky independently of 
any terrestrial cause, it was an historical product of capitalism (Geerlandt, 1978:14). Apart from the 
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political implications, for Garaudy no essence independent of actual social relations would mean no 
opening where a soul might get in, and therefore no room for subjectivity, however much an individual 
may participate in distinctive sociocultural, geographical, and historically contingent relationships and 
environmental contexts (Turner, 2013: 813). For Garaudy, the idea of a universal human essence 
served as a useful shorthand for the uniqueness of humanity, the possibility of individual relationships 
with God and other men, and implicitly, and in sharp contrast with much Marxist–Leninist practice, 
the need for Marxists to treat individual human beings with respect and dignity. But for Sève (1969 
[1978]) and other of Garaudy’s critics, let alone for Marxist structuralists, the invention of a universal 
human essence was not only entirely unnecessary, and in complete contradiction to the VI Thesis on 
Feuerbach (Marx, 1845 [1975]) and the epistemological break that he defined as Marxism, but 
philosophically and politically wrong: it deprived Marxism of its critical focus on economics and class, 
and placed an emphasis on the abstract, which could only end in abandonment of the Marxist project 
altogether (Althusser & Balibar, 1965; Poster, 1974:399). 
Garaudy’s project, in complete distinction, grants to Christianity the capacity to transform 
Marxism by giving it the universal essence of man. Indeed, he can find it nowhere else. But this 
universal essence must be carefully regulated within the project. Garaudy himself had long been in 
sympathy with Hegel’s impact on Marxism in general, and in particular what has been described as his 
replacement of the Cartesian individual with ‘a collective subject, more or less trans-individual’138 
(Goldman, 1970:185), paralleled by the view that ‘Marxism involves a Hegelian historicist account of 
human nature’ (Sayers, 1998:3). Garaudy’s argument, that Marx’s conception of the species–essence 
is to be found in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (Marx, 1844 [1975]), whilst by no means 
finding unanimous agreement amongst Marxists, has found significant and continued support (e.g. 
Mulhall, 1998:9; Czank, 2012:317). But Garaudy would still have had to give short shrift to anything 
resembling a conservative Hegelian psychology (e.g. Martensen, 2004:73–147). And there could still 
 
138 un sujet collectif ou tout au moins transindividuel 
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be no room within the project for any Absolute Personality as the historical realisation of divine Spirit 
in a personal unity of subjective will and divine will (Walsh, 2018:18), no concession that human beings 
are mere modifications of Substance (Thompson, 2004:230), and therefore no ‘ethical life’ 139 in any 
politically conservative sense of the term. If Christianity is to give something specific to Marxism, it 
could be contained within a universal human essence, but such an essence cannot include a politically 
conservative psychology.  
 
Christian subjectivity in the project 
 
Even for Garaudy the Marxist humanist, subjectivity took an historical form, inextricably linked 
with the origin of Christianity and the development of the idea of Man beyond that of a fragment of 
the cosmos and a member of a community. Indeed ‘the birth of Christianity is the most powerful 
example of this emergence of the problem of subjectivity during the total collapse of the Greco-Roman 
order’140. (Perottino, 1969:29). For Garaudy, St. Augustine, however much a precursor of the 
institutional Church he detested, was also responsible for ‘the assimilation into Christianity, in a 
radically new synthesis, the heritage of oriental mysticism, Judaic prophetism, Greek philosophy and 
Roman organisation’141 (Perottino, 1969:30). This argument, Perottino noted, was originally 
developed in Garaudy (1949:273–300) and expressed again in similar form in Garaudy (1966 
[1970:130]). For Garaudy, it was Christianity that introduced subjectivity: 
‘While for Greek humanism Man is a fragment of the universe and a member of the city, 
Christianity, following Judaism, emphasised the possibility for Man of beginning a new future; 
it stressed the element of subjectivity in man’s life. Between action coming from the external 
world in order to deal with this threat, lies consciousness at its various levels: pain and effort, 
quest and dream, hope and love, danger and decision. That is what subjectivity means. 
 
139 Sittlichkeit 
140 la naissance du christianisme est l’exemple le plus saisissant de cette émergence du problème de la 
subjectivité lors de l’écroulement total de l’ordre gréco–romain 
141 l'assimilation au christianisme, dans une synthèse radicalement nouvelle, de l'héritage du mysticisme 
oriental, du prophétisme juif, de la philosophie hellénique, et de l'organisation romaine  
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Christianity has accumulated a rich store of experience on this plane, from St. Augustine to 
Kierkegaard, from Pascal and Racine to Claudel, while elaborating, in its adoption of the neo-
Platonist themes of renunciation of the external world, the doctrines of fatalism and 
resignation’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:134]).  
It is worth presenting the counter-argument, that ‘the Christian idea of freedom has very much the 
same features as the concept of freedom in the cities of ancient Greece’ (Brinkman, 2003:11),  but 
perhaps the limitation of this freedom to equality before the law for citizens and a denial of equal 
treatment for others serves to reinforce Garaudy’s argument that it took Christianity to transcend a 
very limited Greek view of freedom. Garaudy himself never engaged in debate over the correctness 
or otherwise of his assertion. 
Contemporaneously, socialist humanists in Poland, Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic and in the 
West, especially those who participated in the Marxist–Christian dialogue during the 1960s, were very 
prepared to debate such issues as freedom, alienation, culture, ethics, and philosophy in general. But 
as evidenced by the contributions by Schaff, Marcuse and others to an anthology of Socialist 
Humanism (Fromm, 1967) they all stayed firmly within the secular tradition of Marxism; unlike 
Garaudy, they found no need for Christianity to develop a theory of the individual that they, at least, 
believed wholly compatible with Marxism. So although Schaff, for example, argued, in language that 
sounds very similar to Garaudy, that: 
‘when the problem of the individual receives its proper place in the system of Marxist thought, 
it is possible to introduce this subjective element in the field of knowledge, a psychological 
factor in sociology and an individual factor in politics — without which all these fields might 
easily be treated in a mechanical and simplified manner’ (Schaff, 1965 [1970:37]) 
his position with respect to Christianity was negative. He overtly counterposed a Marxist concept of 
human autonomy with the human individual as the product or emanation of superhuman forces, a 
‘typically religious approach’ of which an example is ‘Catholic personalism’ (Schaff, 1967:130), insisting 
that ‘there is no person as a spiritual unity who can be distinguished from the individual as a real being’ 
(Schaff, 1965 [1970:95]). Thus: 
‘when anthropology starts from an ultra-human world — God, supernatural forces, the 
Absolute Idea, a world of objective values, etc. — Man is not its point of departure but a point 
132 
 
of arrival. It then has a theocentric character when (as is usual in traditional anthropologies) 
it is based on a religious faith, or, more broadly, a heteronomous one when what is implied is 
the influence of an ultrahuman factor that is not necessarily supernatural in the traditional 
sense of the word’ (Schaff, 1965 [1970:101]).  
Schaff therefore publicly distanced himself from Garaudy’s anthropology (Schaff, 1971:161). This 
demonstrated a hard truth, for Garaudy: socialist humanists were not aiming to align Marxism with 
Christianity, let alone make them congruent, even though their attack was on something of a straw 
man: for Kierkegaard, for instance, ‘Not for a single moment is it forgotten that the subject is an 
existing individual, and that existence is a process of becoming’ (Kierkegaard, 1846 [2019:176]). It may 
have been coveted ground for all involved, but the socialist humanists believed they had no need of 
spiritual allies to help them occupy it. Marxists, even most socialist humanists, had therefore no need 
of Christianity. Existentialists such as Sartre (1946 [1955] were equally keen to celebrate individual 
freedom, but with the same limitations, the end result being described as ‘an odd amalgam of 
existentialism and Leninism that raised more questions than it answered. ’ (Miller, 1982: 172).   
The insistence by Schaff and others that a Christian conception of individuality would always 
fail the humanist test therefore meant a parting of the ways. For Garaudy, as for the socialist 
humanists, the role of the individual was always central to the Marxist project. Yet whereas t hey 
remained as consistently secular as mainstream critics such as Sève as well as their structuralist 
Althusserian opponents, in Garaudy’s work in his earliest theoretical publications (Garaudy, 1949:273–
300) as well as later works as a Marxist humanist (1968d; Garaudy & Lauer, 1968) ‘there is continuity 
in the appreciation of what Christianity brings to the conception of Man’ (Perottino, 1969:26). And 
this was that ‘Christianity, as an extension of Judaism — Roger Garaudy will emphasize it constantly 
— emphasized the possibility for Man to start a new future, that is to say has put the accent on the 
subjective moment of the life of Man.’142 (Geerlandt, 1978:13). This was to such an extent that his 
protector in the PCF, Maurice Thorez, had to forgive him his ‘gaps’ in orthodoxy, in particular, his 
 
142 Le christianisme, dans le prolongement de judaïsme – Roger Garaudy le soulignera constamment –, a mis 
l’accent sur la possibilité pour l’homme de commencer un nouvel avenir, c’est-à-dire a mis l’accent sur le 
moment subjectif de la vie de l’homme 
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formulas tending to rehabilitate ‘the best of Christian culture’ in his writings on Christianity143 (Gauvin, 
2018:243).  
Ultimately intensely problematic for the project, which was to incorporate and broaden these 
‘gaps in orthodoxy’, would be any accusation that the principle of individuation is a philosophical 
problem unique to, or at least induced by, Christianity itself (Weber, 1906 [2001]) and then exported 
to colonised societies via Christianity (Bastide, 1973). In response, contemporary anthropologists 
suggest that distinctions, such as between porous and buffered selves (Taylor, 2007:33), and concepts 
such as dividuality (Smith, 2012: 51) and fractality (Bialecki & Diswani, 2015:274) may yet rescue 
Christian individuality from possessive individualism. If either of these rescue attempts proves a slip, 
there is evidently a threat to the project, as Chapter Six will discuss. 
Faced with these threats, in what does this Christian subjectivity that Garaudy claims for the 
project consist? One possibility might be, given Garaudy’s admitted debt to Kierkegaard, that Christian 
subjectivity could be the voice of conscience, the strong arm by which eternity takes hold of each one 
separately and sets each person apart as a single individual before God. For Christianity has ‘made 
every relationship between men a matter of conscience’ (Kierkegaard, 1847 [1941:110]). Sartre would 
acknowledge a debt of this kind, amongst others (Grooten, 1952:65). Other possibilities might be to 
recognise some kind of life-view, the transformation of personal experience into a confident approach 
to the love of God in Christ, to rely at least in part on ethics, the amalgamation of the particular and 
the universal as the ethical goal worth striving for in Christ, reviewed in Chapter Seven, or perhaps 
subjectivity could be better located in the imitation of Christ (Walsh, 2018:131).  
Kierkegaard’s subjectivity in particular has been characterised as containing four elements:   
(1) a passionate concern for one’s being, which is threatened by death, relating one at all times to the 
concern;  
 
143 formules tendant à réhabiliter « le meilleur de la culture chrétienne » dans ses écrits sur le christianisme 
134 
 
(2) an adherence to anything which the individual finds edifying;  
(3) an isolation in freedom and an uncertainty of even possessing subjectivity;  
(4) it is a suffering which is masked from the world (Garelick, 1965:27).  
Was this what Garaudy meant by subjectivity? It would not seem so, as none of these principles finds 
a place in Garaudy’s project, where the imitation of Christ, rather than as in Kierkegaard being a 
movement from ‘the outward to the inward’ (Welstead, 2014:815) takes on an altogether more social 
and therefore less existentialist form. His attitude to death is one key difference: for Garaudy, ‘My 
own death is a constant reminder that my project is not an individual project’ (Garaudy, 1975:47). This 
links to the second: we should understand that, ‘ in Christianity a man can be constituted as Man only 
through dialogue and communion with the other person’144 (Garaudy, 1979:170). As a Marxist, 
Garaudy would not expect any individual choice to be acceptable, and he never suggested it. Other 
Marxists were more strident and criticised the Kierkegaardian vision overtly, for example responding 
to Kierkegaard by castigating this ‘permanent carnival of fetishized inwardness’ (Lukács, 1948:84), 
arguing in terms familiar to any doctrinal Marxist that only the shared experience of the proletariat 
could actually transcend that finitude (Hannay, 1995:163). So where does Garaudy stand? Agreement 
with Lukács in principle, in rejecting any kind of subjectivity that does not involve a collectivity, but 
disagreement in practice, fortified by a more nuanced perception of the possibilities of collective 
action than found in Lukács’s dependence on the ontological categories  of Marxism–Leninism. Finally, 
nowhere does Garaudy suggest that individuals are either isolated in freedom, characterised by a 
failure to believe in their own subjectivity, or that subjectivity identified as suffering should be 
concealed. On the contrary. the optimism which suffuses his work in the ‘prophetic period’, ‘what the 
young demand’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:13]) is a denial of both silence and uncertainty. The evidence 
therefore suggests that Garaudy’s subjectivity was quite distinct from that of Kierkegaard. 
 







Love: the Christian dimension of the individual 
 
Garaudy the Marxist humanist, keen to acknowledge the importance of the subjective 
element in Marxism, was equally keen to accept the ‘gift’ of subjectivity from Christianity, along with 
its underlying concepts of the individual and of a universal human essence. But once the project began, 
Garaudy wanted Christianity to do much more than just provide a theoretical ontology of the 
individual and subjectivity to balance traditional Marxist ideas of class. He sought epistemological 
confirmation as well. If Garaudy is to assert that Christianity brings subjectivity to Marxism, if ‘even 
the way of approaching the problem of subjectivity is specific to Christianity’  (Garaudy, 1966 [1970: 
133]), what is that way?  
Put another way, how are subjectivity, and the desire for change implicit in the project, 
actually characterised? Surely not all individual human relations count? So which ones do? In his 
version of Existential Marxism, Sartre suggested that it would be impossible to build the future ‘on the 
basis of individuals largely bereft of such sociable attributes as compassion and trust ’ (Miller, 
1982:187). And Garaudy? 
With transcendence and subjectivity, Garaudy wants us to believe that despite its prevalence 
in classical literature, love is one of Christianity’s most undeniable contributions to the figure of man. 
At least according to Kierkegaard, to whom as already observed Garaudy acknowledged his debt, the 
self-denial resulting from love is ‘Christianity’s essential form’ (Walsh, 2018:135). Here we reach the 
starkest of distinctions between Garaudy’s Marxist humanist phase and that of the project which 
succeeds it. As a Marxist humanist, he regretted that ‘When the Christian speaks of the transcendence 
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of love, when he thinks of it . . . [he] lives it in an alienated way, that is, in terms of exteriority (as Marx 
showed in The Holy Family)’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:134]). In the project, in complete contrast, there 
are the calculatedly striking last words of Parole d’homme, which enjoin us: ‘To live according to the 
fundamental faith of life: love. The Cross taught me to renounce the world as it is. The Resurrection, 
to go beyond it. I am a Christian’ (Garaudy, 1975:265).  
Here therefore within the project, Garaudy’s belief in the congruence between Marxism and 
Christianity can finally be seen emerging from its chrysalis during the Marxist–humanist years. 
Economics, and even social class, have been left far behind, not necessarily ontologically, but certainly 
as engines of change. ‘This new plurality will occur amidst the most basic and deepest relationship of 
man: love’ (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:451). It is love that Marx missed in his own project, however capable 
of loving he may himself have been, even treating it in a somewhat desiccated fashion in a discourse 
about money (Marx, 1844 [1975:326]). And in missing it, Garaudy strongly implies, he helped create 
the opportunity for the distortions of Marxism that ended in Stalinism. Christian love is therefore an 
indispensable gift from Christianity to Marxism. 
Garaudy turns to the Trinity for the source of love: 
'The experience, which Greek philosophy could not express, nevertheless constituted the 
specific contribution of Christianity to the conception of Man and God which he carries within 
himself, the Trinity, and which one can talk about in very straightforward terms: unlike 
Hinduism, Jesus of Nazareth revealed to us that personal consciousness cannot be self-
knowledge, but before that, love, that is to say, that what constitutes us fundamentally is our 
relationship with the other145 (Garaudy, 1979:170).   
Garaudy never dwells further on the Trinity — he expressly denies any claim to be a theologian — but 
he is not alone in suggesting it as a model for both individuality itself and human love. The Trinity finds 
a home within the early Church St Ignatius of Antioch (Fortman, 1972:38–40), the contemporary 
Orthodox tradition (Damian, 2011) as well as enjoying consistent and prolonged attention from 
 
145 L’expérience, que la philosophie grecque ne pouvait pas exprimer, constituait pourtant l’apport spécifique 
du christianisme à la conception de l’homme et du Dieu qu’il porte en lui, la Trinité, et qui peut se dire en termes 
très simples: à la différence de l’hindouisme, Jésus de Nazareth nous a révélé que la conscience personnelle ne 
peut pas être connaissance de soi, mais d’abord l’amour, c’est-à-dire conscience que ce qui nous constitue 
fondamentalement est notre rapport avec l’autre 
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theologians, for example Barth (1933 [1936]), Buber (1958), Rahner (1969 [1970]), Moltmann (1981), 
Boff (1988), LaCugna (1991), and Grenz (1994, 2001), who ‘ground their discussions in social 
trinitarianism’ (Turner, 2013:810), such that the Trinity has been described as ‘the basic 
presupposition of the doctrine of God’, (Barth, 1933 [1936:301]) and ‘the innermost heart of Christian 
faith and worship, the central dogma of classical theology, the fundamental grammar of our 
knowledge of God’ (Torrance, 1996:2). Trinitarian theologians conclude that ‘God is eternally involved 
in dynamic and loving relationships within himself in the mystery of the Trinity’ (Grenz, 1994: 93–102). 
Garaudy evidently does not wish to engage in precise theological controversy. What is for him 
the stated significance of the Trinity lies not only in the relation of love, but in the fact that ‘this relation 
cannot be closed between two terms. It is only love if he opens ad infinitum. It implies, as a condition 
of this opening, a third term by which only love can be love, that is to say, to extend this relationship 
"I–you" to all others who thus enter a community’ (Garaudy, 1979:170).146 Although ‘This loving 
couple, not the individual, is the smallest basic unit of society, of the community’ (Garaudy, 1979:170), 
no doubt it is crucial to Garaudy’s argument that love between two people can easily extend more 
generally, with the Trinity as an example. In this community, the fundamental relationship of love is 
such only through the personal relationship between two people, opposing its model to individualism 
and totalitarianism. Quite the contrary, for each person, as for Garaudy on that fateful day of his 
expulsion from the PCF, 6 February 1970, ‘the most painful and terrible ordeal’147 (Garaudy, 
1972a:34]), there is that same double need, which he characterised as Grünewald [German painter 
Matthias Grünewald, c.1475–1528] and Bourdelle [French sculptor Émile-Antoine Bourdelle 1861–
1929] (Garaudy, 1975:24; Da Costa Pinto 2017:447). On the one hand, to free oneself from the illusions 
of having, of power, and on the other, to know how to love the Other, which at that moment, one 
 
146 Ce rapport d’amour ne peut s’enclore entre deux termes. Il n’est amour que s’il ouvre sur l’infini. Il implique, 
comme condition de cette ouverture, un troisième terme grâce auquel seul l’amour peut être amour, c’est-à-
dire étendre ce rapport  « je–tu » à tous les autres qui entrent ainsi dans une communauté….Dans cette 
communauté, la relation fondamentale d’amour n’est telle que par la rapport personnel entre deux êtres, 
opposant son modèle a l’individualisme et au totalitarianism. Ce couple d’amour, et non pas l’individu, est la 
plus petite unité de base de la société, de la communauté 
147 l'épreuve la plus pénible, la plus terrible 
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imagines was almost the entire assembled membership in the conference hall: an act of faith that is 
yet the moment of reason. This faith in man, this trust in hope, does not rest so only on itself. It is the 
result of a ‘choice, irreplaceable, undemonstrable’148 (Garaudy, 1976: 184]). It is one with the 
awareness of Man as transcendence and creativity. But It is faith, nonetheless — not historically 
determined, and certainly not inevitable.  
But criticism could come from all sides. Garaudy never took issue with Fromm’s answer to the 
question, now posed over many decades, as to whether in Western society love was virtually 
impossible in the first place, that ‘To raise the question is to answer it in the negative’ (Fromm, 
1956:37), as ‘Under capitalism, under the prevailing institutional structures of exploitation, love and 
freedom can only ever be ideological’ (McLaren & Jandrić, 2018:603) which if true would cut the 
ground from underneath the entire project, at least in the West, the very countries where Christianity 
might be expected to exert its strongest influence. On the contrary, subjectivity for Garaudy appears 
to inhabit an ontological space sheltered by universal human essence and therefore quite untroubled 
by the storms of culture, economics, geography, history or psychology.  
Garaudy seems oblivious too of the growing literature even by the time he wrote that argued 
absolutely to the contrary (e.g. Zaretsky, 1976), even in the PCF itself, where theoreticians expressed 
themselves no friends of the nuclear family (Shames, 1981:17fn). The dangers of failing to appreciate 
the theological implications of earthly paradigms are illustrated by even relational Christian theorists  
writing outside the Marxist tradition. Hence, to take just one example, it has been suggested that the 
stories Christians tell about the origins of humanity, particularly the existence of biological men and 
women and their mutual relationship, should render it impossible for us to understand persons as 
isolated entities (McFayden, 1990:18). This seems a perilous path to tread in a modern world of much 
less certain gender identities (Kaufman & Powell, 2014). The Trinity seems much less judgemental, 
even more radical, as the basis for understanding love, as the Garaudy of the project seems to have 
 
148 un choix, irremplaçable, indémontrable 
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understood, although the Trinity fails to make an appearance in his advocacy of feminism (Garaudy, 
1981). Through a modern lens, the idiosyncratic appreciation of park benches in Hanoi that ‘are made 
only big enough for two and only two people to sit on, so that another person would not even have 
the technical possibility of disturbing’ (Marcuse, 1967:82) points up potential social risks  of failure 
external to the couple inherent in Garaudy’s formulation, including from what Marcuse himself 
describes as the appreciation of an incurable romantic, but the irony seems lost on them both.  
Neither does Garaudy feel any need to respond to the claim, also potentially damaging to his 
argument, that ‘The rigorousness of the love advocated by Kierkegaard partially devaluates the 
beloved person…[it is] close to callousness’ (Adorno, 1939:416). It is  evidently a difficult tightrope to 
walk, and even if it is possible, it is far from certain that Garaudy appreciated just how difficult. 
We are surely entitled to press the issue further qualitatively as well as quantitively, too. What 
distinguishes Christian love from any other love? Why is it only through Christ that we are able to 
relate to one another in new and transformational ways? (McFayden, 1990:5) An especially 
contentious argument to the contrary, given Garaudy’s emphasis on the dualism of Ancient Greek 
thought, is that ‘The essence of the person is relationship, the fullness of the person in a free and 
binding relationship with the other — this is love in the meanings of all three Greek words for love’ 
(Bahovec, 2015:344). A theologian can respond by asking rhetorically: ‘From where do humans get the 
courage to love, to surrender?’ (Brinkman, 2003:67) To this Kierkegaard can answer, from being loved 
by God, initially realised in contact with other people. We can love because we are loved, as a gift from 
God — what following St. Augustine church tradition would later call gratia praeveniens (Purcell, 
2008:74).  
For Kierkegaard, love always presupposes a strong interconnectedness between a passive, 
receiving and an active, giving attitude to life. Love can only be given by one who can also receive love 
and love can only be received by one who can also give love; not only that, but we love the other 
person in the same way in which God loves us (Brinkman, 2003:67). If this dialectic is the unique source 
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and structure of Christian love, then Garaudy fails to establish anything that distinguish Christians, nor 
any set of beliefs about the capacity to love which require nothing more than quite ordinary 
individuals, even Ancient Greeks. Even worse for Garaudy’s argument, if there is anything unique 
about Christian love, it would appear to require the very supernatural God that Garaudy has already 
dismissed from the ontology of the project. It might therefore be that Garaudy would have been better 
served by explicitly restricting his claims for Christianity to only a paradigm example of love, rather 
than presenting it as a repository of any special potential gift, whether to humanist Marxism or to the 
project as its successor.  
Even if we grant Garaudy that his gift can be traced back to Christianity specifically, what 
evidence should we seek for love? At this point Kierkegaard’s view is potentially again useful for 
Garaudy’s project, as he suggested that ‘every human being by his life, by his conduct, by his behaviour 
in everyday affairs, by his association with his peers, by his words, his remarks, should and could build 
up and would do it if love were really present in him’ (Kierkegaard, 1847 [1995:213]). But if these are 
the categories by which to identify love, how is it that love has been used to justify so many conflicting 
political and personal decisions? So, for example, the contention that one’s soul can only be lived, not 
saved (Lawrence, 1928 [1968:598]), surely leads back to an existential subjectivity that Garaudy has 
already seen in Sartre and long wished to reject. Mere ‘discipline’ (Hamilton, 1998:71) will surely not 
suffice: discipline to what end?  
Marxists have wished to be more discriminating than egalitarian in their love. The idea of 
equality before the law, that ‘the law is the plan, love the fulfilment and the absolutely definite; in 
love the law is absolutely definite’ (Kierkegaard, 1847 [1941:85]) is far from any Marxist conception of 
love, including that of Garaudy. For Garaudy as with the liberation theologians, because the material 
conditions for such egalitarianism are no more present than they are for the implementation of moral 
ideas, Christian ideals are ‘mere alibis’ (Fierro, 1977: 232). And secondly, liberation requires different 
treatment for different individuals. From a doctrinal Marxist standpoint, love must be class love: ‘One 
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loves the oppressed by liberating them from their misery; one loves the oppressors by liberating them 
from their sinfulness’ (Girardi, 1971:94).  Discriminating love is no Marxist monopoly: conservative 
Christians as much as Marxists emphasise that love for all does not entail identical treatment for all 
individuals (Emerson et al., 1999). Kierkegaard is silent on the question of discriminating love, and has 
been portrayed as arguing that that love serves to create equality in the temporal world (Brittain, 
2017:46), but perhaps in his emphasis on purely interpersonal relations Kierkegaard has not properly 
understood the implications of power and the reality of oppression, as was long ago pointedly 
suggested, that ‘Instead of any real criticism of inequality in society, he has a fictitious, merely inward 
doctrine of equality’ (Adorno, 1939:421). Yet for a more outwardly expressed alternative,  ‘The church 
as the community of faith is the personal and communal expression of the recreation of humanity’s 
created sociality as redeemed sociality’ (Schwöbel, 1991:157), such that ‘Our life is not to be lived in 
isolation. We are a people in community’ (Cameron, 2005:58). Any political action remains a mirage. 
It is therefore little surprise that in the revised version of the most well-known text of liberation 
theology (Gutiérrez, 1988), ‘Marxist class struggle is replaced by a description of the progress towards 
unity and universal love made possible by building community through faithful action in a fragmented 
world’ (Grumett, 2010:523).  
Garaudy’s project likewise aims to avoid both extremes: whilst remaining overtly Marxist to 
avoid this criticism, its politics at least entails less violence against oppressors (and indeed a hazier 
definition of who they are), more respect for individuals and a love that might therefore at least seem 
a little more egalitarian than any to which Marxist–Leninist might lay claim. Such a loose definition of 
the ends of love is as far as either Garaudy or Gutiérrez can advance an answer to the questions, 
without an associated political project. Garaudy certainly attempted one although did not go so far as 
to suggest the centrality of a community of faith, not least because of his attempt to draw in all faiths 







Sin and Redemption 
 
At the frontier between the Christian ontology of good and evil and the theory of the 
personality lies sin. As Boer recognises, ‘In societies shaped by Christianity, the understanding of 
human nature turns on the following question: can human beings do some good on their own initiative 
or are human beings unable to do good, relying completely on God?' (Boer, 2019:91). Garaudy 
recognised that to align Marxism with Christianity required an answer to this question. Radical 
Christians from Pelagius, notably in his Letter to Demetrias (Burns, 1981:50) to Teilhard de Chardin 
(1922; Grumett & Bentley, 2018:326) have answered with an emphatic insistence on the former. 
Pelagius refused to accept the biological transmission of original sin, asserting that ‘human discipline 
and cultivation could achieve transformation’ (Boer, 2019:92). For Pelagius, Christians are how they 
act, not how they are created. ‘We are sons of God not by nature but through imitation’ (Pelagius, 
Expositiones 372; De Bruyn, 1993). ‘It was Pelagius who had seized the logical conclusions of this 
tradition: he is the last, most radical and the most paradoxical exponent of the ancient Christianity — 
the Christianity of discontinuity’ (Brown, 1968:107). Stripped of intergenerational sin, human beings 
in a Pelagian ontology have the capacity for moral judgement, for right action. Led right, life can lead 
us to become sons and daughters of God (Pelagius, On the Christian Life, [Rees, 2004:113]). Most akin 
to Garaudy’s thought — but also that of Marxist psychologists such as Leontiev (1979) and later is the 
view that the human essence is evidenced in action, not in ontology. All people, Christian or otherwise, 
have received the same opportunity from God, so Pelagius ‘steers clear of sectarianism’ (Brinkman, 
2003: 116). As we have seen in Chapter Three, Garaudy too aims at such inclusivity. For Garaudy as 
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for Pelagius, individuals are created in God’s image and are therefore free to imitate God. But for 
Pelagius, the route is uniquely through Christ: ‘the gift of the gospel is that we are instructed by the 
grace of Christ, encouraged and shown the goodness of God that is within us, in action through justice, 
although equally, free to pursue evil’ (Brinkman, 2003:115–121). Here, Garaudy is more cautious 
about the Christian message, suggesting only that criteria for salvation might can be provided by ‘the 
example of Christ of the life of Christ and an intimate and personal dialogue with his way of life’149 
(Garaudy, 1975:239).  
Traditional Christians have responded to this uplifting vision of individual capability 
unenthusiastically: ‘ever since Augustine rejected the Pelagian optimism, Christianity has tended to 
look with suspicion on any over-optimistic assessment of human nature’ (Carpenter, 1982:260). It is 
therefore little surprise to find that Garaudy sides with Pelagius thus far in the rejection of original sin 
and the perfectibility of individual humanity. Similarly, he wishes to relegate St. Augustine to the 
Constantinian church from which he sought to rescue Christianity. Garaudy would not therefore agree 
that ‘The assertion that we are created in the divine image operates both as an assertion of the way 
things are — an ontological given — and as an ideal regulating personal and social conduct’ 
(McFadyen, 1990:18). If Garaudy’s project is to adopt a Christian individuality, it is one bereft of 
humanity as an ontological mirror of a supernatural God.  
But neither would Garaudy necessarily be happy to follow the logic of Pelagianism very much 
further. There are crucial differences between Pelagius and Garaudy that Garaudy’s mere nod to him 
disregards. Pelagius always recognises that although it is within human capacity, God’s assistance, at 
least, is required to achieve the good (Boer, 2019:92; Brinkman, 2003:116). Pelagius further accepts 
that it is the rite of baptism, not revolution, that allows the rebirth of an individual free from sin 
(Brown, 1968:105). It has also been argued that for Pelagius, God’s grace is the possibility that He gives 
us to follow not only the example of Jesus but the law in all its particulars, as 'it is never a light matter 
 
149 L’exemple de la vie du Christ et la dialogue intime et permanent avec son mode de vie 
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to despise God even in small things' (Pelagius, On the Divine Law 30:1 [Rees 2004:95). Christians should 
do so under pain of excommunication (Herren & Brown, 2002:132), with the threat of hell and the 
desire of heaven to spur them on (Márkus, 2005:167). Garaudy might be keen on the example of Jesus 
supported by Pelagius (or at least by some, at least, of those identified as Pelagians) in terms of its 
radical emphasis on the redistribution of wealth, ‘socialism of a coherence hardly to be met again 
before the nineteenth century’ (Morris, 1965:51), but surely much less so on this importance of the 
law, and still less keen on a supernatural heaven or hell as motivation. As he wrote, ‘Pelagius’ mistake 
was not to assert that Man could gain salvation through his own efforts, it was to forget that there is 
no other immanent criterion to judge his efforts’150 (Garaudy, 1975:239). Though cited favourably, 
Pelagius is merely a useful weapon in Garaudy’s contest with ‘Constantinian’ Christianity, in which 
Augustinian conceptions of sin play a useful and essentially conservative political role.  
The very partial appropriation of his doctrine, however, is the less interesting aspect of 
Garaudy’s decision to draft Pelagius as support for his Christianity. If Garaudy is to reject original sin, 
then implicitly, and perhaps surprisingly, we would expect him to accept actual sin into his ontology. 
And therefore, given his stress on individuality and personal responsibility, this would have to be a 
more conventional, potentially socially conservative concept of actual sin, specifically dependent on 
individual responsibility (Tennant, 1925:37), rather than an exclusive reliance on contemporary 
concepts familiar to liberation theology and relational theorists of individuality alike that identify sin 
with injustice, whether class, covenant or gender (Wiley, 2002:23; Boer, 2007:298). Yet Garaudy would 
also surely wish to abjure a conservative definition of the kind of ‘Where no law is, there can be no 
sin’ (Tennant, 1925:38). And this is what we find: the transformation of the world requires both a 
recognition that ‘sin is not only individual, but collective’151 (Garaudy, 1977:236), but also personal 
 
150 L’erreur de Pélage n’était pas d’affirmer que l’homme peut gagner le salut par ses propres efforts, c’était 
d’oublier qu’il n’existe aucun critère immanent pour juger ces efforts 
151 le peché n’est pas seulement individual, il est collectif 
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transformation, the political struggle demanded by the Gospel also entails ‘ liberation from sin, that is 
from egotistic turning in on oneself’ (Garaudy, 1976a [1980:1]). 
If they were to adopt Garaudy’s project as their own, Marxists need not therefore adopt all of 
Pelagius’ arguments, just those that are useful in the collective endeavour to change the world. 
Moreover, the exchange of ideas need not be unidirectional: Marxists themselves should not be 
reluctant to offer their alternative explanations of sin to Christianity. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
early on in his prophetic period, Garaudy describes Teilhard de Chardin’s view of original sin as a 
tentative explanation of evil in a fixed conception of the world (Garaudy, 1971:130). Unfortunately, 
Garaudy makes no attempt to dig deeper, for example to determine whether any of the different 
conceptions of original sin that Teilhard advances, Garaudy does not dwell upon exactly what Teilhard 
proposed regarding sin, let alone indicate whether he agreed with everything Teilhard suggested. 
Rather, in the sweeping and generalised fashion with which readers of the Garaudy of the prophetic 
period would become very familiar, he argues that: ‘Marxist analysis allows us to prevent the moral 
confusion which otherwise may be ascribed to original sin, which has run through man’s history and 
relieves him of his responsibility152 (Garaudy, 1971:130), whilst he later quotes Gutiérrez on the social 
context of sin (Garaudy, 1977b:17). We are left in no doubt that the project requires the rejection of 
the concept of original sin at the level of the individual, in favour of a collective, social concept, but 
equally that no further elucidation of the concept is either required or necessary to bring Marxism and 
Christianity into alignment.   
Not all Marxists either then or now would agree even about Pelagius, let alone Teilhard de 
Chardin. Collier too recognises the importance of original sin for any alignment of Marxism with 
Christianity. He, however, is dismissive of precisely Garaudy’s project: ‘A Pelagian Christianity can 
meet a Feuerbachian Marxism on the ground of an anthropocentric philosophy, and confirm each 
 
152 l’analyse marxiste permet d’empêcher la confusion morale par laquelle on risque de mettre sur le compte du 
pêché original, ce qui découle l’histoire de l’homme et relève de sa responsabilité  
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other in their humanist errors’ (Collier, 2001:1). I have argued in this chapter that these are the very 






What answer, then to the question posed in this chapter: what was this ‘subjectivity’ that 
Garaudy argued Christianity could and should contribute to Marxism? Was there any real difference 
between the individuals and the human essence of socialist humanism and those of Garaudy’s 
project? Not ontologically, perhaps — but teleologically, yes. There was much talk by Marxist 
humanists, of individuality, of freedom, of the need and possibility for individuals to develop their 
personal capabilities in the process of changing society, even socialist society. But below the surface, 
the absence of need to discuss human motivation and the drivers of change remained; thanks to the 
legacy of Marxism–Leninism, neither class nor socialism itself were disputed concepts. Although the 
socialist humanists had dispensed with dialectical materialism, they therefore still wrote as if historical 
materialism were a practical reality, apparently oblivious of what Lenin would have told them, that it 
is impossible to have one without the other (Lenin, 1913 [1977: 21–28]).  
At the time, both sides of the debate over Man within the PCF appear to have assumed that 
Garaudy in particular could have the field to himself in terms of the relationship between subjectivity, 
at least as he defined it, universal essence and Christianity. It is a need that has been recognised by 
more recent Marxist scholarship, where the anti-structuralist argument that: ‘it is clear that there are 
universal and trans-historical, relatively unchanging human characteristics and, in that sense, a 
universal human nature’ (Sayers, 1998:151; Geras, 1983) is now more widely accepted than when 
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Althusser (1965 [2005]) espoused the denial of human nature. Even further away seem the early days 
of the Soviet Union, where eugenicists debated with social engineers as to how to create the New 
Soviet Man (Bauer, 1952). If Garaudy were to draw his concept of subjectivity from Christianity, 
however, then it might be expected that he would engage with the theological debate over the relative 
role of grace and nature in Man, as does Lash (1982:410), and to answer the implicit question as to 
what extent any subjectivity derived from Christianity that a Marxist can accept is able to explain how 
Man can reach a right and just conclusion as to belief and action. But he does not.  
So far as Garaudy’s contemporary critics were concerned, however, it was a plague on all three 
of your houses: universal human essence, subjectivity and Christianity. Structural Marxists disagreed 
so fundamentally that they further rejected the concept of personality and the need for an 
understanding of the individual. Sève did not go that far, but it is easy to see why he would not have 
wanted his theory of personality assimilated in any way to Garaudy’s subjectivity, even without the 
intermediary of a universal human essence and without Christianity.  
Lenin had already promoted the subjective element in class politics, however, albeit that he 
regarded it as inextricable from objective economic factors (Lenin, 1905 [1965:17]). It would have 
been but a relatively short step from acknowledging both the biographical construction of an 
individual and the subjective element in politics to suggesting that subjectivity was a property of an 
individual personality, in the sense Sève meant it. This would have had the advantage of beginning the 
explanation, which Garaudy avoided, of why subjectivity in his terms varies very widely between 
individuals in practice, despite their sharing in a common human essence. Subjectivity could have then 
been assimilated within Marxism without any requirement for a universal human essence, still less for 
Christianity, which might have been much closer to what Marx originally had in mind, albeit that it 
was Marx’s own use of the term in the VI Thesis on Feuerbach that started the debate (Kühne, 
1979:803). The way to this had already been opened by Schaff’s suggestion cited above that Marx 
meant the term only rhetorically. This would have been a much closer enemy for the project than 
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anything Garaudy encountered in practice, either within the PCF or beyond. As it was, Sève’s 
references to this ‘subjective element’ within Marxism were simply dismissive (Sève, 1969 
[1978:158]). 
With starker opponents, earlier chapters have shown how Garaudy had already, even before 
his expulsion from the PCF, begun to argue for the need to demonstrate common ground between 
Christianity and Marxism as a better way to fill Sartre’s gap and place the individual at centre stage 
within Marxism, but as much for reasons of political practice as for philosophical theory. Where the 
project went further than Marxist humanism, however, was in Garaudy’s new insistence that the 
congruence between Marxism and Christianity involved mutual dependence. A subjectivity derived 
from Christianity characterised by love replaces historical materialism and violent revolution. Garaudy 
evidently believed that this would protect the project from the fate to which Sartre had warned 
Marxism was exposed (Sartre, 1957 [1963:82]) and at the same time match contemporary political 
reality. Yet, as noted in Chapter Three, he can be accused of engaging in some kind of proposed faux 
fair barter, in which Marxism will donate a social justice that it does not own to Christianity, in return 
for a love that Christianity does not own either. 
So too, Garaudy’s stress on subjectivity, and its pursuit of a Christian theory of the individual 
with which Garaudy seeks to empower the project, when stripped of a very limited economic gloss, 
turns out to be close, at least, to the pervasive individual of much contemporary theology (Turner, 
2013:810). Returned to its roots, Christianity can serve the purpose of providing not just subjectivity, 
but the underlying agent, the individual, to the project, but only at the expense of a deep and 
prolonged division within Marxism itself. Garaudy would still surely insist on differentiating his 
subjectivity from the possessive individuals of liberal political thought (MacPherson, 1962), those 
‘autonomous, self-sufficient centres of consciousness, each of which manifests certain more-or-less 
universal properties, attributes, qualities, and capacities regardless of when and where they live ’ 
(Turner, 2013:810). Disapproved of by many contemporary theologians, their force and longevity has 
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been widely recognised (e.g. Taylor, 1985:10), as well as their indissoluble association with capitalism 
(Balibar, 1993 [2017:30], 2018:23). But although Garaudy leaves both the idea of an individual and 
that of sin largely implicit, we are left once again with the impression that philosophically at least, we 
are dealing with very ordinary individuals committing very familiar sins.  
Perhaps even more importantly for the project itself, bereft of both the God of Kierkegaard, 
‘who commands in saying “The Other” to an “I”, that is to say a God who commands a relation’ 
(Chevallier, 2001:111), and of the guiding direction of the Communist Party, Garaudy’s subjectivity 
requires a strong ally for its success though, or else we should surely be left with a discontinuity 
between the theory of love and political practice. This in turn would inevitably lead to the suspicion 
that Garaudy wishes to mould love to the shape of his political project, an easy target for criticism if 
ever there were one.  
The mechanism through which these very ordinary individuals and their subjectivity would 
bring about the extraordinary changes demanded by the project despite the alienation of capitalist 
society therefore becomes the almost inevitable focus of consideration. This mechanism Garaudy 
consistently termed transcendence, and he believed himself well aware of the distinction between the 
two: ‘The study of subjectivity does not provide an escape from the problem of transcendence’ 
(Garaudy, 1972 [1976:90]). Distinction, but not, as he had asserted existed for existentialism and 
transcendence, contradiction (Garaudy, 1959 [1969:48]). The next chapter will therefore concern the 




Chapter Five: The role of transcendence in the project 
 
 
Introduction: a necessary concept? 
 
Garaudy, the protagonist for transcendence, directed his criticism as a Marxist philosopher at 
the mainstream of modem philosophy. He was not alone: a similar claim was that it had ‘moved 
generally in the direction of linguistic analysis and has deserted its traditional post as leader in the 
search for meaningful models of transcendence’ (Ratliff, 1975:7). For Garaudy, by comparison: 
‘As a Marxist, my constant preoccupation was to find the place where transcendence could fit 
in Karl Marx's thought. It was not a question of the transcendence of God in relation to man, 
which could not find a place in Marx’s problematic, but of the transcendence of Man in 
relation to nature’153 (Garaudy, 1985:266) 
So Garaudy valued transcendence very highly, but as others have asked before (Da Costa Pinto, 
2017:452; Gauvin, 2018:398), what did he mean by it? At the most general level, a definition has been 
provided as: ‘That which encompasses, or "goes beyond," all closed systems’ (Ratliff, 1975:2). It has 
been further suggested that in the philosophical traditions of the West — in which as we saw in 
Chapter Three Garaudy’s project was anchored — there are three different interpretations of 
transcendence: a metaphysical or religious sense that is distinguished from the immanent, an 
epistemological sense of the ‘transcendental’ existence of the physical world by comparison to 
perception found in Kant, Berkeley or Husserl, and a linguistic sense, in which the significance of a sign 
‘transcends’ the technical capacity of the sign itself (During, 1988:288).  
Finally, there was what has been described as the ‘Marxist existentialist’ use of the term by 
Sartre (Miller, 1982:156). Sartre advocated that revolutionaries should adopt a ‘philosophy of 
 
153 Marxiste, ma préoccupation constant fut de rechercher le lieu ou pourrait s’insérer la transcendance dans la 
pensée de Karl Marx. Il ne s’agissait point de la transcendance de Dieu par rapport à l’homme, qui ne saurait 
trouver place dans la problématique de Marx, mais de la transcendance de l’homme par rapport à la nature  
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transcendence’, which would replace the society of laws with a community of ends. In the most 
general terms Sartre suggested that a revolutionary philosophy of freedom would show that men laid 
the contingent foundation of all transcendent values, assume that any set of values could be 
overthrown and replaced, illuminate how any set of values formed part of a social order and tended 
to preserve it, and suggest that any social order was mutable, even if the expression of new values 
had to be invented in practice, through the very effort of transcending given values (Sartre, 1946 
[1955:234–235]). Did Garaudy suggest anything much different to this? 
 
A Hegelian beginning 
 
Garaudy emphasised transcendence long before he publicly embraced Christianity. He had 
sought to incorporate a Hegelian sense of transcendence into his Marxist thinking. And what was this? 
In the words of another author, Hegel ‘seeks to transfigure the cave of human experience with all the 
transcendental lights and perspectives which other types of thought put entirely beyond it ’ (Findlay, 
1981:359). Garaudy’s approach to Hegel had been to stress the immanence of his dialectic (Garaudy, 
1959 [1969:34]); from another Marxist humanist came a similar argument that ‘Hegelian experience 
is a different story: it reveals concrete reality, and reveals it without modifying or “perturbing” it’ 
(Kojève, 1947 [1980:178]). But if ‘Absolute knowledge in Hegel’s speculative system takes the place of 
revelation and faith and totally excludes the experience of transcendence’ (Friedrich, 1967:205), can 
Hegel’s philosophy be Christian?  
This particular question did not trouble Garaudy before the project. In his Marxist humanist 
period, Garaudy had been sufficiently interested to write two books on Hegel (Garaudy, 1962, 1966b). 
For him it was sufficient that both Hegel and Marx favoured total man, such that Hegel’s philosophy 
represented ‘the twilight of all the Gods, for the Hegelian dialectic of history and spirit reduces each 
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God to an element in the realisation of total man’154 (Garaudy, 1962 [1970:428]). Hegel therefore 
represents a latent Marx (Friedrich, 1967:204). It still required Marx to liberate Hegel’s transcendence, 
which can then be placed at the disposal of Marxism — and contribute to it. An uncritical view of Hegel 
had already been criticised as blinking when Absolute Spirit is mentioned (During, 1988:295), a 
difficulty corrected by Marx, who ‘points out that Hegel’s conception of history155 presupposes an 
abstract and absolute spirit, the embodiment of which is the mass’ (Lenin, 1895 [1976:34]; Anderson, 
1995:44), an approach that formed the basis of the twists and turns of attitudes towards Hegel in 
Soviet philosophy (Pavlov, 2016).   
A Marxist humanist approach was no doubt less focused on the Party than that of a Marxist–
Leninist, but Garaudy no less than Marx aimed to ‘liberate Hegel's system from its final, and perhaps 
dispensable, gesture towards the absolute’ (During, 1988:288). Garaudy’s transcendence in the 
project was however to become more than simply the secularisation of the Hegelian dialectic. It also 
depended on the importance of the individual to his Marxist humanism. So, in his view, ‘What gives 
meaning and beauty and value to life, for Marxists as for Christians, is the unstinting gift of self to what 
the world, through our sacrifice, can become in the future’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:153]). Armed with 
that faith himself, Garaudy could proceed to discuss change in society with a confidence that he 
believed that Marxist humanists could not in all honesty share, however much they leaned on the 
Hegelian dialectic. Sève observed critically, but surely quite correctly, that Garaudy confers on Man a 
transcendental freedom: Man is not reducible to the social relations which condition him (Sève, 
2008:46,105,397), he is transcendent with regard to society and his own history (Sève, 2008:379).  In 
Sève’s view Garaudy had in the end simply misunderstood Marx: Christian values of transcendence 
and love were foreign to a materialist understanding of religion (Sève, 2008:402). 
 
154 Le crépuscule de tous les dieux, car la dialectique hégéienne de l’histoire et de l’esprit, ne fait de chaque dieu 




Undeterred, Garaudy’s next step was therefore to apply this secularised Hegelianism to that 
individual. He advanced this view by way of insisting that the way Marx’s thought developed rested 
to a significant degree on his view of the importance of Fichte to Marx (Garaudy, 1964 [1967:33–43]. 
In particular, that Fichte was already committed to a notion of immanence which ‘informs his account 
of history in such a way as to prevent the need to introduce the transcendence associated with a 
supernatural event that interrupts the course of history as a whole’ (James, 2016:1163). Only 
therefore if this concept of transcendence can itself be described as Hegelian can the argument that 
‘When he eventually embraced Christianity in 1975, he arguably did so as a Hegelian’ (Robinson, 2004: 
n.p.) be supported. Garaudy did quote with approval Hegel's description of Christ as the man in whom 
the unity of God and Man has appeared, who has shown by his death and his history in general the 
eternal history of the Spirit (Garaudy, 1975:243). And for Garaudy the common thread of German 
philosophy from Kant through Hegel to Fichte is the human capacity for self-development (Garaudy, 
1938:15, 1977a:100). For Garaudy however it is Fichte in particular who has captured the correctness 
of transcendence within the individual personality: 
‘What is characteristic in Fichte’s conception of the ego is its continual transcendence. At 
every moment the ego sets a limit and simultaneously leaps over it, as if the infinite were 
calling it; its present is never defined except in terms of its future growth. The ego is always 
[a] project: What I have been and what I am only assumes its full meaning in the light of what 
I am about to be’ (Garaudy, 1964 [1967:39]). 
Others thought in slightly different terms, but also addressed the question of individuality in relation 
to transcendence. Schleiermacher, for example, for all his insistence on its dependence on the Divine, 
wanted to use transcendence to end the dualism of subject and object, ‘Schleiermacher thought of 
the centre and sum of life as consciousness of the divine absoluteness which transcends both subject 
and object’ (Hegedüs, 1991:8). Garaudy too opposed what he regarded as Greek dualism, of many 
kinds: ‘opposition between earth and sky, body and soul, profane and sacred, time and eternity, and 
immanence and transcendence’156 (Garaudy, 1971:113):  
 
156 l’opposition de la terre de du ciel, du corps et de l’âme, du profane et du sacré, du temps et de l’éternité, de 
l’immanence et de la transcendance  
154 
 
‘What must be sought, therefore, in this creative interface, are approaches to a conception of 
transcendence that contains neither alienation nor the dualism of body and mind, the earthly 
and heavenly world, and where Man and God are not so radically opposed to each other that 
God is as alien to Man as an object’157(Garaudy, 1978a:157). 
This would not be an easy task, as Garaudy also recognised that: 
‘Transcendence is a dangerous word, for it is burdened with a weighty past history of 
confusions and mystifications. Traditionally, the notion implies belief in the beyond, in the 
“supernatural”, with all that those notions contain of irrationality, of the miraculous, of 
mystery, and ultimately, of deception’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:133]). 
So dangerous, perhaps, that before he openly broke with Marxism–Leninism, Garaudy preferred to 
use the expression ‘dialectical surpassing’ which in his opinion meant the emergence of the ‘new’, of 
the different beyond all the conditions already present in reality already (Gauvin, 2018:398). In his 
subsequent view as a Marxist humanist, to be a realist is not to imitate the image of the real, but to 
imitate its activity; it is not to give an exact copy or duplicate of things, events or men, but to 
participate in the creative act of a world which is in the process of maturing, to discover its inner 
rhythm (Garaudy, 1963). Certainly, it should be recognised that Garaudy’s view was not unique — a 
contemporary Polish Marxist, for example, suggested that transcendence should be seen as 
‘consisting essentially in endeavours and activities aimed at going beyond the given reality, the world 
as it is, overcoming it practically, conceptually and ideologically’ (Krejčí, 1969:87).  
Garaudy however, as a Marxist, found neither individual human action nor science wholly 
satisfactory locations for transcendence. Garaudy therefore went further, declaring a specifically, and 
for his project even more important, Marxist transcendence. For Garaudy the Marxist, humanist or 
otherwise, this possibility to surpass — inaccessible to the animal or to inanimate nature — exists 
because of man’s ability to transform the world through labour. Man is part of nature, but with man, 
through culture, a higher level of nature begins to emerge. This is the real human core of this pre-
project Marxist idea of transcendence: it is the alienated expression of the leap beyond nature 
 
157 In dieser schöpferischen Nahtstelle gibt es also Ansätze zu einer Konzeption des Transzendenz, die weder die 
Entfremdung noch den Dualismus enthält, die Körper und Geist, irdische und himmlische Welt, Mensch und Gott 
nicht so radikal einander entgegensetzt, daß Gott dem Menschen so äußerlich ist wie ein Objekt 
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effected in culture. The species which crossed this threshold, Man, has been so successfully influenced 
by this transcendence that another order of reality beyond nature was imagined: a future. As yet, this 
is full of risk, and oppression. Such is the constraint on transcendence in an alienated — capitalist — 
world. Marxism, on the other hand, holds out the possibility that once alienation can be overcome, 
immense reserves of initiative and creation can be released in the transcendence of existing society 
and the creation of the new. Transcendence, in the secondary or attenuated sense of surpassing or 
rising above the human situation, was therefore already of crucial importance for Garaudy, even 
though he seems not to have employed the word itself before his Marxist humanist phase, except to 
note how Marx had succeeded in escaping its seductions (Garaudy, 1938:20).  But certainly as a Marxist 
humanist, Garaudy believed that under socialism alienation would be progressively abolished 
because, instructed in dialectical materialism and its theory of knowledge, human beings would 
become conscious of the laws of nature and the laws of social life which have dominated them for 
millennia. They would thus be able for the first time in human history to make use of these laws in the 
interests of society. In short, knowledge of necessity brings with it the only freedom available to 
humanity, that of transforming the world. 
Such an attempt could stretch to the suggestion that the creative capacity of man, 
demonstrated through labour, actually means that he becomes human only through this 
transcendence. To make transcendence the identifying characteristic separating Man from animals, 
as Garaudy does, is certainly to place considerable responsibility upon the concept. Yet that is exactly 
what Garaudy did: his view was that:  
‘As Marx explains, when, with the appearance of specifically human labour — of labour, that 
is, which has as its law the end or project aimed at — Man raises himself about all the other 
animal species and begins an historical development whose rhythm is incommensurable with 
that of biological evolution, then we come up against a qualitative leap, a true supersession, 
a transcendence (in the strictly etymological sense of the word) in relation to nature. 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:133])  
For Garaudy the Marxist humanist, the human capacity for transcendence in relation to nature was at 
the very least one of the key characteristics identifying humanity (Gauvin, 2018:398), a view Garaudy 
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shared with his Marxist critics (e.g. Sève, 1969 [1978:139]) who also used in support of their own 
conception of what differentiates human beings from animals the same quote from Marx, who ranked 
the worst architect above the best bee, because ‘he builds it in his head before he builds it in wax’158 
(Marx, 1867 [1976:198]).  
‘Thus, for Marx, the work, in its specifically human form [. . .] begins with the emergence of 
the conscious goal, the project, which now dominates without breaking it, the web of causal 
chains. Conscious finality "transcends" determinism. It is in this "creative break" that Garaudy 
identifies in Marx a form of "transcendence" that is essentially "transcending” the present 
order’ (Gauvin, 2018:269)159.  
It is worthwhile stressing the essentially Marxist definition of transcendence here. Take away the 
existence of labour, in the Marxist sense, and the concept evaporates. It is therefore only by extension 
that for Garaudy the Marxist humanist, Krejčí and other Marxists, transcendence corresponds to any 
wider definition, to mean any taking away, any break with regard to the given, whether it is a work of 
art that is never content to simply reproduce nature, or the historical break that is a revolution.  
Because it operates at an individual level, transcendence therefore for Garaudy implies 
subjectivity, and permeates individual consciousness, residing in dreams, hopes, love, danger and 
decision. Hence for example in relation to Marxist aesthetics, he combated the narrowness of 'socialist 
realism', seeking the point where the act of artistic creation, the act of faith in a socialist future, and 
political action, coincided. He acknowledged that all works of art are realist in the sense that they refer 
to a reality exterior to themselves and independent of them, for it is not consciousness which 
determines life but life which determines consciousness.  
By comparison with his Marxist humanism, however, the emphasis during the project moves 
away from labour towards making transcendence stand alone: ‘Man is always something other and 
something more than the sum of the conditions which have produced him. This is what distinguishes 
 
158 er die Zelle in seinem Kopf gebaut hat, bevor er sie in Wachs baut 
159 Ainsi pour Marx, le travail, sous sa forme spécifiquement humaine […] commence avec l’émergence du but 
conscient, du projet, qui domine désormais, sans la rompre, la trame des chaînes causales. La finalité consciente 
“transcende” le déterminisme. » (Biographie du XXe siècle, opus cité, p.268)  
C’est dans cette « rupture créatrice » que Garaudy repère chez Marx lui–même une forme de « transcendance 
» qui est essentiellement « dépassement de l’ordre présent »  
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him from all other kinds of animal’ (Garaudy, 1973b:63). If this concept of transcendence is to be 
compatible with Marxism, then Marxism itself will surely have to give ground in respect of the 
dominance of labour in its creation. 
  I am not sure, however, whether Robinson goes too far when he argues that ‘Because [my 
emphasis] of the high premium which Garaudy set on transcendence in the sense of surpassing or 
rising above the human situation, he was already in his Communist days an inveterate opponent of all 
those brands of materialist philosophy which tend to deny human creativity and subjectivity’ 
(Robinson, 2004: n.p., my italics). That he was so, as I have argued in Chapter Four, is hard to deny. 
But whether it is fair to say that a failure to recognise the importance of transcendence specifically — 
as opposed to the importance of subjectivity itself — caused that denial of materialist philosophy (and 
indirectly led to his Marxist humanism) I am not so sure. Many other factors contributed to his break 
with Marxism–Leninism. Transcendence, moreover, could be defined collectively, or even structurally 
— as noted in Chapter Four, we should be extremely careful to avoid the assumption that Garaudy’s 
individual is quite such an independent character as his Marxist critics liked to envisage.  
To remove just this causal link, however, may open the way to arguing that for Garaudy 
transcendence actually serves a more fundamental role, that of justifying a Marxist approach in 
general, rather than Marxist humanism in particular. Garaudy’s insistence on the importance of 
transcendence was never, and is not in the project, a cause of dissonance with Marxism; rather, it was 
always intended to be aligned with it. In Garaudy’s view, ‘the future will be filled with questions which 
surpass and transcend anything we can imagine about the future. Yes, Man will always be capable of 
an always greater future’ (Garaudy, 1965 [1967:79]). 
So where should we look to find this transcendence, if it is to be somehow distinguished from 
every individual action or the action of every mechanical object? Garaudy answered, it is to be found 
where Man breaks the circle of positivist knowledge or action through a creative act, whether artistic 
creation, scientific research, technical development, love or sacrifice — all these are the human 
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dimensions of transcendence (García, 1988:146). It is well signposted by the life of Jesus himself, as 
Garaudy indicated in a response even during the period of Marxist–Christian dialogue (Garaudy, 
1968f).  
Pinto, faithfully transcribing Garaudy virtually word for word, summarises this  view of 
transcendence: Man’s ability not just to extrapolate the past or the present, but to create a new and 
different future, and to recognise that ability to make history, to make the eighth day of creation. 
From the edge, forgotten, downtrodden and neglected, transcendent human action, deeper gestures 
of spontaneity such as the party and dance, poetry, art and music, gift, faith and love can burst forth 
to create change (Da Costa Pinto, 1982:736). To break with this mockery of civilisation, rupture it, and 
reorient society radically requires a prophetic decision, a creative act that is essentially an act of faith 
— Garaudy was ever the optimist, but ever also the dirigeant. In Garaudy’s view, ‘the resurrection is 
to be grasped by faith: it is neither a historical event nor a scientific fact but something accomplished 
each day in our creative acts in which we break with routine, complacency and alienation, not as 
isolated individuals but by our common participation in the only ultimate reality, the reality of human 
decisions, initiatives and creations’. (Robinson, 2004: n.p.). But what, then, prevents this opening to 
the Divine, which, according to him, is the sine qua non condition of this 'mutation' of humanity he 
calls for? Garaudy is silent, but the answer is implicit in Marxist analysis: it is capitalism itself that 
counters transcendence. For Garaudy, capitalism and the Devil must live and die together. The 
alternative to both must always be positive: transcendence cannot err, nor entangle itself with sin. 
So ultimately, Garaudy’s project locates transcendence in revolution (Garaudy, 1974a). The 
only way to ‘transcend’ alienation, Garaudy the Marxist humanist answers, is through class struggle 
(Garaudy, 1964 [1967:62]). So, when Garaudy asks, if revolutionary consciousness is not simply 
produced by circumstances, from whence does it derive, he answers, from transcendence. For the 




A secular transcendence? 
 
Thus far, it should be agreed that, in sharp distinction to any conception of ‘hard wiring’ 
transcendence in an immutable immanence, or at least one in which social and political 
transformation can play but an ancillary role, ‘Underneath the appeal to transcendence lies this real 
experience, that while Man belongs to nature he differs from things and animals and that, with his 
capacity continually to outstrip himself, he is never a completed being’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:133]). 
Transcendence is itself therefore evolving, ultimately for a Marxist as a result of changing social 
conditions. 
  As we have seen, Garaudy’s transcendence was firmly rooted in his Marxist humanism and 
therefore immanent. This is because for Garaudy the Marxist humanist, ‘transcendence is no longer 
an attribute of God but a dimension of man, a dimension of our experience and our acts’ (Garaudy, 
1965 [1967:39]). In his purely Marxist period Garaudy asserts that any attempt to refer transcendence 
to an absolute, to God, would be to limit Man by imposing an antiquated worldview on him. To the 
Marxist Garaudy, transcendence is actually a demand, an exigency, a driving force, but a force that 
cannot be conceived, named, or expected’ (Paulose, 2000:n.p). But for Garaudy, it is suggested, ‘this 
transcendence must always remain within the immanence of human possibilities’ (Paulose, 2000:n.p). 
None of the possibilities of initiative and creation is in this pre-project conception of transcendence 
an attribute of an independent God, let alone the transcendent God of conventional Christian 
theology. Nowhere can Garaudy find sympathy with the argument that ‘the deepest resources in 
theism for self-transcendence are found on the religious and ethical level, where the otherness of God 
appears in language that speaks about a God that commands, judges, and forgives by grace’ 
(Henriksen, 2010:162). He cannot allow transcendence to be ’the movement that draws us away from 
our natural preoccupation with ourselves’ (Westphal, 2004:13) if that be towards a God–outside–the 
world. Nor can he even permit the existence of that weak God who reveals the possibility of initiative 
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and change by allowing events of a specific and disturbing kind to occur (Caputo, 2006:12). On the 
contrary, initiative and creation remain firmly attributes of man, and those that distinguish him from 
all the other animal species. ‘Transcendence — Garaudy will repeatedly insist whilst a ‘mere’ secular 
Marxist — “is not an attribute of God, but a dimension of man”, it “is the attribute first of Man and his 
creative act", and it becomes synonymous with real humanity, in the sense of "explore all dimensions 
of human reality”.  
Transcendence is, then, “human future", or in Lacroix's phrase, with which Garaudy concurs, 
"the future is the only transcendence of men, without God’’ ’160 (García, 1988:145). Bloch, though 
already seeking to establish the consistency of Christianity with Marxism, thought the same: If 
humanity looks ahead, then atheism becomes a ‘transcending without any heavenly transcendence’ 
(Bloch, 1959:1522). Garaudy intends to use the Marxist paradigm to defeat what Moltmann, bereft of 
Bloch’s perception of what dialectical change will achieve, criticised as an endless ‘transcendental 
immanence without transcendence’ (Moltmann, 1966:30). As Garaudy put it: we have to find out what 
need, or suffering, or hope, can have brought Man to his current state of alienation. ‘Poetry and love 
disclose man’s transcendence in relation to each of his provisional realisations. This transcendence is 
the only transcendence known to atheists: the future. In this profound sense,  for example, ‘woman is 
man’s future’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:143]). This transcendence is the only transcendence known to 
atheists: the future. Garaudy is always sensitive to the question of determinism here: to investigate 
the dimension of transcendence, conceived not as an attribute to God but as a dimension of man, ‘is 
not to start from something which exists in our world in a vain attempt to prove the existence of what 
can exist only in another world; it is simply to investigate all the dimensions of human reality’ 
 
160 la trascendencia – insistirá repetidamente Garaudy– «no es un atributo de Dios, sino una dimensión del 
hombre», « es el atributo primero del hombre y de su acto creador », y viene a ser sinónimo de humanidad 
plena, en el sentido de « explorar todas las dimensiones de la realidad humana » Trascendencia es, pues, « el 
futuro humano », o dicho en frase de Lacroix, a la que asiente Garaudy, « el porvenir es la única trascendencia 
de los hombres »  
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(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:104]). There is therefore always, prior to the project, a final reluctance to admit 
the existence of the Divine.  
So, despite Garaudy's empathy for radical Christian thinkers and activists, he was as a Marxist 
humanist prepared only to give so much ground: ‘Like every ideology, religion is a project, it is a way 
of breaking away from, transcending the given, of anticipating the real, whether by justifying the 
existing order or by protesting against it and attempting to transform it ’ (Garaudy, 1965: [1967: 76]). 
Despite his whole-hearted commitment to Marxist–Christian dialogue, during his Communist days he 
held that art and poetry offered Man a surer means of rising above the human situation than religion. 
In relation to religion, prior to the project he also argued: 
‘As far as faith is concerned, whether it is a question of faith in God or of faith in our task, 
whatever may be the divergence or what its source is, though it be for one party a bowing to 
the will of God and to the other a purely human creation, it imposes upon us the duty of 
making every man … a poet in the profoundest sense of the word — that which makes every 
day of his overreaching himself creative of what the Christians call his transcendence and we, 
his true humanity (Garaudy, 1965 [1967:107]).   
Because the crucial difference is this:  
‘For a Christian, transcendence is the act of God who comes towards him and summons him. 
For a Marxist, it is a dimension of man’s activity which goes out beyond itself towards its far-
off being’ (Garaudy, 1965 [1967:80]).  
This distinction is where Garaudy left matters before commencing the project, although his reluctance 
to ascribe transcendence to the Divine was never intended to prevent inclusiveness. Quite the 
contrary: Garaudy the Marxist humanist believed that transcendence ‘concerns the action of each of 
us, whether Christian or not’ (Garaudy, 1974a: n.p). We should surely glean from this that such a 
transcendence ought, among many other things, to transcend individual religions at the same time as 






Alignment with the views of radical theologians 
 
Although he looked back beyond the ‘Constantinian’ church to an alleged golden age of 
Christianity, so that, in common with a more recent evaluation of transcendence, it should ‘take the 
form first found in primitive Christianity as one way of renewing lived social relations’ (Hinkson, 
2018:31), the possibility, at least, of ‘allowing Christianity in’, even in its contemporary forms, or even 
to use transcendence as at least part of the way to create consistency with Marxism, was evident to 
Garaudy well before he left the PCF. Even as a Marxist humanist, Garaudy claimed that ‘Christianity 
unlocked Man from his fixed place in the cosmos and made him the agent of historical change’. (Cox, 
1968:24). Transcendence that does not defy immanence, Garaudy says, he learned early from Maurice 
Blondel (Garaudy, 1989:41). Blondel was a French Catholic theologian, an emeritus professor at Aix 
when Garaudy studied there. His key idea, first expressed in L’Action (Blondel, 1893), was that Man 
can only achieve fulfilment by action that transforms both himself and the lives of others. Garaudy 
expressed the same idea by arguing that Man could not become fully human except through not just 
one other, but also ‘with all others, that is to say, transcendence’ 161 (Garaudy, 1979:170). For both 
Blondel and Garaudy, only God can fill the void between me and you that prevents that fulfilment. 
Blondel argued that each of man's acts implies a greater project and that we thus arrive eventually at 
an ultimate project which defines our attitude to the world. This was appealing to Garaudy because, 
‘like Marxism, it was a philosophy of praxis rather than a philosophy of being’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.)  
Garaudy’s principal apologist agrees: 
‘In L'Action, his thesis of 1893 condemned for "immanentism" by the Catholic Church, Blondel 
gives a philosophically acceptable form to the need for transcendence of the young Garaudy; 
and he emphasizes the "perfect complementarity between reason and faith.  Between a 
reason that does not proceed only from the cause in question, but goes back from end to end. 
And a faith that does not think transcendence in terms of externality, and does not oppose 
 
161 ‘et avec le tout autre, c’est–à–dire la transcendance 
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immanence and transcendence. The student thus embraces Blondel's reflection as 
rationalizing openness to transcendence’162 (Gauvin, 2018:122). 
Whereas Blondel tried to reintroduce transcendence via individual human action, and ‘Chenu insisted 
on the liberating force of incarnation in the building of the world’ 163 (Ries, 1974:515), another of 
Garaudy’s spiritual sources, Teilhard de Chardin, sought to create a scientific theory of transcendence. 
He maintained that all phenomena including inorganic matter, plants, animals and human beings, are 
interrelated, and that the universe is evolving towards an 'Omega point' of supreme consciousness at 
which the Universal and the Personal will culminate simultaneously in each other (Teilhard de Chardin, 
1948 [1969:141]). Garaudy enthused that the great synthesis which constitutes de Chardin’s 
phenomenology, this search for the most fundamental aspect of life and history, is a human one. As 
yet unachieved, the complete synthesis derives meaning and purpose from the future. But is there a 
component in Garaudy’s project that corresponds to Point Omega, in Teilhard de Chardin’s teleology? 
Arguably so: for Teilhard, love drives the arrow of evolution towards Point Omega (Schmitt, 1961:276), 
and for Garaudy, transcendence as a dimension of Man is a horizon that recedes, even though the 
goal remains that of Marx and Engels: communism, ‘the overcoming of alienation and the creation of 
a social order where Man would be defined by what he was rather than by what he possessed’ 
(Robinson, 2004:n.p). Of course, Blondel and Teilhard de Chardin ostensibly believed in God, whereas 
the pre-project Garaudy still spoke of himself as an atheist. In that regard, we should note that one of 
the reasons why they both fell out of ecclesiastical favour was that they were indeed both suspected 
of immanentism.  
Garaudy was certainly also prepared to cherry-pick the central ideas of more mainstream 
theologians for his concept of transcendence, for example Karl Rahner — notwithstanding the 
 
162 Dans L’Action, sa thèse de 1893 condamnée pour « immanentisme » par l’Eglise catholique, Blondel donne 
une forme philosophiquement acceptable au besoin de transcendance du jeune Garaudy ; et il souligne la « 
parfaite complémentarité entre la raison et la foi. Entre une raison qui ne procède pas seulement de cause en 
cause, mais remonte de fin en fin. Et une foi qui ne pense pas la transcendance en termes d’extériorité, et 
n’oppose pas immanence et transcendance. »  L’étudiant épouse ainsi la réflexion de Blondel comme 
rationalisant l’ouverture sur la transcendance  
163 Chenu a insisté sur l'incarnation libératrice dans la construction du monde 
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development of Rahner’s theology advanced by Metz in Chapter Three. As a Marxist humanist, 
Garaudy had no embarrassment with Rahner’s starting point, ‘the individual subject and his 
experience of transcendence’ (O’Donovan, 1980:49). Thus open to Rahner’s theology, what especially 
interested Garaudy was the ‘transcendental’ Christology through which Rahner sought to 
demonstrate how individual human beings, even — in fact, especially — through ordinary choices and 
actions — Garaudy could perhaps have tarried longer over Rahner’s insistence on the mundane — and 
engagements with other individuals, transcend their existing constraints to glimpse God, who has 
enabled those choices. Human beings are therefore both transcendent and immanent, the two 
entwined within actual history.  
But at least, in drawing on Rahner’s view of transcendence, Garaudy attained at least a parallel 
to the Christian mystic position at the individual level. Everything is a manifestation of God, and ‘… the 
more intensive and mystical the experience becomes, and the more a supernatural elevation of 
transcendence exerts its influence… the clearer it must become that this emergence into awareness 
of transcendence and of the term to which it tends, discloses a transcendence qualitatively different 
from the merely concomitant and implicit form’ (Rahner, 1964:145–146 n34; Egan, 2013:55). To 
balance this and to go beyond Rahner’s tentative nod in the direction of political theology, Garaudy 
also drew on the perception of Metz’s more overt acknowledgment that transcendence itself has 
become an historical process, as ‘God is no longer merely ‘above’ history; he is himself “in” it, in that 
he is also constantly ‘in front of it’ as its free, uncontrolled future’ (Metz, 1968 [1969:22f]). Garaudy’s 
formulation during his Marxist humanist phase was still couched in terms of denial: ‘God’s 
transcendence implies his constant negation, since God is beyond all essence and all existence; he is 
constant creation’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:160]).  
Whilst both Metz and Rahner were important contributors to the theory of transcendence in 
the project, Garaudy was not prepared to adjudicate in any theological debate. Rather, he drew 
selectively on the theology of others, as for example pointing to Bultmann as acknowledging 
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transcendence ‘in its most exalted form, as a dramatic invasion of the divine into the history of man’ 
(Garaudy, 1965 [1967:34]). And by contrast to Rahner’s insistence on the mundane,  ‘So far as myth is 
concerned, Bultmann argues that is the form in which the transcendent makes its presence felt in the 
life of man; and this form depends on the way in which the world was envisaged at the time when the 
myth was born. Myth has no value in itself. It’s a direct way of making all things accessible, putting the 
world into a rational order and allowing the believer a window into transcendence’ 164 (Bustros, 
1976:245). 
Very well: there is nothing new here in theological terms, except perhaps the relentless 
implicit insistence that a theory of transcendence necessary for consistency between Christianity and 
Marxism need not take sides in any theological debate, although that need not dismay us.   
 
A spiritual transcendence in the project? 
 
Already at the time Garaudy wrote, the death of God movement and radical theology had 
begun to shift theological debate. The Garaudy of the prophetic phase was not alone in his perception 
of transcendence. Kee argued that transcendence was a secular term, representing the mind of self-
determination: the way of transcendence is the lifestyle of a person whose behaviour is determined 
by his own value judgments (Kee, 1971:228). So too Altizer insists on: 
‘The ongoing self-annihilation of God brought about by divine kenosis or sacrifice . . . The 
incarnation and crucifixion accordingly re-enact and illustrate ‘a transition within God by 
which the transcendent God became immanent’ (Peterson, 2014:6) 
 
164 Quant au mythe, Bultmann le considère comme la forme sous laquelle s’exprime l’irruption du transcendant 
dans la vie de l’homme; et cette forme dépend de la manière dont on concevait le monde à l’époque de la 
naissance du mythe. Le mythe n’a donc aucune valeur par lui–même. C’est un simple moyen de rendre accessible 
tout ce qui dépasse encore la mise en ordre rationnelle du monde et de permettre au croyant une ouverture 
vers la transcendance 
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and ‘a sense in which the God–above–us had to die in order to become the God–with–us’ (Sproul, 
1985:19). Likewise too, for both Bonhoeffer and Moltmann, the boundary between transcendence 
and immanence runs through the existence of Man (Hegedüs, 1991:103). This is explained by the 
argument that ‘Modern Man’ no longer finds transcendence in the outermost, all-encompassing 
periphery of the cosmos, but in himself, for he has made himself the centre of the world. Moltmann 
then deepens the problem of God to include the problem of transcendence in modern society. The 
feeling that God is dead is understandable if a trusted concept of God is lost. (Moltmann, 1969). 
Likewise, Berger suggested that certain reflections could become a legitimate basis, ‘signals of 
transcendence’, for theological projections about transcendence (Berger, 1969:94–95).  
So, within the project, Garaudy now seeks to draw the two ends of the chain much closer 
together, repeating the thought of his youth that:  
‘. . .  If it was true that the working class is only the suffering class, perhaps Christianity 
corresponded to its expectations, because it knew how to express and transfigure suffering 
by giving it a meaning that magnifies it beyond nature, in a “supernatural” way’165 (Garaudy, 
1975:94).  
Within the project he now writes of the content of transcendence in very similar terms to that of his 
Marxist humanist phase, but no longer in terms reluctant to admit of the existence of God. Rather, 
God becomes central to the Marxist project precisely because of transcendence: 
‘There is thus, in this creative rupture, the outline of a conception of transcendence which is 
no longer alienation or dualism, radically opposing the body and the mind, a terrestrial world 
and a celestial world, Man and a God external to him as an object would be, but a 
transcendence which is a break with a mechanical determinism, which is choice between the 
possible, the anticipation of the future by a project which is not only a reflection of the already 
existing world or simply negation of this world, but going beyond the present order. An act to 
be created, not given. This transcendence, even if it is only the transcendence of Man in 
relation to nature and nature and his own history, creation in act of a human nature, is the 
necessary postulate of any revolutionary action, because without it Man would indeed be "a 
puppet produced by structures". It marks the point of possible insertion, in Marxism, of an 
authentic transcendence '166 (Garaudy, 1977a:27).  
 
165 S’il était vrai que la classe ouvrière est seulement la classe qui souffre, peut–être le christianisme 
correspondait–il à son attente, car il a su exprimer et transfigurer la souffrance en lui donnant une signification 
qui la magnifie au-delà de toute nature, de façon « surnaturelle » 
166 ‘Il y a donc là, dans cette rupture créatrice, l’ébauche d’une conception de la transcendance qui n’est plus 
aliénation ni dualisme opposant radicalement le corps et l’esprit, un monde terrestre et un monde celeste, 
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Which words could easily draw comparison with those of Sartre’s words: ‘human reality is a perpetual 
surpassing towards a self-coincidence that is never given’ (Sartre, 1943:46; Gillespie, 2013:78), except 
that for Garaudy, ‘going beyond’ could never mean, or be explained, other than in social action, and 
ultimately in political change. 
The persistence and relative stability of the idea for Garaudy, and its inextricable connection 
with individual human freedom is, in fact, quite notable. In one of the key texts of the project he 
writes: 
‘Transcendence is, by the same token, that dimension of history when we realise that it is not 
linear, one-dimensional, but on the contrary that it is born of a multiplicity of possibilities, so 
that, when returning to the past, the single possibility that we record as having triumphed 
need necessarily have done so. On the other hand, history in the process of being made, and 
the future that will come from it, are not scenarios already written outside us and beyond us, 
and which will leave us to play only pre-determined roles, but a continued creation, a choice, 
for which we are fully responsible, among many possibilities’167 (Garaudy, 1976:182) 
So as one commentator summarised Garaudy’s argument:  
‘The postulate of transcendence is biblical and has become powerfully mobilizing through calls 
to realize the Kingdom of God on earth. The various Kingdom projects bear the imprint of the 
time in which they were conceived, but they are not a simple reflection of the existing world, 
each time they propose a new social order. From Joachim de Flore to current political 
theologies there is one constant: it is to conceive of the Kingdom of God not as another world, 
but as a different world. Thus the postulate of transcendence, which is, like hope, an aspect 
of faith, is at the origin of all defatalisation of history’168 (Winling, 1981:270). 
 
l’homme et un Dieu extérieur à lui comme le serait un objet, mais une transcendance qui est rupture avec un 
déterminisme mécanique, qui est choix entre les possible, anticipation du futur par un projet qui n’est pas 
seulement reflet du monde déjà existant ou simple négation de ce monde, mais dépassement de l’ordre présent. 
Acte créateur et non être donné. Cette transcendance, même si elle n’est encore que transcendance de l’homme 
par rapport à la nature et à la nature et à sa propre histoire, création en acte d’une nature humaine, est le 
postulat nécessaire de toute action révolutionnaire, car sans elle l’homme serait en effet « une marionnette 
mise en scène par les structures ». Elle marque le point d’insertion possible, dans le marxisme, d’une 
authentique transcendance   
167 La transcendance est, par là même, cette dimension qu’à l’histoire lorsque nous prenons conscience qu’elle 
n’est pas linéaire, undimensionelle, mais au contraire qu’elle est née d’une multiplicité de possible et qu’elle ne 
nous apparait nécessaire que lorsque, nous retournant vers la passé, nous enregistrons seulement qu’un seul 
possible a triomphé. Par contre l’histoire en train de se faire, et l’avenir qui va naitre d’elle, ne sont pas des 
scénarios déjà écrits en dehors de nous et sans nous, et qui ne nous laissèrent qu’à jouer des rôles préfabriqués, 
mais une création continue, un choix, dont nous sommes pleinement responsables, entre plusieurs possibles 
168 Le postulat de la transcendance est biblique et est devenu puissamment mobilisateur à travers les appels à 
réaliser le Royaume de Dieu sur terre. Les différents projets de Royaume portent l'empreinte de l'époque à 
laquelle ils ont été conçus, mais ils ne sont pas simple reflet du monde existant, ils proposent chaque fois un 
ordre social inédit. De Joachim de Flore aux actuelles théologies politiques court une constante : c'est de 
concevoir le Royaume de Dieu non pas comme un autre monde, mais comme un monde autre. Ainsi le postulat 
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But there is even more: at least before the prophetic period, Garaudy had already recognised that  
‘God’s transcendence implies his constant negation, since God is beyond all essence and all existence; 
he is constant creation’169 (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:160]). Now, however, this irruption of the 
supernatural becomes in Garaudy’s project not a simple negation, but a breaking power. 
Transcendence is that dimension of Man which releases what has been hitherto concealed: 
‘It is the opposite of the irrational; it is the critical moment of reason, the permanent 
questioning of the reason already made in the name of a reason being made and of which it 
is the ferment’170 (Garaudy, 1974b: n.p.). 
And in ontological terms, ‘Transcendence is the interior conflict of immanence. It belongs, not to the 
order of being, but of doing’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:90]).  
There is still no room in the project for an Otherworldly God, no acceptance that ‘The wholly 
otherness of transcendence can transform and make transparent the whole immanent world from 
darkness to light’ (Hegedüs, 1991:43), nor agreement with a literal interpretation of Jesus’ injunction 
to ‘Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of 
itself’ (Matthew 6:24). Rather, it must still be the case that 'Transcendence, this presence of the future 
in man, this prophetic dimension of life, is a human dimension, that which inspires it the strength to 
relativise, to desacralise existing orders and established powers'171 (Garaudy, 1976:185). Otherwise 
we would be stuck with what Moltmann called an alienated transcendence (Moltmann, 1969:183). 
This is a hopeful theology as much as a theology of hope, in the end. We are asked to believe that we 
have lost our way, in a world threatened for its very existence, and lost faith in an eternal God. We 
 
de la transcendance, qui est, comme l'espérance, un aspect de la foi, est à l'origine de toute défatalisation de 
l'histoire 
169 La transcendance, cette présence de l’avenir dans l’homme, cette dimension prophétique de la vie, est une 
dimension humaine, celle qui lui inspire la force de relativiser, de désacraliser les ordres existants et les pouvoirs 
établis 
170 elle est beaucoup plus le moment critique de la raison, la mise en cause permanente de la raison déjà faite, 
au nom d'une raison en train de se faire et dont elle est le ferment 
171 La transcendance, cette présence de l’avenir dans l’homme, cette dimension prophétique de la vie, est une 




want to experience eternity in the transitory by means of the false absolutes of power, wealth, delight, 
ecstasy and so on, but we are denied (Hegedüs, 1991:111). Garaudy, at least, can tell us why. 
Not all will agree with the Marxist explanation. Tillich for example says that what is both most 
similar and most different between Marxism and Christianity is the view of history: prophecy, and 
differing views of transcendence, of which the last is ‘the most fundamental’ (Janz, 1998:25).  
‘There is a kind of transcendence in Marxism, i.e., the limits of the present possibilities of 
human nature are transcended by the expectation of a coming stage of justice. A kind of 
miracle in the transition from the present to the future stage of mankind is presupposed, at 
least implicitly. And it is obvious that Marxism draws a great deal of its psychological power 
from this element of transcendence and faith. But this transcendence is not the absolute 
transcendence of Christianity. It remains in time and space, in history and politics. It is 
dependent on immanent processes. It transcends the present time, but not time as such. It 
does not know eternity breaking into time, shaking, turning, and transforming the temporal. 
Marxism never reaches this transcendence’ (Tillich, 1941: 256).   
 
Garaudy does not concur: 
‘For what characterizes this Christian revolutionary tradition from Joachim of Fiore to John 
Huss, from Thomas Münzer to the theologies of hope and political theologies of our own day, 
is that the Kingdom of God is not conceived as another world in space and time, but as a 
different world, a changed world, a world changed by our own efforts. The Kingdom of God is 
not a promise we have passively to wait to be fulfilled but basically a task to be accomplished’ 
(Garaudy, 1973b:66-67).  
Norris equally, in developing his critique of Garaudy the Marxist, focuses on transcendence as the key 
to dialogue between Marxists and Christians. Marxists, he says, have developed a radically temporal, 
dynamic, and humanistic concept of transcendence as inherent futurity. Specifically referring to 
Garaudy (1976), Masset argues that: ‘This project … rests on a conception of man, according to which 
what is possible is already part of reality; the possible is already reality; Man is what goes beyond, 
transcendence, a break with what is given and a projection into the future. Transcendence is here’ 172 
(Masset, 1977:322), that ‘dimension of Man which is fully aware that he has no other essence that his 
future, and that his life will always be incomplete173 (Garaudy, 1976:182). Both appreciate that 
 
172 Ce projet . . . repose sur une conception de l'homme, selon laquelle le possible chez l'homme fait partie du 
réel, le possible est déjà du réel ; l'homme est dépassement et transcendance, rupture avec le donné et 
projection dans l'avenir. La transcendance est ici 
173 « cette dimension de l'homme prenant conscience qu'il n'a pas d'autre essence que son avenir et qu'il vit 
d'être inachevé » 
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Garaudy's concept of transcendence is a human attribute, grounded in individual experience of 
discontinuity, exigency, and a new future. Theologians too frequently conceive of God's being as the 
power and the mystery of the future, but conceptualise transcendence as a divine attribute, the 
limiting concept of an absolute future. For the theologian the future is a reality which comes toward 
us and can never be reduced to the limited, projected futures of men. It can therefore be called ‘God’ 
(Dean, 1976:186). From this distinction, Norris concludes that Garaudy's account of transcendence 
rests on an immanent and reductionist concept of the future which is ontologically and normatively 
empty (Norris, 1974:55). 
For Norris it further follows that Garaudy must view creativity and history as an endless 
dialectical process, in which the makeability of history becomes itself the goal of the making of history. 
But for Norris, criticising Garaudy, God's being, as the power of the Absolute Future, is not 
incompatible with human autonomy; in fact, it is that from which Man derives his real freedom and 
responsibility. Despite its value as a source of historical change and social reform, his conclusion is 
that Garaudy's transcendence does not provide that view of the absolute by which to judge our plans 
and projects. Finally, unlike the theologian, Garaudy is  unable to affirm ‘the absolute value of each 
individual over against all social collectivities ’ (Dean, 1976:186). This view finds an echo is much more 
recent criticism of Garaudy’s esoteric Christian position:  ‘As a Communist, and later as a radical 
Christian, Garaudy believed in transcendence in the sense of surpassing or rising above the present 
human situation, but his Marxist background made it very difficult for him to countenance a 
transcendent Deity above and independent of the universe’ (Robinson, 2004, n.p.).  
With his project to establish mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity, Garaudy 
aimed at papering over this chasm, and so predictably, he does not agree with Norris. ‘It is not utopian, 
it is sufficient to consider that transcendence, that is, a permanent rupture in Man regarding his 
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biological or social, psychological or cultural past, is the fundamental teaching of Christianity’174 
(Garaudy, 1977b:17). For the Garaudy of the project, it was in Christianity where the problem of 
transcendence was raised, and where it is still raised: ‘the transcendence at the middle, the this -
worldly transcendence appears as the weakness of God in Jesus among the strengths of men’ 
(Hegedüs, 1991:26). In recognising the role that Christianity — and most importantly the example of 
Christ himself — now plays within the project in generating the basis for transcendence, Pinto refers 
to three ‘postulates’ of the rupture: transcendence, prophecy and hope. This final postulate Garaudy 
now identifies175 with the essence of Christ (Da Costa Pinto, 1982:738), above all the experience of 
overcoming limits, and the possibility of creating, at every moment, something new and 
unforeseeable. God is the creative force at the heart of everything. ‘God exists wherever something 
new is coming to life, in artistic creation, scientific discovery, love or revolution. God is the 
contradiction of entropy’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:28]). 
The resurrection of Christ inaugurates a new existence which is a rupture and surpassing of 
individualism with the conviction of the good news that ‘everything is possible with man, the possible 
is part of the real’. The resurrection promises a new quality and intensity of life founded on the 
frontiers of our ‘I’ and opens us to the other in the common project of new relationships with nature, 
with our fellow human beings and with the divine. ‘But what is it for Garaudy that in Man overflows 
to man? What is too great in Man to stop himself? Garaudy designates it with a word that he 
frequently uses in his essay: "the transcendence", "the transcendent". And in Garaudy's opinion, it is 
through others that one becomes aware of this “transcendence”'176 (Fernández, 1975:n.p). This is a 
familiar existential theme from Sartre (1943:308) and the death of God movement (Altizer, 1980:50, 
 
174 No es dominio de la utopia, basta considerar que la trascendencia, la posibilidad permanente de ruptura en 
el hombre respecto a su pasado biológico o social, psicológico o cultural, es la enseñanza fundamental del 
cristianismo 
175 identifica 
176 Pero, ¿qué es para Garaudy lo que en el hombree desborda al hombre? ¿aquello que en el hombre es 
demasiado grande paran bastarse a sí mismo? G. lo designa con una palabra que recurre con frecuencia en su 




2006). But Garaudy’s transcendence sides with the liberation theologians (Verhoef, 2017:e4), and 
post-colonial theorists (Rivera, 2007:170) in being dynamic and socially transformatory, at least in 
intent, as opposed to Sartre’s use of self-knowledge through others as an epistemological device or 
Bloch’s reliance on the dialectic (Bloch, 1959:271; Zimmerman, 1970:102). Whilst the effects of this 
transcendence may be the same as for the Marxist humanist, its source is now different.  
The concept of transcendence in the project was still, as was recognised in contemporary 
comment (e.g. Ries, 1974) and reiterated in contemporary analysis (Pinto, 2017:456) very far from 
traditional Catholic or Reformation thought. Neither the ineffability of God, His unnamability, holiness, 
or a Trinitarian ontology, play any part in Garaudy, who would surely have been suspicious of such 
suggestions as ‘the theoretical philosophy of finite Man cannot know the infinite God’ (Hegedüs, 
1991:7), seeing in them the legacy of a religion and a church from which he was seeking to distance 
any Marxist humanist concept. Rather, Garaudy’s transcendence still ‘is of a finite nature as with 
Bishop J. A. T. Robinson. It is a transcendence limited to this historical world: nature outgrowing itself 
into culture. Transcendence bears within it the concept of alienation’ (Hughes, 1970:61). Finite, yes, 
but metaphysical in its expression: Garaudy’s view was that the ‘prophetic spirit’ was liberating as it 
‘relativises all values, forbidding us to take as finished, in the sense of completed, what is finite, that 
is, created to meet particular needs, and is thus insufficient in relation to the infinite’ (Garaudy, 1972 
[1976:122]). 
 
Further questions and objections 
 
Garaudy’s project rested on the existence of a powerful transcendence at the individual level 
that could, and did, manifest itself socially, concurrently across not only politics but in works of art, 
literature, science and in love. In so doing, however, Garaudy’s transcendence can therefore be placed 
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along with others from Hegel to Žižek who have argued that transcendence is necessary for the 
development of human freedom.  
A criticial review of Norris, for example, faults him for assuming that it is a fault that the 
Marxist notion of transcendence is immanent in the historical process and, being historically open, 
also empty. To this can be opposed either a Marxist determinism, with which Garaudy must break 
(Vree, 1974:50), or a Christian theory in which transcendence is an attribute not of Man but of God. 
In either case, God or history takes on the capacity of the Absolute Future, the engine of history who 
has, or at least eventually will, lead Man to Himself. From Garaudy’s standpoint within the project, 
neither is true — both deny freedom to Man, the former confirming Christian suspicion of Marxism as 
a thief of human freedom and the latter, confirming Marx's contention about Christians and theism. 
If Vree’s view of Marxism devalues human freedom in the name of the dialectic, Norris in effect 
negates human freedom to elevate the glory of God (Schuller, 1976). Transcendence, in this view, is 
the enemy of freedom, whether Marxist, Christian or otherwise. If such a criticism were to be 
extended to the project, a critic could argue Garaudy adopted the worst of both worlds. As one 
reviewer comes a whisker away from discerning (Carro, 1977:199), transcendence becomes the 
dialectical materialism of the project, albeit that for the project, historical materialism precedes the 
dialectic.   
This criticism might be thought ill-judged, or at least too harsh. But it is not alone. A second 
criticism has been that theologians, with whom we can perhaps associate Garaudy in this respect, 
tend to locate the transcendent in brief moments of experiences (with the rest of our lives doomed 
as being less important) (Verhoef, 2017:e14). Rahner may have been an exception to this rule — 
although his stress is epistemological, on transcendental revelation (1976 [1978:149]). So too Jürgen 
Habermas, who insisted on the transcendental significance of virtually universal linguistic structures 
of human communication (Habermas, 1987:7). A potentially elitist extension of blindness to these 
alternatives is therefore surely the possibility that transcendence, like intelligence or wealth, is 
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unevenly distributed, especially under capitalism. Perhaps not all people develop equal capacity to 
experience transcendence? One is reminded of the suggestion that ‘For the Protestant, access to 
immanent transcendence was freed from the necessary mediation of a hierarchy of clerics but was 
still restricted to the chosen few within the laity. The damned ones could only be spectators of 
transcendence’ (Ferrara, 2015:112). If so, Garaudy’s project introduces a spiritual dimension of human 
inequality to Marxism, whilst arguing for exactly the reverse.  
Even if Garaudy can extricate himself from this dire predicament by convincing us of a 
specifically Marxist view of alienation, how is this reservoir of transcendence he has identified to be 
perceived, let alone organised or used? Along with others, Garaudy runs the risk of creating a ‘too 
distant’ transcendence, one that has been criticised as becoming unknowable, unreachable and 
eventually irrelevant to us (Verhoef, 2017:e4). An important example of this problem is that whilst 
transcendence, and belief in the Resurrection, play a decisive role in the project in explaining how the 
future may come about, they are notably absent from any analysis by Garaudy of how that future 
might itself look. It might seem that the three postulates — hope, transcendence and prophecy — are 
only poorly aligned themselves within the project of mutual dependence between Marxism and 
Christianity. For as soon as Garaudy turns to conceptions of the future, it is to concepts of freedom, 
liberty and self-management found in Rousseau, and to Marx that he refers, not Jesus (Garaudy, 1972 
[1976]). And in fact, as noted above in Chapter Three, it is not even to them that Garaudy looked, 
rather to alternative futurists such as Chauvey (1970) who as an economist and political theorist makes 
no mention of, nor seem to require, any concept of transcendence. So how is this transcendence, so 
important to Garaudy in the political struggle of the moment, to be perceived, let alone organised or 
used?  
At a practical level, if Garaudy believed that his conception of transcendence would encourage 
further agreement between Marxists and Christians, he was certainly to be disappointed. None of his 
arguments before the project and certainly any after it either convinced contemporary Marxist critics, 
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who had parted ways with him over Marxist humanism and were therefore quite unlikely to consider 
transcendence as anything other than metaphysics. For his principal critic Sève, therefore, 
transcendence is a redundant concept, swept up in the wider definition of what men actually are. 
Worse, ‘When Garaudy talks of transcendence, Sève replies that the concept is ‘at the very least 
tainted with speculative equivocation’ (Geerlandt, 1978:55), which in Marxist terms, is criticism 
indeed. ‘Its use is rightly a heresy in the sense of the orthodox Marxists, and Lucien Sève did not fail 
to point out mysticism in the use of this concept’ (Didier Gauvin, personal communication, 29 
November 2018). As if, of course, an accusation of mysticism would in some sense be fatal — in their 
eyes, at least — if proved correct. Or if not fatal, they should have perhaps to accept that Garaudy was 
using transcendence as an essentially ideological concept in the Marxist sense, part of a Marxist 
humanist debate in which his work, like that of Sève and Althusser, need not be taken seriously at the 
level of theory. Some of Garaudy’s critics have asked whether he even meant the same thing over 
time. Although recognising its importance during Garaudy’s Marxist–Christian period, Gauvin argued 
that transcendence in Roger Garaudy is an erratic notion. According to Gauvin: ‘The concept of 
"transcendence" has evolved a lot in Roger Garaudy. Everything happens as if it made this term work 
as one of those portmanteau words that made Georges Cogniot (1965) say that it is a ‘word game’’ 
(Gauvin, 2018:398). These are however two different points: I argue that transcendence did mean 
something more specific, so long as he remained a Marxist, whether avowedly Christian or not. As I 
will argue in Chapter Six, Gauvin here must borrow from Garaudy’s own future to make his case 
against consistency. As to word games, Marxist critics of Garaudy would also have to accept awkward 
allies: for a logical positivist of the stripe of A.J. Ayer (1936), it would also perhaps not even be clear 
that Garaudy was saying anything meaningful at all, any more than was Teilhard de Chardin (Medawar, 
1961:99), over whose work Garaudy enthused, being responsible for bringing them to the attention 
of PCF comrades (O’Collins, 1968:269).  
Finally, even if we support Garaudy against dogmatists of a Marxist, positivist or religious 
inclination, and reject Gauvin’s accusation of shifting sands, the suspicion remains, as Norris (1974) 
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argued, that Garaudy’s transcendence is there to be exploited whenever the need arises, an omnibus 
concept designed, it would seem, to keep atheism at bay. Four decades on, even his key apologist 
concedes that transcendence, like the principle of levels of analysis, is forced by Garaudy to do too 
much work: ‘each time, we find, as a solution to the deviations or insufficiencies of the present 
civilisation (or of its socialist contestation) the theme of transcendence as salvation — of a new 
(spiritual) alliance with the divine’ (Gauvin, 2018:397). With what divine, we may also therefore 
legitimately ask? Did Garaudy in effect simply abolish the notion of transcendence as a divine 
attribute, retaining the word 'God' as a convenient label for what he perceived, in the last analysis, to 
be a purely human phenomenon? By comparison, more recent Afro-American Christian advocacy, for 
example, points to the Holy Spirit as the force behind human transcendence (Hinson, 1999), but 
Garaudy never assigns the Holy Spirit this role. Conversely, in his Christological focus Garaudy could 
be accused of not entirely escaping the shadow of Rahner, even of the kind of dismissive Christian 
exceptionalism that has surfaced in subsequent decades, for example amongst African Christians (e.g. 
Maghezi & Maghezi, 2016), were it not for the evidence of the ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’ within the 
project, which was specifically aimed at rejecting any kind of Christian exceptionalism. It is evidently 
a narrow path to tread successfully, and there must be at least a suggestion that Garaudy does not 
wholly succeed in keeping to it, however much he attempted it within the project. 
Further, not only does Garaudy arguably want the concept to do too much, but he wants to 
appropriate it. Sweeping up freedom, choice and responsibility, it must involve a rupture with existing 
political structures, an openness to a dialogue of civilisations, it must involve a sacrifice of individuality 
as traditionally conceived in the West (Garaudy, 1976:181). And above all, it is Marxism and 
Christianity themselves that must eventually be transcended. Evidence for this can be found in the 
fact that changing political direction after his departure from the PCF did not require Garaudy to 
dispense with transcendence: rather, it became his invisible political ally. What was missing — and 
what makes Garaudy’s transcendence an elusive concept — was analysis of what happens when 
spiritual transcendence meets political reality. So nowhere does Garaudy recognise, let alone 
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confront, the possibility that others may have quite different conceptions of transcendence. These 
might range from a liberal contention that two pre-eminent examples of ‘non–individual immanent 
transcendence are the figure of the Rousseauian legislator and the Rawlsian understanding of the 
normativity of justice as fairness’ (Ferrara, 2015:114), where creative intervention in law and code 
could mean ‘a Rawlsian micro-reform’ (Hall, 2012:370) to more malign concepts, especially those tied 
up with national or even racial identity. Nor does he ever admit any connection between 
transcendence and the failure of the Marxist–Leninist project, which has been summarised as 
‘transcendence is a relic of former mistakes’ (Verhoef, 2017:e5). This omission was eventually to end 
in tragic consequences, as Chapter Six will show.  
More immediately, as the failure of his political project became evident, his optimistic idea of 
transcendence inevitably threatened to follow it into eclipse. The role of transcendence in the project 
is liberation. So, if the project fails to deliver liberation, what else can be at fault but transcendence? 
A parallel can be seen in the role of hope for Moltmann, who has been criticised for presenting ‘God’s 
Kingdom mainly as a transcendent reality so that it becomes almost a Platonic ideal standing in 
contrast to earthly existence’ (Fiorenza, 2000). Moltmann’s ‘disappointment at the end of ‘socialism 
with a human face’ (Moltman, 1974 [2015:xviii]) led to a retreat to the Cross: Garaudy’s response to 
this continued disappointment is examined in the subsequent Chapter.  
 
Transcendence in the project 
 
It is now possible to draw the threads of this analysis together. Whilst much philosophically of 
the concept remains from the Marxist humanist conception — goals, in particular, psychology and the 
underlying philosophy of action — what really changed for Garaudy with the advent of the project is 
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therefore not what transcendence is, but its cause and effect. Four aspects of transcendence in 
particular change.  
First, the cause of transcendence. No longer satisfied in an entirely humanist explanation, 
Garaudy now argues that transcendence cannot be extracted, or even deduced, from man’s biological 
heritage, sociological conditioning, history or even economics. It must come from God; only from God 
can Man acquire a transcendence which can be ‘a break with regard to determinism and rationality as 
they are defined at this or that moment in history177’ (Garaudy, 1974b: n.p.). He now does believe that 
his thirst proves the existence of the spring. The concept has retained its underlying ontological 
continuity — the formulation that ‘transcendence is the alienated expression of the leap beyond 
nature effected in culture’ (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:134]), but the Garaudy of the project is no longer 
confident that a purely materialist explanation can suffice for its existence. On the contrary, he now 
identifies the cause of transcendence as the sacred, whereas for a Marxist humanist it must lie 
somewhere in culture and the personality, to which varying degrees of independence from the 
economics of class and oppression may be ascribed. This was a point that had been made against him 
before the project: Paul Lehmann confronted Garaudy’s point and countered, not by quibbling over 
politics but by insisting that ‘”Transcendence” refers to the possibility and the power of initiative and 
creation, not as the specific attribute of man, but as the specific gift to man’ (Lehmann, 1967:221). As 
a Marxist humanist, Garaudy was quite prepared to agree that for Christians transcendence was ‘the 
effort to surpass all human limits with the help of God’, according to an expression of Carson 
Blake…Transcendence becomes therefore a dimension of each of our creative acts’ 178 (Garaudy, 1968g 
[2013: n.p]).  
The difference between this and transcendence within the project, however, is that Garaudy 
now agrees that transcendence is divine. Yet as Bustros notes, Garaudy seeks to bridge any Christian 
 
177 La transcendance est ainsi rupture à l'égard des déterminismes et des rationalités telles qu'elles sont définies 
en tel ou tel moment de l'histoire 
178  « l’effort pour transcender toutes les limites humaines avec l’aide de Dieu », selon une expression de Carson 
Blake…La transcendance déviant alors une dimension de chacun de nos actes créateurs 
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assertion of opposition between the transcendence of God and that of Man, and therefore any 
concept of transcendence as a gift of God, whether as an aspect of grace or imparted to human nature 
by God, by combining the two: 
‘The more that I work, the more God is the Creator. There is no God outside me. God has 
passed entirely into Man: he reveals himself and continues his creation in him, through him179 
(Garaudy, 1975:236).  
The conclusion is comprehensive: ‘Garaudy’s stress on the problem of subjectivity in the thought of 
the founders of Marxism leads him to a conception of Man based essentially on transcendence and 
artistic creation’180 (Bustros, 1976:45), albeit that this conception of creation is broad; it can and 
should incorporate the activities of our daily life (Garaudy, 1975:54). In his prophetic period, it is 
expressed thus:  
‘We have never ceased to show how urgent it was to bring out, at every level, projects 
transcending the immediate desire, the established order or the established norm. We must 
clearly define what we mean by transcendence, not just as an attribute of God, but as the 
essential dimension of man'181 (Garaudy, 1976:179). 
Which he then proceeds to do: 
‘We mean by transcendence the way in which man, in each of his creative acts (be it scientific 
invention, or technique, artistic creation, love, revolution or sacrifice) transforms his lived 
experience into something above and beyond the historical conditions that have engendered 
it; that his future cannot be deduced from just his biological heritage, his sociological 
conditioning, his culture, or his training. Transcendence is thus a rupture with determinism 
and rationality, defined at this or that moment of history, for reason is never anything but a 
provisional account of the conquests of rationality’182 (Garaudy, 1976:179).  
And again that: 
 
179 Plus je travaille, plus Dieu est créateur. Il n’y a pas d’extériorité de Dieu. Dieu est passé tout entier dans 
l’homme; It se révèle et continue sa création en lui, par lui 
180 La mise en valeur par Garaudy du problème de la subjectivité dans la pensée des fondateurs du marxisme 
l’amène á une conception de l’homme basée essentiellement sur la transcendance et la création artistique 
181 Nous n’avons cessé…de montrer combine était pressante l’exigence de faire émerger, à tous les niveaux, des 
projets transcendant le désir immédiat, l’ordre institué ou la norme établie. Nous devons définir clairement ce 
que nous entendons par transcendance, non pas seulement comme attribut de Dieu, mais comme dimension 
essentielle de l’homme 
182 Nous appelons transcendance le dépassement par lequel l’homme, en chacun des actes créateurs (qu’il 
s’agisse d’invention scientifique, ou technique, de création artistique, d’amour, de révolution ou de sacrifice) 
fait l’expérience des conditions historiques qui l’ont engendré; que son avenir ne se déduit pas seulement de 
son héritage biologique, de ses conditionnements sociologiques, de sa culture, de sa formation. La 
transcendance est ainsi rupture à l’égard du déterminisme et des rationalités tels qu’ils sont définis en tel ou tel 
moment de l’histoire, car la raison n’est jamais qu’un bilan provisoire des conquêtes de la rationalité 
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‘We call transcendence the permanent possibility of breaking with the established order and 
the already existing models of society. That is to say, the way in which, instead of seeking the 
ends of a society within the system, as in our societies of growth for growth, to resign oneself 
to the blind proliferation, without finality human, science, technology, economics and 
consumption, we can seek the ends of society outside the system; in a new way of living our 
relationships with nature, with other men, with the future, and choosing a new model of 
civilisation’183 (Garaudy, 1976:180). 
 
And hence: 
‘We will call transcendence this dimension of Man where he becomes aware that he has no 
other essence than his future and that he lives to be unfinished. This future, at the same time 
it welcomes it as an unforeseeable gift — some will say "a grace" — and at the same time it 
seeks and prepares it as a work to be done, as in the poetic act, in the creative act’184 (Garaudy, 
1976:183).  
So further: 
‘This same faith in “transcendence”, that is to say in the certainty, turning into a principle of 
action, that no authority can impose itself as the centre and measure of everything, is 
protection at the same time against any external tyranny and against any abandonment of my 
individual drives. 
Transcendence is the opposite of “sufficiency”, for individuals as well as for institutions. This 
certainty is the foundation of complete freedom; there is a power, which is in us without being 
ours, to let ourselves be enslaved by no partial desire, to make ourselves available for any 
enterprise beyond our own interests. It makes us fully responsible for our personal freedom 
as well as our common history.  
Freedom is not an “attribute of the individual", isolated from all others, competitors and rivals, 
in the jungle of interests and the race for growth; it is based on the presence in each of this 
transcendent power’185 (Garaudy, 1979: 31).  
 
183 Nous appelons transcendance la possibilité permanente de rupture avec l’ordre établi et les modèles déjà 
existants de société. C’est-à-dire l’acte par lequel, au lieu de chercher les fins d’une société à l’intérieur du 
système, comme dans nos sociétés de croissance pour la croissance, de se résigner à la prolifération aveugle, 
sans finalité humaine, des sciences, des techniques, de l’économie et de la consommation, nous pouvons 
chercher les fins de la société au dehors du système; dans une manière nouvelle de vivre nos rapports avec la 
nature, avec les autres hommes, avec l’avenir, et de choisir un nouveau modèle de civilisation. Il ne s’agit pas 
d’une simple négation, mais d’un pouvoir de rupture. La transcendance est cette dimension de l’homme qui fait 
émerger en lui l’homme cache. Elle est le contraire de l’irrationnel; elle est le moment critique de la raison, la 
mise en cause permanente de la raison déjà faite au nom d’une raison en train de se faire et dont elle est le 
ferment 
184 Nous appellerons transcendance cette dimension de l’homme prenant conscience qu’il n’a pas d’autre 
essence que son avenir et qu’l vit d’être inachevé. Cet avenir, à la fois il l’accueille comme un imprévisible don 
– certains diront   « une grâce »  — et en même temps il le recherche et le prepare comme une œuvre à 
accomplir, comme dans l’acte poétique, dans l’acte créateur 
185 Cette même foi dans la  « transcendance », c’est–à–dire dans la certitude, devenant principe d’action, 
qu’aucune autorité ne peut s’imposer comme centre et mesure de toute chose, est protection à la fois contre 




The best example of such transcendence is to be found in great art186, says Garaudy (1979:234): the 
opposite of an individualistic, Renaissance version of artistic endeavour, a mere reflection of existing 
reality aimed at the market, but rather, a project, exploration of and experimentation with possible 
futures, which draws in not spectators, still less consumers, but co-creators of a prophetic future. 
For the Garaudy of the prophetic period, transcendence is therefore impossible without the 
opening of Man to God: ‘This book is written only to trace the birth of God in Man and Man in God’ 
(Garaudy, 1979:65). ‘Eschatology does not consist in saying: this is where we will be led to, but in 
saying: tomorrow can be different, that is to say, everything cannot be reduced to that which exists 
today. This biblical postulate of transcendence is the first postulate of all revolutionary action’ 
(Garaudy, 1975:235–6). Not that Garaudy ever tries to use transcendence as proof of the existence of 
God. Transcendence plays a role in battles within Marxism, not over faith.  
Second, therefore, faith in transcendence. Garaudy argues that: ’To express faith in the 
language of our time means to help people to realise that creation is not finished. That the act of God 
is to create. That God is act, the act of love, the act of liberation’ (Garaudy, 1976a [1980:9]). What 
Garaudy offers here, it is alleged, is a confession of faith disguised as philosophical analysis (Mayrl, 
1978:86). Genuine Christianity, we are told, is similar to authentic Marxism in that it adheres to a 
dialectic of possibility. It rejects dogmatic and positivistic approaches to reality — the tendency to 
sanctify and reify what is and thereby to overlook what could be. ‘For a Marxist, transcendence is 
never absolute. It means passing from one order to another’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:90]).  
 
La transcendance, c’est le contraire de la  « suffisance », pour les individus comme pour les institutions. Cette 
certitude est le fondement de toute liberté plénière: il existe un pouvoir, qui est en nous sans être à nous, de ne 
nous laisser asservir par aucun désir partiel, de nous rendre disponible pour n’importe quelle entreprise 
dépassement nos intérêts propres. Il nous rend pleinement responsable de notre liberté personnelle comme de 
notre commune histoire. La liberté n’est pas un « attribut de l’individu », isolé de tous les autres, concurrents 
et rivaux, dans la jungle des intérêts et de la course à la croissance; elle est fondée sur la présence en chacun de 
ce pouvoir transcendant 
186 Le grand art nous offre le modèle le plus évident de cette transcendance 
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In Christ, Garaudy argued, ‘the God of distant transcendence entered into the daily history of 
men’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:91]). Garaudy’s Christ is ‘a breaker of idols and chains, a by-passer of 
boundaries, one who destroyed taboos and placed himself beyond justice, good and evil in the name 
of a love that transcended all historical limits’ (Garaudy, 1972 [1976:91]). And Marxis m must 
incorporate this Christian insight, the divine element in man, for it to succeed: ‘The revolutionary 
attitude, in politics as well as in art, needs transcendence even more than realism’ (Garaudy, 1972 
[1976:91]).  
Thus, the exhortations of Hebrew Prophets to do away with false idols were really struggles 
against reification; the resurrection of Christ was an expression of dialectical transcendence. 
Moltmann is therefore quoted with approval, ‘This faith can be defined as the moment of rupture, the 
experience of rupture, of transcendence’ (Garaudy, 1977:15). Ries reported that at a colloquium held 
at Mons in May 1974, Garaudy argued that to replace even a law of correspondence, let alone of 
determinism, a genuinely revolutionary consciousness supported by a postulate of transcendence 
emerges from the future — a prophetic tradition which insists that the current order is not immutable. 
‘Many times, this challenge is based on religious models ’ (Ries, 1974:515). In seeking consistency 
between Christianity and Marxism, Christian faith has for Garaudy tentatively replaced a Leninist faith 
in the Party. 
Third, the means of transcendence have altered. For Garaudy, transcendence was always ‘a 
gift of love from the individual to the whole of humanity’ [Garaudy, 1966 [1970:114]). Its significance 
is unparalleled: ‘the new dimensions and significance given to love by Christianity are the richest 
contribution it has made to the continued creation of man by man [of Man by men]’ (Garaudy, 1966 
[1970:137]). Why? Because in the absence of the militant discipline of a Marxist–Leninist Party, the 
rediscovery of love, one of the decisive contributions of Christianity, takes on an independent role in 
bringing about transcendence. In every being, love is a witness to the impossibility of living in isolation’ 
(Garaudy, 1966 [1970:139]). Christian love is the essential relationship of the human being toward 
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God and other fellow humans. It is the transcendence of the individual in birth, the act of creating the 
human being. It is the immanent need of the human being as a spiritual being. Love of the other 
therefore calls on us to emerge from ourselves, to break through our own limits and transcend 
ourselves, to identify our interests with those of others and to recognise the possibility of 
transcendence through sacrifice, following Christ’s example. ‘Love belongs to the order not of nature 
but of culture: for a value cannot be given “from outside”, even though the giver be a God’ (Garaudy, 
1966 [1970:140]). In this he has support from another thinker whom he admires: ‘Someday, after  
harnessing the winds, and the tides, and gravity, we shall harness, for God, the energies of love. And 
then, for the second time in the history of the world, Man will have discovered fire’ (de Chardin, 1975: 
86–87). Again, transcendence powered by Christianity substitutes for revolution dictated by a 
Marxist–Leninist Party as the mechanism of social transformation. 
Yet transcendence, although its absence is its essential dimension, cannot be reduced only to 
a question of means, as Bloch recognised. It is also that which is actualised in the human being, that 
which is creative and thereby expressed also in immanence’  (Skledar, 1989:18). ‘For Garaudy, 
transcendence is a dimension of man, of his history, of his future. In the lived experience which shows 
to Man that he is more than the result of conditioning, is an overcoming. The new models of culture 
make it possible to grasp, through the permanent possibilities of breaking with earlier models, the 
hidden emergence of man. Finally, the consciousness of incompleteness shows us that history is born 
of a multiplicity of possibilities among which only one triumphed187 (Ries, 1974:515). Noteworthy 
within the project is the stress Garaudy placed on new models of culture — some of which he himself 
was closely involved in promoting through the ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’. 
 
187 Pour Garaudy, la transcendance est une dimension de l'homme, de son histoire, de son avenir. Dans 
l'expérience vécue qui montre à l'homme qu'il est plus que le résultat des conditionnements, se trouve un 
dépassement. Les nouveaux modèles de culture permettent de saisir, à travers les possibilités permanentes de 
rupture avec les modèles antérieurs, l'émergence cachée de l'homme. Enfin, la conscience de l'inachèvement 
nous montre que l'histoire est née d'une multiplicité de possibles parmi lesquels un seul a triomphé 
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Fourth, the although the most significant effect of transcendence remains revolution, we know from 
discussion above (in Chapter Three) that in the period of the project Garaudy’s conception of 
revolution, especially in developed countries such as France, had evolved to be far different from that 
with which he may have identified in previous decades. What now also distinguishes the project from 
its Marxist humanist predecessor is the enhanced role of transcendence. No longer is it what Pinto 
describes as ‘horizontal’ (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:453). The Garaudy of the project is explicit that ‘without 
the recognition of the transcendence of God in relation to man…the permanent possibility of a wisdom 
that goes beyond science and commands it to its purposes, and of unpredictable divine emergency 
and creation beyond the limited ends of our technical reason’, there can be no socialist revolution — 
and no real future for man188 (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:458). For the Garaudy of the project, there can be 
no transcendence without Marxism, any more than there can be transcendence without Christianity, 
or at least without borrowing its contribution to transcendence.  
Still further, Garaudy now claims that all political humanism will fail unless it recognises this 
transcendence as its first and most fundamental dimension. In his view, this conception of history 
would be as much a break with the conservatism of traditional structures as with the so-called 
"revolutionary" and, in fact, positivist version of pseudo-scientific determinism (Garaudy is pointing 
the finger at dogmatic Marxism–Leninism). To embrace transcendence is to reject any mechanistic 
conception of a "sense of history, whether placing Man under the fiefdom of a Divine Providence 
external to him or equally to a historical dialectic, if conceived as a particular case of a "dialectic of 
nature " (Garaudy, 1976:180). Garaudy cites Gide’s aphorism that ‘there is no worse conservative than 
a revolutionary in power’189 and quotes liberation theology in support: ‘Messianism is the 
presupposition of humanism, which depends entirely on its confiding in the power of transcendence 
 
188 Sans la reconnaissance de la transcendance de Dieu par rapport à l’homme…la possibilité permanente d’une 
sagesse qui dépasse la science et l’ordonne à ses fins, d’imprévisibles émergence et création divines qui 
dépassent les fins limitées de notre raison technicienne 
189 il n’est pire conservateur qu’un révolutionnaire au pouvoir  
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of Man as the only factor of liberation possible’190 (Garaudy, 1976:185; Alves, 1969:116; Gutiérrez, 
1973). Indeed, ‘the theology of liberation starts from the biblical postulate that the resurrection is the 
affirmation of "everything is possible". It incorporates the prophetic postulate under which a human 
work is never the last end. Therefore, we must change the world and change the world changed. For 
this theology, transcendence is a dimension of Man and the sacred is immanent to human work’191 
(Ries, 1974: 516). This conception of a politics that embraces transcendence, Garaudy reminds us, 
must include feminism, as ‘a humanist socialism that welcomes the feminine side of itself, cannot 
disregard faith, nor can it disregard women’ (Garaudy, 1981:138–139). This view pre-dated the project 
— Garaudy having argued before that ‘woman is man’s future’. (Garaudy, 1966 [1970:143]), but 
Gauvin still dismissed this as evidence merely of Garaudy’s lack of immunity to political correctness 




Transcendence was carried over by Garaudy from his earlier Marxist humanism into his 
project of mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity. As a result, the content of his 
concept of transcendence changed but little, illustrating how thin Garaudy’s atheistic veneer really  
was in his Marxist humanist phase. At that time, it garnered support from others easily enough when 
the God–from–above was declared dead. Moltmann’s God draws us to the future, encouraging the 
development of a concept of transcendence. Equally significantly, Altizer’s God became the spiritual 
dimension of man’s own being — more Marxist than Christian, if the only choice is between the two 
 
190 Le messianisme est le presuppose de l’humanisme qui dépend entièrement de sa confiance dans le pouvoir 
de transcendance de l’homme comme seul facteur de libération possible 
191 En effet la théologie de la libération part du postulat biblique que la résurrection est l'affirmation du « tout 
est possible ». Elle y integer le postulat prophétique en vertu duquel une œuvre humaine n'est jamais fin 
dernière. Dès lors, il faut changer le monde puis changer le monde changé. Pour cette théologie, la 
transcendance est une dimension de l'homme et le sacré est immanent à l'œuvre humaine  
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definitions of transcendence Garaudy presented. At least as far as transcendence is concerned, 
Garaudy’s project of mutual dependence was therefore already effected when Christianity, at least 
radical theology, caught up with Marxist humanism. The ordinary individuals Garaudy had created 
were now enabled to do extraordinary things.  
Unfortunately, the transcendence of Garaudy’s project was as elusive a concept as the project 
in which it played such an important role. It was as easy as radical and liberation theology in general 
to be subjected to intellectual criticism and subjected to the test of history. It was also vulnerable not 
only to the criticisms levelled against Garaudy’s predecessors, but also some particular to Marxists 
and others specific to his own formulation of the concept. By the end of the time he committed to the 
project, Garaudy perceived his transcendence as in desperate need of an invincible ally. Yet none of 
the criticisms eventually proved fatal. Partly this is because as with the tenacity of the project overall, 
so with transcendence as a component. Conscious of the need for political and ideological flexibility, 
and more aware of the likely shape of the future than contemporary critics, Garaudy had always 
intended to remain at a high level of generality and distinguished his analysis as much by what he 
refused to elaborate as by what he did argue.  
Loosely defined, transcendence had its space, or level, in the project — but its elusiveness was 
not necessarily as much of a weakness as his critics argued, especially when left to others to develop. 
in thus siting transcendence within immanence, Garaudy anticipates the future biography of 
transcendence, which has ‘shifted from the metaphysical belief that the very essence of the Other or 
Truth or Transcendence can be known, to an openness to transcendence at the historical, immanent 
level’ (Du Toit, 2011:e9). It may after all matter that when modern thought rediscovered 
transcendence, it is in significant measure Garaudy’s version that has now been uncovered. I present 
transcendence more critically and give voice to this rediscovery in my restatement of Garaudy’s 
project in Chapter Seven. For Garaudy himself, however, it was too late, the project had ended.  
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Previous Chapters focused entirely on Garaudy’s project during the 1970s, identifying the 
mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity at its core.  The eventual trajectory of the 
project was that, far from bringing the two ends of the chain together, in 1982 he dropped them both 
and converted to Islam. Several attempts have already been made to explain Garaudy’s conversion 
(Fleury, 2004; Gauvin, 2018; Minard, 2019). The reason why I am attempting it again in this chapter 
lies in my focus on the project which immediately preceded it: an explanation for conversion is also a 
self-critique of the project.  
It may be wise to commence by agreeing with scholars who have argued that ‘conversion is a 
shift in religious allegiance across traditions ’ (Stark and Finke 2000:114). But whilst this may appear 
uncontroversial, there are multiple conceptualisations and definitions of religious conversion (Snook 
et al., 2018:224). It has even been argued that ‘conversion is what a group or person says it is’ (Rambo, 
1993:7). My resolution of this conundrum is that whilst Garaudy’s shift of religious allegiance towards 
Islam is a matter of empirical record, there remains the wider question as to what extent his 
conversion encompassed a change of faith or belief, whether religious or otherwise, which I seek to 
elucidate in this chapter. Two claims must I believe be addressed immediately. 
The first is that Garaudy’s conversion was entirely driven by his personal life. At one level this 
was the suggestion that ‘It is hard to find a single explanation for his different political and ideological 
affiliations. Roger Garaudy was a very complex personality. His itinerary proves it’ 192 (Tissot, 2012, 
 
192 Il est difficile de trouver une explication unique à ses différentes adhésions politiques et idéologiques. Roger 
Garaudy était une personnalité très complexe. Son itinéraire le prouve 
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n.p.). At another is the suggestion implicit in the remark that ‘Roger Garaudy converted to Islam, 
several weeks after having met his future wife, the Palestinian Salma Al-Farouki’193 (Prazan & Minard, 
2007:37f). No doubt Garaudy was a complex personality; no doubt also that his conversion and 
marriage were two intertwined events. As Sève rightly said, it is necessary to take into account an 
entire biography when assessing individual decisions (Sève, 1969 [1978:141]). But to attribute 
Garaudy’s conversion entirely to his personal life would overlook the fact that his interest in Islam 
dated back many decades, as well as the surely strong possibility that any such intertwining might 
have a more complex set of causal relationships. It would also make for a short chapter indeed. An 
equally limited perspective would be to go to the other extreme and take Garaudy’s own arguments 
for his conversion at face value without subjecting them to critical analysis. My approach will therefore 
be different from both: I aim to take Garaudy’s conversion as seriously as the project that immediately 
preceded it.  
The second, almost diametrically opposite to the first, even if from the same source, is that ‘It 
appears that this conversion was not the result of mere caprice, but rather progress over many years 
which in retrospect seems almost naturally to lead to adherence to Islam'194 (Minard, 2019:2), a view 
to which Robinson (2004) pays tribute by quoting from scripture: ‘Allah guides to his light whomsoever 
he wills’195 (Quran 24:35). Amidst the ‘remarkable silence’196 with regard to of theories of conversion 
to Islam by Europeans (Allievi, 1999:283), this way of thinking generally suggests that conversion 
cannot be reduced to a decision point, as symbolised by the moment of ritual of integration into a 
new community. This echoes the view taken by many Western scholars over the decades, who have 
placed emphasis on a progressive series of events rather than a separately identifiable, unique 
experience (Scroggs & Douglas, 1967:206; Zinnbauer & Pargament 1998; Hood et al., 2003). It may 
 
193 Roger Garaudy s’est converti à l’islam en 1982, quelques semaines après avoir rencontré sa future femme, la 
Palestinienne Salma Al–Farouki 
194 Il apparaît que cette conversion résulte non pas d’une simple foucade, mais d’un cheminement de plusieurs 
années qui, rétrospectivement, semble Presque naturellement déboucher sur l’adhésion à l’islam 
195 Yahde 'llahu li–nuri–hi man yasha 
196 Etrange silence! 
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even be difficult to identify points in time along a continuum where it begins and ends (Snow and 
Machalek, 1974: 170). On the contrary, conversion becomes perceptible as the games and issues for 
the individual become clearer in their interaction with others and the dialectical relationship with the 
individual personality (Fleury, 2004:28).  
After his conversion, Garaudy himself did take the view, frequently identified amongst 
converts (Stark & Finke, 2000:122), that Islam was his natural final resting place (Garaudy, 1985, 1989), 
‘the logical outcome of a path with which it is in perfect continuity’ (Forget: 1997:111). Perhaps this 
was understandable, after the kind of adverse comment on his previous change of political tack 
discussed in Chapter Two, and then his public declaration of Christianity (Garaudy, 1975:265). I 
however do not seek to deny the claim of process itself, as any refutation of inevitability or even 
likelihood would be difficult without straying into speculation over alternative biographical 
trajectories. Nor is my purpose to use the example of Garaudy to debate theories of conversion. 
Rather, I seek to prevent any such claim facilitating elision of what I argue is a very significant break 
between the project and the Islam that followed it: what was inevitably cast aside in Garaudy’s 
conversion and why. There may, however, be an implicit theoretical rebuke in my argument: 
sociological theories of gradualness could be envisaged as obscuring very real differences of belief 
required to convert from one religion to another.  
 
The political failure of the project 
 
My principal assertion is that in the case of Garaudy, these differences of belief need not 
necessarily be differences of faith. Garaudy himself referred to ‘The central affirmation of my life: that 
politics, artistic creation and faith are all one’197 (Garaudy, 1975:259). Yet what he saw in practice 
 
197 L’affirmation centrale de ma vie: la politique, la création artistique et la foi ne font qu’un 
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during the 1970s was a fracturing of all three. Politics as Garaudy had known and practised it for almost 
five decades had evidently reached a dead end. There was not the slightest chance of revolution in 
France; rather: 
‘the 1970s marked the end of an era in French intellectual life, symbolised by the death of 
Jean-Paul Sartre in April 1980. The slow atrophy of Marxism provided spaces for a wide variety 
of non-Marxist intellectual currents, most notably liberalism, but none of them seemed to give 
much direction to the great political struggles of the era’ (Chabal, 2016:244).  
The political suggestions Garaudy had advanced in the successive books of the project — notably in 
L’Alternative (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]), Parole d’Homme (Garaudy, 1975) and finally in Appel aux vivants 
(Garaudy, 1979) — had come to nothing in the short term. He had tried to lead his country to a 
promised land, but without a Party, without even a coherent band of followers. Amorphous concepts 
of potential agents of change such as ‘youth’ or even ‘the new historical bloc’ had turned to political 
dust. Politics, at least in France, did not even seem to have any need for the prophets that he had 
argued it needed (Garaudy, 1979:9). He had become ‘politically marginalised’ 198 (Minard, 2019:12).  
Second, and connected with the former, intellectuals and culture were in significant measure 
divorcing the political Left worldwide, including in France (CIA, 1985:13; Poirrier, 2004:305). Artistic 
affiliation to the political Right had by the end of the 1970s become far more socially acceptable in 
France than it was even a decade earlier, let alone immediately post-war, when Garaudy could suggest 
that there was such a close relationship between Marxism and ‘French culture’ that ‘The greatest 
masters of thought and of the arts are with us or near us’ (Garaudy, 1946b:1). And finally, the anti-
Communist direction in which Pope John Paul II was taking the Catholic Church (Giovagnoli, 2005) 
indicated the extent to which Vatican II and the Marxist–Christian dialogue had been left far behind.  
The extent and rapidity of this triple rebuff, which occurred predominantly during the course 
of Garaudy’s project, should surely not be underestimated. The challenge with which the Garaudy of 
the project increasingly grappled was therefore this: that however much personal treasure he had 
 
198 Marginalisé politiquement 
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saved up in the world, however high his reputation, he did not believe that the project had made the 
world a better place in practical, political terms. Although as outlined in Chapter Three, he nominally 
had a programme of action to replace Marxism–Leninism (Garaudy, 1976, 1979), the risk was now 
clearly apparent to him that this programme would fail, at least in the short term.  Gauvin was scathing 
in his assessment: 
‘His return to God in the 1970s locked Roger Garaudy into an offbeat image, generated by a  
social perception which was essentially secular, atheist and culturally markedly on the Left, as 
these were the characteristic features of French society; the perception was largely passed 
through the prism of Garaudy’s ‘enemies’ (Althusser, Foucault and their imitators) and was 
therefore rather negative. Whoever then passed for a 'renegade' for the PCF — but also for 
the 'progressive tradition' — had little chance of preserving their audience except to 'play the 
game' by 'symbolic acrobatics' aimed at offsetting the devaluation of his own [intellectual] 
capital; a vicious circle, because even the search for visibility resulted in spectacular but 
delegitimising positions’199 (Gauvin, 2018:430–431).  
Such a realisation could have perhaps led to different outcomes: a retreat to quietism, which Garaudy 
felt unable and unwilling to do, for example, or an attempt to revise the political programme and the 
project generally, which I attempt in Chapter Seven. In fact, it led Garaudy to the public adoption of 
another set of political and religious identities altogether.  
 
No longer a Marxist 
 
I argue that Garaudy’s openness to Islam relied crucially on his inability to satisfy himself any 
longer of the relevance, plausibility or applicability of Marxism, even that of the project, to the politics 
of the 1980s and beyond. The progressive revision of Marxist ontology, ethics and ‘eschatology’ is 
evident in his work and has been described above in Chapter Three. The political failure of the project 
 
199 Son retour à Dieu des années 1970 a confiné Roger Garaudy dans l’image décalée par une perception sociale 
essentiellement laïque, athée et culturellement marquée à gauche, puisque tels étaient les traits 
caractéristiques de la société française; cette perception largement passée au prisme des ‘ennemis’ de Garaudy 
(Althusser, Foucault et leurs épigones) fut donc plutôt négative. Celui qui passe dès lors pour un ‘renégat’ pour 
le PCF –mais aussi pour ‘la tradition progressiste’ légitime– avait peu de chances de préserver son audience sauf 
à ‘faire le jeu’ par des ‘acrobaties symboliques’ visant à compenser la dévaluation de son capital propre ; cercle 
vicieux, car la recherche même de visibilité se paie de prises de positions spectaculaires mais délégitimatrices 
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in practical terms led Garaudy to a further, and still more dramatic theoretical reappraisal. After what 
Garaudy had seen with the successive failures of Stalinism, then Eurocommunism and the PCF, and 
above all finally with what he saw as the failure of his own project, even the vastly revised Marxism of 
the project no longer seemed to him a solution to the problem of the ills of the world. By the time 
Garaudy reached the point of his conversion, he was prepared no longer to look at the world as a 
Marxist. Whilst this of itself was not a sufficient cause for his conversion, once Garaudy no longer 
considered himself a Marxist, the principal roadblock to conversion to Islam was removed, and a huge 
political space opened up for him in consequence.  
 
The political attraction of Islam 
 
Garaudy recounted several times the event that first brought Islam to his attention. In Algeria, 
his life was saved by Muslim guards who refused to shoot innocent prisoners, including him. At the 
time, the religious aspect of the incident was less important to him than the solidarity of the prisoners, 
and their fraternal relations with the guards; he actually described the whole affair as his first 
experience of militant action (Garaudy, 1975, 1989; Robinson, 2004). Back in post-war France, 
Garaudy could not have avoided the ambiguous attitude of French intellectuals in general towards 
Islam because of French colonial rule over Islamic countries in North Africa and the Middle East. There 
can for example be no doubt of the strength of Islam as part of the inspiration towards national self-
determination in Algeria. The gradual dawning of increased recognition of the contribution made to 
France by its colonial history, and the growing political and artistic significance of the Muslim 
immigrant community in France, all appeared to Garaudy at least to chime with his own campaign 
within the project for a ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’ (Garaudy, 1976). 
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Such resonance was reinforced by the widespread perception, in the immediate post-war 
decades, that unlike a Christianity allegedly revolving around individualism, the already collective 
ummah of Islam could turn to socialism. The early 1970s were still heady political times that had seen 
the Palestinian resistance, and Ba’ath parties in Iraq and Syria expressing their allegiance to socialism, 
at least in principle (Carré, 1973:1054). The Islamic world, just as much as the Western, was permeated 
with socialist, and Marxist ideas, even in the years immediately prior to Garaudy’s conversion (Sing, 
2018). At the time Garaudy converted, the identification of the Islamic world with resistance to 
Western capitalism was still not too far-fetched, provided one was prepared to overlook such 
instances as the blatant collaboration of the Taliban in Afghanistan with the United States in their fight 
against Soviet occupation (Hartman, 2002). Other French intellectuals, such as Vincent Monteil, were 
similarly impressed: for them both, ‘Islam therefore appeared as the means of committing oneself in 
a fight against the oppression of the West’200 (Gardeul, 2004:509). Contemporary Islamic capitalism, 
as witnessed par excellence in the United Arab Emirates, but also in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and even 
Iran and Pakistan, was much less in evidence, and even then, it was Wahhabi Islam in Saudi Arabia 
that was to impress Garaudy least.  
But, it has been suggested, ‘It was the Iranian Revolution above all which accelerated 
Garaudy’s rapprochement with Islam’201 (Minard, 2019:5). ‘Inevitably, Islam's power to mobilise the 
masses in the Iranian revolution of 1979 fascinated and attracted him’ (Robinson, 2004), not least 
because of the inequality of wealth in the Shah’s Iran (Garaudy, 1979:19). In the West much was heard, 
during the course of the Iranian revolution, about ‘an unnatural alliance between Marxists and 
Muslims which was bound to end with the Marxists swallowing up the Muslims after the overthrow 
of the Shah’ (Algar, 1980:10). Robinson was surely right to point to both the anti-Americanism and the 
anti-Zionism of the Iranian revolution as politics with which Garaudy felt at home. Although Europe–
 
200 L’islam apparaît alors comme le moyen de s’engager personnellement dans un combat contre un Occident 
oppresseur 
201 c’est surtout la révolution iranienne qui accélère le rapprochement de Garaudy avec l’islam 
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wide, the Left’s response varied between Parties and factions (Greason, 1986), and by no means all 
converts to Islam did so with Marx in mind (Minard & Prazan, 2006:30), the importance of the Iranian 
revolution for the Left in France must not be underestimated. Garaudy was not the only left -wing 
intellectual to fall under its spell. Michel Foucault was arguably the most prominent, his positive 
evaluation of the Iranian revolution coinciding with a reading of Bloch (Foucault, 1978), and 
extensively criticised thereafter (e.g. Scullion, 1995; Leezenberg, 2004; Afary & Anderson, 2005). In 
Garaudy’s project, Islam and especially the revolutionary promise of Iran, Libya  and even Algeria were 
already all potential recruits to the cause of transcendence. Hence the new type of revolutionary that 
Garaudy thought he discerned in contemporary Islam (Garaudy, 1979:283) was one ‘fully aware that 
transcendence is the first condition of the break’ (Garaudy, 1979:296–7). In the project, there was 
always hope, even if there was not good judgement. 
Yet however sympathetic he was to the Iranian Revolution, it was the Middle East where 
Garaudy developed an increasing political focus. The particular political issue to which Garaudy found 
himself increasingly drawn during the 1970s was the plight of the Palestinian people. Finally, this came 
to a head, as described by Robinson: 
‘in 1982, together with Fr. Lelong and Pastor Matthiot, Garaudy paid to have a full–page article 
in the French daily newspaper Le Monde. In the article, which appeared on 17 June, the 
authors argued that the recent massacres in the Lebanon, far from being an unfortunate 
mistake, were consistent with the internal logic of political Zionism. As a result of this, Garaudy 
received several anonymous death threats and was widely ostracised. A fortnight later, he 
officially converted to Islam. Although he had been contemplating doing so for some time, we 
may surmise that the support that he received from Muslims who endorsed his criticism of 
Israel gave him additional impetus’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.).   
In criticising Zionism during the project, he had drawn on Islam equally with his own recently professed 
Christian faith (Garaudy, 1975:265), arguing that the Quran, Islam also being a religion in the 
Abrahamic tradition, was ‘inspired by the same universalism and the same spiritual interiority in its 
interpretation of the covenant. It is an alliance open to all who act according to the spirit of God . . . 
[for] “The Lord said: My covenant will not extend to the wrong-doers”’ (Sura II, 124). Therefore, it is 




But criticism of Zionism within the project was never accompanied by an attack on the Jewish 
religion, let alone by anti-Semitism. By the time of his conversion, however, anti-Zionism, which served 
as a bridge to help connect his socialism and Islam, had finally become so important a part of his 
politics that it developed sufficient impetus to drag him across the religious spectrum, and he was 
prepared to abandon Marxism for what he perceived as the greater good.  
 
Political Islam as a replacement for Marxism 
 
Garaudy was far from alone in envisaging Islam as a religion that was less comfortable with 
the Western world than could be any eschatological Christianity. There was, it has been claimed, an 
‘elemental rift between a Christian vision in which the world is politically fallen and an Islamic one in 
which the world can surely be redeemed partly via the political’ (Akhtar, 1991:7).  If ’Classical Islamism 
until recently was a phase of Islam in combative contestation with European colonialism, while 
engaged in conversation with its two major ideological rivals — nationalism and socialism’ (Dabashi, 
2008:258), more recently too there has been no shortage of advocates for a political Islam that set its  
face against corruption and injustice: ‘The storms that now blow across Arab deserts can dethrone 
kings’ (Akhtar, 1991:3). In this view, predominantly Latin American liberation theology, which as we 
saw in Chapter Three was conceptually close to Garaudy’s  project, ‘is essentially an Islamization of 
Christianity’ (Akhtar, 1991:11). So far, we may think that Robinson (2004), Collès (2013) and Gauvin 
(2018) are right: Garaudy has only changed his religious community, not his faith, nor his politics.  
This would be mistaken. Well before Garaudy converted, leading Islamic scholars had gone 
beyond the ‘tempestuous love affair between Marxism and Islam’ (Sing, 2018:49) — that metaphor 
again — and both the adoption of ideas from Marxism within Islam and the usurpation of Marxist 
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rhetoric (Talattof, 2005:646) to make explicit the irreconcilable differences between them. A notable 
example was the series of articles that the leading left=wing Islamic scholar Ali Shar’iati published in 
the Iranian newspaper Kayhan in 1976, under the title of ‘Man, Marxism and Islam’, collected and 
translated four years later in a book (Shar’iati, 1980). For Shar’iati, the radical idea of an Islam without 
institutionalised religious leadership (Shar’iati, 1980:9) was prefaced by the recognition of Islam as a 
total world view202 (Shar’iati, 1980:8). In his view, in Marx, ‘man is ultimately returned to the 
mechanical nature of the naturalists, to be conceived of as a material entity’ (Shar’iati, 1980:29). Marx 
gives with one hand — to society — and takes away with the other — by materialism (Shar’iati, 
1980:29). He went on to argue that ‘In communist society, we find a similar downward curve in human 
moral values’ (Shar’iati, 1980:33), and concluded that ‘the intense attention to fashion and luxury now 
prevalent in both individual lives and the system of state production arises from the fact that, 
practically speaking and in the final analysis, Marxist and capitalist societies present a single kind of 
man to the marketplace of human history’ (Shar’iati, 1980:33). Garaudy would no doubt have agreed 
with the criticism of ‘communist societies’, had Shar’iati confined his judgement to the Soviet Union 
and other countries organised along similar lines. But whereas both as a Marxist humanist and within 
the project Garaudy wishes to rescue Marxism, Shar’iati sought to bury it along with the societies he 
presented as inescapable conclusions of Marxist principles, and by contrast ‘attempt to counterpose 
Islam as a comprehensive religion, philosophy and an intellectual current to Marxism’ (Bayat, 
1990:29). More widely, whilst Shar’iati had at least made some attempt at the incorporation of Marxist 
categories into Islamic activists (Javadzadeh, 2011), ‘By the 1980s and 1990s, however, even this small 
Marxist influence had gone among Islamist intellectuals’ (Bayat, 2008:49).  
I conclude that Garaudy could not have been unaware that: ‘The Iranian revolution has been, 
among other things, an implicit repudiation of Marxism as a revolutionary ideology and as a doctrine 





supposing there was some route to at least consistency between Marxism with Islam, by the time 
Garaudy converted, even former Palestinian Maoists were declaring themselves no longer Marxists, 
but jihadis instead (Sing, 2011). Garaudy’s conversion could not therefore be an attempt to subvert 
Islam for Marxism, and there is no evidence that he tried.  
On the other hand, Islam could still serve as a weapon of attack on the West, as he himself 
made clear:  
‘By its two fundamental principles: that of power belonging only to God, which relativises all 
social sovereignty, and that of "consultation" (shura), which excludes all mediation between 
God and the people, are found at both an absolutist tyranny sacralising power and claiming 
to make a ruler a god on earth, and a Western–style "democracy," that is, individualistic, 
quantitative, statistical, delegated, and alienated. Freedom is not negation or loneliness, but 
fulfilment of the divine will’203 (Garaudy, 1985:299).  
He went on to claim that all forms of representation were an imposture, whether an absolute Monarch 
or a Parliament. Parties, classes, ‘are a substitute for the tribe or the sect’ 204 (Garaudy, 1985:299). As 
one analysis depicted the analysis of converts to Islam: without sharia, the West offers only anarchy 
(Rocher & Charkaoui, 1986:81).  
Echoes of the project remained, especially in his characterisation of what he believed he was 
fighting against. For example, he observed that the Western model of ‘growth’ was characterised by 
blind production of things, whether useful or useless, including destructive armaments (Garaudy, 
1987b). Such growth in the West, Garaudy argued, had been possible only by systematic colonisation, 
including the genocide of Native Americans, the African slave trade, the opium wars in China and 
culminating in the atomic attack on Hiroshima (Garaudy, 1987b: ix). There would be few Marxists to 
disagree with this. Garaudy’s view that underdevelopment was caused by the West has also been 
frequently supported, not only by Muslims (Dabashi, 2008) but by others (e.g. Said, 1978; Hardt & 
 
203 D’abord en ce qui concerne le pouvoir politique. Par ses deux principes fondamentaux: celui de pouvoir 
n’appartenant qu’à Dieu, qui relativise toute souveraineté sociale, et celui de la « consultation » (shura), qui 
exclut toute médiation entre Dieu et le peuple, se trouvent écartées à la fois une tyrannie absolutiste sacralisant 
le pouvoir et prétendant faire d’un dirigeant un dieu sur la terre, et une consultation « démocratie » de type 
occidental, c’est-à-dire individualiste, quantitative, statistique, déléguée et aliénée. La liberté n’est pas négation 
ni solitude, mais accomplisseement de la volonté divine 
204 se substituant à la tribu ou à la secte 
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Negri, 2000), who did not themselves feel obliged to convert to Islam as a result. On the contrary, well 
before Garaudy converted there was the contention available for his review that ‘There has been no 
special Muslim road for capitalism’ (Rodinson, 1966 [1973:184]) — no evidence that economic policy 
in Islamic countries was any less directed at economic growth. In resistance to Empire, even when 
‘Muslims and various left-wing and Marxist groups have come together again, because they face the 
same enemies — imperialism, colonialism, militarism, racism and Zionism’, (Fowkes & Gökay, 
2009:25), the most that even radical Islamic liberation theology can promise is to curtail capital, not 
abolish it (Dabashi, 2008:21). Hence the very description of the events of 1979 in Iran as ‘Khomeini’s 
revolutionary success’ (Dabashi, 2008:93). There is to be no revolution against capitalism itself, which 
is neither promised within Islam nor achieved by the Iranian revolution or any other Islamic 
government or state, whether Sunni or Shia, notwithstanding that some Sunni religious authorities 
have on occasion attempted to portray Shia and Marxism as interrelated twin heresies (Sing, 2018:89). 
The Garaudy of the project would recognise therefore that that Islam is not, as its apologists have 
suggested, a third way (Shubber, 2010:15) between communism and capitalism: Islamic economics 
are both in theory and practice various forms of capitalism (Nomani & Rahnema, 1994) and must 
eventually expect to be transcended. Moreover, further pause for thought might have been given by 
the fact that since World War II political differences between Sunni and Shia have also sadly 
contributed to violence and war, albeit intricately connected with Western geopolitics (Douai & 
Lauricella, 2014). Garaudy did worry, worshipping in the Süleymaniye Mosque, whether Islam had not 
suffered the same fate as Christianity in becoming ‘an imperial ideology’ (Robinson, 2004, n.p.). But 
this concern never provided sufficient motivation to prevent his conversion, nor for him to try to leave 
the faith. 
Far from it: it has been suggested that one problem with such a radical change as Garaudy‘s 
conversion to Islam is an over-enthusiastic adoption of the new belief system (Da Costa Pinto, 2017). 
So it was that Garaudy enthused over Islamic economics. Property in Islam, he now said, is already 
neither the property of an individual or a group. Rather, it is a social function, divinely ordered. Unlike 
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European law which defines property as 'the right to use and abuse', Islam asserts that God alone 
possesses. Muslims are therefore forbidden either to accumulate wealth for their own ends or to 
squander it (Robinson, 2004). Moreover, the institution of zakat should in theory operate both as a 
form of social security and as a way to prevent the accumulation of hereditary fortunes. No doubt a 
Muslim welfare state may be welcome, for example to those who may have yearned for the return of 
‘permanent employment, state-subsidized education, and free health care’ (Schwartz, 2009:25) as 
provided by the Soviet system. But to talk positively of accumulating wealth, when combined with the 
absence of a future beyond capitalism, is to have walked out on Marxist economics altogether 
(Choudhury, 1996:121). If Islam ‘has the advantage over Marxism of leaving the economic sphere 
more or less alone' (Gellner, 1991:6), then it does so only by leaving it to capitalism, however regulated 
and controlled.  
What is especially noticeable is the way in which Garaudy replaced Marxism with Islam, for 
example in the quite explicit claim that: ‘Islam can bring the world to a different future’ (Garaudy, 
1985:174). As Garaudy explained a decade after his conversion in relation to Les Fossoyeurs, ‘This book 
indissolubly associates political problems and religious problems’ (Garaudy, 1992:11).  Minard agreed: 
for Garaudy, ‘it’s in the Islamic religion, which confers all authority on God and highlights the principle 
of 'consultation' (shura) of believers, that can be found the principles of a real egalitarian, anti-
authoritarian democracy' (Minard, 2019:6). It is therefore interesting to compare the view of Lash that 
‘Today, forms of belief in God that have not internally felt the pressure, experienced the 
persuasiveness and power, of the dominant forms of contemporary atheism, are likely to hinder rather 
than to help the human quest for truth, justice and freedom’ (Lash, 1981:6), with Garaudy’s tacit 
recognition that emerging radicalism within Islam would be of far greater political significance in the 
21st Century than Marxism, let alone the relationship between Marxism and Christianity.  
Yet the actual state of Islamic politics or economics does not enter into Garaudy’s calculations. 
It is what Islam is capable of delivering without utilising Marxist categories such as class or alienation 
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to which he has turned. It was clear very early on that not only was Islam to be a refuge for Garaudy, 
but one to which the same rigorous moral and critical criteria that he applied to the West, France in 
particular, would not be applied. Hence the accusation that in Garaudy (1981) he made ‘frequent 
comparison of the actual history of the West with the principles (heavily idealised, too) of Islam’ 
(Morabia, 1983:343). If both the politics and the artistic creation of the past were irreparably 
damaged, Garaudy was open to changing the third, his faith, in order to recapture them in another 
form, with the added advantage now of mutual consistency between all three. Neither did Garaudy 
seem to have wanted to subject Islam to the same kind of progressive sociological criticism to which 
he was subjecting Christianity. No clearer example of this can be provided than his attitude towards 
women and feminism. As late as Appel aux vivants, he was arguing that women lived in a really 
degraded way through their subordination to men within the family as well as in society more 
generally (Garaudy 1979:36). After his conversion he is largely silent on the question of women, if 
vociferous about human rights in general (Garaudy, 1990a). In regard to other radical causes that 
might not find favour with Islam, such as LGBT rights, he is completely silent. 
After his conversion to Islam, those who read his enthusiasm for his new-found religion were 
sharply critical. ‘These works, however, echo an uncritical and uncritical exaltation of Islam, making us 
remember, mutatis mutandis, the Garaudy of the Stalinist phase’ (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:452). This 
accusation could certainly be levelled against the suggestion, for example, that ‘Islam must be 
presented not as a religion among others. Rather, it must be seen as the point of convergence of the 
faith that upholds the world, as the climax of all forces leading toward that ideal faith’ (Garaudy, 
1985:174), an argument that Garaudy was subsequently to put to use in justifying the restriction of 
religious freedom in Islam (Garaudy, 1990). This puts one in mind of Collier’s argument that both 
religion and politics should be subject to reason: ‘Neither Christianity nor Marxism can accept that 
human ends are exempt from criticism, and hence both, at least implicitly, are committed to a 
dialectical rather than an instrumental conception of reason’ (Collier, 2001:137). A secular Marxist 
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went further: ‘Progressive ideas cannot be derived from dogmas that claim divine origin, and which 
include so many obviously reactionary and oppressive ideas’ (Halliday, 1987:14).   
Another surely remarkable aspect of the conversion was Garaudy’s failure to apply the 
principle of community to himself. He tells us that we should: ‘realise that a ‘conversion’ is not 
necessarily a change of faith, but of the culture in which it is expressed’ (Garaudy, 1989:228). Changing 
communities, however, is not necessarily so easy: Garaudy seems to have thought that his own racial, 
national, linguistic and indeed biographical aspects should be no obstacle to his conversion. To anyone 
who thinks of faith being expressed through culture this is surely remarkable — he seems to have tried 
to become a living denial of precisely this assertion. He particularly underestimated the backlash that 
would follow his conversion from his Christian friends. They had gone out of their way to welcome 
him back into the faith during the years of the project. One had written: ‘The case of Garaudy, my 
teacher, my brother, is not only the case of an adventurer; it is our case, the one that we celebrate 
and suffer, we enjoy and appreciate, that of the restless and those always ‘frowned upon’, those born 
in the cursed village ‘from where nothing good could come’ (De Llanos, 1975:25). His former allies 
would be forgiven for thinking that Garaudy’s conversion to Islam implied that those left behind by 
capitalism might have to be left behind, yet again, unless they too were to convert to Islam. 
Finally, for his attitude towards Marxism after his conversion, we can look to Les Fossoyeurs 
(Garaudy, 1992), Even if I do not agree with Robinson (2004) that it was written as a reaction to 
adverse experiences with Muslim scholars, I concur that this particular work does often seem as if it 
was a revival of the project — what Robinson decries as a lapse — rather than a work from an Islamic 
perspective. It is surely remarkable that a Muslim could write a book on politics mentioning Marx but 
not the faith. Nevertheless, there are still major differences: Marx does now have to take his place 
alongside Nietzsche and others, there is no suggestion of ‘Marxism’ in the book. What remains of Marx 
there is very tame — just a commitment to the future and a break with historical determinism. ‘This 
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eruption of the future in the present is the ferment of history’205 (Garaudy, 1992:223). Whatever of 
Marx Garaudy had retained, it was not the Marxism of the project that preceded it. We should 
conclude at this point that in converting Garaudy substituted political Islam for Marxism.  
 
The turn to the Right 
 
The conversion to Islam therefore ended Garaudy’s Marxism, both economics and politics. In 
doing so it paved the way for a very different politics. Reference to Nietzsche might have been 
recognised as a significant harbinger of change in Garaudy’s politics, as a  persistent theme of critics is 
that Garaudy’s defection to Islam flowed through association with nationalist and others of the 
‘rouge–brun’ movement, an alliance between ex-communists and the extreme political Right (Prazan 
& Minard, 2007: 42). Politically, there was in his writing a new note of angry, nationalistic pessimism, 
illustrated by sympathy with a strident criticism of everything American (Fumaroli, 1991; Garaudy, 
1992:83). This was the language of Alan de Benoist (2003:467) and has the same unmistakeable whiff 
of the Nouvelle Droit about it. Garaudy even talked of a new, deplorable species of human being — 
that of the ‘cyberman’206 (Garaudy, 1990; 1992:97, 2004:346) concerned only with means, not ends. 
New pessimistic, positivist postulates of the alleged progress of Western civilisation were introduced: 
those of Descartes — mastery of nature — Hobbes — the law of the jungle — and Faust —the death 
of God. All of these are said to have generated the atrophy of the transcendent dimension of Man 
(Garaudy, 1992:101–2), still derided as constructed within the logic of the market decried by Marx 
(Garaudy, 1992:105) but now with no plan for its complete replacement. The measure of his continued 
association with the political Right was that his eventual death was first announced by an organisation 
which belonged to it (Cédelle, 2012).  
 




What permanently blocked any retreat to the project, however, was the consequence of 
Garaudy’s alignment with Holocaust denial (Garaudy, 1996). One of the most prominent sympathisers 
of the Palestinian struggle responded by arguing that any such engagement with negationism was 
both morally repugnant and politically suicidal (Said, 1988). Though there were Muslims and others 
to be found to argue against the former, it was certainly the latter. A positive evaluation of Garaudy’s 
legacy as a Muslim by a prominent negationist is therefore not unexpected (Poumier, 2013). For 
Poumier, there is nothing for which to apologise, and no difficulty in accepting Garaudy’s Islam: 
‘Misunderstood by his peers, expelled from the Communist Party, Garaudy was looking for another 
horizon to embody the purity of his research. He encountered Islam, and devoted himself passionately 
to Islamic studies’ (Poumier, 2013: n.p.). Whilst it has been claimed that Garaudy’s descent into 
perceived anti-Semitism was gradual (Prazan & Minard, 2007:14), it is in fairness worth remembering 
that Gauvin, who knew him personally, believed that at a personal level he was not anti-Semitic, and 
that it was now sad that to discuss Garaudy today, ‘one must accept the official dominant thesis of a 
man who fell into one of the ideologies of hate that he fought all his life’ 207 (Didier Gauvin, personal 
communication, 27 June 2019). Sad, gradual or not, the practical significance of his conversion and his 
subsequent career lies in how he was and is still generally perceived, and the facts of his political move 
to the Right cannot simply be glossed over.   
 
The rejection of Christianity 
 
From a Muslim perspective came the suggestion that it was the project itself that drove 
Garaudy to reject Christianity: ‘Having separated from communism, Garaudy turned to studying other 
religions and creeds. His religious tendencies became deeper day by day and this drove him towards 
 
207 on doive accepter la thèse dominante officielle d’un homme tombé dans une des idéologies de haine qu’il a 
combattues toute sa vie  
204 
 
truth’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.). I would disagree: Garaudy’s ‘religious tendencies’ were already very 
much in evidence during the project, and even before during his Marxist humanist phase. On the other 
hand, for some his conversion was unexpected, a great surprise (Rodriguez, 1984:12). It should not 
have been, even from his published work during the prophetic phase that his conversion ended. 
Garaudy’s project was certainly not restricted to Marxism and Christianity. Consistency between 
Marxism and Islam, if not the mutual dependence envisaged for Christianity, was also part — arguably 
an increasing part — of the project. I do not agree however with Robinson that it was Garaudy’s 
perception that Christianity no longer had the capacity to be a religion of revolutionary change which 
led him to embark on research on other religions like Islam, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Judaism, which concluded when he found his ideal in Islam and converted. As demonstrated in 
Chapter Three, Garaudy’s interest in other religions operated in parallel with his self-identification as 
a Christian. With the conversion did come a rejection of the principle within the project noted in 
Chapter Three, that of selecting ideas from religions, in favour of adopting just one. If my argument in 
Chapter Three above that Garaudy was certainly not a Christian supersessionist during the project is 
correct, then there was also no supersessionist logic for him to follow when he now substituted Islam 
for all religions.  On both counts the conversion marked a break with the project, not a continuity. 
I do not therefore wholly agree that Garaudy’s conversion was a biographical trajectory 
somehow independent of analysis, ontology or eschatology (Fleury, 2004). In Fleury’s constructivist 
view, individuals associate with people who seem to share the same representations as they do. In 
doing so, they engage in social enterprises where they pursue objectives that in many cases reinforce 
their personal identity. Intolerable conflicts of interpretation linked to ethics changed the relational 
dynamic in which they evolve, to the point where they will no longer recognise the adherence of 
others to their values (Fleury, 2004:130). Fleury’s argument is that Garaudy’s membership of the one 
epistemic community, Marxism, was essential, given his overall project, to his membership in the 
other, Christianity. Bereft of the community of the PCF, whilst confronted with the reality of its 
declining power and the inefficacy of the Soviet Bloc, the Marxism Garaudy could defend by the 1970s 
205 
 
was already a shadow of its former self. Whereas I see Garaudy’s conversion as essentially a political 
response to the failure of Marxism, Fleury therefore effectively argued that the two boxers in the ring 
knock each other out: Garaudy ceases to be a Marxist because his Christianity, eventually, will no 
longer let him — but not before his Marxism delivers a knock-out blow to his Christianity. He had 
reached not just one dead end, but two. From the moment this vision of the world collapses (Fleury, 
2004:125), Islam seems then to him be the way forward: ‘Garaudy’s religious conversion in 1982 
allowed him the possibility of publishing his writings again, but this time, from within a new epistemic 
community’208 (Fleury, 2004:109). 
This seems too constructivist an argument to me. It is true that Garaudy was also dissatisfied 
with institutional Christianity more widely — his work both during the project and before provided 
ample evidence of his criticism. Robinson suggested that there were three reasons for his 
dissatisfaction:  
First, ever since his Communist days, he had held that the Roman Emperor Constantine had 
adopted Christianity for political ends and that throughout history the high ideals of 
Christianity had frequently been used by those in power to manipulate the down-trodden and 
oppressed and keep them in their place (Robinson, 2004: n.p.).  
In practice, ‘The Catholic church has chosen since Constantine to follow the ‘way of power’209 
(Garaudy, 1992:139). All liberation theory has been in vain, as ‘Mercilessly, the old Roman tradition is 
determined to extinguish this “fire on the earth”’210(Garaudy, 1992:140). For Garaudy, as a Muslim, 
there was no need either to revise his opinion of the deleterious effect of the Romanisation of the 
Church and the Hellenisation of its doctrine (Robinson, 2004). In direct reply, one Christian reviewer 
declared that: ‘Christianity could not have developed into the worship of the universal Christ without 
Paul’s Christ-centred mysticism, which discloses God as Holy Love and secures free access to God’s 
redemptive and re-creative grace’ (van der Bent, 1993:123). Garaudy might even agree, but only to 
 
208 La conversion religieuse de Garaudy, en 1982, lui offre la possibilité de publier à nouveau ses écrits, mais 
cette fois, à l’intérieur d’une nouvelle communauté épistémique  
209 les voies de la puissance 
210 impitoyablement, la vielle tradition romaine s’acharne à éteindre ce « feu sur la terre »  
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reinforce his argument, not to regard it as refuted: the worship of the universal Christ in practice was 
exactly his complaint against Christianity. In sum, therefore, Garaudy was attracted to Islam because 
it seemed still to have the moral influence which Christianity had lost (Robinson, 2004).  
Moreover, once he converted, his attitude to other religions changed. In particular he became 
noticeably unsympathetic towards Judaism, arguing that: ‘Jesus broke with the idea of God inherited 
from the Torah, this vengeful God, commanding sacrifices and imposing His will from on high towards 
us below like a Moloch’211 (Chelain, 1996:5). Garaudy himself openly admitted that he wanted to 
dissociate himself from Christianity, which relays a certain Zionist ideology. For Garaudy the convert, 
Islam is, in the Abrahamic tradition, the most integral faith (Guetny, 1982:52). This is not the Garaudy 
of the project, who dedicated an entire chapter in Appel aux vivants to the role of the Jewish faith in 
the project. It is a different and I would contend an at least arguably anti-Semitic Garaudy.  
Second, he was highly critical of the Church's attempt to define the person of Christ using the static 
terminology of Greek philosophy. He argued that the formula adopted by the Council of Nicea in 325, 
which stated that Christ was 'of one substance with the Father', had been unintelligible to the masses 
at the time and had given rise to a whole series of 'heresies' whose adherents were brutally 
persecuted. He asserted shortly after his conversion that ‘My arrival at Islam is not a rupture, but a 
culmination. It does not imply any rejection, either of JESUS or of MARX’212 (Garaudy, 1983:65), and 
qualified this later only by observing that he had not intended to deny Christianity, but only its 
European cultural form. Calling himself a Muslim was a kind of challenge, a provocation, which without 
changing his attitude to Jesus represented what Islam means — abandonment to the will of God. On 
this basis, he maintained, there was no rupture in becoming a Muslim (Garaudy, 1994a: 10). 
 
211 Jésus rompait avec la notion de Dieu hérité de la Thora, ce Dieu vengeur, ordonnateur de sacrifices et 
imposant sa volonté du haut vers le bas comme un moloch  
212 Ma venue à L’Islam n’est pas une rupture mais un accomplissement. Elle implique aucun reniement, ni de 
JESUS, ni de MARX 
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Third, he realised that although individual Christians might still strive to live out their faith for the good 
of humanity, institutionalised Christianity was a spent force which had ceased long ago to influence 
Western economic and social life and relations with the Third World (Robinson, 2004, n.p.). Robinson 
argued that Garaudy’s conversion rested on ‘his conviction that Western civilisation has reached an 
impasse from which neither Communism nor Christianity can provide an escape route’  (Robinson, 
2004: n.p.). Robinson is surely right that Garaudy thought so, when he converted. The whole of 
Western civilisation, including both Christianity and Marxism, was now on trial in his mind (Garaudy, 
1979). On trial, and eventually found guilty: ‘The Western countries are sick’ (Garaudy, 1987:x), a 
judgement that found its way into both the media and academia (Rorty, 1992:582). By contrast, ‘The 
love of his Arab grandmother and the recognition he feels for those Muslims who refused to take his 
life are two feelings that will eventually triumph over his long and fruitless attempts to conciliate 
Catholics and Communists incarnating, in his eyes, the institutionalization of two systems of values 
which seemed to him perfectly compatible’213 (Raveault, 2004:9).  
In my view there is, however, an insuperable obstacle to accepting Robinson’s analysis thus far as a 
reason for his conversion. All three of these arguments against Christianity dated from Garaudy’s 
Marxist humanist period. They all therefore pre-dated the project and his announcement that he was 
a Christian (Garaudy, 1975). As shown in Chapter Three, Garaudy’s Christianity was always of a very 
different stripe from that of the Christian church that Robinson highlighted Garaudy criticised. His 
criticisms are directed at institutional Christianity, not that of the project. Unless mixed with some 
other factor, they cannot, therefore, have been sufficient reasons for Garaudy to convert to Islam. 
Admixed with these three arguments, however, is another. Robinson’s implicit fourth reason for 
Garaudy’s rejection of Christianity was that by the time he converted to Islam, Christianity now 
seemed to Garaudy so fatally intrinsically flawed that even independent of its institutional practice 
 
213 L’amour de sa grand-mère arabe et la reconnaissance qu’il éprouve envers ces Musulmans qui ont refusé de 
lui enlever la vie sont deux sentiments qui vont finir par triompher de ses très longues et infructueuses tentatives 
de conciliation des Catholiques et des Communistes incarnant, à ses yeux, l’institutionnal isation de deux 
systèmes de valeurs qui lui semblaient pourtant parfaitement compatibles 
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through the Church, it could no longer be reasonably supported as the bearer of his own ideals for a 
human community. Could this analysis provide the necessary touch-paper for the rejection of 
Christianity? For an answer to Garaudy’s attitude towards Christianity in the years after 1982 we may 
justly raid his subsequent work. We need not be as sympathetic as Da Costa Pinto (1994) in regarding 
his entire work as a consistent whole, but at least during that period which Robinson wished to 
characterise as a lapse of Islamic faith, Garaudy’s view of Christianity appears little changed. He still 
wished to separate the example of Jesus’ life from the teachings of St Paul, the Jewish tradition, and 
the Greeks — and through that separation ‘decolonise’ the Christian faith. For Garaudy, Jesus still 
‘opens the perspective of another society, of another form of community, radically different from that 
[Roman] Empire, that of a Kingdom of God’214 (Garaudy, 1992:142). St Paul’s message, and indeed 
Christianity itself, has been distorted to fit a Jewish prism. ‘The Evangelists bring, through their 
testimony on the life of Jesus, new arguments to the central idea of St. Paul: to integrate Jesus into 
the Jewish tradition’ (Garaudy, 1992:234). This Garaudy says applies especially to the Gospel of St 
Matthew, where each action and each word of Jesus is presented as an illustration of a text from the 
Old Testament (Garaudy, 1992:234–5). Hence the need, Garaudy says, to establish Jesus as Joseph’s 
son to legitimise his descent from David. Conceding that in the Pauline version of the Divine story, 
accomplishment is not the restoration of the kingdom of David triumphing over his enemies, but the 
Resurrection of Jesus triumphing over death, Garaudy placed this entirely in a Jewish (and Greek) 
context. And this is not without political significance as ‘Such is, without the slightest equivocation, 
the foundation of all theology of domination. From this sacralisation of authority flows a practice of 
resignation and submission’215 (Garaudy, 1992:240). The dualism of this theology of domination over 
all of the State and its subjects, of the master and the slave, men and women, said Garaudy, stems 
from a fundamental dualism: that of the soul and the body, of God and of Man. He argued that 
 
214 ouvre la perspective d’une autre société, d’une autre forme de communauté, radicalement différente de cet 
empire, celle d’un Royaume de Dieu 
215 Tel est, sans la moindre équivoque, le fondement de toute théologie de la domination. De cette sacralisation 
de l'autorité découle une pratique de résignation et de soumission 
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whereas the Greeks, Romans and Jews thought of God as an omnipotent king and lawgiver, Jesus 
reveals God not through power, royalty and commandment but on the contrary in the most 
impoverished man, born poor and working class, then a wandering preacher, and finally, victim of the 
powerful, held up to ridicule, and dying by the most ignominious means of execution reserved for 
slaves, namely crucifixion. This could well lead to the conclusion that: ‘Christ, were he to return, would 
surely be more comfortable amongst the despised and impoverished British Muslims than the 
Anglicans’ (Akhtar, 1991:15).  
But even this argument, though undoubtedly more powerful, is not to my mind conclusive. Robinson’s 
analysis is no doubt substantially correct insofar as Garaudy’s  dissatisfaction with institutional 
Christianity is concerned, although criticism of St Paul might be open to the charge that there was 
little in the way of developed Christian doctrine by that point. He is right, too, to raise Garaudy’s 
concern that Islam risked losing Jesus’ message, in particular the mystery of love, which he held had 
become through Jesus the warp and woof of every life (Robinson, 2004: n.p.). But he has overlooked 
the other dissatisfaction, that with Marxism. What Robinson therefore missed, I argue, is that 
Christianity’s unique place in Garaudy’s thought principally derived from its essential contribution to 
the Marxism of the project. Once Christianity is no longer needed for that purpose, there is no reason 
for Garaudy to continue to attempt to rescue it from St. Paul. I would similarly argue that this summary 
is open to the same criticism: ‘In 1982, he converted to Islam without renouncing his previous ideals. 
Islam is a religion that "subsumes" the other two, which completes the revelation. He also wanted to 
be on the side of the "dominated" and those who once spared his life’216 (Collès, 2013:123). 
 I argue that it was the failure of Marxism, in his eyes — the failure of political parties derived from 
class analysis and then wider political movements, both aiming at the replacement of capitalist society 
— that left a huge hole to be filled. It was not a failure of Christian faith, and certainly not of the 
 
216 En 1982, il se convertit à l'islam sans renier ses idéaux antérieurs. L'islam est une religion qui «  subsume » les 
deux autres, qui parachève la révélation. Il veut aussi être du côté des « dominés » et de ceux qui lui ont jadis 
épargné la vie 
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example provided by the life of Jesus Christ. Even as a Muslim, Garaudy asserts that Jesus was a man 
inhabited by the presence of the divine, and conscious of not existing except in relation to the divine; 
that it is by his death that he is fully divine; and that his death shows that the omnipotent God of the 
ancient theisms is dead (Garaudy, 1992:162). The conclusion I draw is that the rejection of Marxism 
entailed the search for a political replacement, not a spiritual one.  
 
Did Garaudy really convert? 
 
Those who would prefer to support a narrative of continuity for Garaudy’s biography (Gauvin, 2018; 
Reynaud, 2019) could point to those Islamic commentators who argued that that for all his 
protestations and enthusiasm, Garaudy had not actually converted at all. Whereas Robinson regards 
Garaudy (1992) as a temporary lapse of Islamic faith, it has been suggested that even after his 
conversion, several important aspects of his faith remained unchanged. These were those that led him 
into conflict with Islamic authorities (Da Costa Pinto, 1994), so that he was a relatively unconventional 
Muslim, both in theory and practice, throughout the remainder of his life (Didier Gauvin, personal 
communication, 21 December 2018). His conviction that Islam, as much as Christianity, stood in need 
of a theology of liberation (Garaudy, 1990:135) was one such, his continued support in principle for 
feminism (Garaudy, 1995b:37) another. 
Islamic criticism of Western intellectuals for their dilettante attitude to Islam — ‘nothing exasperates 
Muslims more’ (Arkoun, 1979:349) — could be readily found, had Garaudy looked. It was not therefore 
surprising that Garaudy’s early Muslim pronouncements found no contemporary shortage of stern 
critics: 
From his work on the historical contribution of Arab civilisation [Garaudy, 1946a] to his recent 
apologetic book Promises of Islam [Garaudy, 1981b], R. Garaudy constantly grafted his 
Stalinist–progressive convictions onto a fascination, now a majority in the intelligentsia, 
exercised by Islam as faith and civilisation. The Arab–Islamic civilisation is held up as a source 
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of redemption for a West that "represents a failure on all levels" (Bani Sadr, quoted in 
Garaudy, 1981b: 175). The revolution itself can only succeed by taking the example of the 
"Islamic revolution": reflection on it "allows us to recover a full conception of the revolution, 
which is not only a subversion of structures but, at the same time, a transformation of Man" 
(Garaudy, 1981b: 176. I underline). No more no less. In short, Islam is the future of Man, and 
the only way to his salvation. (See the title of an abbreviated version of the Promises of Islam: 
Islam lives in our future, (Descle de Brouwver, 1981)217. (Taguieff, 1982: n3).  
After his public declaration of Islamic faith, criticism was redoubled: ‘At the discretion of his needs, he 
“sails” from principles to reality, and constrains his readers to a real winding course, where everything 
is placed pell-mell, where all the heritage of the East is subtly baptised “Islam”’218 (Morabia, 1983:342), 
in what the reviewer describes as a mass of contradictions and debatable assertions. In particular, 
lumping together theory and practice within Islam into an idealised amalgamation where Sufism 
seems to stand in for Islam as a whole, facts are twisted or ignored, and Islam is made to serve, in the 
end, simply as a synonym for ‘good’. Better should be expected than ‘a Manichean painting, a 
landscape in black (West) and white (Islam)! We expected better from Garaudy, who is usually more 
inspired and more critical’219(Morabia, 1983:343).  
Subsequently, Garaudy’s presence within Islam was not itself without sufficient negativity that he 
might be excused for wondering whether he had made the right decision after all (Robinson, 2004). 
Certainly, the outcome of his engagement with conservative Islamic scholars was mutually 
unsatisfactory. It was exemplified by his argument with a Wahhabi scholar from Qatar, who criticised 
him for speaking of the role of the love of God in Islam (Garaudy, 1989). More seriously, his principal 
mentor, the Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Bin Baz, declared that he was a hypocrite, a syncretist and in 
 
217 De sa Contribution Historique de la Civilisation Arabe (Alger, 1946) à son récent livre apologétique Promesses 
de l’Islam (Paris, Seuil, 1981), R. Garaudy n’a cessé de greffer ses convictions stalino -progressistes sur une 
fascination, désormais majoritaire dans l’intelligentsia, exercée par l’Islam comme foi et civilisation. La 
civilisation arabo-islamique est érigée en source de rédemption d’un Occident qui « représente un échec sur 
tous les plans » (Bani Sadr, cité par R. Garaudy, 1981, p. 175). La révolution elle-même ne saurait se réussir qu’à 
prendre exemple sur la « révolution islamique » : la réflex ion sur celle-ci « nous permet de retrouver une 
conception plénière de la révolution, qui n’est pas seulement subversion des structures mais, d’un même 
mouvement, mutation de l’homme » (1981, p. 176. Je souligne). Ni plus ni moins. En bref, l’Islam c’est l ’avenir 
de l’homme, et l’unique voie de son salut. (Cf. le titre d’une version abrégée des Promesses de l’Islam: L’Islam 
habite notre avenir, Desclée de Brouwver, 1981) 
218 Au gré de ses besoins, il « navigue » des principes à la réalité, et contraint ses lecteurs à un véritable parcours 
sinueux, où tout est placé pêle-mêle, où tout l'héritage de l'Orient est subtilement baptisé « Islam » 
219 un tableau manichéen, un paysage en noir (Occident) et blanc (Islam)! On attendait mieux de M. G. qui est, à 
l'accoutumée, mieux inspiré et plus critique 
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fact, not a Muslim at all but an unbeliever, who hated Muslims and Islam. Eventually he made Garaudy 
the subject of a fatwa, explaining his reasoning thus:  
‘Garaudy believes that the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him) and the 
Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) deducted from the Quran and the Sunnah cannot be applied in 
this age as they were revealed for a certain age. He calls for the deduction of new laws, thus 
abandoning the religion of the Messenger of Allah (peace be upon him), because, according 
to him, it cannot be applied in this age. He calls for the invention of a new religion’ (Bin Baz, 
1997:195). 
And further, that: 
‘He [Garaudy] says: "During my membership of the World Supreme Council for Mosques, I 
have discovered that they are the most ignorant people. They mechanically repeat Prophetic 
Hadith and the juristic views [of people] who lived in the middle age which they memorize by 
heart. I do not think that I can cooperate with those people, because of the bad impressions 
they gave me". This is Garaudy's view of Muslim scholars who were deceived by him, thought 
highly of him, honored him, and made him participate in their conferences. This is a lesson to 
all the scholars, so they will not trust whoever pretends to profess Islam easily, such as 
Garaudy, who were known for their apostasy before professing Islam until they become sure 
of their belief…One of the issues that proves Garaudy's disbelief is his call of disabling the 
penalty of theft and the change of shares of inheritance…Garaudy says that he would give a 
woman double the share of a man, if they both were disputing over the inheritance’ (Bin Baz, 
1997:198). 
In conclusion, the Grand Mufti declared that:  
‘Roger Garaudy is not a Murtad (apostate) but he is a Kafir (disbeliever), as he did not embrace 
Islam, for he says, "I accepted Islam finally, but I did not disavow my personal views and 
beliefs”’ (Bin Baz, 1997:199).  
What perhaps surprises an outsider is that having decided upon Islam, he did not move towards 
Sufism, and then from that, to the unity of all religions. He evidently came close: ‘This is a definition 
of the Trinity that can bring all people together, I do not say such or such religions, or such and such 
wisdoms, but of all who believe in God, that is, to say of all those for whom life makes sense’ 220 
(Garaudy, 1995a: n.p.). But in fact, as Robinson (2004) observed with satisfaction,  ‘Judging by 
Grandeur et décadence de l'Islam [Garaudy, 1996], however, he then reverted to a more orthodox 
Muslim attitude to divine transcendence and to the role of Jesus, on him be peace’ (Robinson, 2004: 
 
220 C'est là une définition de la Trinité qui peut faire l'unité de tous les hommes, je ne dis pas de telles ou telles 
religions, ou de telles ou telles sagesses, mais de tous ceux qui croient en Dieu, c'est-à-dire de tous ceux pour 
qui la vie a un sens 
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n.p.). For an explanation, it might not be too far-fetched to look at surrounding events, and in 
particular, the furore surrounding his publication of what was eventually to prove the final undoing of 
his reputation in France, Les mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne (Garaudy, 1995). Bereft of 
friends in the West, the loneliness of a war on two fronts might have seemed too much for one elderly 
man to endure. 
 
Subjectivity and transcendence in Garaudy’s Islam 
 
As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, subjectivity and transcendence played a decisive role in the 
project. Christianity provided both to Marxism in exchange for social justice and political goals.  As the 
role of Marxism receded, and the project collapsed, there was therefore less need for a special place 
for Christianity, leaving the way open to a conversion to Islam to replace it. Within the project, 
subjectivity had provided the motor for historical change — for revolution. By contrast, in Garaudy’s 
Islamic worldview, revolutions in the Western sense of the word are now indeed impossible (Garaudy, 
1981b:35). One of the principal reasons for Garaudy’s Christianity has therefore evaporated. 
Alternatively expressed, if Christianity has provided the individual to remedy the deficit in Marxism to 
which Sartre had pointed, then Islam is the religion of community, and subjectivity is no longer even 
necessary — not least because there is no longer a need for political revolution. In Garaudy’s new 
Islamic vision, there is therefore neither room nor need for the previous concept of subjectivity, which 
disappears from his work henceforth, except for a subterranean existence in Les Fossoyeurs, Garaudy’s 
solitary post-project work that harks back to it, where Garaudy suggested that ‘God is not a being but 
an appeal to being’221 (Garaudy, 1992:113). Its replacement is the Islamic sense of community: the 
rejection of anyone who proclaims themselves an individual rather than recognising their dependence 
on absolute values and their responsibility towards the community and its members. In the project, 
 
221 Dieu n’est plus un être, mais un appel à être 
214 
 
this is a progressive conception of individuality, indissolubly bound up with subjectivity and 
revolutionary change; after the conversion it takes on the status of a static end–in–itself.  
The fate of transcendence in the conversion was quite different. Although Garaudy (1981b) was 
written before he announced his conversion, he was already of the view that Islam had an important 
contribution to make to the future of the world because it valued transcendence and community, two 
vital dimensions which contemporary Western society neither valued nor much possessed. For 
Robinson, Garaudy’s enthusiasm for Islam, evidenced in this text even before his official conversion, 
was based on both his rejection of Marxism and his implicit denial that Christianity could bring, or 
encompass, transcendence. His conversion therefore actually rested upon ‘his conviction that 
Western society is based on a false understanding of man, and his own life-long quest for 
transcendence’ (Robinson, 2004, n.p.). For Robinson, Garaudy’s concept of transcendence is not only 
a constant, but also a star that helps him eventually to his conversion, the struggle he says he has led 
throughout his life to recognise the transcendent dimension of man.  
I argue for a different balance of causes for the conversion, but I agree that Garaudy both continued 
to promote the importance of transcendence, and also asserted that Islam could deliver it. Mention 
of transcendence in Garaudy’s later, post-conversion, work is however relatively scant, and almost 
completely confined to his one excursion from conventional Islam, where he returned to an old theme 
by arguing that ‘A revolution has more need of transcendence than of determinism’ 222. (Garaudy, 
1992:50). Where this text treats of religion and belief, it does read as if written much earlier, 
notwithstanding that its politics are very contemporary.  
Whereas for Robinson, the concept of transcendence remains, but the means change, for Gauvin, the 
concept of transcendence in Garaudy’s thought is itself fluid:  
‘However, in Biographie du XX° siècle, le testament philosophique de Roger Garaudy, 
(Garaudy, 1985) while he had already defined himself as Muslim for four years, the 
philosopher still defines the transcendence, following Islam, by the "dependence of Man in 
 
222 une révolution a plus besoin de transcendance que de déterminisme 
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respect of its creator, with regard to God and his plan beyond any human project "[Garaudy, 
1985: 272]; and by the existence of "absolute norms, not deductible from reason" [Garaudy, 
1985: 274]. This makes it difficult to concur with the idea that his definition of transcendence 
"has not varied in [his] approach to Christianity, Marxism or Islam, but [. . .] has become clearer 
thanks to it" [Garaudy, 1985:264]223(Gauvin, 2018:398). 
He concluded that ‘This concept has evolved significantly as Garaudy rediscovered his initial faith and 
developed it, in contact with Christianity and then Islam, towards an increasingly radical conception 
— the exteriority and superiority of God in relation to the world’224 (Gauvin, 2018:398). The 
significance of accepting the Islamic concept of God is recognised here. The Islamic community serves 
ends which go beyond it, ends fixed by God; the community transcends the individual and God 
transcends the community. ‘Islam is the vision of God, the world and Man which assigns to the 
sciences and the arts, to each man and to each society, the project of building an indivisibly divine and 
human world comprising the two major dimensions of transcendence and community’ (Garaudy, 
1981:23).  
These words are not sufficient, however, to persuade Robinson that the idea of transcendence itself 
transformed once Garaudy has converted. They do persuade me: this is not the transcendence of the 
project, whereby God-given human capabilities enable the transformation of the world, and in 
particular, the eventual replacement of capitalism. In Garaudy’s Islam, by contrast, the idea of 
revolution has died a death: transcendence intersects directly with the divine; it implies no secular 
transformation of the world. Garaudy has replaced the subjectivity of the project with the community 
of Islam. Robinson argued this: 
‘his Marxist background made it very difficult for him to countenance a transcendent Deity 
above and independent of the universe. Shortly before his conversion, however, he appears 
 
223 Cependant, en 1986, dans Biographie du XXe siècle, alors qu’il se définit comme musulman depuis déjà quatre 
ans, le philosophe définit tout de même la transcendance, à la suite de l’Islam, par la « dépendance de l’homme 
à l’égard de son créateur, à l’égard de Dieu et de son dessein au-delà de tout projet humain » (p. 272) ; et par 
l’existence de « normes absolues, non déductibles de la raison » (idem 274). Ce qui rend difficile de le suivre 
dans l’idée que sa définition de la transcendance « n’a point varié dans [son] approche du christianisme, du 
marxisme ou de l’Islam, mais […] s’est précisé grâce à celui-ci »  
224 Ce concept a nettement évolué à mesure que Garaudy retrouvait sa foi initiale et la développait, au contact 
du christianisme, puis de l’Islam, vers une conception de plus en plus radicale — l’extériorité et la supériorité de 
Dieu par rapport à l’homme 
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to have become convinced that such a belief was morally necessary and that the Islamic 
tradition had within it the resources for making it intellectually tenable’ (Robinson, 2004: n.p.). 
There is no doubt that this represents a key change in Garaudy’s thought. I argue, however, that this 
argument has the process upside-down. The collapse of the ‘Marxist background’, the possibility of 
Heaven on Earth, allowed the conversion to Islam. Islam filled the gap left by the Heaven on Earth of 
the project with a transcendent Deity above and independent of the universe. Only now in his 
historical review of the Russian revolution can his previous conception be located: ‘the revealing of 
the transcendence of Man in relation to the sectoral determinism of nature’ 225 (Garaudy, 1994:125). 
In his Islamic work more generally, transcendence has, one might suggest, become something of an 
embarrassment, with its connotations of humanism and inextricable connection with revolution and 
socialism. If it is to be retained, it must be drained of its secular content. Transcendence must be 
pressed into service for the purposes of God outside of the universe, not of Man within the universe. 




The temptation to assert continuity in Garaudy’s thought is evidently strong. For example, Robinson 
rightly noted that: 
‘In many respects, his views have remained remarkably constant throughout the Communist, 
Christian and Muslim phases of his life. He has persistently favoured revolution; opposed the 
USA and Zionism; criticised the Romanisation of the Church and the Hellenisation of its 
doctrine; and attributed the global crisis to the false view of Man which has dominated 
Western thought since the sixteenth century’ (Robinson, 2004, n.p.).  
It is a view with which Gauvin (2018) wholly concurs. But, I think, this argument overlooks what is not 
consistent. In particular, it fails to give sufficient weight to Garaudy’s eventual rejection of Marxism, 
especially the core questions of the abolition of wages, alienated labour and private property (Singer, 
 
225 l’affleurement de la transcendance de l’homme par rapport aux déterminismes sectoriels de la nature 
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1980:27), in short, the overcoming of capitalism itself, with its panoply of social classes and individual 
alienation. Between Garaudy’s espousal of shura, zakat and the injunctions of Islamic economics on 
the one hand, and Marxism on the other, lie a gulf: enormous and unbridgeable. In the project, the 
overcoming of capitalism is quite clear. Dom Camara sets out the core of the project as shared by 
liberation theology in a letter to Garaudy:  
‘The next step we Christians have to take is to proclaim publicly that it is not socialis m but 
capitalism that is 'intrinsically perverse' and that socialism is not condemnable but in its 
perversions. And the next step that you have to take, Roger, is to show that the revolution is 
not tied with an essential but only a historical bond, with philosophical materialism and with 
atheism, and that, on the contrary, it is consubstantial with Christianity’ (Garaudy, 1975:118).  
But the problem was that Garaudy seems to have lacked patience, what could be expressed as a sense 
of historical perspective, the very thing Marxism might have been expected to provide. After a decade 
of no doubt exasperating political failure, he appeared only to be able to see the here-and-now: ‘Islam 
is the only faith capable of effectively countering the fatal implications of Western dominion. Against 
positivism, it gives us transcendence; against individualism, it gives us the ummah’ (Garaudy, 
1985:174). For him, if revolution were to recede so far into the future as to become irrelevant for 
practical purposes, then although Christianity could even still be the revolutionary religion of the 
future, there was a more immediate, and more important, requirement for a reformist religion of the 
present, which was met by Islam. The rejection of subjective, liberal, Western Marxism was both a 
necessary and, it seemed, almost a sufficient reason for the conversion, granted Garaudy’s continued 
need for an immediate politics of social transformation. 
Christians may yet want to satisfy themselves as to why Garaudy felt so little apparent remorse at 
leaving the faith. His own explanation throughout was that Christianity and Islam were not faiths, but 
religions — communities of worship — and that his own views had not changed. This may not satisfy 
Christians or Muslims alike, but Garaudy certainly wore his Christianity lightly, mainly for what it had 
to offer to his project, and not therefore for long. His was never an exclusivist faith: he did notsp 
believe in the Resurrection literally, nor in any other tenet of Christianity that might have given him 
significant pause before converting. Once Garaudy dispensed with Marxism, Christianity, its twin 
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within the project, was dispensable. If, as he claimed, he ‘entered Islam with a Bible under one arm 
and Marx under the other226 (Garaudy, 1998:126), he left both at the entrance to the mosque. The 
collapse of the project permitted Garaudy a position closer to the early Islamic teaching of taḥrīf, that 
‘the scriptures of other monotheists and/or their interpretations have been corrupted, and thus 
obscure the message that had been previously sent by God’ (Keating, 2014:203) albeit that such 
teaching has frequently been tempered with the injunction that, however much Islam may recognise 
Mohammed’s succession to the Judeo-Christian line of prophecy, ‘the Quran makes of Islam ‘a 
“guardian” (muhaymin)  over the surviving advocates of the earlier versions of faith’ (Winter, 
1999:139), and there are certainly radical Islamic scholars who can be found to object even to this 
degree of Islamic supersessionism, in particular its political implications for jihad (Sachedina, 
1996:159). Nevertheless, Garaudy’s position after his conversion can be sharply compared with the 
comparatively equal, and certainly more open, inclusion of different religions within the project. For 
Garaudy the new convert, Islam not only provided an effective substitute for Marxism, it also 
represented the apogee of religions. Christians can perhaps only take comfort in this: Garaudy’s 
religious conversion owed more to politics than it did to faith, and certainly than to theology.  
Islam by contrast presented to Garaudy as a faith with the enormous advantage of ready-made 
economic and to his mind favourable political ideology. It appealed as a synthesis, in the way that the 
mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity within the project had explicitly lacked. 
Garaudy would still have argued that by contrast to others (Garaudy, 1996), his synthesis, at least, was 
not an example of ‘intégrisme’, although we may query how plausible would such a denial be, and 
whether he is simply using the term to refer to his political opponents within Islam and outside it. But 
we must recognise that no longer did Garaudy conceive of himself as the centre of a project, using 
historical bias even-handedly to dispense largesse between different sources of ideas. It is hard not to 
read in Garaudy’s writing an enormous sense of relief after his conversion, as anyone in the position 
 
226 Venu vers l'Islam avec la Bible sous un bras et Marx sous l'autre  
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he had been throughout the 1970s might easily be forgiven for experiencing. No longer did he have 
to advocate revolution, nor in isolation try to sculpt strategies appropriate to a politically difficult 
period for the Left in France. He could also now participate again in a community, and perhaps more 
importantly, a struggle against established ideas and political practice in the West. No doubt his 
association with the anti-Zionist cause of Palestinians made it easier, but the trajectory did not depend 
on his marriage to a Palestinian — it simply crystallised the decision. Not everyone has been impressed 
by this self-abnegation; one liberal academic for example quipped that: ‘He sounds like a man who 
needed to be told what to think’ (Anne Schwenkenbecher, personal communication, 2 December 
2017).  
But for Garaudy there could be no political adherence without spiritual adherence. One attraction of 
Islam, therefore, was its provision of a ready-made integration between the religious and the political, 
Foucault’s option as an atheist, to identify ‘political spirituality’ without necessarily sharing it in any 
specific form, was not open to him. In Garaudy’s quite different perception, if the correct political path 
to follow was that of the political Islam of the Left, then he had to convert, given that the choice of 
religion was only one of community, not what has been described as spirituality, as distinct from 
religion (Zinnbauer & Pargement, 2005), ‘a personal, subjective, and flexible means for an individual 
to experience and connect to a transcendent spiritual force’ (Snook et al., 2018:225). 
Once he became a Muslim he therefore no longer had to wrestle with ‘the two ends of the chain’ but 
had instead a ready-made and evidently durable set of values, principles, duties and rules that applied 
within capitalism, and which therefore in no way required the constant insertion of revolutionary or 
other methods of overcoming it. ‘Muslims have never developed a theory of powerlessness’ (Akhtar, 
1991:73). We might even remind ourselves of the old adage that many people become right wing in 
their old age, Garaudy just took a lot longer about doing it, and succeeded in temporarily disguising it 
— possibly even to himself — by cloaking his retreat in an Islamic veil.  
220 
 
The decision to convert nevertheless brought serious adverse consequences. It is at least surprising 
that Garaudy, as a former Marxist, never seemed to appreciate, or even acknowledge, that the 
association of religious community with political logic surely has a consequence: if the political logic 
turns out to be flawed, then the decision to convert must similarly be flawed. Garaudy was certainly 
right that the often-used measure of government success, GDP, includes ‘counter-productive’ efforts, 
illustrated by apparent paradoxes such as the famous broken window fallacy — the misguided notion 
that destruction or military expenditure are both economically desirable (Bastiat, 1850). However, 
despite Garaudy’s early optimism about Islamic economics (Yurdakök, 2015) and his insistence that: 
’Islamic economics, following Quranic principles, takes as its aim balance not economic growth 
(Garaudy, 1981), there is little to suggest, from the standpoint of the 2020s, that Islam has provided 
any alternative economic model. Far from it, Islamic countries, notably those confronting high rates 
of population growth such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Indonesia (Looney, 1982) have consistently 
been amongst countries adapting Islamic legal and banking systems to reach the goal of economic 
growth (Zare, 2018:429). One might only add that results have been very mixed (Ahmad, 2004), 
especially in respect of income and wealth distribution, one scholar finding that whereas at the time 
of Garaudy’s conversion, inequality was on balance lower than in the Western world, ‘Muslim societies 
have experienced the highest rise in income inequality of all religions since 1990’ (Navarro & Skirbekk, 
2018:196).  
As if this were not sufficient to indicate the flaw in Garaudy’s replacement of Marxism by Islam 
politically, Garaudy separated himself abruptly and totally from his community, through the widely 
abhorred narrative of Holocaust denial, and implicitly by rejecting France, as ‘God is above patriotism’ 
(Akhtar, 1991:17). As a result, Garaudy lost his main opportunity for influence and ended up disgraced 
and rejected in the country and in the community where he had the most potential ability to do good, 
that of France. As the head of the Representative Council of French Jewish Institutions was quoted in 
one of his obituaries, ‘He ended up pitifully, on an intellectual level, with the lowest kind of 
revisionism’ (Prasquier, 2012). No doubt the project did not die easily in Garaudy’s mind, as Les 
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Fossoyeurs (1992) demonstrated. No doubt too his approach to Islam was both iconoclastic and wary 
of ‘intégrisme’, (Garaudy, 1995b, 1996, 1998). But once his obsessive Anti-Zionism (Godin, 2011:222) 
resulted in his intellectual isolation in France, except for the extreme Right (Taguieff, 1996:208), there 
was no way back. 
In the light of both of these flaws with the logic of Garaudy’s conversion, I will now in the next chapter 
pick up both ends of the chain again and turn back to Garaudy’s project. What might emerge from an 




Chapter Seven: The project revised 
 
 
Where to begin 
 
The preceding Chapter portrayed how Garaudy’s development of his original Marxist humanist project 
of consistency between Marxism and Christianity into a relationship of mutual dependence came to 
an abrupt end with his conversion to Islam. It might therefore seem obvious that any attempt to revise 
the project must pick it up where he left it, the end of the 1970s, albeit that elements of his subsequent 
work hark back sufficiently to the project as to warrant inclusion in any revised project. This Chapter 
has that aim. 
There is a need to answer key questions. What lessons does subsequent history provide for anyone 
who might want to pick up the pieces where Garaudy dropped them? Could the concerns that 
emerged in previous chapters — in particular that subjectivity and transcendence were both 
insufficiently specified so as to be put to the service of the project and made to do too much work 
once they were — be allayed? Is it possible to develop a revised project? And could such a revised 
project be rendered sufficiently robust that even Garaudy himself would not have found it necessary 
to abandon either his Marxism or his Christian faith?  
There are clear dangers here. First, of reincarnating the project as one or more of a purified, sanctified, 
ahistorical, or even omnipotent source of wisdom, useless in practice. Second, of presenting revision 
in the guise of an entirely subjective and equally contemporary version of ‘improvement’, destined in 
its turn to be rapidly eclipsed by events and replaced by another. There is even perhaps a third risk, 
that in accepting the argument that Garaudy’s objective all along was that Marxism should ‘cease to 
be an ideology and become a critical philosophy’  (Cranston, 1970:18), it may become incapable of 
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providing answers to the very questions it posed. If so, a revised project may end up so elusive as to 
deliver nothing at all. 
 
What did the critics of the project eventually do? 
 
The subsequent paths followed by those who criticised Garaudy’s project may perhaps illustrate the 
enduring merit or otherwise of their criticisms as a potential basis for a revised project. Three 
examples may suffice as examples. 
Lucien Sève, Garaudy’s principal critic, eventually took the view that we should think ‘with Marx’ — 
no longer as Marxists ourselves. In the first volume dedicated to this task, he belatedly discovered 
that, at the end of their lives, Marx and Engels already envisaged possible non-violent ways forward, 
carried out through democratic politics’227 (Sève, 2004:11). He concluded, in terms reminiscent of 
Garaudy’s original project, that to think with Marx now must be a combination of ‘political clashes, 
bioethical debates, scientific exchanges’228 (Sève, 2004:264). In the second volume, although he 
remained firmly atheist, he no longer talked of ‘the militant life’229 (Sève, 1969 [1978:368]) but instead 
of ‘the committed life’230 (Sève, 2008:510) and the fate of the earth, in terms very reminiscent of 
Garaudy’s project that he so denounced at the time.  
Louis Althusser preferred the more dramatic route of killing his wife and admitting his intellectual 
dishonesty (Althusser, 1994). His colleague Pierre Macherey referred to himself even in the 1990s as 
a ‘dinosaur’, a survivor of the ‘structuralist epoch, the textual monuments of which are regarded by 
contemporary readers as curiosities, as puzzling in their complexity as the simultaneously strange and 
 
227 Marx et Engels envisageaient déjà de possibles voies pacifiques frayées par un combat démocratique 
228 affrontements politiques, débats bioéthiques, échanges scientifiques 
229 la vie militante 
230 la vie engagée 
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familiar skeletons exhibited in a museum of natural history’ (Montag, 1998:3). More recently there 
has been what might be seen as a rewriting of history, when structuralist Marxism was described as 
in retrospect ‘a way of wresting the historicity of class struggles from linearity, predetermination or 
prophecy, so as to restore to it its character of unpredictable eventfulness and perpetual “beginning”’ 
(Merrick, 2017, n.p.), a telling suggestion, which even if true would have the extraordinary result of 
rendering the entire debate within the PCF otiose, as everyone would ‘really’ be in agreement.  
Finally, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, student hero of the May 1968 uprising in Paris, eventually became a Green 
politician and centrist critic of the populist ‘Gilets Jaunes’ movement (Willsher, 2018). His political 
direction closely mirrored that of Garaudy’s project in his rejection of economic growth, emphasis on 
ecology and co-operatives, all in the hope of creating ‘a breach’231 in capitalism capable of placing the 
entire system in jeopardy (Castoriadis & Cohn-Bendit, 2014:55).  
The conclusion that it is very tempting to derive from these three very brief subsequent biographies 
is that leaving the Communist Party earlier rather than later, prompt admission of the faults of Soviet 
Marxism, and appreciation of the transformed agents and limited prospects for resistance to 
capitalism in the short to medium term might not have done anyone much harm, and probably quite 
a lot of good. One cannot help but wonder too what might have happened to Garaudy himself, had 
he been applauded by the delegates to the PCF Conference in 1970, instead of being listened to in 
stony silence. Garaudy alone could neither have saved the PCF from political oblivion, nor led it to a 
promised land, but the Party’s trajectory would certainly have been very different had his views been 
in the majority. As it was, any possibilities of reconciliation, even of rejuvenation, between Garaudy 
and his former PCF comrades were never taken up. Garaudy was left, as the title of one of his 
autobiographies heralded, to pursue his journey through the century on his own (Garaudy, 1989).  
In fairness, it is easy to criticise with the benefit of hindsight. Sève himself used the examples of 
Garaudy and Althusser to observe that ‘an extremely important point appears certain: a marked 
 
231 une brèche 
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change in the ideas to which one is attached essentially has everything to do with a no less notable 
biographical change for the simple reason that the ideas to which one is attached are themselves in 
many ways due to life experiences’ (Sève, 2008:526). This may readily be conceded, but we are still 
left with the conclusion that none of Garaudy’s critics within the PCF or on the contemporary Left 
seem to be able to offer anything of significance for the project beyond some possible political 
strategies, either then or now. 
 
Žižek and Eagleton — can a ‘turn to religion’ revise the project?  
 
One way to envisage how Garaudy’s project might be improved, or at least altered, is surely therefore 
by drawing comparisons with other work specifically encompassing both Marxism and Christianity. 
Those ‘post-secularists’ (Braidotti, 2008:2) who remain on the Left (McLennan, 2010:4) yet who 
embrace ‘the new visibility of religion in politics’ (Sigurdson, 2012:xi), including in France (Breckman, 
2005:74) are keen, one suspects, to return to religion, Christianity in particular and specifically 
theology, in order to enlist their support for whatever kind of contemporary left-wing politics that can 
oppose capitalist hegemony. Jürgen Habermas, for example, seemed to have reached the position of 
‘dialogue’ between theology and philosophy, reason and revelation (Habermas, 2010:18). Others have 
even moved heaven and earth to bring Marxism and Christianity into some kind of political alignment, 
for example what has been described as Boer’s ‘theologism’: whereas ‘Marxism should recognize its 
theological bearings and ambitions, theology for its part must fully internalize a strong materialist, 
Marxist perspective on ideology and emancipation’ (McLennan, 2019:83). Throughout an extensive 
examination of the engagement between Marxism and Christianity, however, Boer still seems to have 
concluded that providing we reject exceptionally narrow definitions of both Marxists and Christians, 
which actually exclude virtually all who have ever called themselves either, we can all agree on struggle 
against oppression, to which the logic of both positions should send us. Nothing else much matters, 
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even ethics, and certainly not belief in anything close to a traditionally conceived God. Both the 
approach of pure dialogue and that of ‘theologism’ are evidently a long way away from the project 
altogether. 
I have chosen instead to focus on the work of Slavoj Žižek and Terry Eagleton, who stand out amongst 
those who have taken the path of engagement between Marxism and Christianity, not least because 
of the ability they share with Garaudy to reach a wider audience than the overwhelming majority of 
professional philosophers. In engaging with their work, I should at once admit that brevity has 
imposed an undoubted unfairness in my summary treatment of them both. For example, I have not 
been able to pay close attention to the evolution of their views over time, nor therefore any 
incompatibility between their earlier and later work, although there is evidence that both of them 
have altered their views over time, albeit less spectacularly than did Garaudy.  Again, I have followed 
Boer (2007) in focusing only on that part of their work concerned with the relationship between 
Marxism and Christianity: a wider perspective might conceivably bring a different judgement, 
although it would not of course erase what they have written. With that caveat, what contribution to 
a revised project might each of them bring? 
Reversing their original roles in the metaphor of puppet and dwarf (Benjamin, 1940 [2009:2]), Žižek’s 
suggestion has been that contemporary theology is to win all the time, by enlisting the secret service 
of historical materialism (Žižek, 2003:3). In this ‘modern’ world, religion globalises, but is ‘reduced to 
a secondary epiphenomenon with regard to the secular functioning of the social totality’ (Žižek, 
2003:3). Hindsight has always been said to be a wonderful thing: but its wonders do not necessarily 
advance linearly, and on this point developments since would seem to reinforce Garaudy’s prior view 
in the project of the importance of actual religious belief, by comparison to Žižek’s globalist vision of 
the decay of genuine faith. This in turn might raise doubts over Žižek’s reincarnation of dialectical 
materialism as a reconciliation and proposed synthesis between Hegelian dialectics and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Žižek, 2012), a psychoanalytic approach which leads to a unitary conception of 
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subjectivity, which though ‘it continues to haunt every effort to overcome it’ (Žižek, 2012a:76) can 
only be Lacanian ‘doubts, questioning, inconsistency’ (Žižek, 2012a:20) or a Hegelian ‘gesture of 
withdrawal’ (Žižek, 2012a:94) from the real world. For Žižek, subjectivity cannot therefore play the 
positive, directive role that Chapter Four showed a particular version plays in Garaudy’s project.  
Similarly, love, the positive force so essential for Garaudy’s Marxism, is dismissed as ‘beyond Good 
and Evil’ (Žižek, 2012a:81) or merely inviting ridicule (Žižek, 2012a: 191) and the intrusion of an alien 
third (Žižek, 2012a:37). Likewise, the suspicion of technology and demand of the project that humanity 
be concerned with ends not means is reproduced in a much paler and transient way by Žižek in his 
referencing of Heidigger’s Gestell: ‘the human being reduced to an object of technological 
manipulation is no longer properly human’ (Žižek, 2012a:31). 
Transcendence serves as another point of opposition to the project: Žižek’s move to accepting a 
concept of an Event — ‘something shocking, out of joint, that appears to happen all of a sudden and 
interrupts the usual flow of things; something that emerges seemingly out of nowhere, without 
discernible causes’ (Žižek, 2012a:2), that is close to the very different version of revolutionary 
subjectivity propounded by his original source (Badiou, 1988:213; Harrison, 2011:8). This is by his own 
admission a recognition of transcendence, albeit a determinedly materialist one (Žižek, 2014:72). For 
Žižek, however, the existence of ‘the effect that seems to exceed its causes’ (Žižek, 2012a:3) poses a 
philosophical problem for transcendence, that of causality. But where the Garaudy of the project 
rejects dualism — and therefore the problem itself — Žižek has revelled in it (Žižek, 2012a:91). In this 
bleak philosophy, transcendent events are reduced to random, unplanned demonstrations of 
universal human freedom (Žižek, 2012a:88). The claim that the final crisis of capitalism — a prolonged 
process of delay and disintegration — is upon us therefore sits uneasily with the admission that there 
is ‘no agent to give this decay a positive twist and to transform it into a passage to some higher level 
of social organization’ (Žižek, 2019:24). No agent at all, is surely Žižek’s eventual problem, as I suggest 
is demonstrated by the admission that with the failure and even dissolution of the traditional 
proletariat, ‘The problem of western Marxism (and even of Marxism tout court) was the absence of 
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the revolutionary subject’ (Žižek, 2019:50), so that all we are left with is a problem, with no solution 
in sight (Žižek, 2019:57).  
As for Christianity itself, having previously damned most practising Christians with faint praise (Žižek, 
2000; Kotsko, 2008), he initially took precisely the opposite view from that of Garaudy in his prophetic 
phase. Sigurdson pointed to his claim that ‘there is no Christ outside Saint Paul’ (Žižek, 2000:2), and 
equally that there is no ‘authentic Marx’ beyond Lenin’s lens. Any view to the contrary is simply a 
fetish (Løland, 2018:65), ‘an attempt to escape the uncomfortable dimensions of religion in favor of a 
mere thought experiment without any social consequences’ (Sigurdson, 2012:26). Žižek later adopted 
a perspective on Christianity as a religion based on the Event of the Incarnation (Žižek, 2012a:38) 
where ’God dies and is resurrected as the Holy Ghost, as the form of collective belief’ (Žižek, 2010 
[2011:118]). In confronting Christ, ‘we become aware of our own freedom’ (Žižek, 2014:47). But the 
perspective is ontological, not eschatological: ‘the ultimate Event Is the Fall itself’ (Žižek, 2012a:49), 
which we can all echo (Žižek, 2014:292).  
Similar ideas surface in Žižek’s work and Garaudy’s project, and they are equally at home with artistic 
metaphors, but in Žižek’s hands they both take on a darker, less optimistic hue, and often with a 
diametrically opposite interpretation. For example, Garaudy and Žižek would surely agree that St. Paul 
is a pivotal figure for Christianity. But whereas for Garaudy he represents the perversion of the original 
Christian message, for Žižek he is a Leninist to be admired, intent on building the church amidst 
adversity. So too, whereas the project stands at the edge of Christian belief and openly revises 
Marxism, for Žižek, Christian orthodoxy is both ‘daring and perilous’ (Žižek, 2003:35), a ‘thrilling 
adventure’ (Chesterton, 1908 [2009:152]), just as Marxist orthodoxy should be done ‘shamelessly’ 
(Žižek, 2014a:32) . Nor is it any surprise that disagreements over religion do not end with Christianity. 
Islam suffers from the ‘traumatic presence’ of the feminine (Žižek & Gunjević, 2012:123), whilst 
Christianity must also be distinguished from ‘so-called Oriental spirituality’ (Žižek, 2000 [2008:vii]) — 
scarcely surprising when, for Žižek, Western Buddhism is ‘arguably the most efficient way for us fully 
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to participate in capitalist dynamics’ (Žižek, 2003:26), a form of militaristic Zen that justifies cruelty 
through detachment. Within the project, by contrast, as discussed in Chapter Three, Islam is praised 
for its sense of community, whilst Zen enjoys a more peaceable reputation in a panoply of different 
religions: each religion has something to offer humanity.  
Differences over theology emerged onto practical terrain with the suggestion that we should celebrate 
violence as the means to achieve freedom (Žižek, 2003:31). Whereas anti-war demonstrations are 
dismissed as self-indulgence, they would only have ‘saved their beautiful souls’… Žižek (2007: n.p.), he 
can eventually only suggest that Christians should admire, and even themselves form, armed 
resistance against capitalism. This is a resistance which does not appear to be part of any organised 
political programme, Marxist or otherwise, as the continued failure of highly visible and sporadically 
popular movements such as the Arab Spring and Extinction Rebellion to confront or even denounce 
capitalism demonstrate. Hardly surprising, if neither they nor those that do, such as Occupy, nor Žižek 
himself, has any idea any longer of even the solution to the world’s ills (Žižek, 2019:57), let alone the 
means to achieve it. Marxism is confined to an historical ghetto, in the absence of solidarity or a united 
front against capitalism (Žižek, 2019:56). 
Like Garaudy, Žižek has sought to bring the two ends of the chain together. But whereas Garaudy 
reaches out for those two ends that are nearest each other, Žižek’s two ends have been those furthest 
away from each other. Such a goal is not unique: a contemporary wrote of his wish that Lenin and 
Althusser should meet Augustine and Luther (Collier, 2001:1). But whereas for Garaudy, Marxism 
stands in the greater need, for Žižek it is precisely the opposite. To attack ‘the religious hard core that 
survives even in humanism’ (Žižek, 2003:171), Christianity must follow Christ’s example. It must 
sacrifice itself to save its treasure, which is the destruction of the traditional form of hope, in favour 
of a reformulated communal Holy Spirit that looks only to itself for salvation and adopts Leninist 
politics, none of which, I suggest, is at all likely to happen within any reasonable timeframe. It is telling 
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that in an entire book devoted to Žižek’s engagement with Christianity (Mitralexis and Skliris, 2017) 
there is no optimism derived from Žižek himself.  
Yet at the risk of possibly dangerous mixed metaphors, and possibly also of landing a low blow, it is 
hard not to reverse the accusation against Garaudy made at his trial cited in Chapter Two, that of 
supporting totalitarianism in the name of liberty. Both the content ion that ‘there has been a marked 
revulsion from the Promethean ethic of human liberation on the ground that it provides no built -in 
check against such horrifying excesses’ (Kamenka, 1969:22), and Boer’s suggestion in relation to Bloch, 
that ‘the elevation of ‘man’ in God’s place, or matter in place of spirit, has all the potential for 
totalitarian and oppressive politics that can now be justified by such an ideology, for this ‘man’ can 
behave as though he were God’ (Boer, 2007:52), are criticisms that could have been directed against 
Garaudy’s original project. But Žižek’s revised conception of theology is equally open to the objection 
of the Russian doll. Within his sober anti-humanist historical materialist dwarf, in turn allegedly 
controlling a puppet theology, there seems to me to be an exuberant humanism, a faith in humanity 
and an ethical impulse. All three must be suppressed, lest they burst forth and the entire hierarchy be 
overturned, Christianity take charge of Benjamin’s chess game, Marxism veer in a revisionist direction, 
and Leninism be lost forever. That must remain tantalising conjecture, however: if we are to take Žižek 
at his word, he has nothing to offer the project except direct criticism. Wherever one turns in Žižek’s 
work, there is in fact an almost uncanny inversion of anything resembling Garaudy’s project. Hence 
his comparison to his assertion that ‘the subversive kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a 
materialist approach’ (Žižek, 2003:6); he points dismissively to ‘how much less risk and theoretical 
effort, how much more passive opportunism and theoretical laziness, is the easy revisionist conclusion 
that the changed historical circumstances demand some “new paradigm”’ (Žižek, 2003:35). No doubt, 
a revised project should beware both theoretical laziness and political opportunism, but that is surely 
self-evident, and if Žižek’s humanism is to be forever concealed, so that such advice is the sum total 
of any contribution to a revised project, it does not amount to much. 
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If Žižek has little to offer, what of another leading contemporary avowed Marxist with a strong interest 
in religion, Terry Eagleton? His case for a fresh look by the Left at religion is beguilingly straightforward: 
Marxism was never intended to be a theory of everything (Eagleton, 2011:34), whereas ‘Jewish and 
Christian scriptures have much to say about vital questions — death, suffering, love, self-possession, 
and the like — on which the Left has for the most part maintained an embarrassed silence’ (Eagleton, 
2009:xii). It is a silence that he argued should end. For Christianity, the example of Jesus  — not only 
his behaviour but his morality, described as ‘reckless, extravagant, improvident, over-the-top’ 
(Eagleton, 2009:14), ‘with ‘very little to say about sin at all’ (Eagleton, 2009:20) — is the first place to 
look. The extreme sacrifices made by Christian ‘martyrs in the struggle against US supported 
imperialism’ (Eagleton, 2009:98) are also clear examples. Hence it is in the struggles of every everyday 
life (Eagleton, 2009:19), in the love for fellow human beings that Christianity places at the centre of 
its vision of the world (Eagleton, 2009:31) and not in religion, and certainly not in a church which has 
been ‘oily, sanctimonious, brutally oppressive, and vilely bigoted’ (Eagleton, 2009: 56) that salvation 
lies. Thus far, Eagleton may seem to be in step with any revised project. His emphatic rejection of both 
Islamic radicalism and Christian fundamentalism as seeking to replace politics with religion (Eagleton, 
2009:43–44) further identifies him with the project rather than sympathetic to Garaudy’s conversion. 
The identification of ‘the impending upheaval which Marx calls communism [with what] the Christian 
Gospel calls the kingdom of God’ (Eagleton, 2018: 279) might seem conclusive evidence of common 
ground.  
Below the surface, however, and despite his denial that Christian faith is not primarily about ontology, 
I follow Boer (2007:275) and Sigurdson (2012:81) in recognising that Eagleton’s latent Catholicism is 
never far from the surface, which in turn, I argue, limits his potential contribution to a revised project. 
We find for example in his now disavowed early work advocacy for the priesthood to migrate into a 
political vanguard akin to the Party (Eagleton, 1970:92), both of which will eventually wither away 
(Eagleton, 1966:114). And so to some extent they have, though certainly not after a revolution: the 
Party now broken by history into many ineffectual pieces, and the priesthood under significant threat 
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in developed countries (Schoenherr, 2002:4), even allegedly in need of reinvention (Higgins, 2017), 
this simulacrum of orthodoxy now seems wholly of its time. We also observe this more recently in 
Eagleton’s conviction that a ‘lordly, overweening humanism’ (Eagleton, 2009:15) is no improvement 
on orthodox theology: it may even be a servant of liberal reason and one of the driving forces of 
Western neo-imperialism, and even more overtly in his assertion that Christianity holds that there are 
‘flaws and contradictions built into the structure of the human species’ (Eagleton, 2009:48). All that is 
missing — and we may regret it, given its relative absence in the original project as well, is  a considered 
analysis of sin flowing from this observation, and perhaps a reappraisal of the view from long past that 
original sin implies that the possibility of exploitation is built into ‘all human relationship’ (Eagleton, 
1970:52), at least outside Christian salvation. But as Boer observed, in his recent work ‘Eagleton 
produces a range of substitutes — history, confession and forgiveness — that turn around the absent 
centre of sin itself’ (Boer, 2007:295). We do not find, for example, a discussion of Pelagius; rather, we 
are exhorted to beseech God’s grace, albeit most surreptitiously, via literary commentary (Eagleton, 
2014:102). When this subterranean orthodoxy is adduced in addition to consideration of Marx again 
on the basis of the plausibility of historical materialism, albeit aimed at ‘the cultural and political Left’ 
(Boer, 2007:277), it is clear that Eagleton’s turn to religion is much less ambitious than Garaudy’s bold 
attempt in the project to use Christianity to provide Marxism with new foundations. Nor does Eagleton 
suggest that Marxism has anything particular to offer Christianity beyond its allocated level — the 
traffic he is interested in is all one-way. It would seem that Eagleton is indeed a leading practitioner 
of ‘compatibilism’ — ‘the idea that Marxism (still) gives us the best analysis of capitalism and its 
discontents, plus some historical grounds for social hope, but that it is religion that (still) more directly 
and independently deals with life’s big issues and the angst of subjective commitment’ (McLennan, 
2019:82).    
We should not be surprised. With the collapse of organised Marxist political parties, and the collapse 
of the Marxist political enterprise of the last century, Eagleton has found himself in the political 
wilderness along with many on the political Left. But not for him the advocacy of a revised Marxism 
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that incorporates patient, fragmented resistance to oppression and capitalism, even if he himself has 
tried to do so. I suggest that what Boer takes for a less convoluted and 'more relaxed' (Boer, 2007:279) 
style in his later writings is actually something much more serious, though scarcely uncommon: the 
loss of political faith. Eagleton's 'return to religion' is inescapable: there is nothing else left for him. So 
when Boer observed that 'the crux of Eagleton's theological recovery in the later works is that 
Christology has a distinct political dynamic that the Left ignores at its own peril' (Boer, 2007:277), even 
that ‘Eagleton holds out Christ as a political model’ (Boer, 2007:307), the problem here is not really as 
he suggests a cult of personality, or even an obsessive focus on Christ. It is certainly not the re-
introduction of traditional personal ethics (Eagleton, 2009a), which as I will argue below, is not the 
flag of surrender that Boer has suggested it represents (Boer, 2014:264), but a welcome development 
if it serves to provide further impetus to the overthrow of capitalism as envisaged by the project. 
Rather, it is a much larger problem with the very term 'the Left’. The close attention to Christianity in 
Eagleton’s later work stands in contrast to indifference towards actual politics. By separating out 
Marxism (and much else political) from Christianity in his later work, he has run the risk of defining 
'the Left' himself, leaving it in what seems to me a distant and abstract limbo, which rather reduces 
the impact of any supposed alignment with any form of Christianity and dilutes any practical 
significance of his ‘compatibilism’. A similar complaint has been made elsewhere: in commenting on 
Eagleton’s study on hope (Eagleton, 2015), a reviewer suggests that they are  ‘desirous to know the 
precise details of this structure and how it affects everyday practice’ (Cooper, 2016:993) The faintest 
of suspicion even arises that today’s Eagleton would actually prefer ‘the Left’ to remain in limbo, so 
such details never need to be elucidated. 
Apparent similarities between Eagleton’s work and the project are therefore deceptive, concealing a 
difference that is in fact stark. The project puts political action at its centre; fully prepared to disagree 
with Marxists, starting with Stalin but eventually reaching to Marx himself, its goal is to revise Marxism 
not to bury it. As time has gone by, Eagleton has become the opposite, increasingly removed from the 
difficult political choices of a long opposition, always keen to cite Marx and to use his insights for 
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economic explanation, or indeed literary or artistic criticism, but with an interest in Christianity and 
its ethics that seeks to use it as a substitute for Marxism, not a support. Or, to put matters slightly 
more generously, far from trying to bring the two ends of the chain together, Eagleton has resigned 
himself to an attempt merely to keep them within sight of one another.  
What can be derived from this brief analysis of Žižek and Eagleton? Two ostensibly very different 
perspectives, certainly, but as time has passed, I suggest, they have edged ever closer, with recently 
even explicit recognition of the similarity between them: ‘Jesus, to adopt a phrase from Slavoj Žižek, 
must accept the Real in all its brute meaninglessness’ (Eagleton, 2018:46). My conclusion is that 
insofar as the original project stands in need of revision, Eagleton no more than Žižek offers anything 
much from their respective Christian orthodoxies, except in Eagleton’s discussion of ethics, and even 
that must be treated with caution lest it develop an independent life of its own, away from the central 
concerns of the project.  
The differences between Garaudy’s project and the work of Žižek and Eagleton might therefore lead 
to the surprising conclusion that the project is more hopeful, in exactly the sense of one critic of them 
both, ‘a mutual expectation, beyond mere wishful thinking, that something new is possible, a better 
society than the current alienated and social existence of humankind’ (Sigurdson, 2012:5) and 
presents a more ambitious relationship between Marxism and Christianity than either of their own 
contributions. This is not to say that the project as Garaudy developed it was perfect, needing only to 
be disinterred and dusted down to be completely serviceable half a century after its interment. 
Elements I argue would need substantial revision, whilst there were also important omissions that 
would need to be included. The starting point, as with the original project, but sharply distinguished 





A revised political analysis 
 
The radical politics that Garaudy himself clearly viewed as an essential component of the project, 
although relatively unusual at the time, have a contemporary feel in their general emphasis on the 
environment, on building international political consensus, and on the autonomy of local 
organisations rather than a traditional Marxist emphasis on state control. Others who have considered 
themselves Marxists and Christians have more recently concurred: ‘Where Marxists were to be 
politically effective — as in the Communist Party of South Africa — it was always because they had 
adopted programmes and forms of action only connected with Marxism in the loosest and most 
indirect ways’ (MacIntyre, 1995 [2008:421]). True then, and I would argue even more true now: the 
utter failure of socialist practice does often blind observers to achievements in other directions, such 
as the ending of apartheid and the winding-down of the nuclear arms race. Is it not interesting, to say 
the least, that these are precisely the political areas in which collaboration between Christians and 
Marxists has always been most readily achievable?  
But here, perhaps, we stumble, because the political trajectory of those such as Eagleton and Žižek, 
has varied little, in practice, from that of Critchley or MacIntyre, or the ‘prophetic’ character of 
Garaudy’s own existence during the period of the project. None of them, nor the Left in general,  has 
been able to make political capital out of any accommodation with Christianity, or any other religion. 
It must be conceded: nor might the advocates of any revised project. Yet the task of revising Marxism 
has not gone away, and the politics of the original project do however now seem, with the benefit of 
hindsight, partially incorrect and exaggerated in three important specific respects, all of which do tend 
towards alignment with much of what has been regarded as radical Christian politics.   
First, the question of the environment and the role of technology. Garaudy’s relationship with 
technology in the project was evidently awkward. His Malthusian worry about famine in the 
developing world has been continually defeated by the very technology he denounced in Appel aux 
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vivants (Garaudy, 1979). Criticism of ‘a civilisation dominated by science and technology’232 (Garaudy, 
1992:108) begs the question of which sciences and which technologies are to be kept and which 
jettisoned. The global population has passed the five billion mark he forecast, and gone on to seven 
billion, whilst the number dying from famine has regularly diminished, albeit unevenly, whilst United 
Nations agencies agree that ‘Conflict remains the main driver of food crises’  (Food Security 
Information Network, 2018:33) , not development or economic growth. Whilst for Garaudy, ‘Choosing 
this model of growth makes the status quo immutable and revolution impossible’ 233 (Garaudy, 
1979:15) he was evidently only half-right — revolution became impossible, but the status quo, at least 
for the majority, became much more liveable, not less. Meanwhile the threat of nuclear war, whilst 
still with us, has so far not manifested. There is always a chance of the threat eventuating — at the 
time of writing — but it has been mercifully elusive, notwithstanding further international nuclear 
proliferation. The intense political opposition to nuclear energy that Garaudy put at the front of in the 
politics of the project evidently needs to be better nuanced. Whilst Chernobyl was a massive ecological 
disaster by any measure, with thousands of deaths attributable to it (Cardis et al., 2006), and 
Fukushima taught us that nowhere in the world is immune to a nuclear disaster (Steinhauser et al., 
2014), the rise of renewable, especially solar, energy technology (IRENA, 2019) does provide some 
grounds for believing that with a few exceptions, notably perhaps France, even global capitalism is 
unlikely to have recourse to further extensive programmes of nuclear power development, at least in 
the foreseeable future and with existing technology. A revised project would find itself more easily in 
alignment with the global climate change movement specifically, adopting a more granular and 
nuanced focus on the distinction between technology as a potentially positive influence on humanity 
and its undoubted possible risks.   
Second, over-optimism regarding the struggle against capitalism. Religion as protest, the Bible as 
biased towards the poor, the Church as open and free, God as truly human — decades ago this was 
 
232 une civilisation dominée par les sciences et les techniques 
233 choisir ce modèle de croissance c’est rendir le statu quo invivable et la révolution impossible 
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characterised as ‘an impressive doctrinal system that has proved to be a positive catalyst in Marxist–
Christian dialogue’ (McLelland, 1988:182). This view was already looking dated by the time it was 
written; over three decades later the trajectory of both Marxism and Christianity suggests that it was 
a blind alley. An honest assessment would highlight the failure of both the political Left and politically 
engaged Christianity to achieve any progress in the overthrow of capitalism during those decades and 
even thereafter, where not even the most existential challenges to the global order of war and 
pestilence have been able to shake its grip on global economics, and even strengthened it.    
Third, the truncated timescale of the project was completely in error, to a significant degree as a result 
of Garaudy’s impatience. Joachim de Flore suggested that the Age of the Spirit would begin around 
1260 (Reeves, 1980:298). Garaudy, who was familiar with his work (Garaudy, 1980:5), nevertheless 
suggested that unless action were taken soon, there would be no future even in the 21st Century. 
Both Christians and Marxists have evidently been very wrong on timescale. Reading Garaudy’s work 
from his prophetic period — or those of liberation theologians such as Alves (1969) or humanists such 
as Marcuse (1960, 1964) — is reminiscent of de Flore in this respect. Garaudy’s poor judgement as to 
the tenacity of capitalism failed to desert him even decades later, when he argued that ‘The 
restoration of capitalism in Russia has made a new Third World out of the old Soviet Union’234 
(Garaudy, 1994:3). Certainly, Garaudy’s view of the time frame in which change to the capitalist 
system could possibly eventuate has been proved dramatically over-optimistic. The viewpoint he took 
in L’Alternative (Garaudy, 1972 [1976]), and even in Appel aux vivants (Garaudy, 1979), of basing 
politics on the need and possibility for immediate change in order to avert catastrophe, now seems 
ill-judged, even slightly hysterical in tone, the prerogative of distinctly minority movements such as 
Occupy and Extinction Rebellion. On the contrary, the global dominance of capitalism as an economic 
form since the project has been accentuated, and has permeated throughout Islam, the alternative 
that Garaudy sought after abandoning the project. The immediate short-term success of the project 
 




was perhaps its highest hurdle, and it failed at it. A more realistic timescale as a starting point, and 
application to individuals as well as society, will be needed in a revised project that short-term, even 
lifetime, disappointment cannot defeat. This was quite evident to many politicians, philosophers and 
economists even throughout the 1970s, although it is fair to observe that it was equally not so obvious  
to significant numbers either. Whatever any consistency between Marxism and Christianity is now is 
designed to achieve, politically or theologically, it is not to avert an imminent nuclear holocaust, or  to 
rescue Russia from Third World status, however many nuclear weapons still remain and however poor 
many Russians remain. 
Neither political ideas, nor indeed religions, are refuted because of setbacks, even persistent failures, 
but if at all because they are ‘shown to be pernicious or impracticable’ (Collins, 2001:12). It must only 
be recognised that any contemporary attempt to utilise Garaudy’s thought in establishing mutual 
dependence between Marxism and Christianity should be based on at least the reas onable 
expectation of the continuation of the international capitalist system in more or less its current form 
for the foreseeable future. Yet it must be compatible with critical analysis of its failings as well as 
projections and encouragement of its eventual replacement.  
This is evidently an exacting requirement with many aspects, some of which are relatively clear, others 
not. For example, the original project may be seen to be in the vanguard of revisionist approaches to 
Marxist class analysis, needing only further detailed empirical analysis for a revised project. So too, 
the importance of international culture was a hallmark of the project. Both indicated an evolution 
from a narrow conception of the proletariat as the sole class destined to deliver the overthrow of 
capitalism. Although ‘The original advocates of liberation theology ignored central issues in human 
experience, linked with sexuality and gender, which continue to be key areas of human need and 
oppression’ (Rowland, 2007: xiii), it has now evolved towards ‘a multiplicity of liberation theologies’ 
(Boer, 2011:7; Cooper, 2013). A revised project could certainly now draw on Christianity for some of 
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its politics, for radical theology has not only caught up with Garaudy, but in some crucial areas  gone 
further:  
‘The one God of the Christendom that took up the Roman pattern and built empires on the 
labor of slaves had, through centuries, provoked many rounds of exodus. The US civil rights 
movement and the birth of Black theology along with Latin American liberation theology 
churned up new Christian discourses of exodus…God’s faces and names began to proliferate. 
God’s façade of bourgeois democracy began to slip’ (Keller & Schneider, 2010:5).  
Whilst at least the emergence of this frame of reference had certainly commenced by the time he 
wrote (e.g. Cone, 1969), Garaudy’s attempt to break through such a façade took him in on the contrary 
eventually to Islam. This in practice also took him away from not only the option for the poor of 
liberation theology, but also from any opportunity to integrate the real struggles of minorities — and 
conflicts between them — into the project. A revised project would have to set this aright, but without 
losing the central Marxist insight that opposition to capitalism must lie at the centre, not the periphery, 
of politics. 
No doubt the universal appeal that Garaudy intended the project to have was always one of its more 
appealing aspects, but at the same time most difficult to achieve in practice. The ‘Dialogue of 
Civilisations’ Garaudy proposed was either far too parochial and small-scale to have any significant 
effect, or too vague and lacking in operational detail to be of any practical use. Support for 
international organisations of many kinds, including those launched by churches as well as between 
governments, is the closest the 21st Century world comes to anything like a true dialogue of 
civilisations, and no doubt a revised project should incorporate many of them. But clashes between 
different cultures, religions and sets of beliefs, the majority of which have surely had the tendency 
since Garaudy wrote to reinforce the hegemony of capitalist institutions worldwide — these are 
absent in the analysis of the project, and therefore so too any proposal as to how to resolve them. 
This thesis is not the place to discuss political strategy for the Left. There may not currently be any one 
satisfactory place, or any good answers (Holloway, 2002:255). A revised project would however 
certainly need to be aware of these clashes, and develop responses to them, to become less politically 
vulnerable and worthwhile pursuing.  
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A plausible Marxism for the 21st Century and beyond must therefore surely involve the development 
of the patience that Garaudy lacked. Any teleology that encompasses the demise of capitalism must 
therefore be visualised as a very long-term objective, deriving its politics from a realistic appreciation 
of actual political developments. Marx himself worried that the time for revolution may have been 
missed: participants in the revised project, as some Marxists have acknowledged, must work out very 
complex, and quite possibly entirely individual, strategies of resistance to enduring ‘universal 
alienations’ (Harvey, 2018:452). ‘In this situation [1995, but equally so at the time of writing more 
than two decades later], ‘what is most urgently needed is a politics of self-defence for all those local 
societies that aspire to achieve some relatively self-sufficient and independent form of participatory 
practice–based community and that therefore need to protect themselves from the corrosive effects 
of capitalism and the depredations of state power’ (MacIntyre, 1995 [2008:422]).  
Patience must not obscure the need to overcome capitalism and the hope for a future beyond it, which 
should remain as the ultimate goal of a revised project: so too the long-held conviction that Marxism 
can intrinsically be revised so as to tolerate theism without ceasing to be a philosophy or a metaphysics 
and yet retain its essential insight into human life on this planet (Adelman, 1968:68). ‘Revisionism is, 
then, a part of the dialectic. This is probably the best insight that the Marxists have had in some time. 
Marxism in theory cannot stand pat; it must evolve’ (Adelman, 1968:69). And evolve it consistently 
has, in exactly the direction Garaudy argued it must, discarding structural Marxism and with calls to 
violence largely ignored. Any revised project, now free from any obligation to avoid the charge of 
revisionism, must confront honestly the tremendous obstacles that capitalism has placed in the way 
of its own transcendence, the possibility of regress, as well as the dangers of reinventing a form of 
Marxism–Leninism, and continue the process of revising Marxism until that need is met and hope 
fulfilled.  
In all of these three ways, therefore, a revised project can better be defended against the objections 
Garaudy himself implicitly raised to his own original project, and further, establish that to abandon 
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the project in favour of Islam was only to advance the cause of capitalism, not act to defeat it. The 
political challenge of the project is to develop appropriate long-term strategies for the Left without 
losing the Marxist hope at the centre of the project, that capitalism is inherently temporary, and that 
through transcendence humanity has the subjective capacity to surmount it.  
 
Christianity in the revised project 
 
There are three ways at least in which the role of Christianity within the revised project needs to be 
studied beyond its input of transcendence and subjectivity to Marxism.  
Firstly, the politics of Christianity. It was the early Marx who argued that Christianity, or more precisely 
St. Augustine, ‘teaches, as religion is bound to teach: submit to authority, for all authority is from God’ 
(Marx, 1842 [1975:184]). The Christianity of the project owes nothing to St Augustine except explicitly 
to maintain that Marxism would be the poorer without him (1965d:70),  and certainly does not 
advocate submission to political authority any more than did Marx himself. This insight, defended by 
Eagleton and Žižek as much as by Garaudy, must be retained and even if possible enhanced. So too, 
the very possibility of divorcing Christian principles from practice. It was the early Marx too, who 
argued that ‘It is the greatest irreligion, it is the arrogance of secular reason, to divorce the general 
spirit of religion from actually existing religion’ (Marx, 1842 [1975:184]) as Garaudy undoubtedly did. 
I argue that the revised project must build a successful political engagement within Christianity and 
other religions in order to avoid accusations of a similar arrogance.  
This may be assisted by the fact that the role of Marxism in the decline of Christianity in countries such 
as France, as argued by Cholvy & Hilaire (1988), was after all surely slight. McLeod, for example, 
devotes very little space to Marxism, and finds alternative, largely capitalist explanations for the 
decline of Christianity in the West including for example Pope Paul VI’s conservative stance on clerical 
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celibacy and contraception (McLeod, 2007:13). Indeed, Marxism may have actually promoted 
Christianity, albeit indirectly, by giving it a target to oppose, which Pope John Paul II managed adroitly, 
as a study of the Encyclical Laborem Exercens amply demonstrated (Baum, 1987). 
Secondly, the relationship between Christianity and Marxism. For Bloch, the absolute rejection of 
Christianity by vulgar Marxism is not the right critique of religion. Rather, it is to subject Christianity 
to a class, and by extension an ethical, rebuke. What emerges from the Marxist criticism of Christianity 
is a religion purified of oppression generated by class. If Christianity should be scrutinised by a 
theology located in the world, then so long as Marxism was a dominant form of contemporary 
atheism, taking Marx seriously ought to be important for Christians (Lash, 1981:6). But Lash certainly 
followed his own dictum: as Marx became less significant in the world, he ceased to engage with it. 
MacIntyre followed the same path: once he decided that capitalism had the capacity to prevent 
proletarian revolution indefinitely, he declined to engage much further with it (MacIntyre, 1981), 
except to reminisce (MacIntyre, 1995 [2008]). The disinclination to engage, both from Christians and 
many others, became a self-fulfilling prophecy: Marxism beat a hasty retreat to the academy after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, where it has generally remained since.  
In response, whereas the original project largely concerned what Marxism could derive from 
Christianity, a revised project should also concern itself with (amongst many other things) the reverse. 
It should lean on the repeated insistence of another scholar that a Christian cannot help but be a 
Marxist (Turner, 1975, 1977, 1983) to attempt to lodge a revised Marxism as securely as possible 
within the practice of actual Christianity. A great deal of contemporary political theology is structured 
along similar lines. To take just three examples from the academy: the ‘grammar of hope’ in the recent 
work of Emmanuel Katongole (2017:264) in his attempt to come to grips with the lessons of 
Christianity for politics in Africa, and for another, the work of Peter McLaren (2015) attempting to 
breathe life into liberation theology in Latin America, and the feminist liberation theology of Marcella 
Althaus-Reid (2002). The revised project is therefore far from unknown in general terms. In its 
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contemporary forms, however, it is without any overt recognition of its precursor, almost certainly 
because of Garaudy’s conversion and subsequent reputation. More of concern is that although 
Marxism and liberation theology share an orientation toward the future, and hope that human action 
‘will eventually result in improvement for living in this world’ (Li & Rowland, 2013:184), recent 
liberation theology frequently survives without an explicitly Marxist goal of the abolition of capitalism, 
in turn leading to diverse, fissiparous and potentially even divisive approaches to political goals and 
action.  
Unfortunately too for any revised project, it will continue to have powerful, active opponents. 
Liberation theology has since the 1970s been firmly a minority pursuit with liberation theologians 
distancing themselves from Marx (Kee, 1990:xi), even if those examining Marx and religion are on 
occasion reluctant to recognise the fact (Uchegbue, 2011). Similarly, the tolerant, egalitarian, 
intellectually sophisticated, liberal Christianity frequently presented in the academy of the late 20th 
Century (e.g. Altizer & Hamilton, 1968; Hamer, 1967) is simply not the majority Christianity of China, 
of India, still less of the Evangelical Churches of Africa nor even now of much of Latin America. The 
majority of believers there would certainly not agree that with the assertion from the time of the 
original project that the Marxist–Christian dialogue had made it ‘abundantly clear that the real division 
is not between believers and non-believers, but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat’ 
(Hornosty, 1976:286). Their Christian faith no longer even feels the need for the Marxist hypothesis, 
notwithstanding — or perhaps because — in many cases much less than perfect regimes professing 
allegiance to Marxist principles ruled in many of their countries, or parts of them. Nor even, to many 
of the values that underpin it, if they ever did. As the strongest growth in Christian believers in the 
21st Century is amongst this majority, the current task would seem the herculean one of persuading 
them to take Garaudy’s project — or something very like it — seriously. 
A realistic evaluation of the revised project must recognise that the relationship between Marxism 
and Christianity has always depended on which Christianity, and which Marxism. At the time Garaudy 
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was about to abandon his original project, Lash argued that for any kind of synthesis, any sufficiently 
modified Marxism would not be recognisable as a form of Marxism by other forms of the Marxist 
tradition (Lash, 1981:291). If Marxism and Christianity are to engage in the 21st Century, if any kind of 
post-capitalist world is even to be envisaged, let alone worked for, Boer is surely right to suggest that 
there must be some kind of confrontation, not only between the traditions, but perhaps even more 
so, within them (Boer, 2014). Yet if Lenin and Althusser were to meet Augustine and Luther (Collier, 
2001:1), most would agree, they would not agree on much. ‘Synthetic dialogue’ demands that ‘good 
Christians’ repudiate ‘bad Christianity’, and that the ‘good Marxists’ repudiate ‘bad Marxism’ (Vree, 
1978:399). But what might these be? Yes, ‘A Pelagian Christianity can meet a Feuerbachian Marxism 
on the ground of an anthropocentric philosophy’ (Collier, 2001:1) and following earlier attempts by 
Macmurray (1933), MacIntyre (1953) and Turner (1975, 1977, 1983) the revised project may have to 
accept that mutual dependence must stop there. A revised project will therefore have to remain 
insistent that it is possible for an individual or group to claim to be both Christian and Marxist, but 
only by rejecting certain aspects of what at various times has been claimed as part of both. Garaudy 
was one of the first to state this clearly and unequivocally. And, as has been argued in previous 
chapters, there are consequences of this insistence, both theological and political. 
Thirdly, the political limits of Christianity. Garaudy seems to have conflated two different components 
of the relationship between Marxism and Christianity — the one theoretical, the other practical. At a 
theoretical level it may well be that subjectivity and transcendence make for a better, more humane 
revolution than do dialectical and historical materialism. They may also be a better analysis of the 
human condition. They may even be essential for Marxism. So too religion’s continued political ‘power 
to inspire and incite’ must be recognised (Brown 2010: 83). But to argue that it is necessary 
‘indissolubly [to] associate political and religious problems’235 (Garaudy, 1992: 11) or to argue that 
religion is the only practical force capable of creating social change seem exaggerated claims, 
 
235 associe indissolublement problems politiques et problems religieux  
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especially in relation to developed countries. On the contrary, the decline of both Catholic church 
attendance and of membership of Marxist parties in France indicates the weakness of both (McLeod, 
2007:11). It has been contended that the world can still be set alight by a Christianity that permits ‘the 
possibility of a non-ideological social order modelled on the radical egalitarian collective of the ‘Holy 
Spirit’ (Kotsko, 2014:97), evoking that Spirit which is ‘a real force acting upon real minds’ (Fielding 
Clarke, 1977:39). But even if there were an indissoluble connection between faith and political 
immediacy in an advanced capitalist state, which I doubt, synergies might well be minimal, and the 
effect possibly even deleterious to both. Garaudy may be right that Christianity might well be required 
to provide Marxism with theoretical life support, a role of supreme political importance for the 
project, but perhaps paradoxically it seems ill-placed to provide it with sufficient political influence as 
well, at least in the immediate future.   
I conclude that the idea of using Garaudy’s project to identify the mutual dependence of Marxism and 
Christianity in the 21st Century may still not be that farfetched. If ‘Theology that starts from manifold 
intuitions of multiplicity and relationality is often inspired by stories of liberation, of resistance to some 
monolithic religio-political rule’ (Keller & Schneider, 2011a:3), then Christianity can be expected to 
continue to place political obligations on its practitioners, but it would equally be naïve to believe that 
it will ever be easy to build consensus between even sympathetic Christians and those who still 
consider themselves Marxists as to the right way forward. 
 
Prophecy and the principle of levels 
 
The Garaudy of the project, however, was always too wise to allow the strength of Marxism as a 
political movement to determine his analysis of Christianity. In contrast to both Bloch and Lash, though 
not with Žižek and Eagleton, he is at ease with levels of analysis, but as the criticism of the original 
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project has shown, others were not. Since then, the principle of ontological levels has gained wider 
acceptance. It has for example enabled the Dalai Lama too to call himself a Marxist, and even suggest 
that at the level of spirituality as everyday practice, a sense of concern over the other’s well-being. 
‘Marxism is spiritual at that level’ (Dhar et al., 2016:588).  
In respect of epistemology, Garaudy is surely on the soundest ground. Whilst Bonino (1975) argued 
that Marxism in general and liberation theology shared a critical perspective on abs olute truth, the 
critical position advanced by Garaudy (1970a) seems more logical, but he stringently avoids 
consideration of almost all theological questions. A revised project cannot altogether hide behind 
Garaudy’s excuse that he was no theologian. To consider two examples. First, nowhere in his project 
does Garaudy either assert or deny the existence of an immortal soul. As to individual resurrection, 
certainly Garaudy does deny the likelihood of individual bodily resurrection, but this is a scepticism he 
shares with many other theologians. A revised project need not exclude such a belief, though it need 
not be required to underpin Marxism. Similarly, openness to prophecy, though it must not be allowed 
to employ mysticism in the service of capitalism, so that it ‘subtracts everything from poverty, 
reducing it to misery’ (Negri & Fadini, 2008:666) might yet allow that some mythology that Garaudy 
put in the exclusion zone need not be there: Garaudy is perhaps too swift to attack the miraculous. It 
will be a delicate strategic withdrawal from materialism, but the Marxism of the revised project, 
operating at levels, as Collier and others have suggested, a concept to which Garaudy himself was 
open, and having left dialectical materialism far behind, could still leave open belief in the possibility 
that materialist explanations do not wholly suffice, even to explain each and every material event.   
 




General considerations aside, the core of the relationship between Marxism and Christianity within 
the project has been shown to be transcendence and subjectivity. How should they fare in a revised 
project? In Chapter Four I argued that for Garaudy, Marx was the pre-eminent philosopher of freedom. 
Philosophically, however, Garaudy spent little time finessing the degree of individual freedom that 
history ever permitted, and the extent to which individual creativity is any sense actually compatible 
with a Marxist economic framework. To tell us that ‘The problem of freedom is for Marx not only an 
individual problem, but a historical and social problem, a problem of class’ 236 (Garaudy, 1977a:142) 
really does not get us very far. To assign to Marxism alone an especial problem with the question of 
freedom is evidently unfair: determinism need not be economic, or even primarily economic, to 
circumscribe the range of individual choice. But to leave entirely unspoken the actual issue of 
individual autonomy is even less acceptable within any plausible political project than it was in 
Garaudy’s time. Even the question of the extent to which economics, and class, plays a central role in 
the personality needs to be elucidated in much more depth than Garaudy ever attempted. Such an 
attempt would need to avoid the trap, into which arguably Sève and even Garaudy did originally fall, 
of developing a psychology around the division of labour (Burkitt, 1991:128), that ‘through work man 
becomes Man, beyond other animals’237 (Rodriguez, 1981:24), thereby creating no more than a 
psychological parallel to Lysenko’s discredited views on biology (Kolchinksy et al., 2017). Ironically 
perhaps, it is Sève whose much more balanced recent work has pointed the way to how a personality 
ought to be considered from the standpoint of the project, for example the importance of recognising 
a complex definition of biography as a way of understanding individuals and the subjectivity they 
possess at any one time (Sève, 2008:5). Garaudy himself merely gestures to this when he distinguishes 
between our true individuality and that imposed by capitalism (Garaudy, 1975:48). A revised project 
will have much catching-up to do here. 
 
236 La problème de la liberté est donc pour Marx non pas seulement un problème individu, mais un problème 
historique et social, un problème de classe 
237 mediante el trabajo el hombre llega a ser hombre separándose del animal 
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On the other hand, advocates of a revised project would surely be gratified to read those of a militant 
disposition insisting on the importance of love for revolutionary change, for example the assertion, 
which does read remarkably as if written by Garaudy himself, that ‘Theology becomes important for 
revolutionary thinking when charity and love (agape and amor) are assumed to be unrestrainable 
powers — where, in other words, the same logos, the same rationality is placed at love’s disposal’ 
(Negri & Fadini, 2008:666). Whilst the migration of revolutionary thinkers towards the recognition of 
the power of love is no doubt a welcome development for any revised project, this cannot serve as an 
excuse not to pursue more detailed explanation. If love is suppressed within capitalism, how will it 
eventually rebel against its tormentor? For how long must Marxists look only to the sporadic rejection 
of liberalism (Fukuyama, 2018) as evidence that history has not ended? A revised project stands in 
need of more detail here: in what way does this process work in practice? And where are its limits: why 
does it not work more successfully? 
 
A more subdued transcendence  
 
What of the role of transcendence in a revised project? At the conclusion of Chapter Five I noted that 
Garaudy’s transcendence fails to engage with political reality. The very breadth of the idea militates 
against its effective application in matters political in a 21st Century world that seems to have rejected 
equality, and has only adopted a piecemeal facsimile of socialism in response to a global natural crisis. 
The choice would further appear to range from Negri’s rejection of transcendence as a liberating force 
(Revel, 2016:474) to accepting that, for the time being at least, its force at a political level is subdued, 
local, and insufficient for any major achievement. Some explanation must be given for the apparent 
boisterous progress of capitalism, after all. Garaudy’s transcendence might, however, be viewed 
sequentially rather than in parallel, as he did: there are times when a common humanity overcomes 
political difficulties — one thinks of the abolition of slavery or the defeat of Fascism — but there may 
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also be times when transcendence focuses on science, or even when it can be observed only at the 
level of individual love. A revised project will take more cognisance of that fluidity, and recognise the 
impact of different perspectives of transcendence, for example that of feminist theory (Rivera, 2007).  
That is a positive revision. But if ‘Marxism’s truncated approach requires the completion of theological 
transcendence to make the required breakthrough’ (Boer, 2014:7), a response is required to the 
important criticism to which the apparently compulsively optimistic Garaudy provided no answer. 
That is, ‘if transcendence is simply the ‘presence of the future in man’, the ‘prophetic dimension of 
life’, as Garaudy says (Garaudy, 1976:185), nothing allows us to hope that this future will be good, that 
it will be better than the present’ (Masset, 1977:323). As has been observed, the Marxist dialectic of 
human practice did not leave the possibility of regress as open as that of progress. The result was that 
the progressive framework of Hegelian dialectic remained unquestioned (van der Bent, 1987:5). 
Garaudy’s transcendence and subjectivity were as open to the same charge: they seem to lack any 
dark side. And as both natural and political events can conspire to produce outcomes that might be 
heralded enthusiastically by some yet deplored by others, without any ethical compass it might not 
even be clear where to find evidence of transcendence. An honest appreciation of humanity in the 
21st Century for a revised project would have to resolve this conundrum: although there is no doubt 
that even under contemporary capitalism, individuals are capable of great acts of creativity, of love, 
and of sacrifice, there is also great reason to believe that those forces that act in the other direction 
— towards conformity, tribal hatred and selfishness — will continue to hold the upper ground for 
generations to come. A strategy to incorporate that reality into version of Garaudy’s transcendence 
stripped of unbalanced optimism, but without introducing unjustified pessimism either — is needed. 
As has already been suggested, ‘we must temper this optimism of the will with at least some 
pessimism — or, better, some realism — of the intellect’ (Hall, 2012:369). A balance would no doubt 
be difficult to achieve, let alone to maintain, but it is undoubtedly necessary.  
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Work to place transcendence in a revised project would therefore seek to connect the frontier 
between economic and political resistance to capitalism, often at the margins, the continued existence 
of that evidently difficult to define concept, hope, at the individual and collective level, and the role 
that could potentially be played by a spiritual force such as the Holy Spirit, all of which was all under–
theorised in the original project. At the same time, the revised project should also defend 
transcendence against projected replacements, such as a ‘gap in immanence’ (Žižek, 2001:99) not 
least because of the political implications of violent resistance and quixotic political failure that such 
a replacement may bring. 
More recent humanist conceptions of transcendence are unfortunately defanged — detached from 
Marxism and rendered harmless for capitalism. Hence a concept of ‘horizontal transcendence’ 
stretches across the very familiar contemporary territory of interpersonal relationships, concern for 
the planet and for future generations (Krattenmaker, 2018:28). Transcendence has somehow lost its 
way here, even being ascribed not just to the mundane, but to conformity itself. It is not surprising 
that ‘transcendental projects such as Karl Rahner’s can seem to belong to a bygone era of categories 
now surpassed’ (Crowley, 2010:569), not least because of their apparent parochiality with regard to 
other religions than Christianity with which a comparative theologian is evidently hardly satisfied 
(Clooney, 2005:8). All can surely agree that a transcendence that is not only universal, but 
omnipresent, which ends up dissipating in an ethical swirl that at the social level changes nothing, and 
at an individual level fuses with moral virtues, yet remains entirely located within one particular 
religious tradition in practice is scarcely likely to command respect as a force capable of overcoming 
capitalism.  
Yet transcendence of human vice, of capitalism, must remain an integral part of any revised project. 
As the principal force upon which the project relies to change the world, how could it not be? The 
contemporary study of transcendence, as opposed to that comfortable assumption of revolution 
which is thought to terminate with Bloch (Agar, 2014), fortunately remains malleable material for the 
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revised project, with assertions such as: ‘After the world–interpretations of the philosophers came 
the world–transformations of the social and technical revolutionaries. Now, we must interpret the 
world again, if we want to save it for ourselves. The self-evident existence of our world has become a 
problem of existential decision for us. The problem of the world was never before the problem of 
human existence in such intensity and extensiveness. This requires total and global concentration 
from us, which is possible only in God’ (Hegedüs, 1991:103). This formulation would seem to go some 
way to defending Rahner against the charge of Christian parochiality. But what is still missing is an 
explanation of how transcendence works in practice, and in particular, an explanation must be found 
as to exactly why a transcendence that can bring people together to sweep away apartheid, or defeat 
Fascism, cannot fuse sufficient energy to overcome antagonisms and mobilise global resources to defy 
and even replace capitalist priorities. For example, why transcendence fails to bring clean water to 
ever more African villages, rather than leaving the matter in the hands of a transnational institution 
that by its own admission lacks the resources to do the job (FAO, 2019). At an analytical level, this is 
where the revised project must explain transcendence in much more detail than the original, if it is not 
to avoid the same fate as dialectical materialism in failing to provide a motor for change for good that 
actually works.  
 
Ethics — a fourth postulate?  
 
The project stressed subjectivity as a force for change, but as we have now seen, Garaudy’s optimism 
placed too much emphasis on individual freedom and insufficient on individual responsibility. This is 
partly explained by the most surprising omission within the project, the absence of a treatment of 
ethics. In a project situated within both the Marxist and Christian traditions, the absence of any 
treatment of ethics is surely remarkable. The fact that since the time Garaudy wrote there has been 
an ethical turn in Marxist theory (Bourg, 2007; Blackledge, 2012:3; Thompson, 2015) — what has been 
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described as ‘snatching Marxism back from its scientific status and restore it to its utopian, or rather 
ethical, possibility’ (Negri, 2008:130) makes a call for ethics, neglected by Garaudy, to be included in 
a revised project even more plausible. A revised version of the project proposed in this chapter would 
answer that need by adopting an ethic derived from Christianity, as challenging to many Christians as 
to Marxists, but broadening the philosophy of the project onto terrain where Marxist critics would 
find themselves less comfortable. 
In daring to do so, my first observation is that much of the criticism directed against the ‘ethical turn’ 
has rested on the fear of robbing Marxism of the cloak of invincibility derived from its prediction of 
the eventual, inevitable demise of capitalism and its ‘cult of the perfectibility of man’ (Kamenka, 
1969:26). For Marxism to drop its claims to scientific status — as Garaudy insisted it should — would 
for many Marxists certainly leave a void. But through the project, Garaudy already offers an alternative 
to both dialectical and historical materialism, derived from Christianity: as even in his Marxist 
humanist period he argued that ‘By the questions it raises, Christianity keeps the Marxist awake’. 
(Allen, 1966:629). For Garaudy’s project, therefore, the fear of dropping claims to scientific status for 
Marxism dissipates. 
Yet it would seem that however strongly he held ethical beliefs personally, for Garaudy, as for Marx, 
ethics is to be treated with suspicion, and certainly could be relied upon to be at the centre of a revised 
Marxism or any wider project for the liberation of humanity. As Denys Turner has consistently argued 
the state of the world demands a moral response for which we still do not have the discourse without 
recourse to Marxism: ‘it is within the dialectics of the praxis of “strong compatibility” that the 
materials of that discourse will be forged, or not at all’ (Turner, 1983:250, 2020). As Turner goes on to 
say, there is nothing to say we will forge them, which leads to little surprise that his recent view is that 
Marx only sought to establish a kind of pre-morality, to advance demands of a capitalist world ‘that it 
practice what on its own terms it has to preach, and so conform to the truth of itself which, if Marx is 
right, it cannot do and survive as capitalism’ (Turner, 2020:154).  
253 
 
Subsequent developments within Marxism have, however, identified, explained and promoted 
specifically ethical principles within contemporary Marxism which enjoy a potentially close correlation 
with those advocated within the domain of political theology. The view evinced by one of the leading 
advocates of the ‘ethical turn’ in Marxism, Paul Blackledge, is that Marx's central ethical contribution 
rests on the rejection of 'the modern liberal assumption, best articulated by Kant, that moral 
behaviour involves the suppression of our naturally egotistic desires on the basis of a disembodied 
conception of reason' (Blackledge, 2012:4). Marx's ethics, by contrast, although ‘he follows Kant in 
putting human freedom at the center of his social theory’ (Blackledge, 2012:24) seeks to develop a 
collective version of that freedom, and 'amounts to a modern version of Aristotle's account of those 
practices underpinning the virtues through which individuals are able to flourish within communities' 
(Blackledge, 2012:3). This in turn involves treading a difficult, if not tortuous, path to avoid both the 
Scylla of naturalism and the Charybdis of a tyranny of liberal reason in the direction of an ethic that 
goes beyond Hegel to envisage individual freedom as only possible through intense collective effort 
in the direction of liberation from capitalism. This path is surely at the very least a reasonable facsimile 
of the post Marxist–Leninist ethics of Marxist humanism. It now seems unduly harsh to argue that: 
‘in the work of Marx himself, we find an uncritical conflation of ethical relativism, evolutionary 
ethics, the ethic of self-determination and self-realisation, utilitarian strains, the ethic of co-
operation and a kind of social subjectivism, all assumed or proclaimed rather than argued for’ 
(Kamenka, 1969:2). 
Yet for all the efforts of successive writers to extract an ethic from Marx’s writings (e.g. Kamenka, 
1962, 1969; Fisk, 1984; Lukes, 1985; Churchich, 1994; Sève, 2004:57–67, Critchley, 2007; Blackledge, 
2012; Turner, 1983, 2020), an unease remains over the simultaneous insistence upon the historical 
origin of ethical values and on ‘the moral superiority of socialism over preceding systems’ (Kamenka, 
1969:5). The evidence of successive attempts to present Marx as having successfully transcended 
diametrically opposite philosophers to placate such unease is surely proof that a coherent and 
worked—out Marxist position in ethics, if not an illusion (Kamenka, 1969:2), is still a distant goal. An 
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honest appraisal would be that at the very least the task of creating Marxist ethics is – in common 
with all non-naturalistic ethical projects — extremely difficult, and the outcome very uncertain.  
This unease perhaps explains the absence of ethics within the original project. This was despite the 
fact that Garaudy’s conception of human nature as explained by Marx, the importance of freedom 
and individual development beyond capitalism as proposed by the economic and social dimension of 
the project, and his attack on capitalist values at the individual level, are all recognisably ethical 
conceptions, and together entailed the rejection of the largely consequentialist, and certainly 
historicist, Marxist–Leninist ethics expounded by Trotsky (1938) or Ash (1964). The abandonment of 
violence, for example, Garaudy presents as the implication of economic development and political 
necessity, rather than a break with the kind of ethics promoted by Marxist–Leninists. It is worth noting 
Garaudy’s alignment with Marx, who always rejected any attempt to build a socialist programme on 
abstract moral demands (Kamenka, 1969:5), by contrast with the suggestion that the Left should reject 
'boring ethical considerations' (Žižek, 2008:406), and rather, 'admit revolutionary violence as a 
liberating end in itself' (Žižek, 2008:380). Only much later, after his conversion, did Garaudy distance 
himself from Marx by recognising that, ‘Socialism, the opposite of capitalism, cannot establish itself 
except on an ethical basis. When emulation with capitalism is on the same plane as capitalism itself, 
with its conception of Homo economicus, failure is inevitable’238 (Garaudy, 1994:76).   
Although Christianity provides subjectivity and transcendence — replacements within the project for 
historical and dialectical materialism respectively — Garaudy chose not to engage with Christian 
ethics, perhaps ironically for a religion high in ethical content. We may conjecture that the cause of 
Garaudy’s silence on the matter was largely political: having already jettisoned so much Marxist 
philosophy in favour of what he perceived that Christianity had to offer, to insist that ethics, too, 
should derive its basis from Christianity might well have been a step too far. This despite the fact that 
 
238 Le socialisme, à l’inverse du capitalisme, ne peut se fonder que sur une base éthique. Lorsque l’émulation 
avec le capitalisme se situe sur le même plan que le capitalisme lui–même, avec sa conception de « l’Homo 
economicus », l’échec est inévitable  
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a self-proclaimed Maoist such as Badiou (1993) recognised that it was precisely the failure of 
Althusserian Marxism to explain away the defeats of the Left, let alone to provide a plausible, even 
decipherable, way forward, that led to the revival of ethics on the Left.   
Such a revival seems tailor-made to the revision of the project. In radical distinction to structural 
Marxism, Christian ethics would enable the rejection of Žižek’s prescription for violence and assist in 
engagement with religions themselves, notwithstanding the risk of losing some political sharpness of 
focus. A revised project would still face objections such as the risk of being mired in contemporary 
political circumstances. However, its rejection of violence would at least rest not on political 
expediency but on engagement with the distinction between ends and means, and therefore a more 
complex ethical basis, and ultimately which ‘particular vision of man’ (MacPherson, 1979:478) would 
underpin its ethics. Christian ethical principles of respect for individuality in particular could serve to 
distance the project yet further from its troubled Marxist–Leninist antecedents. 
As an important example, recent attempts to place ecological concerns within Marxism seek to extend 
Marx’s method to ecology (Burkett, 2014; Foster & Burkett, 2017; Saito, 2017). Hence the suggestion 
that ‘Marx’s critique of political economy, if completed, would have put a much stronger emphasis on 
the disturbance of the “metabolic interaction (Stoffwechsel)” between humanity and nature as the 
fundamental contradiction within capitalism’ (Saito, 2016:26). At the time of the revised project, and 
even before, supporters of dialogue ‘asked themselves if the project of “socialism with a human face”, 
the door ajar for Christians and highly coloured with ecology was very credible’ 239 (Gauvin, 2018:36). 
After more than four decades, such a project now seems more like the only possible credible Marxist 
project, and if modified, it would be through the recognition of individuality that Christianity can bring 
to socialism, exactly as Garaudy pointed out. 
 
239 on se demande si le projet de « socialisme à visage humain » mâtiné d’ouverture aux chrétiens et fortement 
teinté d’écologie est bien credible  
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Incorporating a Christian ethical focus on respect for individual personhood, by contrast, balanced 
against a deep and abiding concern for the environment, and ‘a communitarian alternative to 
cosmopolitanism’ (Northcott, 2013:200) would provide an alternative, revisionis t way to provide 
ethical impetus for environmental issues within a revised project. Such an approach would continue 
to place humanity at the centre of Marxism, not at its service. It would chime as noted above with 
contemporary political practice, and has already been pre-figured by the work of scholars not 
necessarily convinced that there is a Marxist dialectic of the environment waiting to be uncovered 
(e.g. Benton 1989, 1992; Löwy, 2008). There is evidently much work to do within a revised project on 
this subject philosophically as well as politically, given both its importance and topicality.  
Their adoption might also reasonably be expected to generate some political synergy with those who 
combine Christian faith with concern for the environment but who do not necessarily see the world 
through a Marxist lens. Engagement by a revised project with modern scholarship of Marxist ethics, 
and the development of ethical principles that would be compatible with subjective action and 
transcendence in the 21st Century, would therefore appear not only neither unreasonable nor 
especially problematic, but on the contrary, useful, or even essential, for the defence of the project 
against criticism, especially from within the Left itself. Marx’s own move from ethics to politics may 
have been ‘too quick’ (Blackledge, 2012:3), his ethical legacy was certainly complex and uncertain. 
There are still those who reject the claim that Christ has ‘reconfigured geographical space, erasing the 
distinction between those who are outs ide and those who are under the law’ (Eagleton, 2009a:317), 
even drawing on theology itself to side with Žižek and claim that they are ‘far less enthused with ethics 
and love’ (Boer, 2014: 264). But they are now in a minority: the introduction of a contemporary 
Christian ethic into Garaudy’s project as a fourth postulate appears to be a desirable development 
which is worth pursuing, at least in the most general sense. As always with the revised project, 
proceeding from general moral categories, exhortations and admonishments, to a fully-fledged and 
genuinely useful ethics is quite another matter. A revised project will have this on its agenda as well as 




Freedom and Responsibility: a revised subjectivity 
 
The question of the nature of individuality, in particular whether an individuality that is fundamentally 
based on social relations can ever be compatible with Christianity, was central to the break between 
the project and other Marxists. The first step, as Garaudy (1959 [1969]) acknowledges, and which Sève 
(2008) was to say much later, without — too much to bear, perhaps — acknowledging his debt to the 
by then widely detested Garaudy, is that a psychology informed by Marxism is essential not only to 
understanding how humanity works, but also to effect man’s transformation.  
In this context, political expediency may explain the notable absence from Garaudy’s work of any 
conception of individual responsibility. This might appear surprising, given that he was engaged in 
constant polemics with Althusser and his supporters over the question of individuality in general. It 
can be perhaps explained by the polemical nature of the broader debate: Garaudy was more 
interested in presenting possibilities, and urging action, than in attempting to delineate the 
boundaries of individual responsibility, let alone engaging in dialogue with others on the subject. His 
reluctance to do so he in fact shared with Sève, for example, equally critical of Althusser, with whom 
he had an extended correspondence (Althusser & Sève, 2018), but who wrote only one text on the 
subject, and that narrowly confined to revolutionary obligation (Sève, 1962). In this he follows what 
has been alleged against Marx himself, that his ‘Kantian strain…is a simplified, Prometheanised Kant 
— a Kant without the conflict between duty and inclination’ (Kamenka, 1969:12).  
Critics from Lehmann (1967) to Collier (2001) have contended that the Enlightenment forgot the evil 
in man, and Bloch extended the criticism to Marxism itself. If so, a revised project must take account 
of the question of sin. Garaudy mentioned Pelagius with approval, but much more needed to be said 
about sin and the individual. Always an optimist, ‘Garaudy picks out the Biblical expectation of an 
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‘unlimited human community’ in which freedom and love are of the utmost importance. Yet, he 
refuses to recognize that this expectation is nowhere separated from the concepts of sin and grace, 
and a relationship with a living Lord’ (Hughes, 1970:61). If salvation, like sin, is collective, not 
individual, and may equally well be considered to feature in human activity as in the realm of the soul, 
then there are ethical consequences. 
If the environment serves as a prime example of the potential usefulness of Christian ethics in general 
for the project, a specific concept of individual responsibility can modify the original project in relation 
to the question of family life. It is noteworthy that during his prophetic period Garaudy emerges as no 
friend of the traditional family, which he characterises as oppressive, in terms that would find voice in 
the socialist feminist tradition (Zaretsky, 1976). We may wish for some clarification from him as to 
how Christian love and socialist feminism might best cohabit, but we do not find it in any of his writing 
during the prophetic period. It remains an unexplored area of potential confusion. The feminist 
tradition has contained much with which a revised project must engage: to cite but one example, 
Ruether contended that Daly’s separatist vision was ‘built on the dualism of transcendent spirit world 
of femaleness over against the deceitful anti-cosmos of masculinity’ (Ruether, 1983:230). On the other 
hand, love within a family as well as a wider context, and the responsibility that attaches to it, need 
not be excluded, or even disparaged, within a revised project.  
 
An inclusive perspective 
 
A major potential obstacle to the success of a revised project is however this. If transcendence, 
subjectivity and — my addition — ethics must all be derived from Christianity in order to revive 
Marxism and restore it to a central place within the politics  of the Left, what are the implications for 
those of a different faith, or none? I do not seek to answer the definitional question throughout this 
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thesis of whether adoption of what I characterised as ‘some beliefs derived from Christianity’ in 
Chapter Three is to become a Christian. But even if not professing Christianity themselves, those who 
adopt the revised project must be prepared to derive their conceptions of transcendence and 
subjectivity, and I argue their ethics as well, from Christianity. Prophecy alone of the postulates may 
be sourced elsewhere, for as Garaudy demonstrated in Appel aux vivants (Garaudy, 1979), each 
religion is best placed to deliver a particular set of lessons for humanity and a reason for incorporation 
within the project.  
The adoption of a Christianity that is itself open to an historical account of the evolution of different 
religions allows for a much easier integration with the project than would be the case with a less 
tolerant and inclusive form of the religion. Recently this has been described as polydoxy: ‘multiplicity 
itself has become theology’s resource’ (Keller & Schneider, 2011a:1). In developing a ‘responsible 
pluralism’, they point out that heresy is nothing new, and that Christians do not speak with one voice. 
‘In this sense, the Christian tradition is already polydox; it is irreducible to any one voice or lineage 
that may claim exhaustively to represent Christian faith, thought, and practice’ (Keller & Schneider, 
2011a:2). The connection to feminism and ecology is quite explicit — ‘polydoxy understands 
unknowing to have a deep relation to creaturely interrelations’ (Keller & Schneider, 2011a:3). There 
does seem some understandable confusion here. Relationality, polydoxy and resistance are not 
automatic allies, as has been optimistically argued elsewhere (e.g. Edwards, 2013). Nor are they even 
completely consistent concepts, as Keller & Schneider seem to imply (Keller & Schneider, 2011a:11). 
Notably for example they succeed in writing an entire book about polydoxy without mentioning Islam, 
Hinduism or any other religion, and they are, in the end, not very polydoxorous at all. They give the 
game away when they say, ‘Engaging the endogenous plurality of traditions, texts and practices in 
Christianity is therefore one aspect of our intent to develop greater probity and rigor in the mode of 
Christian theology that we are calling polydoxy’ (Keller & Schneider, 2011a:13), which all raises the 
suspicion that they are just rebadging LBGT + Christianity as polydoxy. Perhaps they even believe that 
‘We have seen that God is evident only in Christ’ (Hegedüs, 1991:40) In stark contrast, as we have 
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seen, Garaudy’s approach throughout was that the choice of religion was one of ‘communities’. 
Changing community, in his view, meant no more than a change of approach. Accusations of changing 
beliefs, he maintained, were misguided. Since then, much more emphasis has been placed on the idea 
that belief itself is rooted in community, for example Christian (e.g. Stroope, 2011) or Muslim (Stroup, 
2017), although it has never been suggested that an individual could not shift community, whatever 
the difficulties, as Chapter Six demonstrated. 
If both polydoxy and community do not exhaust the possibilities of the role of other religions within 
the project, what of the particular possibility that all religions are essentially one? There were many 
opportunities for Garaudy to have followed a similar path: in works published during his prophetic 
period, notably Comment l’Homme devint humaine (Garaudy, 1978) and Appel aux vivants (Garaudy, 
1979) it did strongly appear that this was indeed the path he intended to follow, to derive 
philosophical lessons from individual religions as part of a robust political project, yet without in any 
way insisting on a single, unified religion as a sine qua non of socialism. This is the response of the 
revised project to the unanimous tradition: that, to put it in sweeping terms, if the kind of Christianity 
Garaudy eventually embraced entails that other religions must be equally compatible with Marxism 
— including Islam — then the choice of religion must rest on something other than an exclusive claim 
to truth or an equally exclusive relationship of compatibility with Marxism.  
Garaudy’s argument when he converted, as we saw in Chapter Six, was that the differences between 
religions matter decisively. We live in a world in which leading religions are in practice indissolubly 
intertwined with capitalism, both at a theoretical and textual level and in practice. It is therefore 
inevitable that much of what is sincerely believed by many of those professing Islamic, Christian or 
many other faiths is necessarily outside the project. No doubt Marxists, especially those participating 
in a revised project, can still find plenty of common ground with many others, including those in Islam 
looking for social justice, even if unlike Garaudy they do not look beyond capitalism to find it. Even 
granted the special place accorded to Christianity in the project to replace dialectical and historical 
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materialism with transcendence and subjectivity respectively, the question of how a revised project 
could and should engage with Islam remains. But as Chapter Six has shown, the difficulty with Islam 
as part of the revised project lies not in its inconsistency with the conceptions of transcendence 
derived from Christianity — it might even find a way to accommodate the concept of subjectivity after 
all — but rather in its incompatibility with Marxism. If some way could be found to excise that 
incompatibility, then the way would be open for a Muslim to adopt Garaudy's project and declare 
themselves both Muslim and Marxist, albeit with that necessary partial mutual dependence between 
Marxism and Christianity remaining within their thought. So too for any religion where it would be 
possible for the believer both to rely on that partial mutual dependence and establish no inconsistency 
between the beliefs of the religion and Marxism. Garaudy’s views as a Muslim must be recognised as 
correct in respect of the consequences if subjectivity, and standing behind it, the conception of the 
individual implicit within the Marxism of the project, are removed. The motor of revolution is denied, 
and the revised Marxism of the project collapses. This is a striking continuity between the original and 
revised project: consistency within the revised project for other religions is only possible if at least 
some of Christianity is incorporated within it as well. To the extent that this subjectivity is inconsistent 
with other religions they too are inconsistent with the revised project. In practice, a revised project 
must recognise this distinction between religions, and seek to bridge it as Garaudy does in Appel aux 
vivants (Garaudy, 1979), without losing sight of the uncomfortable fact that the concept of Man 
advanced by Marxist humanism and carried over into the project through the concept of subjectivity 
is a sine qua non for a revised project.  
In a revised project, therefore, the particular religion does not matter decisively. People can choose 
their own faith, even none (Saint-Arnaud, 2010), but only if transcendence, subjectivity and ethics can 
be accepted from Christianity. Otherwise the claim to participate in the project is empty. Religious 
belief that can neither place importance on the capacity of humanity to move beyond capitalism, 
specifically through the actions of individuals, nor can accept the importance of both taking on 
responsibilities and respecting other individuals as part of the ethical impulse to do so, lie as much 
262 
 
outside the project as Marxism–Leninism, for notably similar reasons. If therefore an individual, for 
whatever reason, is not prepared to accept these conceptions from Christianity, they cannot adopt 
the revised project. If they claim to be Marxists, unless they are still supporters of some form of 
historical, even dialectical materialism as Žižek has claimed to be, they must find their explanation of 
history, personality, and ethics elsewhere.  
There is a most important revision to the original project to be made here. Garaudy did not develop 
an understanding of where ownership for the original project really belonged, beyond his purely 
political musings about a broadening of the working class and his scepticism, after a political lifetime 
at its heart, of the future political significance of the Party. Sometimes he writes as if it is entirely his 
own — my project — and sometimes it is ours, without specifying who ‘we’ are. Greater clarity is 
required for the revised project. Most likely, as part of the continued focus of the Left on ‘culture, 
psychology and personal life’ (Forbes & Street, 1986:30), there must be those who to a greater or 
lesser extent believe in it, a wider circle of ‘progressive forces’, and finally those individuals, events 
and actions that are outside the project altogether. Those at the heart of the revised project, rather 
than being characterised by belonging to a Party vanguard, as with Marxism–Leninism, or even 
association with loose social groups, as in the original project, are distinguished through their common 
hope for, and belief in, humanity’s capacity to overcome capitalism and establish a global society based 
on principles of common humanity. What replaces the Party of traditional Marxism within the revised 




If Marxism is not to remain in the academy, the importance of a revised project can hardly be 
underestimated. In the 2010s, it was argued, in terms reminiscent of Garaudy himself, that it is ‘the 
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Left that is struggling to find an alternative vision for the future. Without that alternative vision, it is 
questionable — possibly for the first time in human history — whether there can be any future’ 
(Thompson, 2016:438). Little appears likely to change in the subsequent decade: even if the claim 
itself is exaggerated, a revised project is a candidate for that alternative vision, which is necessarily 
central to any serious opposition to capitalism.  
But just as the original project sought a dramatic revision of Marxism, so it in turn now requires 
revision. As this Chapter has demonstrated, much has to be done with the project in order to render 
it acceptable both to contemporary and potential future audiences. Equally importantly, Garaudy 
missed out a great deal in his project. The delineation of boundaries beyond which Christians could 
not be considered even as consistent with Marxism, the actual contributions of different religions and 
the application of boundaries to them as well, the extent to which minority struggles should be 
considered as an integral component of the struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the world, 
the question of timeframes and the development of an appropriate political strategy, perhaps above 
all the whole terrain of ethics: none of these attracted Garaudy’s attention sufficiently for him to dwell 
upon them and remain committed to the project. We may wonder how much of these missing 
elements may have found their way into his thought, word and deed over the succeeding three 
decades had he remained committed to it. The effect of introducing them may not be to create an 
immediately successful project, which may be beyond human capacity, but at least may serve to 
recreate a less fragile and hopefully more enduring one.  
A revised version of Garaudy’s project, along the lines suggested in this chapter, would undoubtedly 
face many challenges. The failure of socialism in practice, and the legacy of weakness of progressive 
politics worldwide as a result, is the most obvious. No less important are global challenges that, whilst 
not unknown to Garaudy, have become pressing political concerns, most obviously how to respond to 
environmental challenges and new forms of conflict. The strength of Christianity in the 21st Century, 
and the comparative weakness of Marxism, place the power relationship between them within any 
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revised project in a very different place even to that which prevailed at the time of the original project. 
So too, as conceded above, the success of proponents of capitalism in advocating its compatibility 
with religions worldwide, including Christianity, is an evident obstacle to any balanced exchange with 
the Marxism of a revised project. Whereas the risk of failure for Garaudy’s original project was stark 
and eventually all too evident to its creator, the principal risk to the revised project might well be that 
the difficulty to determining political strategy over the long term could induce political torpor and 
obscure any judgement of success or failure. MacIntyre was right in this: it will not do to escape any 
confrontation with liberal capitalism by reducing both Marxism and Christianity to such tepid, 
inoffensive sets of contentions that indeed, it is hard to find any difference between them, let alone 
any points of conflict, or perhaps any real convictions at all (MacIntyre 1953 [1968:106]). Ways to 
guard against a slide into perpetual accommodation with capitalism are certainly key to the political 
practice of the contemporary Left and likewise would be key practicalities for a revised project. From 
the perspective of the 21st Century, political success remains a distant prospect at best. A revised 
project would also stand in need of people, and perhaps also of prophets, capable of straddling 
Marxist and religious traditions authoritatively, equipped with serious powers of persuasion and in 
the struggle for the long haul. Garaudy may have underestimated himself: no doubt they would be 
hard to find. 
All these are without doubt major challenges. But if through an engagement with Christianity, 
expanded from subjectivity and transcendence to include ethics and prophecy, a revised project could 
achieve even to provide the philosophical basis for confidence in the eventual downfall of capitalism 
and the eventual freedom of humanity, to sustain hope in the face of continued adversity, it would 
undoubtedly have achieved much of worth for the contemporary Left. For that reason alone, it is 
worth pursuing. If that philosophical basis can lean into political practice to help avoid repeating the 







Fragile and in need of revision 
 
I conclude that Garaudy’s project to establish the mutual dependence of Marxism and Christianity 
during his ‘prophetic period’ was fragile in these ways at least.  
First, in its reliance on emotional appeal, rather than logic, and politics, rather than philosophy, it was 
philosophically fragile. There can be no doubt of the many philosophical difficulties in the way of 
establishing any plausible consistency, let alone mutual dependence, between Marxism and 
Christianity, not least in terms of the boundaries of both Marxism and Christianity, as others had 
already recognised in trying to do so (MacIntyre, 1953 [1968:7]). The kind of redoubled criticism of 
Garaudy levelled by Masset (1977), Sève (1978) and others, building on their attacks on his Marxist 
humanism a decade earlier, was not unique. Not for nothing too was Ton van Prooijen’s work on 
Moltmann entitled Limping but Blessed (van Prooijen, 2004). It was persistent criticism, and 
unfortunately remained largely unanswered by Garaudy himself. A significant part of that failure to 
answer was Garaudy’s own neglect of the ethical: a revised version of the project must develop that 
neglected philosophical dimension in order to place it on firmer, more stable ground for the long term. 
Second, it was internally fragile. As has been elucidated in preceding chapters, central concepts such 
as subjectivity and transcendence, which have been characterised has having ‘a chequered career’ 
(Boer, 2014:238) found themselves contested between Marxism and Christianity within the project as 
well as beyond it. As ‘the tendency of his thought continues to be towards Christianity and away from 
Marxism’ (Vree, 1974:51), this lack of coherence, combined with leaps of argument sometimes even 
within a single sentence, could hardly endear Garaudy either to potential adherents, academic critics, 
or even eventually to its originator. If even Bloch’s work could be characterised as ‘ a little too much 
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mysticism for comfort’ (Boer, 2014:335), how much more so that of Garaudy? Apologists for a future 
project will need to be more careful in their phraseology, clearer as to who their allies are, and much 
more prepared to engage with their critics. 
Third, it was logically fragile, drawing — perhaps glimpsing might be a better verb — insights from 
many different, potentially inconsistent, even contradictory, sources into its ambit, as can be seen 
from successive books (Garaudy, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1979). It stood in need of a clearly 
enunciated, relatively stable and robust ‘meta-framework’, both politically and theologically, which 
would serve to explain the basis on which a selection of Marxist, Christian and other religions’ 
ontology, ethics, epistemology and teleology, and any exchange of ideas would be made. The use of 
historical bias in selecting ideas from religions also needed both honest explanation and justification 
Although his multicultural perspective should have protected the project against charges of racism, 
Garaudy evidently failed to see that his intense criticism of the West, and of Constantinian Christianity, 
blurred distinctions between Left and Right and potentially played into the hands of the ‘New Right’ 
(Laloup, 1980:149), even if their leading protagonist insisted at the time that Garaudy was not one of 
them (e.g. Benoist, 1977:473). Garaudy — consumed with active projects and, ironically in retrospect, 
perceiving himself running out of time (Garaudy, 1973:60) — resolutely refused to take sides between 
East and West, with fatal consequences for the eventual survival of the project. Judging too from the 
company Garaudy eventually kept after his conversion, it was a slippery slope (Prazan & Minard, 
2007). A revised project, whilst treading the delicate path of avoiding any charge of total knowledge, 
of ‘intégrisme’ (Garaudy, 1990:9), would need to identify what part of itself is specifically Christian, 
and distinguish itself from any self-appointed meta-right to pick and choose from religions at will, as 
Garaudy’s work increasingly appeared to do (Garaudy, 1978, 1979). Its goal will continue to be to 
overcome capitalism, and not merely to fall tamely in line with the kind of Church teaching represented 
by the ‘Option for the Poor’ (Dorr, 2000) whilst at the same time retaining many of the ideas of 
individuality that Garaudy himself eventually rejected.   
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Fourth, it was politically fragile. The work of the ‘prophetic period’ was aimed at a wide public 
audience, not a narrow academic one. In contrast to his well-regarded earlier academic work (e.g. 
Garaudy, 1959 [1969], 1962), the flamboyant, polemical, semi-autobiographical writing style that he 
now adopted (e.g. Garaudy, 1972, 1975, 1979), opened him up all too easily to the kind of academic 
criticism detailed in the preceding Chapter (e.g. Mayrl, 1978). Christians interpreted his work as an 
attempt to submerge their faith in Marxism (Vree, 1976); Marxists thought the opposite (Sève, 1969 
[1978]). This misunderstanding and rejection he shared with many prophets — most obviously, Jesus 
himself was frequently criticised for paying insufficient attention to Scripture (Luke 11:37–54). 
Moreover, and more importantly for Garaudy himself, nothing he could do or write could prevent 
what seemed to be an inexorable drift to the political Right, in France as much as worldwide. The 
election of a Socialist government in 1981 did nothing to alter this trajectory, and many including 
Garaudy himself indeed saw it as confirmation of it. As a result, Garaudy was increasingly seen as  
yesterday’s man, not the prophet of tomorrow. As his prophetic decade wore on, many of the ideas 
he espoused found themselves under brutal, sustained attack from a range of quarters, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter Two. As Gauvin tellingly concludes: 
‘Although he was able to represent a kind of ‘emancipated organic intellectual’ within the 
Communist Party, Roger Garaudy could not subsequently convert his different kinds of capital 
(political, intellectual) effectively into corresponding areas of action, where he remained in a 
confined and dominated position, to the point where, in a logic of headlong flight, it ended up 
burying an author who was at one time a prominent figure of French Third World 
progressivism and one of the precursors of ecological modern politics’ (Gauvin, 2018:432)240.  
With the collapse of the project, despite the dazzling display of showmanship that his critics saw, it 
became progressively more a burden for an increasingly isolated Garaudy to bear.  
 
240 S’il a pu représenter une forme d’ « intellectuel organique émancipé » au sein du parti communiste, Roger 
Garaudy n’a pu, par la suite, reconvertir efficacement ses différentes espèces de capital (politique, intellectuel) 
dans les champs correspondants où il est resté confiné dans une position dominée, au point de devoir s’inscrire 
dans une logique de fuite en avant qui a enterré un auteur qui fut un temps une figure marquante du 
progressisme tiers-mondiste français et l’un des précurseurs de l’écologie politique moderne  
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As was noted in Chapter Seven, it was not even clear whose project it really was. Was it just Garaudy’s 
own, or ‘our project’241 (Garaudy, 1976:178) — that of a select few adherents, owned by the 
progressive Left, or even automatically that of the entire planet? If there were a fight between 
Marxism and Christianity, after all, it is now surely almost over, and Boer’s metaphor of a love affair 
may now come into its own. But even if a thoroughly revised and contemporary Marxism (Goldstein, 
2005; Harrison, 2016) can now be released from the academy — or so adapted that, for example, 
‘Marxism departs from its past life as a guide to the implementation of socialism, and takes on 
meaning as a touchstone and inspiration for China’s future’ (DuBois & Zhen, 2014:19) — a revised 
project must have a more enduring, patient political basis based on hope, even under adverse 
circumstances where the eventual destruction of capitalism seems an increasingly distant prospect. 
Fifth, then, and as a result of all the above, the project had a  fragile trajectory. It certainly did not 
emerge fully-fledged immediately Garaudy was released from the constraints of his PCF membership. 
On the contrary, it began with such a loss of direction and confidence that Garaudy himself said that 
he contemplated suicide; it evolved relatively slowly and painfully, under the glare of the public 
spotlight; and it ended with its repudiation by its author. Changing intellectual views is not widely 
respected, and there is plenty of evidence that Garaudy was changing his views, or at least shifting his 
priorities, throughout his ‘prophetic period’ (Da Costa Pinto, 2017:451). In particular, as noted above, 
Christianity appeared to become just one religion amongst others, despite its position at the core of 
the project, whilst Marxism was revised beyond recognition for a Marxist–Leninist. The detail of the 
eventual unravelling of the fragile project and its replacement was laid out in Chapter Six, where it 
was argued that Garaudy himself could eventually not live with what he had himself had created. The 
weight of what he perceived as its insupportably fragile intellectual base, its internal inconsistencies, 
its failure to achieve politically, his increasing political focus on anti-Zionism (Garaudy, 1977c), his 
marriage to a Palestinian, and the isolation into which the fragile project had placed such a profoundly 
 
241 notre projet 
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social individual, all eventually took their toll. His subsequent forays into theology, and Marxism, 
would be from a new bastion, to which under the pressure of events he would eventually retreat 
completely. A revised project must reverse course, and as I have begun to do, pick up the pieces where 
Garaudy dropped them, learning from everything that has happened since. 
 
A great tragedy? 
 
In putting down his cross, Garaudy left much undone. As Chapter Seven has shown, there was much 
still missing that his conversion to Islam prevented him from examining and incorporating within the 
original project. It has been suggested that the West, in the early 21st Century has been characterised 
by ‘a sense of quiet suspicion of outsiders, desperate defence of what is passing, and an inebriated 
escape from a world gone to pot’ (Boer, 2014:37fn). Yes, that seems to me a good characterisation of 
the Zeitgeist. But it surely has a lot to do with the lack of a confidently articulated, integrated ideology 
that is both of its time and in tune with an emergent future yet consistent with a significant number 
of ‘Western’ values, especially in relation to the individual, as well as the relationship between religion 
and politics. In terms of its capacity to be integrated with a resistance to capitalism, Christianity retains 
many advantages, notably its ethics, but Garaudy ignored them, as he lost hope in Western civilisation 
as a whole — just around the time that the majority of the Islamic world made a significant turn 
towards the very capitalism the project sought to overthrow.  
As a result, instead of ending up in a position where he moderated and further deepened both his 
Christian faith and his Marxism, perhaps strengthening his own case for their mutual dependence, and 
developing a coherent revised project for the 21st Century, he ended up giving up both — sometimes 
with regret, it might seem — but permanently nonetheless. Garaudy’s conversion to Islam then caused 
irreparable harm, not only to himself, but to the causes he himself most believed in. It was a true 
270 
 
tragedy, in the Ancient Greek sense of the word, as even Didier Gauvin, one of the strongest advocates 
of Garaudy’s intellectual consistency, conceded: ‘the tragedy is there… I agree his reputation would 
have been great and unsullied if he had stayed on his 1976 position’ (Didier Gauvin, personal 
communication, 29 November 2018).  
We may wonder how much influence he could have had, had he stayed the course, but 
counterfactuals are notoriously slippery. We may surmise that on his own, however much he had 
written more deeply on these and other issues, Roger Garaudy could surely never have changed the 
broad sweep of history. But he had an opportunity to exert influence, and possibly a unique one, at 
least in France. The need to reconcile different theological and political positions did not abate, 
despite the decline of Marxist politics, and no more so than in France. Given his eminence as a Marxist 
philosopher in previous decades — he had the ear of politicians, notably François Mitterrand, who in 
1970 cited him as one of the three authors on whom he had built his political thought 242 — and his 
success in reaching a mass audience with his later books, it is far from impossible to conceive of him 
as being one of the leaders of radical, socialist politics — a strong Christian voice raised for equality, 
fraternity and liberty in France, a country renowned for the elevated status of its public intellectuals. 
Garaudy could have taken up a position where he continually revised and broadened both his 
Christianity and his Marxism, putting much more effort into developing a coherent socialist, religious 
perspective that was consistent with much of Christianity as well as other religions, feminism and 
ecology, a true Cardinal for the 21st Century. Garaudy’s linguistic and persuasive skills, his global view 
of the need for the dialogue of civilisations, and his long history of militancy, would have served the 
Left well during a long period of conflict and globalisation. For a parallel in the real world we could 
perhaps look to Slavoj ŽIžek, who although — as elucidated in Chapter Seven — very different in his 
view of Marxism, Christianity and the relationship between them, has achieved something similar to 
that hypothetical trajectory, first in Eastern Europe, and eventually worldwide. Advice something 
 
242 The two others were Maurice Clavel and Raymond Aron (Mitterrand, 1970) 
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along these lines was even suggested at the time: Dupleix (1971) suggested that Garaudy’s ideas did 
indeed have apparent echoes in the ideas of the Parti Socialiste, which had grown from the ashes of 
the former SFIO and which was to grow its own left-wing. In Chapter Seven, possibilities for developing 
a more robust mutual dependence between Marxism and Christianity were outlined, many of which 
were open to Garaudy at the time to research, develop and publish. We can perhaps glimpse how 
such a role in France might have played out, as we have a close parallel life of a French public 
intellectual on which to draw. Lucien Sève, for instance, for whose Marxism the continued existence 
of the secular French State did not pose anything like the same kind of problem, and for whom the 
end of Communism posed a dilemma for Marxism that he wished to investigate, not walk away from, 
did exactly thus. He took what was in effect a reformist standpoint, recognising the importance of 
contributions in new areas, such a bioethics — he served on the Comité consultif national d’éthique 
(CCNE)] for several years, as he stressed, as the only atheist on the committee (Sève, 2006 : 14–15). It 
is not too far-fetched to imagine Garaudy in a similar, perhaps even more influential, role in French 
public life. But counterfactuals are dangerous things, and my conjecture stops here.  
But as it was, in converting to Islam he sacrificed not only his Christianity, but his original sense that 
justice demanded an end to capitalism and the consequent political commitment on the Left that 
Marxism had provided. Some of his later work, Garaudy (1992) in particular, suggests that he wrestled 
subsequently with both what he perceived as the irreversibility and also the difficulty of his 
conversion, although it appears that over time eventually theological conservatism and political Islam 
won the day. Few outside a minority within the Islamic world surely doubt that he would have been 
better able to make a contribution by retaining his cultural identity and historical personality rather 




Garaudy himself said during his prophetic period that ‘It is time to say clearly that what makes us 
Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian or Muslim, it is not what one believes but what one does’ 243 
(Garaudy, 1979:205). In that case, it is fully justified to judge Garaudy’s abandonment of Marxism and 
choice of faith by its outcome. His principal eventual legacy, outside certain circles in the Middle East, 
was a tarnished reputation as a Holocaust denier, rather than a bridge builder between the two 
Western systems of Marxism and Christianity and much more besides. This was a huge loss to both: 
not only he himself, but France, and the world as a whole, was the poorer for it. Humanity lost a 
staunch defender of liberty, equality and fraternity, and gained instead an awkward, and eventually 
notorious, apologist for Islamic extremism. 
Garaudy studies, if we may assemble his critics under one roof, has become polarised as a result. On 
the one hand there are those like Prazan & Minard (2007), for whom the whole of Garaudy’s life and 
work is tainted with his Islamic period, in the distasteful ignominy of Holocaust denial and support for 
Islamic regimes such as Iran and Libya, work which earned the plaudits of Islamic commentators such 
as Robinson (2003). For both sides of this argument, ‘the extremes touch’ 244 (Aulnas, 2019, n.p.). On 
the other, there are those such as Reynaud (2019) and Gauvin (2018) who insist on the essential 
continuity of his thought, seeking to paint his life and work after the conversion in as favourable a light 
as possible. I sit in between, keen to establish the principle that his earlier life and work, especially his 
‘prophetic period’ should not always be judged exclusively in the light of what happened afterwards; 
but equally, I hope, not blind to the reality of Garaudy’s descent into anti-Semitism and cohabitation 




243 Il est temps de dire clairement qu’on est hindou, bouddhiste, juif, chrétien ou musulman, non par ce que l’on 
croit, mais par ce que l’on fait 
244 Les extrêmes se touchent 
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A fragile but significant achievement 
 
In an intellectual life spanning over eight decades, Garaudy gave a decade at most to publicly 
developing, and promoting, consistency between Marxism and Christianity. In the fragile project of 
these few years, Marxism is allotted the role of understanding the development of the world in the 
most general terms, whilst subjectivity and transcendence provide the necessary motor for action and 
explanation of the individual. It was a mutual dependence that, as Garaudy himself readily recognised, 
inevitably owed much to the work of others.  
Garaudy made no claim to be an original philosopher, nor a theologian at all (Garaudy, 1973b:72–73). 
His unique talent lay in assembling philosophical material and popularising it. His concern to reach 
popular audiences led to — I argue mistaken — academic dismissal of his work, but his achievement 
in exposing what was possible in respect of establishing consistency and then mutual dependence 
between Marxism and Christianity deserves respect, not least because of its prescience, but perhaps 
still more because of the possibility that it may have enduring worth for the politics of the Left. At the 
time Garaudy advanced his project, however, quite apart from the Soviet Union and other Communist 
states, Leninist concepts of the Party still prevailed in Communist parties elsewhere in the world, albeit 
that the concept was not unopposed, even in developing countries (Golan, 1987:600). Even to move 
beyond this within the project was an achievement, which as we have seen in Chapter Seven it took 
other PCF members decades to reach. 
The Garaudy of the fragile project may have begun by having lost battles inside the PCF, and ended by 
repudiating his project altogether, but as one of Garaudy’s own intellectual contemporaries said, the 
greatest triumph of an eminent scholar is when his achievements melt into normality (Kolakowski, 
1969:204). Whilst Marxist–Leninism in its Soviet form and traditional Communist parties usually had 
little attraction for those of the Left born in a subsequent generation, they were nonetheless equally 
tempted by a range of alternatives — some first adhering to schismatic Trotskyism, such as the 
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Militant Tendency and other ‘entryist’ groups inside the UK Labour Party (Crick, 1984 [2016]), and then 
relatively rapidly afterwards, abandoning Marxism altogether in favour of social democratic politics 
and the ‘Third Way’, or subscribing to purely feminist, ecological or cultural politics of one type or 
another (Müller-Rommel, 1989). All these political options were presaged within the project. 
Garaudy’s project was also well ahead of its time in relation to religion: in the 21st Century, ‘the 
question of the return, or perhaps better, the new visibility of religion in politics’ (Sigurdson, 2012:1) 
is scarcely in doubt. Recognition of its omissions, and Garaudy’s own subsequent trajectory, should 
surely not blind us to what the project did achieve: whatever relationship Marxism and Christianity 
will have in the future, it seems at least highly likely that the trajectory that relationship will follow, 
and the relationship in turn with political theology and the politics of the Left more widely, faces a 
decisive choice. On the one hand, the kind of continued abstract violence recommended by Žižek 
(2000, 2003). On the other, the hope represented by a revised version of Garaudy’s project of mutual 
dependence, suffused with the Christian ethics of respect, tolerance, and love recommended by 
Eagleton (2009a).  
That today Garaudy’s project has not been widely acknowledged as presaging much of the faith of 
radical Christians in the 21st Century, in politics, philosophy and in theology can be explained not only 
by the fact that Garaudy himself failed to stay the course, but also because his project has been tainted 
by the events that followed his subsequent conversion to Islam. This thesis has sought to demonstrate 
that the Garaudy of the project deserves better treatment than this. The rehabilitation of the Garaudy 
of the project that this would entail is as justified and desirable as is the condemnation of the descent 
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